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ABSTRACT
This study shows that mayors can lead. After the limitat-
ions of the reigning "broker/entrepreneur" model are dis-
cussed, a nine-type classification of leadership styles is
presented. Three Madison, Wisconsin, mayors are studied to
determine the causation of style adoption and the possibilit-
ies of effective leadership: Otto Festge (1965-69) shows the
situational limitations to "Entrepreneurship" as well as the
complexity of style; William Dyke (1969-73) shows both the
potential policy impact and the potential manifest polarizat-
ion which can result from unrestrained "Ideological" leader-
ship; Paul Soglin (1973- ) shows the effectiveness of the
pragmatic, conflict-oriented "Partisan" style--yet the limits
to the change "radical pragmatism" can bring is also noted.
Suggestions for the study of leadership and for effective
urban governance are presented.
Thesis Superviser: MICHAEL LIPSKY
PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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CHAPTER ONE: MAYORAL LEADERSHIP STYLES
The nation's cities are again in severe straits. Faced
with an exodus of both middle-class homeowners and indus-
trial taxpayers they lack the tax base to provide social ser-
vices to a population increasingly needy of such services.
And more recently, confronted by the ravages of inflation,
recession and increasing producer-group demands, some major
cities have even had severe trouble in providing an adequate
level of such basic municipal services as sanitation and
police protection. Massive transfusions of federal and state
aid would go a long way to alleviating the citiest ills; so
would the redrawing of municipal boundaries to allow one unit
to govern and thereby tax the entire integrated economic
region.
But such solutions represent, in reality, a deus ex
machina; they represent the benevolence of outside forces
which is not necessarily forthcoming in any substantial degree
no matter how deserving of such "aid" a city, in the name of
equity, might be. Hence, our cities must do all they can
themselves to both alleviate the social ills of their popu-
lace and, in the name of productivity and efficiency, more
tightly control the administration of municipal services.
Despite possible increments in aid from the federal govern-
ment, it is each city's government that primarily decides how
each new urban crisis is handled.
Creative, innovative leadership is one within-system
factor that will help determine just how well our cities meet
the challenges they face. The mayoralty in those cities where
the office exists, is the obvious place to look for the possi-
bilities of such leadership. But the question is: Can the
mayoralty be expected to provide such leadership?
The answer from the literature on urban politics has for
the most part been "No!" Edward Banfield believes that as
a result of the formal decentralization of power in both
the public and private sector, the capable mayor must be
satisfied with merely reacting to the desires of others.,
These others have the power the mayor needs. Less capable
mayors do not even effectively perform this "broker" func-
tion. Marilyn Gittell sees the mayorts office to be a "dead
end" Job incapable of attracting talented persons.2 Raymond
Wolfinger believes the effective, innovative mayor to be
the exception, not the rule.3
This thesis will attempt to re-examine this "common wis-
dom" regarding mayoral leadership. But any study of the pos-
sibilities of mayoral leadership must focus not so much on the
formal prerogatives of the office but the orientation of the
person who occupies it.
STYLE AND STYLE ADOPTION
A "style" can be defined as "the manner in which an
individual adopts to a role."4 For an office-holder such as a
mayor, style can be viewed even more simply as the "habitual
way" he "goes about doing what the office demands of him."5
When the occupant of an office is expected to exert some
direction over a group's affairs, the manner in which he
adopts to his role can be termed his "leadership style."
But leadership does not come easy; a mayor seeking to
move his city in a certain policy direction will have to deal
with influentials both in and out of city government who may
or may not prove receptive to the mayor's initiatives. The
mayor's style, then, becomes the way he interacts with the
constraints imposed on him by the formal and informal
structures in the city. Faced with these constraints, a
mayor may, for example, be either active or passive, engage
in or withdraw from conflict, organize a coalition that em-
braces all the important elements or only a portion of the
elements in a community's politically active strata.
A mayor's general leadership style may be seen to emerge
in the general manner by which he, as a result of both con-
scious and subconscious processes, selects and chooses to
pursue, or even not to pursue, goals.
The process of style adoption is analogous to the manner
in which an individual chooses a piece of clothing. A person
in selecting his fashion of dress consciously makes a deci-
sion. He might, for example, be dressing in such a way as to
achieve a goal--to minimize cost, gain employment, or even
impress women. Yet, even the choice of these goals, and hence
the choice of fashion, might also be the result of certain
personality forces which demand to be expressed, yet, of
which he is less than totally aware. Similarly, a political
actor's leadership style, too, can be profitably viewed as the
product of both rational and irrational forces.
The choice of ends that a mayor makes is itself the
result of psychological factors; mayors with different per-
sonality dynamics will differ as to the extent of both their
programmatic and personal ambitions. Similarly the means by
which a mayor will choose to seek an end, too, is the result
of personality dynamics. One mayor may seek to go things
alone; another may search for consensual solutions. One mayor
may seek to avoid situations entailing heated conflict;
another mayor with a different personality make-up may better
be able to handle and enjoy such fighting. The conscious and
subconscious elements of style adoption are intricately inter-
twined.
THE CLASSIC VIEW OF MAYORAL LEADERSHIP
There exist many possible ways by which mayors can adapt
to the duties of their office. Yet, for the most part, the
literature on mayoral leadership has focused around two
styles, that of Edward Banfield's "broker"6 and Robert Dahl's
"entrepreneur."7 Despite the differences between the broker
and the entrepreneur, the two can be seen to be variants of
one larger model emphasizing the virtues of consensual
10
leadership. The "good" mayor according to the Banfield/Dahl
model, acts to either build or to maintain a broad-based
overarching coalition within the city; he will take little,
if any action unacceptable to any of the major elements in
this coalition.
The broker is so concerned with protecting his power
position that he will act only if a program proposal has
first gained the endorsement of a consensus of the community
groups directly concerned. He will not advance programs of
his own for to do so would only leave him open to the possi-
bility of having committed himself to a power costly situa-
tion. Hence, according to Banfield, the political head
will be receptive, particularly, to proposals from
people who are in a position to guarantee that
successful action will win a "seal of approval" from
some of the"good government" groups...
For this reason, he will not create a strong staff of
policy advisors or a strong planning agency. The
preparation of policies and plans will be done mainly
within those private organizations having some special
stake in the matters involved and by the civic asso-
ciations. Quite possibly, the political head might,
if he wished, assemble a technical staff of first-rate
ability and, working closely with it, produce a plan
far superior to anything that might be done by the
private organizations and civic associations. But a
plan made in this way would have one fatal defect:
its makers could not supply the "seal of approval"
which is, from the political head's standpoint, its
chief reason for being.9
The political head, therefore, neither fights for a
program of his own making nor endeavors to find a
"solution" to the conflicts that are brought before
him. Instead, he waits for the community to agree
upon a project. When agreement is reached, or when
the process of controversy has gone as far as it can,
he ratifies the agreement and carries it into effect l10
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In abetting the achievement of the program desires of other
actors, the mayor earns their friendships and obligations--a
sort of brokerts fee. He can then use this new found influ-
ence to expedite other programs and thereby gain more obliga-
tions and influence. Hence, acting in broker-like fashion, a
mayor builds his power and risks nothing.
The sole concern of the broker, then, is power.11 He
has no policy goals of his own; his sole orientation is to
maximize and preserve the influence of either himself or the
party organization. Yet, this might prove to be a somewhat
simplistic notion. Surely there exists mayors in a number of
cities who are so failing in vision that they have no program
of their own which they wish to enact or directions in which
they wish to move their city. And surely there must also
exist a number of political heads whose sole preoccupation is
to maximize their ability to remain in office in order to dis-
burse the perquisites of office among themselves and their
followers.
Yet, it would seem that once a person garners power in
at least moderate quantities he would be increasingly tempted
to employ at least part of it in the pursuit of his own policy
objectives. As the political head gains power, he is
increasingly likely to use it to advance policy desires of his
own in resource consuming situations where no community
consensus exists. As he does so, he abandons the broker con-
cept of leadership.
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Chicago Mayor Richard Daley may not have been the proto-
type broker that Banfield describes. It seems incredible that
a person with Daley's extensive power would refrain from using
it to move the city in the directions he sees as desirable,
even in the absence of any pre-existing community consensus.
It would seem unbelievable if Daley did not attempt to
advance any of his own ideas as to what makes a better
Chicago. Robert Salisbury was one of the first to question
whether or not Banfield had painted an accurate picture of
Daley. Salisbury noted that as the cases studied by Banfield
"fall far short of representing the range of major resource
decisions for Chicago," it is still quite conceivable "that
Daley initiates or actively participates in the process
involved in making other decisions.nl2 And there further
exists the possibility that Banfield's observations are time-
restricted. Even if it does provide accurate descriptions of
Daley's approach to his job in his earlier years, it is fairly
clear that the broker model does not adequately describe
Daley's leadership style in his later years. Daley had clear
policy preferences in the areas of public works, highway con-
struction, and urban renewal on which he acted without await-
ing the prior crystallization of public opinion.13
Daley's actions concerning the construction of the
University of Illinois at Chicago campus and the 1975 devel-
opment of plans for a crosstown expressway underscore his
program orientations. The mayor's resolution of the campus
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issue, as described by Mike Royko, stands in marked contrast
to his action, or more appropriately his lack of action,
during the early years of the problem: 1 4
While the people in the neighborhood spent and rebuilt,
City Hall proceeded with its secret plan. Quietly,
the power groups in the caomunity were persuaded to go
along. The archdiocese, which had its big new school
and its churches, agreed. The ward boss and party hacks
were given their orders. That took care of the estab-
lished leaders of any community resistance. There was
nobody to lead I em but themselves. Only then was the
plan announced.
In the expressway case, Daley vehemently and publicly fought
for the proposed project despite the strident opposition of
local environmentalist groups and Governor Walker. In
both cases, the mayor did not act like the prototype broker,
reflexively awaiting the establishment of community consen-
sus. Daley took the quite "unbrokerlike" action of trying to
shape and otherwise manipulate group and public opinion in
the city.
How can we account for the change in Daley's orientations
over the years? It seems quite plausible that as his tenure
in office increased his stock of influence rose to the point
that he no longer felt as constrained to refrain from policy-
oriented behavior in order to guard his power resources.
Brokership is a leadership style likely to be utilized by
mayors whose power resource balance is so precarious that they
cannot afford the risk of a power drain. Mayors who have
built up a fairly large stock of influence can better bear the
14
consequences of power costly action and will be more inclined
to enter controversial situations. Similarly, mayors with
strong goal orientations will be disinclined to adopt a broker
style.
The political entrepreneur, like the broker, avoids con-
troversial situations that might pose a threat to his stock of
power resources. But unlike the broker, he is not content to
simply endorse those policies which have received the endorse-
ment of a consensus of the community elements directly
affected. The entrepreneur has definite policy desires;
instead of waiting for the automatic formation of a community
consensus, he tries to mold a consensus behind his programs.
The entrepreneur is something more than a facilitator of the
wishes of others. The entrepreneur must be a skilled bar-
gainer and salesman who can actively "pyramid" the resources
available to him and thereby assemble a programmatic "execu-
tive-centered coalition:n16
Initially the new mayor had access to no greater resources
than his predecessor, but with superb skill he exploited
them to the limit. In this way, he managed to accumulate
new resources; he rose to new heights of popularity, for
example, and found it increasingly easy to tap the busi-
ness community for campaign contributions. His new
resources in turn made it easier for him to secure the
compliance of officials in city agencies, enlarge his
staff, appoint to office the kinds of people he wanted,
obtain the cooperation of the Boards of Finance and
Aldermen, and gain widespread support for his policies.
Thus the resources available to the mayor grew by compari-
son with those available to other officials. He could now
increase his influence over the various officials of local
government by using these resources fully and skillfully.
An executive-centered order gradually emerged.
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...By using slack resources with higher efficiency the new
mayor moved his actual influence closer to his potential
influence. Then because of his greater influence he was
able to improve his access to resources. In this fashion
he pyramided both his resources and his influence. He
was, in short, a highly successful political entrepre-
neur.17
It would be a mistake from the above description to
infer that the difference between entrepreneurship and
brokership is simply a matter of the degree of activity of
the entrepreneur.1 8 Both the broker and the entrepreneur are
active. No one yet has accused Mayor Daley, even during his
early years in office, of being a passive political execu-
tive. The maintenance of Chicagot s political machine is a
monumental task requiring much of the mayor's time and energy.
The difference between entrepreneurship and brokership is not
the degree of executive activism, but whether or not the
activism has a policy or program purpose. The entrepreneur
provides direction for the city; the broker simply reacts.
Still, whatever differences exist between entrepreneur-
ship and brokership models should not obscure the basic
assumption both share: the good mayor undertakes only those
actions that will maintain, or at least not threaten, a
broad-based coalition. Mayoral observors Banfield and Dahl--
Robert Salisbury,1 9 Raymond Wolfinger, 2 0 James Cunningham,2 1
Alexander George,22 Anne Greer,23 and Andrew McFarland 4 --
all shared this assumption. Even as late as 1972, the
dominance of the consensual model as a guide for mayoral
leadership remained:
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Thus, effective political leadership in a fragmented
system is proclaimed a necessity in American cities.
And political scientists have proclaimed a model
of the broker-entrepreneur who can fill that need.25
Only in the final paragraph of this article in the political
science profession's most prestigious journal did Jeffrey
Pressman recognize that other desirable "kinds of leader-
ship" in the city are possible.26
THE LIMITATIONS OF BROKER/ENTREPRENEURIAL LEADERSHIP
Mayors have been implicitly measured by the standards of
the broker-entrepreneur model.27 Yet, for the most part, the
values and assumptions underlying this model remain unelabo-
rated.28 A normative judgment has in effect been made in the
emphasis placed on the maintenance of a broad over-arching
coalition. To maintain this coalition, the modern mayor must
not only dispense specific distributional benefits2 9 but he
must also "do big things"30--to provide "collective goods" 31
or policies, such as urban redevelopment, that provide "shared
benefits" which cut across ethnic and class lines.32 There is
no place in this scheme of things for either the fiscally
conservative executive who wants to keep the city essentially
as it is, or the mayor who desires such comprehensive changes
in the resource allocations made by city government as to risk
community dissensus by their implementation.
A conservative mayor, concerned with the impact the
provision of new services would have on the city's tax rate,
17
would be unwilling to launch new and innovative programs as
would the entrepreneur or to otherwise "do big things" as
would the broker, He would even object to programs that built
coalitions by dispensing distributional benefits to various
groups as these, too, burden the taxpayer. Yet even if this
mayor succeeded in providing the economical and efficient
delivery of traditional city services, he would be judged by
the standards of brokership and entrepreneurship to be a
failure. The real failure, though, is not with this mayor,
but with the use of a measuring instrument that contains an
implicit anti-conservative bias.
Likewise, a mayor who attempts fundamental change which
can be secured only at the cost of making community tensions
manifest would also be judged a failure by the standards of
the broker/entrepreneurial model. The broker/entrepreneur
model values only that change which can be achieved through
consensual politics.33 A consensus-oriented mayor would not
push for such broad-scale changes as they will only serve to
antagonize some of the major groups in the coalition. The
consensus mayor thus allows each major member of his coalition
a virtual veto over all policy initiatives; redistributional
or "zero-sum" issues are consequently ignored.
Even New Haven entrepreneur Richard Lee, despite his
liberal stand on most racial matters,34 found it necessary
"not to display his racial policies too openly,"35 and hence
abstained from any public action during the city's 1964 school
busing controversy. His electoral position was preserved. A
mayor more committed to the school integration, though, would
have accepted the vocal dissensus if such be the cost of goal
achievement.
Andrew McFarland insightfully underscored the leadership
opportunities available to the entrepreneurial mayor:
In a pluralist society, the "institutionalized
mediator" "with an autonomous range of power" can be
a certain type of politician who is sensitive to
multilateral conflict and accordingly redefines
particular, limited situations to resolve conflict,
satisfying the majority of conflicting interests
involved, and enhance his own popularity...
Another case, more directly involving task expan-
sion and political innovation, is that of the
outstanding urban renewal program of New Haven's
Mayor Richard Lee. (Robert) Dahl reports that Lee's
unusual political success has been based to a great
extent on his creation of an urban renewal program
that unified otherwise conflicting interests. Lee's
response to multi-lateral political conflict led to
a partial redefinition of the political situation,
an upgrading of the common interest, dynamic politi-
eal mediation satisfying the majority of otherwise
contending interests, and an increase in the popu-
larity of a political leader. (emphasis added).36
Yet, McFarland's observations also point to the ideological
restrictedness of the entrepreneurial model. "(P)artial"
redefinitions of "particular, limited situations" which
satisfy the "majority" are not likely to be those outcomes
which best represent the interests of disadvantaged
minorities. Innovations which advance a "unified" "common"
interest do not represent a fundamental or radical assault
on the distribution of resources in a city.
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The relative "antiquity" of the broker/entrepreneur
model is the result of two separate causes. First, it is
the product of the time in which the model was developed.37
Both Banfield and Dahl wrote about politics in the 1950's--
before the racial clashes of the 1960's developed a new sensi-
tivity to the need for more fundamental social redistribution
and before the swelling of the black population in the
northern urban centers led to a polarization of the population
along racial lines. Developed during relatively quiescent
times, the broker/entrepreneur model cannot be expected to
have developed sensitivities to the major social questions
of another era.
Second, the broker/entrepreneur model is closely tied to
the concept of pluralism; both Banfield and Dahl's works were
statements of pluralism. The broker/entrepreneur model thus
reflects a leadership style suitable for pluralist systems--a
fact noted above by McFarland. To the extent that the
pluralist view of political systems dominated the thought of
the political science profession in the early 1960's, the
leadership model implicit in that school of thought dominated
the study of mayoral influence. Only when the polarized
racial settings of the major cities were recognized was the
pluralist bias of the broker/entrepreneur model challenged.38
Brokership/entrepreneurship, then, falls as a normative
leadership model as it does not provide a suitable style for
the leader who wishes to have an impact beyond what
20
consensual-based policy initiatives can accomplish--if indeed
such leaders exist.
A TYPOLOGY OF LEADERSHIP STYLES
As noted previously, brokership and entrepreneurship
are only two of the possible ways by which a mayor can
approach a situation. Alternative leadership styles can also
be identified.
The study of political behavior necessitates the reduc-
tion of the idiosyncratic into fewer but more understandable
types of categories. James David Barber, for example, has
reduced Presidential character to four basic types to better
understand the personality influences on executive decision-
making.39
Typologies serve as a sort of perceptual lens. They
help an observor focus his attention on potentially signifi-
cant distinguishing elements of behavior. Typologies thus
serve to reduce the complex causation of real world events to
a reduced number of forces. Types, then, must not be mistaken
for the "real thing;" they are merely simplified more compre-
hensible schematics of the real world. No simple type will
likely be able to totally explain the behavior of any politi-
cal head; all we can ask is that a type give us substantial
insight into his actions.
Along just what dimensions mayoral leadership orienta-
tions should be typed is the question that must be answered.
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The concept of "leadership" poses many operational difficulties
and has been used in a multitude of ways, there still has
emerged, nonetheless, "a widely shared view that 'effective
leadership' should be associated with the attainment of goals
and the exercise of influence."4 0 Leadership is "social
causation. "4 1
The basic constructs of leadership, then, are the having
of goals and the "following through" in the pursuit of these
goals. Leadership can even be manifested in the pursuit of
negative goals, as, for instance, in a leader's vetoing
certain alternatives.42 Mayors who have specific policy goals
and act to pursue them can be said to provide direction for
the city, and can be profitably distinguished from those
mayors who lack such goals or who fail to effectively identify
possible paths of action by which these goals can be pursued.
The degree of direction a mayor provides for his city con-
stitutes the first dimension along which mayoral leadership
styles can be categorized.
Direction is a "multiplicative" concept. Both goals and
task accomplishment must be present for effective direction
to be provided. If a mayor is either lacking goals or
incapable of identifying paths toward the attainment of the
goals he has set forth, the city is deprived of leadership
from its chief executive. Just as in mathematics, if any of
the multipliers in a multiplication equation is near zero,
the product is near zero:
22
x = the presence of mayoral goals
y = effective task accomplishment
x.y = mayoral direction
(1) if goals are lacking, x=O
O.y = zero direction;
(2) if task accomplishment is lacking, y=O:
x.O = zero direction;
(3) if both goals and task accomplishment are
present, x$O, yO:
x.y = mayoral direction.
The second baseline along which mayors can be profitably
typed is the extensiveness of the coalition or network that
a mayor seeks to form or maintain in the pursuit of his policy
goals. The basic questions here are: does the mayor essenti-
ally operate as a solo actor, refraining from actively seeking
support of others? does he seek to act from the vantage
point of community consensus? or, does he seek to form or
reward a coalition that embraces only a portion of the entire
community spectrum?
By trichotomizing both the direction and the coalition
dimensions, a nine-type classificatory scheme of basic
alternative leadership styles is produced. (see Table 1).
This typology has the further advantage in that eight of its
nine cells correspond to leadership styles already identified
in the literature on mayoral action.
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Table 1
A TYPOLOGY OF MAYORAL STYLES
Degree of Mayoral Direction Provided(goals * task accomplishment)
Coalition Low Moderate
Perspective
Consensus
Intermediate
Solo-Actor
Broker
Caretaker
Ceremonial
Integrationist
Executive
Personality/
Individualist
Enterpre-
neur
Partisan
Ideologue
High
_ _ _ _ _ __
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The Ceremonial Mayor.43 This mayor has no goals of his
own nor does he attempt to systematically identify problem
areas in which the city could be turning its attention.
Whatever network or coalition building he undertakes is done
via personal appeals. He tends to ignore his authority over
the city bureaucracy; likewise, he makes little attempt to
mobilize other city actors in both the public and private
sector.
The Ceremonial mayor derives his name from his tendency
to define his Job in terms of the ceremonial duties of his
office. He attempts little of substance beyond the public
and social functions he routinely performs. He may be an
active mayor; but his activity is limited to ceremonial, not
policy, matters.44 Of all mayors he has the least impact on
the functioning of his city.
The Caretaker. Like the Ceremonial mayor, the
Caretaker too entertains a very short-range agenda choosing
to deal with what "comes up" rather than initiating new pro-
grams of his own. But the Caretaker goes beyond the Cere-
monial mayor in developing and modifying his network to main-
tain the status quo; he may even restructure city departments
to facilitate the efficient management of city operations.
Rather than acting solely as an individual, the Caretaker
makes some use of the bureaucratic authority he is formally
allowed. His impact on the city, though far greater than
that of the Ceremonial mayor, is still for the most part
incremental in nature.
The Personality/Individualist.4 6  This mayor has a some-
what broader agenda, or more sharply defined idea of what he
wants to get done, than the two mayors previously described.
He directs appeals to other public and private sector actors;
he might, for example, establish a close relationship with the
business community. Still, for the most part, this mayor
chooses to "go it alone;" he approaches goals from a
heightened individualistic task accomplishment orientation.
As John P. Kotter and Paul R. Lawrence note, in many ways the
Personality/Individualist is a Ceremonial mayor who has become
more aggressive and enlarged his conception of his job.47
The Individualistic style of this mayor has its roots in
the mayor's personality factors--and hence this style's name.
This mayor maintains a "negative" orientation towards politics
which limits the maneuverings he is willing to undertake as
mayor. This sort of mayor seeks office only out of civic
obligation; he feels the call from the community. Once in
office he attempts to run the city in a business-like manner
in the "public interest."4 8
The Executive.4 9 This mayor has the same moderate-in-
scope agenda as has the Personality-Individualist. This type
of mayor employs all types of network building processes to a
certain degree; yet for the most part he relies on his control
over the city bureaucracy for task accomplishment. He relies
heavily on his formal authority as the city's chief executive
26
--and, hence, his name. The Executive can be simply viewed
as a Caretaker who has had to become more aggressive as a
result of his expanded "domain" or area of intended impact
on city affairs. 5 0
The Broker. This style, elaborated on in the work of
Edward Banfield, has already received detailed comment in
this thesis. As the Broker initiates no programs of his own
to avoid risking his political neck, he can not be seen to
provide much direction for his city's affairs. He has no
agenda of his own. Rather, he will advance any program that
has received the backing of all substantially powerful groups
directly affected. The Broker's perspective is thus consen-
sual; to advance non-consensual policy solutions is to risk
disintegrative conflict.
The Integrationist. Like the Broker, the Integrationist
realizes the possible "power costliness" of a general activist
programmatic posture, and consequently prefers to refrain from
introducing any new policies on his own. However, unlike the
Broker, he does not believe that total mayoral restraint pro-
vides the maximal protection of his power position. For if a
conflict flares up in the wake of mayoral inaction, the mayor
may yet find himself caught between conflicting demands,
The Integrationist mayor seeks to keep potential power-
costly situations from worsening. He initiates solutions of
his own that integrate diverse community elements and thereby
protect his position by averting dissensus:
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The politician can prevent controversy if he can
anticipate points of friction and minimize them by
finding a common ground where action is not a flat
acceptance or rejection of one or another position.
If he can define the issue in such a way that the
goals of various groups do not appear to be strictly
inconsistent, he can head off controversy. If the
issue is not settled in its early stages and factions
turn for support to the general populace, controversy
may cause the politician to fear any action and to
lose all control over outcome.>1
Waukegan's Robert Sabonjian is the prototype Integra-
tionist mayor.52 Anne Greer observes that to a great extent
Sabonjian is a prototype Broker who takes a "stand-off posi-
tion" in any matter where a community consensus can not be
obtained.5 3 But she also notes, quite correctly, that in
Sabonjian's willingness to take action to avert major contro-
versy, "there is evidence of behavior inconsistent with
Banfield's generalization."54  Such "unbroker-like" behavior
is apparent in Sabonjian's actions in the 1968 controversy
which stemmed from the refusal of certain landlords who rented
to military families in the area to sign a Navy pledge of
nondiscriminatory rental practices. Sabonjian reassured land-
lords that as only about half a dozen black families from the
Great Lakes Naval Training Center were renting in Waukegan,
housing arrangements could be made without forcing any hostile
landlord to rent to the families concerned. With this assur-
ance, the pledges were signed. By providing direction during
the early phases of the dispute, Sabonjian prevented its flare-
up into a possible major controversy that could have resulted
in a drain on his power.
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The costs of the Integrationist approach are the same
as those of the other consensus-oriented leadership styles.
If an overarching coalition is to be maintained, demands for
broad-scale or redistributive change will be ignored. For
the most part, only incremental change will be feasible; or
as Greer puts it, "Under the mayor's supervision, the equili-
brium "moves" but does not leap.5 In the example mentioned
above, all Sabonjian gained was a reaffirmation of the status
quo--the housing of a half dozen black families in places they
would have otherwise been housed had there been no mayoral
intervention. Community harmony was maintained at the price
of avoiding any firm commitment by the city to fair housing.
The Entrepreneur. This is the last of the three
consensus-oriented mayoral types. This mayor has a fairly
long-range agenda; he has specific programs that he wants
accomplished that transcend the immediate time frame.56 This
mayoral type engages skillfully in coalition building and net-
work modification; he bargains, threatens, appeals to city
pride and financial self-interest and does whatever else it
legally takes to form his executive-centered coalition. This
mayor gets his name from his ability to utilize the "entrepre-
neurial" task accomplishment process--the actions he takes to
create relationships that increase his influence beyond that
formally accorded to the office.
The engagement in coalition maintenance and the building
of the broad overarching executive-coalition, as reported
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earlier in this chapter, are essential elements in the style
of the Entrepreneur. Too often, Entrepreneurship has been
defined solely in terms mayoral innovations or action charac-
terized by "originality, risk-taking, initiative, energy,
openness, organizational ability, and promotional ingenuity."5'
Though these are essential elements of Entrepreneurship, they
are not style characteristics that by themselves provide a
good basis for distinguishing between mayors.
Kotter and Lawrence, for example, relying on the work of
James Cunningham, define the "Public Entrepreneur" as "a bold
problem solver" whose "two most important characteristics are
originality and the willingness to take risks."58 Yet under
this definition both New Haven Mayor Richard Lee and New York
Mayor John Lindsay would both be considered Entrepreneurs as
both actively initiated major and oftentimes quite innovative
programs in an attempt to deal with the major social problems
facing their cities. Yet, the basic leadership patterns
exhibited by Lee and Lindsay are, along a different evaluative
dimension, quite different.
Lee, governing from the perspective of maintaining his
executive-centered coalition, built his administration around
such issues as urban renewal, that broad-based or near con-
sensual support could be obtained. Lee avoided those issues,
such as school busing,60 around which such support could not
be mustered. Lindsay, in contrast, actively pursued divisive
programs, such as open enrollment at the city's university,
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scatter-site public housing, community control of schools, and
civilian review of the police.
A definition of Entrepreneurship that embraces only such
characteristics as activism, risk-taking, and innovativeness
does not adequately separate between Lee and Lindsay, two
mayors who had quite different leadership styles. Broad-
based coalition building is an intrinsic part of the Entrepre-
neurial approach. Richard Lee with his near-consensus orienta-
tion, was the true Entrepreneur; John Lindsay, the goal-
oriented mayor who guided by the strength of his ideological
convictions did not attempt to limit his program pursuits to
consensual solutions, must be classified elsewhere.
The Partisan. The Partisan, like the Entrepreneur, is a
goal oriented mayor who employs all possible network building
and task accomplishment techniques. Yet, the Partisan differs
from the Entrepreneur in that the former does not seek to
govern from the perspective of a coalition which spans the
breadth of all concerned community elements. The Partisan
identifies with only a portion of the community; he defines
his constituency not in terms of the people of the entire city
or even of all concerned power groups but in terms of the mem-
bers of his own group,61 however he may define his "group."
Community-wide integration is not one of his goals.
Charles Levine has noted the tendency of both black and
white mayors to adopt a Partisan leadership approach in cities
marred by intense racial conflict.62 Instead of adopting a
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general "booster" orientation towards the city as a whole,
these mayors define their jobs as the advancement or main-
tenance of the position of their particular racial group in
the city.
Levine distinguishes those styles of mayoral leadership,
such as Entrepreneurship and Brokership, which emerge in
pluralist communities from those, such as Partisanship, which
emerge in polarized settings.63 Yet, this differentiation is
unnecessary. Even if a particular mayoral style proves more
productive in one setting, there is nothing that precludes a
mayor from adopting the same style in a less appropriate
setting. Mayors, like all political officials, live in a
world of imperfect information. Consequently, they will not
always adopt a leadership style compatible with the environ-
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mental context in which they must work. Similarly, a
mayor's own goals may be inconsistent with the character of
conflict he finds in his city. A mayor, for example, who
desires a return to political quiescence could attempt to
adopt an Entrepreneurial approach even in a polarized cammu-
nity. Similarly, a mayor may consciously transform a quies-
cent community into a polarized community by introducing
consideration of redistributional programs which advance the
cause of a city's minority residents. 6,
Levine, in his study of mayoral styles in polarized
communities, has identified a "hegemonic" style of leader-
ship. The hegemonic mayor, though, can be viewed as a
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Partisan whose faction has gained political predominance in
the community. The hegemonic mayor is free to reward members
of his faction without having to necessarily adopt a com-
bative orientation.
Contextual variables, such as the degree of power of the
mayor's faction, only impose the setting in which a mayor must
govern and do not of themselves constitute distinct leader-
ship styles. The orientations of the hegemonic and Partisan
mayor are essentially the same. Both head medium-range coali-
tions which differentially incorporate majority and minority
elements;67 both seek to dispense political rewards exclusively
to members of their own faction. Hegemonyship, hence, is a
"form of partisan posture," 69 not a leadership style to be
differentiated from Partisanship.
The Ideologue. Only for one cell in the typology, that
of the high direction/solo actor, is there no corresponding
style recognized anywhere in the literature on mayoral leader-
ship. This sort of mayor can be viewed as a Personality/
Individualist mayor who has broadened his agenda and possesses
an extremely strong policy orientation. He has definite pro-
gram objectives which he pursues basically on his own, without
enlisting the cooperation of others. This mayor embodies what
Nelson Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky have called the "purist"
style in American polities.70 As his crusades are rooted in
his own sense of morality or ideology, he earns the appelation
"Ideologue." This sort of mayor will continue even with a
33
power costly action--action which alienates others--just so
long as in his heart he knows he is right. The Ideologue
differs from the high direction mayor closest to him, the
Partisan, in that the latter has a sense of political realism.
The Partisan surveys the political terrain beforehand and
chooses the battles he will fight; he takes only those actions
that will advance, not undermine, the cause of his faction.
The Ideologue, in contrast, has no such coalitional perspec-
tive. He is driven solely by the dictates of his conscience,
and armed with his convictions will plunge head down into a
political storm, even to the point of undertaking counter-
productive actions.
As each of the baselines in the above typology are
ordinal scales, exact equivalencies are not necessarily
implied by giving two or more styles the same rank on a
scale. 7 1 For example, the intermediate coalition ranking is
a broad category embracing all mayors who cultivate some net-
work support, but not to the point that they will refrain from
action if a community near-consensus cannot be obtained. Simi-
larly, the classification of the Broker, Caretaker, and Cere-
monial mayors as low direction types is not meant to imply
that each style affords the exact same degree of direction
for a city. Both the Broker, who aids in task accomplishment
by implementing those programs which receive the endorsement
of important community groups, and the Caretaker, who has
chosen the limited goal of maintaining those services that
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the city already provides, afford somewhat more direction for
a city's affairs than the Ceremonial mayor, who abstains from
most policy-related action.
The typology is also for the most part non-normative.
No one or two types are held out as the best or ideal mayoral
leadership style. Different styles will best suit different
mayors, depending on their personalities, their policy goals,
and the different political settings in which they must work.
It is the task of the mayoral analyst to ascertain the
relative advantages and limitations in the employment of each
of the styles.
This thesis will begin an intensive investigation of the
strengths and weaknesses, both as regards a mayor's ability
to achieve his goals and the impact of his actions on the
city's polity, of the three high direction mayoral styles.
The focus of this study will be on the three mayors of
Madison, Wisconsin, who served from 1965 through 1975, and
each of whose style, by fortunate circumstance, at least in
part corresponds to a different high direction mayoral
leadership type.
In addition to identifying the advantages and problems
associated with various leadership approaches, this disserta-
tion will attempt to Judge each mayor according to his ability
to reach his own stated goals. As each mayor entertained a
different agenda, each will necessarily be assessed on
different policy lines.
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Each mayor will be evaluated on his performance in both
major city controversies and those issue areas which never
flared into public conflict but in which the mayor still
expressed a policy orientation. Major controversies do not
constitute the entire range of affairs with which a mayor must
deal. A mayor who wishes to maximize his impact must concern
himself not only with the more visible allocative disputes but
with those innumerable routine functionings of city hall which
never command great public attention.
METHODOLOGY
Analysts of mayoral leadership have never made explicit
what constitutes evidence that a mayor has adopted a particu-
lar leadership style. This lack of scrupulousness has
resulted in some confusion. For example, both Charles Levine
and Kotter and Lawrence have studied Cleveland Mayor Ralph
Locher (1962-67). But whereas Kotter and Lawrence consider
Locher to be a Caretaker, Levine sees him in the much differ-
ent light of the Partisan. 7 2
Similarly, Levine's typing of Birmingham's George Seibels
as a hegemonic mayor remains suspect.73 Levine supports his
classification as the "Birmingham remained a white hegemony"
throughout Seibels' first six years in office, and that the
mayor "contributes to its maintenance by successfully communi-
cating a different image of the city."74 Yet, Levine's
history of the Seibels' administration can be reinterpreted
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with a quite different conclusion. Much of the evidence
Levine presents can be used to support the thesis that
Seibels' style was that of Caretakership--with its distaste
for political conflict, relative lack of network building,
short-range agenda setting, and reliance on the individual-
istic task accomplishment process--rather than the hegemonic
variety of Partisanship:
"His approach to politics tended to be based on
boosterism and the naive view that changes could be
made without confrontation or bargaining, even when
entrenched interests were adversely affected."
(distaste for political conflict, and reliance only
on purposive appeals in network building).
"He tried to do too much himself and failed to build
a first-rate staff which could augment his administra-
tive and political weaknesses." (individualistic task
accomplishment process and lack of long-range agenda
setting).
"Because he abhorred conflict and criticism, he
avoided being forceful when dealing with department
heads and state, county, and local officials."
(distaste for political conflict and low usage of
task accomplishment processes).
"He led such a frantic pace attending meetings,
cutting ribbons and giving speeches that he wasn't
able to focus on specific problems or conduct sys-
tematic evaluation of the implementation of his poli-
cies by city departments." (lack of long-range agenda
setting or strong goal orientations as indicated by
his tendency to define his Job in terms of the cere-
monial duties of his office).
"He often failed to consult with the city council
before proposing major programs that the council
would have to approve and the departments would have
to eventually implement." (lack of network building
and reliance on the individualistic task accomplish-
ment process).75
Seibels' willingness to submit to the desires of local busi-
ness groups, a pattern which "relegated Birmingham's mayor to
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the role of a secondary policy-maker, " 76 is also indicative
of a lack of direction from the mayor's office. A hegemonic
or Partisan mayor would not have been content to play such a
secondary role, but would have been a primary force in moving
his city in the direction he desired--which in Seibels' case
would still have been towards the interest of the city's
business community. The role of a secondary policy-maker,
rather than being evidence of high direction hegemonic
leadership, is consonant with the style of the low direction
city heads--the Ceremonial, Caretaker, and Broker mayors--who
defer the making of major policy decisions to other officials
and groups in the city.
Was Seibels a hegemonic (or Partisan) mayor or a Care-
taker? Was Locher a Caretaker or a Partisan? The evidence
presented by the authors in each case is inadequate to permit
such precise classifications. Yet, means of studying mayoral
leadership must be developed which will enable such precise
classifications. For only after such classifications are made
with confidence can the actions of an individual mayor be
better understood and comparisons between mayors at various
times and in various cities be undertaken to ascertain the
advantages and limitations of particular leadership styles.
The absence of quantitative indicators as to a mayor's
style does not preclude a disciplined study of the field.
Steps can and must be taken to minimize the subjectivity of
the classificatory process. The following steps constitute
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the basic elements of a more "scientifie" and accurate
investigation of leadership styles:
1. Using Detailed Histories and Case Studies as
Evidence. The mayoral analyst must present the reader with
the evidence he has mustered to support his typing of a parti-
cular mayor. As no synoptic indicator of a mayor's leader-
ship style exists, the researcher has no alternative but to
draw elaborate histories of his mayor in action. One or two
case studies of a mayor dealing with specific problems will
not suffice as there is no way to assure how representative
the mayor's approach to these problems is of his approach to
his job in general. After the researcher has described the
mayor's style in general, focusing on his goals, utilization
of task accomplishment processes, and the degree of his wil-
lingness to engage in coalition formation, then it is desir-
able that the generalizations made be further illustrated by
the elaboration of specific case studies. These detailed
histories and case studies of a mayor in office constitute the
"data" the researcher uses in the typing process.
This seemingly simplistic piece of advice--that the
researcher should present the evidence upon which his deter-
minations are made--was for the most part ignored by one
mayoral action study, that conducted by Kotter and Lawrence,
probably as a result of the voluminous output that would have
been required in a study of twenty mayors. Only in one
instance, in their classification of Atlanta mayor Ivan Allen
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as an Entrepreneur, was a detailed history introduced as
supporting evidence. The brief glimpses offered into the
behavior of the other nineteen mayors are simply too frag-
mentary to permit generalizations as to a mayor's style with
any degree of certainty. As in their classification of Ralph
Locher as a Caretaker, the reader has no way to ascertain
whether the conclusions Kotter and Lawrence arrive at are
warranted by the evidence or whether the authors have simply
misread their data.
2. Getting at the Intentions of the Political Head.
Charles Levine presented a lengthy history of Seibels'
administration, and yet it remained unclear exactly what
leadership style the Birmingham mayor had really adopted.
What additional evidence and observations could Levine have
presented to provide useful support for his interpretations of
Seibels' actions?
A mayor's style is for the most part a reflection of his
own orientations and intentions. It thus becomes crucial that
a researcher tap these orientations if he is to fully under-
stand a mayor's leadership style. For example, Seibels was a
Caretaker if he had a personality which did not permit him to
engage in conflictual activity, thus requiring that he let
others make important policy decisions for the city. On the
other hand, Seibels was a hegemonie or Partisan mayor if he
viewed his Job to be that of advancing or maintaining as best
as possible the dominant position of Birmingham's white
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community. As in this specific instance the consequences of
political withdrawal and hegemonic activity are the same--the
preservation of the status quo and white dominance--it is
impossible to clearly discern exactly what style the mayor had
adopted by the researcher's focusing solely on the outcome of
political activity in Birmingham. It is necessary for the
researcher to get at the intentions of the city's chief execu-
tive.
A similar observation can be made concerning the politi-
cal style of Cleveland Mayor Ralph Locher. Locher was a Care-
taker if he defined his job solely in terms of the efficient
provision of services; he was a Partisan if he identified with
and sought to preserve the position of the city's white com-
munity. The mayor's intentions must be made known before any
definite statement as to his style can be made. The
researcher must thus "get inside the mayor's head" in order to
gain a true picture of what a mayor's goals, task accomplish-
ment and network building orientations are. The histories and
case studies of a mayor's term in office must be constructed
with this necessity in mind.
In reconstructing the events of an administration, the
analyst must consequently pay close attention to any indica-
tors as to what the mayor was thinking at the time. One good,
though less than perfect, source of information on this point
are newspaper accounts. The analyst must look for the words
of the mayor, his aides, or any other participants in a
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dispute, even to the point of paying particularly close atten-
tion to the words of participants underscoring why a mayor
chose the path of action (or even inaction) he did in a par-
ticular controversy.
This approach has two possible drawbacks. First of all,
newspaper coverage of city hall in many American cities is so
inadequate as to make unprofitable the search for mayoral
intentions through the examination of his words or the words
of his close associates in the printed media. This was not
the case in Madison, Wisconsin, however, as the two local
newspapers paid unusually close, if somewhat biased, atten-
tion to city politics. Even more fortunately, as the morning
Wisconsin State Journal was generally conservative Republican,
and the evening Capital Times leaned in a very liberal
Democratic direction, a researcher can obtain a fairly balanced
view of Madison politics by reading the contrasting portrayals
in both newspapers.
The second drawback to this approach is that a mayor
skilled at public relations might be able to manipulate press
coverage so the media would convey only the image he wants,
rather than a picture of his intentions and events as they
really are. Such was the case in New Haven where Richard Lee
was able to make it appear that the business "muscles" of the
Citizens Action Commission, and not his administration, were
the prime movers behind that city's massive urban redevelop-
ment program.7 7
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Direct observation and participant observationr whereby
the observer cannot be screened from the real decision-
making process, is obviously a desirable means of penetrat-
ing this possible charade. However, where direct observation
is impossible, as where events are already past history or
access to decision-making circles is denied, secondary
sources must be relied upon in the reconstruction of events.
Interviews with the mayor, members of his staff, administra-
tive officials, city councilmen and others active in or
knowledgeable about the city's affairs can help flesh out
the reconstruction of events. Hopefully, if a broad range
of participants and observers are interviewed, someone with
inside knowledge of what really took place during the admin-
istration will reveal the truth, if in fact the truth had
been hidden behind a public relations screen.
3. Separating the Hypotheses and Interpretations from
the Observational Data. In reporting events the researcher
might inadvertently succumb to the temptation to present his
data in such a light as to support whatever point he is
trying to make. This danger is especially ominous when
interpretations are intertwined with the presentation of
the detail case studies. Fred Greenstein's advice for the
"objectifying" of the study of personality in politics
applies equally to the study of executive leadership styles:
So far as possible the hypotheses and interpretations
(the latter being hypotheses that have been provision-
ally accepted) should be kept distinct from the
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observational data upon which the hypotheses and inter-
pretations are based. A common fault of the single-
case clinical psychological reports is that the pro-
cesses of observation and interpretation are not
sufficiently differentiated from each other. The
reader cannot himself examine the materials upon which
the interpretations are based. He cannot reconstruct
and, therefore, cannot assess the steps by which the
analyst has arrived at an interpretation, and he does
not have the raw materials with which to advance alter-
native interpretations of his own.7 0 (emphasis in
original).
4 Removin the Researcher's Subjectivity. In classi-
fying a mayor's style, a process that has the potential for
contamination by the researcher's own political feelings and
prejudices, the researcher has two aids in attempting to
maintain his objectivity. First, the researcher must con-
stantly be aware of his own ideological orientation and he
must always be on guard against the subjective feelings he
might harbor concerning the person he is studying. By con-
stantly reminding himself of the disparity between his own
ideology and the ideology of the person under study, the
researcher will be sufficiently reminded of the necessity to
evaluate his mayors according to their ability to obtain their
goals, and not simply advance those values appreciated by the
researcher.
Second, the researcher must seek interviews with people
from all sides of the various disputes in the city and from
people who occupy all portions of the political spectrum. The
researcher has to be on guard against selectively interviewing
only those with whom he might agree and with whom he might be
44
most comfortable. In addition to helping reconstruct events,
these respondents will help make the researcher aware of
alternative explanations as to why a mayor behaved as he did.
The researcher treads on very thin ice here, however, as he
must be able to discern the truth from the cover stories,
while at the same time being quite careful so as not to dis-
miss, out of hand, interpretations he receives which are not
consonant with his initial dispositions.
These four guidelines have been followed to the extent
possible in the investigation of the leadership styles of the
three mayors of Madison, Wisconsin, during the 1965 to 1975
period. An introductory section on each mayor entails an
overview of the mayor's general orientations, the actions he
took in office, and the categorizing of his leadership style.
The style of each mayor emerges with more detail in the case
studies which follow. As much as possible, the presentation
of interpretations has been meticulously kept separate from
that of the observational data.
It is in these case studies that the costs, benefits, and
limitations of a particular mayoral style become apparent.
These case studies were reconstructed from a number of sources,
including the author's experience of having lived in Madison
for over six of the ten years studied; a search tbhrough the
daily newspaper accounts of this period with close attention
paid to the statements made by the mayor, his administrative
aides, and other political actors; an examination of relevant
city records and files; and interviews conducted in the Summer
of 1975 with fifty-six persons knowledgeable about Madison
politics. Among those interviewed were the three mayors them-
selves, their close aides,members of the City Council of
various political outlooks, city administrative officials,
members of various city commissions including the Board of
Education, journalists, and spokesmen for the city's business
and minority communities.
THE SETTING OF MADISON POLITICS
Madison is a moderately large-sized city. Its population
grew sharply from 96,000 in 1950 to nearly 127,000 in 1960,
and to more than 171,000 in 1970. 7 9 Only in the mid-1970's
did the long period of growth finally come to an end; by 1976,
Madison's population rested below its 1970 level at 168,400.
Part of the reasons for this reversal lay in the decline in
the city's birthrate in the 1960's and 1970's--a trend which
had the effect of thinning enrollment levels in some Madison
classrooms as the new schools built during the "boom" period
were no longer all needed.
Downtown schools especially faced the prospects of
closing as families moved to the city's newer East and West
sides. Central city housing in the 1960's came to be occupied
only by the city's student community and the poorer elements
of the city's population. As customers moved to the outer
areas, so did business. As new shopping centers and enclosed
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malls opened in the city's East and West sides in the 1960's
and early 1970's the economic position of the downtown
worsened severely.
Madison's politics has to a great extent been shaped by
the fact that as the seat of both the state capitol and the
University of Wisconsin, the city's economy is heavily service-
oriented. Figures for 1977, for example, show that nine of
Madison's top ten employers had a service-orientation
(Table 2). The State of Wisconsin and the University of
Wisconsin were clearly the cityts most dominant employers.
Only one manufacturing firm, the Oscar Mayer meatpacking
company, can be found in Madison's top ten.
As a result of Madison's primarily service-oriented
population, as Robert Alford notes, "class issues have not
been important and have not carried over into local poli-
8o
tics"80 in Madison. Yet whatever divisions there have been
in Madison politics over the year have reflected the geo-
graphic concentration of different occupational groupings.
The near East side, in close proximity to the Oscar Mayer
plant, is heavily working class in character. The city's
middle and professional class population has located for the
most part in the expanding areas of the city's West and far
East sides. Conservative candidates in city, state and
national elections have traditionally fared better in these
outer city wards.
Madison, as a result of its population make-up, is also a
Table 2
LARGEST EMPLOYERS IN MADISON, 1977
State of Wisconsin
University of Wisconsin
Oscar Mayer and Company
Federal Government
Madison Public Schools
City of Madison
Madison General Hospital
Dane County
Saint Mary's Hospital
Wisconsin Telephone Company
19,100
16,500
4,300
3,700
2,763
1,900
1,550
1, 506
1,300
1,130
SOURCE: "Economic Report" supplement to
Wisconsin State Journal,
January 23, 1977, p. 22.
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highly educated community. In 1960, the median number of
school years completed in Madison was 12.5 as compared with
the national median of 10.6. The result of this highly
educated professional population was a local concern for
questions evolving around the amenities of life and aesthe-
tics, such as the building of an auditorium and the preserva-
tion of Madison's natural scenic beauty, rather than economic
issues.81 This high level of education also helps account
for the level of polarization this city witnessed during the
student-activist-anti-Vietnam protest days of the late 1960's
and early 1970's.82 If Madison's education and profession-
alism permitted the potential mobilization of both liberal and
conservative forces, its impact was particularly strong on
the city's reformist tradition; the city was a center of
Wisconsin Progressivism, and in the 1950's remained a bastion
of Democratic strength when the rest of Wisconsin voted regu-
larly for conservative Republican candidates.
In 1960, 18,800 students, excluding dissertators, were
enrolled at the University of Wisconsin campus at Madison. By
1965, this number had grown by a full 55 per cent to 29,300;
for 1970 and 1975, enrollments increased even further to
34,400 and 38,100 respectively.83 The timing of this sharp
increase in enrollment during the 1960's helps to explain why,
though the University itself at times attempted to influence
city hall, the student population itself was not a significant
political force until the late 1960's.
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In fact, it was not until 1968 that the first young,
student-oriented alderman, Paul Soglin, was elected to the
City Council. He was soon followed by three others: Eugene
Parks, Dennis McGilligan, and Susan Kay Phillips. Until that
late date, the predominantly student downtown wards continued
to be represented by establishment-oriented older representa-
tives. Only with the growth in size of the student community
did this begin to change. It took the pressures of Vietnam-
related civic concern and a Supreme Court ruling which struck
down restrictions on student voting for the student vote and
representatives who had their roots in the student constitu-
ency to become important factors in Madison's politics. The
regimes of Mayors Otto Festge (1965-69) and William Dyke
(1969-73), then, mark an abrupt transition in the style of
Madison politics.
Madison is an extremely "white" community; non-whites
constituted only about 2 per cent of the city's population in
1968. 84 Madison contained no large predominantly black area
of the city; its only major pocket of black concentration was
dispersed throughout the city as a result of an urban renewal
clearance project in 1963. Madison, as a result of its
homogeneous population structure, was spared the racial con-
vulsions that gripped other cities in the 1960's. This is not
to say, however, that Madison was not without convulsions of
its own. The city's participant elements divided themselves
into enemy camps over the question of the Monona Terrace
auditorium--a dispute characterized by extreme rancor. This
division was reinforced by the generally polar oriented posi-
tions of its two newspapers--the crusading liberal Capital
Times and the conservative, generally Republican Wisconsin
State Journal. And in the 1960's, Madison suffered more than
its share of student demonstrations and riots. The city's
population was severely traumatized in 1971 by the death of a
researcher as the result of the bombing of the University's
physics building by a fringe anti-war group.
Though elections in Madison are formally nonpartisan,
the working of party activists and the often competing
endorsement of the two newspapers give campaigns a submerged
partisanship. Formal party machinery, however, for the most
part abstains from operating in city elections. The mayor and
the 22-member City Council, are elected for two-year terms.
The mayor serves as presiding officer of the Council and votes
only in case of a tie. A three-fourths Council vote is
required to override a mayoral veto of Council action.
Madison's system approaches the weak mayor form of
government. The appointment of department heads requires
Council approval. Commissions composed of citizens and alder-
men appointed by the mayor for fixed terms are also responsi-
ble for the direction of many of the departments; such
authority further insulates departmental operations from
direct control by the mayor.
The mayor lacks any significant patronage of which to
speak. Only the mayor's assistant, and starting in the 1970's
the three executives of the new City Manpower Office, serves
at the pleasure of the mayor. Even the position in the
mayor's office most responsible for the workings of the
bureaucracy, the city administrator, was a career position.
One further item must be noted to complete this brief
overview of the Madison setting. Madison is a physically
beautiful city and a highly desirable place to live in. Per-
sons who visit or go to school there have a tendency not to
leave. Madisonians take a great deal of pride in their city
and the "good life" they believe they enjoy. Being physi-
cally situated between two lakes is not without its disadvan-
tages, however, as the lakes act to both limit the space
available for residential and commercial development in the
downtown area as well as the number of potential commuter
routes to the city's central business district.
Madison is by no means the typical American city. In
using Madison as a laboratory for urban leadership nation-
wide, special care has to be taken to account for influences
on the Madison scene that may not always be present elsewhere
-- in particular its large student community and its service-
oriented, well-educated professional population. Even
Madison's form of government is not typical of that found in
medium-size cities; cities in the 100,000 to 250,000 popula-
tion range tend more to have the council-manager form of
government. Madison's mayor-council government is the form
that tends to be found in larger cities.
But, as Raymond Wolfinger notes, no truly typical
American city can be found.8 6 New York is atypical because
of its size; Chicago because of the strength of its machine;
Philadelphia because of its aristocratic tradition. Yet, the
discipline of urban politics would suffer greatly if each
city was looked upon as a unique political system. Analysis
of one city's politics can provide important lessons for other
cities just so long as care is taken to point out the con-
texual constraints of any observation.
CHAPTER T10O: THE LIMITS TO ENTREPRENEURIAL LEADERSHIP
MAYOR OTTO FESTGE AND THE AUDITORIUM, 1965-1969
The matter of building an auditorium and civic center has
been the longest standing question on Madison's political
agenda. It is a question that has resulted in emotional,
heated argument, so much so that it has even helped polarize
Madison residents on issues that were not related to the con-
struction of such a facility. Yet it was just into this dis-
pute that Otto Festge plunged when he became mayor in 1965.
More than any other goal he had, Festge wanted to give Madison
an auditorium.
Any understanding of the auditorium controversy in
Madison must begin with a summary of the dispute in its early
years--if for no other reason than to give the reader a fuller
appreciation of the intensity that such a seemingly unideolo-
gical matter could engender. The thesis of this chapter is
that Otto Festge approached the matter of building an audi-
torium from the perspective of the Entrepreneur. Festge
attempted to find some grounds for mutual accommodation; he
sought to initiate a process through which an auditorium pro-
posal which would satisfy all factors concerned would emerge.
Yet, for reasons to be discussed later, such consensual
leadership efforts failed.
The Pre-1965 Years.1 In 1954 Madison voters approved
three referenda authorizing a four million dollar bond issue
to finance the building of a Frank Lloyd Wright-designed audi-
torium at Monona Terrace. An additional 1.5 million dollars
for the construction of parking facilities for the project was
authorized in a later referendum.
Wright, a native son of Madison, sought to take advantage
of the aesthetic view offered from the downtown terrace site
by extending his auditorium out from the end of Monona Avenue,
over the railroad tracks running parallel to the shoreline,
and into Lake Monona itself. Wright's quite elaborate plans
envisioned a project eventually costing 17 million dollars.
The three thousand seat auditorium, an exhibition arena and
parking facilities were to be built with the bond money avail-
able only as the first stage of construction. Opponents of
the plan claimed the true cost would be somewhere around
30 million dollars.
The auditorium immediately ran into its first obstacle
when Republican State Attorney General Vernon Thomson declared
the project to be unconstitutional as the city did not own the
entire site of the project. The city surmounted this hurdle
by negotiating with the Milwaukee Railroad for the air rights
over its tracks. Then, in 1957, the project was again stalled
when a resolution sponsored by Madison Republican Assemblyman
Carroll Metzner, an auditorium opponent, limited the height of
construction at Monona Terrace to twenty feet.
Much, if not most, of the opposition to the project in
the early years was the product of conservative reaction to
the abrasive personality, unorthodox lifestyle and supposed
Communist sympathies of Frank Lloyd Wright. As one commen-
tator on the early years of the dispute noted:
The dynamics of the Monona Terrace controversy cannot
be understood without knowing the personal dynamics
of Frank Lloyd Wright...His actions and those of his
followers were extremely important; perhaps the most
important single force in the initial stage of the
controversy.2
Personal objections to Wright helped motivate two of the
most prominent anti-Terrace leaders during this time period--
Carroll Metzner and Colonel Joseph Jackson. Jackson, in an
appearance before a state hearing considering the repeal of
the "Metzner Law," called Wright "a Communist or a Communist
fellow-traveler" and detailed the architect's membership in a
list of supposed Communist front organizations.3
No recounting of the auditorium dispute would be complete
without noting the key role played by the city's two daily
newspapers. The morning paper, long noted for its Republican
sympathies--the Wisconsin State Journal--opposed construction
at Monona Terrace and labeled the Metzner Law a "mercy death"
for the project. The complete opposite stance was taken by
the city's progressive, generally Democratic evening news-
paper--The Capital Times. The Times took an unabashedly pro-
Terrace stance, often in its news stories as well as on its
editorial pages.
The two newspapers soon occupied central positions in the
auditorium debate. The polarization could not have reached
the level it did for as long as it did had it not been for the
influence of the two dailies.
In 1959 the barrier to construction imposed by the
Metzner Law was finally repealed. Wright's death later that
year, though, brought no mitigation of the conflict. The
architect for the project would now be the Frank Lloyd Wright
Foundation under the direction of Wright's son-in-law, William
Wesley Peters. The personal level of the controversy con-
tinued with the Terrace opponents referring to the site's sup-
porters as "Wright Worshippers," "Wright cultists," and "Bill
Evjuets (the publisher of The Capital Times) Boys," and The
Capital Times and Mayor Ivan Nestingen lashing back at the
anti-Terrace forces for being "obstructionists." 4
The final dismissal in 1961 of a suit brought by Colonel
Jackson seemingly cleared the last major obstacle to construc-
tion. Nestingen resigned to serve in the Kennedy administra-
tion in Washington, leaving his former administrative
assistant and new Mayor Robert Nuckles with the unenviable
task of opening bids from prospective contractors on the
project totalling over thirteen million dollars--6.6 million
dollars more than what was available in the auditorium bond
account. The opening of the bids became a turning point in
the controversy as the City Council, for the first time
refusing to express its support of the project, turned down a
resolution requesting a new bond referendum to cover the
difference between the amount bid and the money available.
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The mayoral election the next spring saw Terrace opponent and
State Journal endorsee Henry Reynolds defeat Nuckles.
The Council in 1962 authorized a new referendum to
ascertain the desirability of selecting a new site and archi-
tect for the proposed auditorium and civic center. After a
heavy campaign between pro- and anti-Terrace forces, the
Wright-designed Terrace facility was defeated by a 19,056
to 16,369 vote. Mayor Reynolds announced that as a facility
had not been designed within the bond limits, the contract
with the Wright Foundation had "been terminated by the archi-
tect," and the city was not obligated to the Foundation for
past services rendered. The Wright Foundation supporters
charged that the city never gave the Foundation a fair oppor-
tunity to modify its designs to bring the plans within the
cost limitations of the contract.
It was in the midst of the arbitration proceedings over
the fee dispute with the prospects for an auditorium seemingly
stalled, that Otto Festge became mayor in 1965.
The Fee Dispute--Getting the Project Mo Again. In
his inauguration address Festge re-emphasized his campaign
position--that he believed Monona Terrace was the most logical
place to build an auditorium, but that he was not committed to
any particular site for the project. A resolution was intro-
duced in the Council at Festge's request suspending arbitra-
tion proceedings while negotiations with the Wright Foundation
were started anew. 6
But Edwin Cushman, the city's special counsel in the fee
matter appointed by Reynolds, pleaded scheduling conflicts and
refused Festge's and the City Council's special committee's
directives to meet with attornies of the Wright Foundation.
The Foundation, in turn, refused to meet with city officials
until Cushman was present.
Through Festge's continued urgings, a meeting with the
Wright Foundation was finally arranged despite Cusbman's con-
tinued absence. The Mayor invited noted labor mediator and
University of Wisconsin Law Professor Nathan Feinsinger to
attend the negotiations between the Foundation and the city.7
The Foundation claimed it could charge the city anywhere
from $190,000, based on the original cost estimates, to
$800,000, based on the architect's standard fee of fifteen
dollars per hour. Negotiations continued at "extreme arms
8
length." By 5:30 PM the parties were still quite far apart,
with the city offering $100,000 and the Foundation asking for
$225,000. Festge asked Professor Feinsinger to assist in the
negotiations.
At 12:35 AM, after fifteen hours of intermittent nego-
tiation, a settlement was reached. The city would pay the
Wright Foundation $150,000 above the $122,500 in fees already
paid. The Mayor's maneuverings had succeeded in clearing the
first obstacle blocking the building of an auditorium and
civic center complex.
Attempts at Consensus and Shifting Sites. As part of his
strategy to overcome the past polarizations that plagued the
auditorium issue, Mayor Festge appointed an Auditorium Commit-
tee composed of members reflecting all sides of the contro-
versy to find a new approach to the project. The Mayor
himself served as chairman. Of the Mayor's initial eleven
appointments, at least two were outspoken Terrace opponents.
The City Council added three new seats. Two were to be
reserved for representatives of the building industry and the
business community, while the third was to be filled, accord-
ing to The Capital Times, by "someone who could be identified
with the anti-Wright-Monona Terrace group"--a concession which
was made to quiet objections to the seeming pro-Terrace
balance of the committee.9 To this seat, Festge appointed
former mayor and adamant Terrace-opponent George Forster, with
the hope that his presence would add to the legitimacy of the
committee' s recommendations.
Festge charged the committee with the task of selecting
"the finest facilities, at the best location, designed by an
outstanding architect."1 0 But in further qualifying that he
would like to see an auditorium that would be located in the
central part of the city, that made good use of Madison's
lakes, and that was designed by an architect who would lend
stature to the project, Festge was again expressing his per-
sonal desire for the Wright-designed Terrace facility.
The Auditorium Committee decided that the basic facili-
ties for the civic center would consist of a 2,000 to 2,500
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seat auditorium and a 900 to 1,100 seat theater for smaller
productions. Festge had even more grand designs for the pro-
ject; he saw the two buildings only as the project's first
stage, to which, later, the city would add a recital hall,
banquet hall, exhibition space, art galleries and additional
parking.
By the end of the year the committee had cut the list of
fourteen possible sites to three--Law Park (part of the origi-
nal Monona Terrace site), Olin Park, and James Madison Park.
The latter, though, was never given any real consideration as
an auditorium located there would have a general adverse
effect on the surrounding residential area.
A new twist in the controversy was introduced into the
controversy in the beginning of 1966 when the City Plan
Department proposed a new site--East Wilson Street--for the
civic center. Though the East Wilson site was actually con-
tiguous to the location Wright proposed--the design differed
from Wright's concept in that the complex would not extend
over the railroad tracks, North Shore Drive, Law Park and into
the lake. Although Monona Terrace offered most of the same
advantages as did East Wilson, the Department recommended that
if land acquisition costs for the newly proposed site proved
to be too expensive, Olin Park would then be the Department's
choice.
The Plan Department's proposal drew immediate objections
from both The Capital Times, who still favored a Wright-
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designed facility,11 and George Forster, who referred to the
plan as "the Frank Lloyd Wright proposal with more cost." 12
Despite these objections, Festge saw East Wilson as offering
an opportunity to build a consensus around a downtown audi-
torium by circumventing the emotions associated with the
Wright-designed Terrace facility.
The Mayor announced that he considered East Wilson to be
an acceptable alternative to Monona Terrace, his first choice
during the campaign. Festge took the floor before the Audi-
torium Committee to explain East Wilson's advantages of a
downtown location, lake view, accessibility, and conformance
to the concept of a civic center. He opposed Olin Park, as an
auditorium there would be "strictly an event facility" which
"would not get the day-to-day use as would a downtown loca-
tion."13
As witness to his conversion, Festge even voted against
Monona Terrace when that proposed site came before the com-
mittee for a vote. The Mayor hedged only to the extent that
he believed the city should "take a real careful look at the
Monona Terrace plans" if East Wilson were rejected.,• Each
of the sites competing with East Wilson--Monona Terrace,
James Madison, and Olin Park--lost on four to eleven votes.
And despite Festge's maneuverings and pleadings, East Wilson
was also rejected, by a seven to eight vote.
Festge blamed his defeat on those committee members who
were apparently swayed by the threat made by the General
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Casualty Company to move outside the city, with a resulting
loss in the city's tax base, if the company would be forced
to move from its East Wilson location to make way for the
auditorium.15 Nevertheless the compromise he had sought to
engineer had failed.
Festge reaffirmed his commitment to a downtown civic
center in the firm response he took against a suggestion by
the State Journal that the project be split into two phases--16
that an auditorium and theater to be constructed at Olin
Park on the city's East side as the first stage, to be later
followed by the construction of a downtown community center
and convention facilities. Festge voted against Olin when the
site again came before the Auditorium Committee, but later
cast the deciding ballot for a compromise plan recommending an
Olin Park auditorium, Law Park civic center, and the hiring of
Peters as the architect. Festge reasoned that no auditorium
had been built so far because "no one has been willing to
accept anything less than one hundred per cent of what he
thought was best, and that poisoned too many attempts at
rational discussion."1 7 He saw the two-site plan as "the
vehicle to end the factionalism that has torn Madison over
the past dozen years.1l 8
The Mayor then took it upon himself to try to guide
passage of the two-site plan. His first concern was to steer
the plan through a Parks Commission whose members had
expressed the concern that an Olin auditorium and accompanying
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parking facilities would destroy valuable park land:
An unhappy Park Commission voted Wednesday night to
recommend City Council approval of the Auditorium
Committee's two-site proposal for an auditorium
and civic center...The proceedings were carried out
under the watchful eyes of Mayor Otto Festge.19
But Festge could not exert similar influence over the
City Plan Commission which voted to recommend rejection of
the plan "from a planning standpoint" as it did not provide
for the consolidation of facilities in the downtown area.20
The Mayor himself noted that although the splitting of sites
was not the most desirable decision "from a planning stand-
point," at least it was a decision that would get something
built.21
Festge, though, did succeed in getting the City Council
to approve the proposal two days later. The Mayor had earlier
refused to break a tie vote to refer the auditorium question
back to committee with instructions to select a downtown site
for a joint auditorium-civic center complex.
Though the State Journal was pleased with Festge's
"leadership and dedication" in backing the two-site pro-
posal,22 The Capital Times' anger was apparent in its head-
lines:
FESTGE SCUTTLES TERRACE;
Who is Mayor--Festge or Rohr?;
Mayor Could Have Cast Vote to Keep His Promise.23
In a front page editorial, the evening paper further made
known its dissatisfaction with the role the Mayor had chosen
to play:
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The Mayor's responsibility could not be more clear.
Without his support, Rohr and the Obstructionists
could not have succeeded. He not only organized
the effort to put the proposal over. He refused to
break a critical tie vote that would have gont the
proposal back to the Auditorium Committee.'4
Wesley Peters, too, expressed hostility to a decision
which, he believed, for "political expediency," divorced the
auditorium from the city's downtown area.25 Festge knew that
continued objections by the architect would shatter any con-
sensus behind the project he was trying to build.26 The Mayor
sought a meeting with the architect to iron out the dispute:
"By persuasion, patient understanding of opposing viewpoints
and mutual respect we can accomplish our common goals. ' 2 7
In June the Mayor broke another tie, this time defeating
a Council resolution to have the Council determine the final
location of all buildings in the Monona Basin area--the por-
tion of the lakeshore extending from Law Park to Olin Park--
after receipt of the master plan for the area from the archi-
teot, Festge professed to believe that Council determination
of the site would put the city "back where we were before with
arguments between the two forces interested in either Monona
Terrace or Olin Park." 2 8
But in commenting on the leeway he preferred the archi-
tect would be given in developing the plan, Festge further
noted, "Peters may come back with a recommendation that the
auditorium be located in Law Park or he may recommend that it
be located in Olin Park. He needs a free hand." 2 9 Despite
all his efforts to gain acceptance of an Olin auditorium, the
Mayor still had not abandoned his hopes for a Wright Founda-
tion designed downtown auditorium.
On a fifteen to seven vote in October the Council
accepted the contract with the Wright Foundation to develop
a master plan for the Monona Basin area. However, the project
soon stalled again as Carroll Metzner challenged the validity
of the contract in court.
Festge's re-election and nearly ten months passed before
the Circuit Court dismissed Metzner's charges that the city
had abused its discretion, both in the level of the design
fees it set and in the negotiation of a contract for an entire
master plan rather than a single building.
Full Circle--Return to Law Park and Failure. With the
removal of the obstacle imposed by the lawsuit, attention
turned to Peters' master plan for the Basin. Peters proposed
that the auditorium be built at Law Park (the area below the
Terrace), and that such other cultural buildings as a recital
hall, small theater and art center be constructed at Olin
Park. The auditorium bore striking similarity to Wright's
original design.
Carroll Metzner attacked the plan for being "the Monona
Terrace Project all over again,"30 and the Wisconsin State
Journal, taking the same objection, decried that the project
had come "full circle." 31 But Festge, who had always believed
a downtown auditorium was vital to the future development of
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Madison, said the proposal was "the master plan to greatness
for our city" which even put "William Wesley Peters in the
same plane with the great Frank Lloyd Wright." 3 2
A mid-February meeting of the Auditorium Committee
brought sharp exchanges between Festge and the Law Park oppo-
nents but resulted in the committee's approval of construction
of the Law Park auditorium as the first stage of the Monona
Basin Project. Auditorium opponents attributed the margin of
victory by the Mayor to an intense week-end of lobbying which
"brought in East side aldermen." 3 3
The City Council, including Alderman Rohr, voted its
approval of the committee's recommendations. The only
hurdles that remained were Council acceptance of the detailed
plans, cost estimates and final bids on the auditorium.
The dispute subsided for a year as the city awaited
detailed working drawings as a prelude to bidding. Festge,
who had very narrowly won re-election two years earlier, was
not seeking a third term. He now had only a few months left
if he was to successfully guide his project through the
bidding stage.
Informed by Peters that the final bids would exceed the
funds available, Festge persuaded the Board of Estimates to
recommend the borrowing of an additional $560,000. The Mayor
justified the request by viewing the suggested appropriation
as repayment to the auditorium account of interest on the
bonds the city in previous years had spent for other
67
purposes.
New problems arose at this time as the result of a report
leaked by City Traffic Engineer John Bunch. Bunch declared
that the auditorium had originally stuck out thirty-eight feet
over the dockline, and the necessary redesign to bring the
building within the dockline had eaten up so much of the sur-
rounding area as to make parking at the proposed facility less
than adequate. In addition to parking, Bunch also scored as
inadequate both vehicular and pedestrian access to the
facility.35 The State Journal seized Bunch's objections as
the basis for questioning whether the revised designs were
really ready for bidding.36
Both Peters and Festge quickly reacted to the report.
The architect Peters countered that the auditorium had been
moved only about one foot and that he did not know where
Bunch's thirty-eight foot figure had come from.37 Festge
lashed out at Bunch's motives and reports were to come through
Public Works Director Edwin Duszynski or himself. Bunch,
though, continued to make his objections public.
The City Council, at Festge's prompting, finally voted to
submit the project for bidding, but decided against the
Mayor's wishes to wait until the bids were in to determine the
necessity of borrowing the additional 560,000 dollars Festge
had requested. Bids on the auditorium totalling $6,232,216--
$877,604 more than the amount remaining in the bond account--
were opened two weeks before Festge was to leave office.38
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The actual difference between the amount bid and the funds
available was really closer to 1.5 million dollars as Peters
used only about half the 1.5 million dollar bond money which
could be spent only for parking.39 The Capital Times and
Peters blamed the high bidding on the relative lack of compe-
tition in the bidding process as a number of auditorium foes
had told prospective contractors that submitting bids was a
waste of time as the facility would never get built. 4 0
Festge argued that if the interest earned on the audi-
torium bonds and spent elsewhere were returned to the account,
private cultural groups could raise between one hundred thou-
sand and two hundred thousand dollars, leaving the city with
the necessity of raising only an additional $170,000 to
41$270,000 to meet the bids. But the Council refused Festge's
final suggestion and instead directed that the Wright Founda-
tion modify its drawings for rebidding.
The decision on the fate of the auditorium was now in the
hands of Mayor-elect William Dyke. Four years of compromise,
consensus-building and attempts at mayoral direction were in
the end fruitless.
The Failure of Entrepreneurial Leadership. By providing
a sense of general direction and attempting to assemble a
community-wide coalition, Festge clearly adopted an Entrepre-
neurial leadership approach to the auditorium problem:
Mayor Otto Festge played the role of the competent
politician. (Former Mayor Henry) Reynoldst weak-
nesses became his strengths. He worked towards his
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goals by utilizing the bureaucratic resources avail-
able, by operating with committees, and by personal
contacts with the business and government power
structures. His Terrace position was one of firmness
mixed with flexibility; extending whenever possible;
compromising as necessary. This approach tended to
reduce personal tensions and bring about a reassessment
of the basic issues of the controversy. His strategy
was one of methodical problem solving geared toward
breaking seemingly insurmountable problemps into several
small ones; then attacking each in turn.42
Festge did not await the achievement of a consensus of impor-
tant political actors before acting; rather Festge attempted
to engineer the building of such a consensus. He was an
Entrepreneur, not a Broker.
Renewed mayoral direction re-energized the drive for the
auditorium. The fee dispute arbitration was suspended and
meetings arranged with the Wright Foundation despite the
obstinate absence of the city's special legal counsel only as
a result of the continued proddings of the new mayor. Success-
ful mediation ended the fee dispute only because Festge had
the foresight to arrange in advance for the presence of Law
Professor Nathan Feinsinger at the negotiation sessions.
The Auditorium Committee was another vehicle created by
the Mayor to keep the prospects of an auditorium alive.
Festge's willingness to compromise with his opponents in a
search for a "fresh approach" to a major problem is typical of
Entrepreneurial mayors. Robert Dahl observed that bargaining
was one of the keys to the ability of New Haven Mayor Richard
Lee to assemble an effective executive-centered coalition:
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The mayor was not at the peak of a pyramid but rather
at the center of intersecting circles. He rarely
commanded. He negotiated, cajoled, exhorted, beguiled,
charmed, pressed, appealed, reasoned, promised,
insisted, demanded, even threatened, but he most needed
support and acquiescence from other leaders who simply
could not be commanded. Bepause the mayor could not
command, he had to bargain.43
Festge, too, operated "at the center of competing circles."
His active attempts at influence were apparent during the fee
negotiation sessions and meetings of the Auditorium Committee,
City Council and any city agency whose recommendation might
possibly determine the fate of the auditorium.
Festge's shifts in support from Monona Terrace, his
personal preference, to East Wilson and then to Olin Park can
be viewed as an attempt to find an auditorium which would be
politically acceptable to a wide range of elements in the com-
munity. These attempts at compromise could be misinter-
preted as manifestations of Brokerage rather than Entrepre-
neurial leadership except for one important difference--
Festge was not acting upon a pre-existing consensus as to the
project but instead was actively attempting to create such a
consensus. The provision of mayoral direction in the dispute
becomes even more apparent when Festge, who believed that an
auditorium built outside the central city would hasten the
decline of the downtown area, allowed the reintroduction of
the Law Park site despite the renewed opposition this move
brought from the anti-Terrace forces.
If we note the general success enjoyed by Richard Lee,
71
the Entrepreneurial mayor of New Haven, Connecticut,44 we must
now explain why the same leadership style which proved to be
so effective in New Haven was such a failure when tried as an
approach to the auditorium issue in Madison. The answer can
be found by comparing the different environmental contexts
in which Mayors Lee and Festge operated.
A TALE OF TWO CITIES
The Partisan Preconditions of Entrepreneurial Leadership
in a Weak gor City. Throughout the auditorium dispute key
governmental officials thwarted Festge's attempts to build a
Madison civic center. Of crucial importance was Festge's
inability to command the support of city aldermen both in com-
mittee and on the City Council itself. The Council members of
the Auditorium Committee continually fanned the flames of the
dispute in public, rejected the Mayor's East Wilson Street
proposal, and even helped to finally defeat Festge's final
plan by discouraging the submission of bids thus inflating the
costs of the project. As concerns the City Council itself,
Festge found himself hard pressed to beat back attempts to
sabotage the two-site plan compromise. He further proved
totally unable to persuade the Council either to restore the
interest spent elsewhere to the auditorium account or to
otherwise appropriate the difference between the funds avail-
able for the Law Park project and the amount bid.
Richard Lee had little similar trouble in getting
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New Haven's Board of Aldermen to follow his initiatives. The
Board perfunctorally approved the Mayor's urban redevelopment
plans, the high school sale, and even the 1958 draft of a new
city charter--the latter by a twenty-nine to four vote despite
the fact that scarcely any aldermen favored the revised docu-
ment. 45
The explanation for the difference between the two cities
is simple. Festge lacked the extensive incentives and sanc-
tions which Lee used to control his aldermen. Elections in
Madison, first of all, are nonpartisan affairs, in contrast to
New Haven where the party column ballot and a party lever are
employed. Aldermanic candidates in Madison are not dependent,
as are their counterparts in New Haven, on the popularity of
their party's mayoral candidate; in fact, in Madison parties
in city-wide elections do not exist. Also, half of the Coun-
cil in Madison was then elected during the off-mayoral year,
removing the mayor's influence over these candidates one step
further. Once elected, members are as independent of the
mayor on the Council as they had been from him during the
campaign.
Similarly, Lee was advantaged in his ability to use his
connections with New Haven's Democratic organization to deny
renomination to irreconcilable aldermen. Governing in a
non-partisan setting with only an extremely weak behind-the-
scenes party organization, Festge could not depend on the
party for assistance with his Council relations, as had Lee.
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Madison mayors have to live with dissident aldermen.
Mayors in Madison further lack most of the bargaining
leverage which Lee and any mayor of New Haven could derive
from the skillful manipulation of the limited patronage at his
disposal:
A new administration taking over New Havents city hall
had at its immediate disposal about 75 politically-
appointed, non-civil service, policy-making positions;
about 300 lower-level patronage jobs; and about the
same number of appointments to various citizen boards
and commissions. The latter positions varied in
importance; some of them included stipends ranging up
to $25 per meeting or several hundred dollars a year,
and they all conferred "recognition." Summer employ-
ment was an additional source of patronage. Every
year the city hired 100 to 150 young men for unskilled
labor at outside jobs, mainly with the Parks, Public
Works, and Parking Departments .47
In addition to government controlled jobs, patronage in
New Haven also included "government contracts, court appoint-
ments and other spoils" of which dispensation was not greatly
constrained by competitive bidding or civil service require-
ments.4 8 Lee took good advantage of these resources in fur-
thering his own policy desires:
Lee was perfectly comfortable with patronage, but he
did not, like conventional machine politicians, value
it for its own sake, or merely to maintain his own
party position. While his decisions about patronage
recognized the maintenance needs of the Democratic
organization (and were generally made in concert with
5arty leaders7Golden and Barbieri), Lee also used his
patronage resources in pursuit of policy goals that
were more congenial to liberals than to ward bosses.
(His administration has been called "New Frontier
policies on a Last Hurrah foundation." )49
Lee's ability to use this patronage to shape his relations
with the Board of Aldermen is quite explicit:
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...the fact is that most aldermen were dependent for
their livelihood, wholly or in part, on the good
wishes of the mayor. In 1958 eleven aldermen were full-
time employees of the city or the court system, and
three others had close relatives so employed. Five more
aldermen did business with the city or worked for con-
cerns which did; at least two of these considered the
city their best customer. Thus nineteen aldermen were
vulnerable to the mayor's ability to influence their
central economic interests or those of close relatives.
Four more aldermen received appreciable sums of money
as compensation for part-time service on municipal
boards or as party registrars; another had a relative
receiving such benefits, which in most cases amounted
to about $500 a year. Five additional members were
appointed to the board by Lee to fill vacancies. Thus
twenty-nine of the thirty-three aldermen were under con-
siderable obligation to the mayor for past or present
favors .0
Lee's command of these resources was so complete that he
did not often have to employ them as sanctions. As long as he
continued to make clear his intentions to use them in case a
situation ever arose, he could influence the actions of alder-
men without explicitly deploying his sanctions in each speci-
fic case.51
Madison mayors have few of the patronage resources com-
manded by Lee; thus aldermen in Madison are not subject to
having their central economic interests influenced by the
mayor; nor are they "under considerable obligation" to him for
past or present favors. Fewer than five positions in the city
are filled directly by the mayor. 5 2  Nearly all the bureau-
cratic jobs, including those of the department heads, are
protected by civil service. 5 3 No members of the City Council
were full-time employees of the city or the court system;
and even if they had been, civil service protection and the
independence of the county court system would have insulated
them from any influence by the mayor.
In further contrast to New Haven, all major expenditures
in Madison must be approved by the City Council.54 Aldermen
are not financially dependent on the mayor's consequently
meager stock of patronage. Nor do aldermen in Madison, as
they do in New Haven, receive additional compensation for
serving as municipal board members or party registrars. And,
furthermore, in Madison the Council itself, not the mayor,
appoints a new member in the case of a vacant Council seat.
Festge had no more success with the members of Madison's
unpaid boards and commissions and the city bureaucracy than
he had with the Council. As citizen appointees to these
boards and commissions for the most part served without com-
pensation in positions that often placed considerable demands
on their time, any obligations they felt to the mayor were
quite limited. The members of the city bureaucracy were not
necessarily loyal, either. The City Plan Department helped
torpedo Festge's two-site proposal; and City Traffic Director
John Bunch helped fuel the antagonisms to Festge's final audi-
torium proposal.
When Richard Lee confronted a similar situation, he
succeeded in forcing the recalcitrant department head,
Redevelopment Agency executive director Samuel Spielvogel,
to resign his position. Festge lacked the informal power
Lee used to control officials who were formally insulated
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from his control by civil service.
Whatever influence Festge did have was personalized. It
was the result of his Entrepreneurial personality rather than
any formal or informal powers at his command. This personal-
ized influence was sufficient to induce a reluctant Parks
Commission to approve the Olin auditorium proposal, but it
proved insufficient in persuading the Plan Department to do
likewise. Festge lacked the informal powers necessary to
battle the Plan Department which Lee found useful in his
challenge to New Haven's Board of Zoning Appeals.57
As the members of most of Madison's boards serve stag-
gered three to five year terms, a new mayor finds himself
usually dealing with bodies the majority of whose members he
did not appoint. Mayors in Madison must be re-elected before
they can be assured that the majority of any board will be
sympathetic to their program desires.
In Madison, politics are non-partisan, and parties
normally play only a small behind-the-scenes role at election
time. The absence of a strong party organization deprived
Festge of a reliable base of support for any plan he might
propose. Lee, in contrast, could usually depend on the
Democratic organization in New Haven to help build public
support behind a proposal independent of the merits of the
proposal:
Perhaps the most important extrinsic part of the
project coalition was the Democratic organization.
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While the machine's support produced the aldermanic
majorities that were essential to the project, this
support was not induced by favorable attitudes towards
Church Street redevelopment. Within very broad limits
...the organization supported Leets policies almost
irrespective of their substantive content. Many party
figures were indifferent to the mayor's policies and
at least a few were opposed to the scope of his urban
renewal program3 But policy was far less important
than patronage. 8
The importance of party organization to Lee is further under-
scored by the fact that the only major issue he lost was the
only one in which he was not given the party's full support.
The Democratic Party would have been so adversely affected by
Lee's proposed charter revision that it contributed to its
defeat by failing to work for it and sometimes even actively
opposing it during the referendum.59
The Situational Preconditions of Entrepreneurial
Leadership. The possibilities of mayoral influence are not
constrained solely by the partisan nature of a city's poli-
tics or the relative control of patronage resources avail-
able to the mayor. The actions a mayor will be successful in
taking are also a function of the predispositions of the other
political actors in the community. Dahl himself noted that
access to a sufficient amount of resources which a mayor
could pyramid to enhance his influence is only the first pre-
condition to the formation of an executive-centered coalition.
The second necessary condition for success, according to Dahl,
is that, "The policies of the political entrepreneur must not
provoke so strong a countermobilization that he exhausts his
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resources with no substantial increase in his influence."60
There must be a level of political quiescence in the community
which will allow a mayor to operate without having to face
strident opposition. An Entrepreneur can profitably maximize
the use of the resources available to him only if others are
not provoked to make better use of their "slack" resources
in opposition to his proposals. 6 1
Lee succeeded in his redevelopment program only because
a latent agreement existed in New Haven among the persons
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affected concerning the desirability of redevelopment. The
complete domination which Lee exhibited in the politics of
redevelopment could not be tried in other areas, such as
school affairs, where the degree of consensus was much
weaker:
In urban redevelopment, the constraints on centrali-
zation were weak. In public education, they were
much stronger; the area of latent agreement was less
inclusive, the opposition was more powerful, and
decisions were marked by extensive negotiation, con-
ciliation, and bargaining. 3
The Entrepreneurial approach to leadership proved a failure in
the only major issue Lee faced--the charter revision--where
latent agreement was totally lacking.
The situational necessities for successful Entrepreneurial
leadership were lacking in Madison on the auditorium issue.
Rather than being quiescent, other key political actors pulled
in the slack in the use of their resources. The Wisconsin
State Journal, Joe Jackson, Carroll Metzner, George Forster,
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Harold Rohr and others seized every opportunity to block a
downtown auditorium; The Capital Times, Wesley Peters and pro-
Terrace aldermen vociferously objected to the building of the
facility anywhere else. Festge could take no move without it
resulting in the countermobilization of one of the camps. In
such a polarized situation, bargaining could not produce a
broad enough consensus to establish a winning executive-
centered coalition.
The differences in the situational context between
New Haven redevelopment politics and the Madison auditorium
issue also helps explain why Festge could not use the Audi-
torium Committee to legitimize his program as Lee had used the
Citizens' Action Commission (CAC). The CAC was used as a
"selling organization" by Lee to both generate and bear wit-
ness to the public support for his redevelopment plans. 6 4  As
Dahl further notes:
The importance of the CAC in assuring acceptability for
the redevelopment program can hardly be overestimated.
The mere fact that the CAC existed and regularly
endorsed the proposals of the city administration
made the program appear nonpartisan, virtually nulli-
fied the effectiveness of partisan attacks, presented
to the public an appearance of power and responsibility
diffused among a representative group of community
notables, and inhibited criticisms of even the most
daring and ambitious parts of the program as
"unrealistic" or "unbusinesslike." Indeed, by creating
the CAC the Mayor virtually decapitated the opposition.
Though the members of the CAC represented the major centers of
influence and status in the community, they "never directly
initiated, opposed, vetoed, or altered any proposal brought
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before them by the Mayor and his Development Administrator,"
except for a few trivial instances.66
Lee was fortunate in that he was able to appoint a group
that would appear representative but which would still maintain
a consensus as to the need for urban renewal. The members of
the CAC "genuinely believed in the value of redevelopment;
they believed in it on grounds that made sense according to
their own predispositions. 67 Thus, Lee, despite the appear-
ance of mayoral dominance over the CAC, was never really put
in the position of having had to persuade the commission to
take any action with which it was not already in fundamental
agreement:
There is no indication in the interviews that the Mayor
and the redevelopment officials significantly altered
or even tried to alter the kinds of criteria the men
on the CAC brought to their judgments; probably the
most the Mayor and the redevelopment officials could
do was to sh w how, given these criteria, the proposal
made sense.60
In addition to lending prestige to Lee's redevelopment
plans, the CAC acted as a sounding board for the Mayor's
redevelopment initiatives. The commission was a valuable
mechanism not for settling disputes but for avoiding
them altogether. The Mayor and the Development
Administrator believed that whatever received the
full assent of the CAC would not strongly be opposed
by other elements in the community. Their estimate proved
to be correct. And the reason was probably not so much
the direct influence over public opinion of the CAC
collectively or its members individually, as it was
that the CAG was public opinion; that is, its members
represented an- reflected the main sources of articu-
late opinion in the political stratum of New Haven.
The Mayor and the Development Administrator used the
CAC to test the acceptability of their proposals to the
political stratum; in fact, the very existence of the
CAC and the seemingly ritualistic process of justifying
all proposals to its members meant that members of the
administration shaped their proposals according to what
they expected would receive the full support of the CAC
and therefore of the political stratum.b5
Because of the different situational context of the
Madison auditorium dispute, Festge could not create an
Auditorium Committee whose members he could be assured would
be favorable to his initiatives. Festge further sought to
create a committee whose purpose was to settle a decade long
dispute, and in the process legitimize the committee's recom-
mended proposal among all segments of the Madison community.
But the extreme conflict over the auditorium meant that if the
committee was to be truly representative of all sides in the
dispute--and this was a necessity if its recommendation was to
have widespread validity throughout the community--it would
itself be composed of members identified with all sides, and
as a result would become highly factionalized.
The Auditorium Committee members were not about to
"routinely" approve any of Festge's requests. And the Mayor
could not afford to take the tact of only submitting those
proposals on which he could be assured of the committee's sup-
port; such a strategy in a highly charged controversy would
only have resulted in the complete immobilization of the Mayor.
In the absence of any latent agreement, the Auditorium
Committee members and the city's political stratum could not
find the basis for a consensual approach to an auditorium.
82
CONCLUSION
Jeffrey Pressman in his article "The Preconditions of
Mayoral Leadership"70 called for an elaboration of the
personality and environmental prerequisites of effective
leadership. This chapter has made use of a comparative case
study approach in an attempt to more clearly isolate the pre-
conditions of success of one mayoral style--that of the
Entrepreneur. Both Richard Lee and Otto Festge had the per-
sonal dispositions for the extensive bargaining and general
level of activity which are characteristics of the Entrepre-
neurial leader. Similarly, both mayors attempted to reach
their goals by assembling a broad-based community coalition in
support of their program.
Both executives also operated in "weak-mayor" cities. In
both New Haven and Madison, city departments are run by boards
whose members are appointed to overlapping fixed terms; con-
trol over the city bureaucracies is thus one step removed from
the mayor's office. As the formal structure of municipal
government is essentially the same in the two cities, differ-
ences here do not explain Lee's relative degree of success as
compared to Festge's.
We might be tempted to find the explanation for the dif-
ferences in success enjoyed by the two mayors in the differ-
ences in tenure of their administrations. Festge's short
four years in office, as compared to Lee's phenomenal sixteen,
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meant that like most mayors he lacked the tenure to see his
projects through their completion.71 But this explanation is
too simple; whereas Lee made demonstrable progress on his
redevelopment plans in his early years,72 Festge in two terms
could bring Madison's auditorium no closer to realization than
it was when he first took office.
Lee enjoyed one clear advantage over Festge in assembling
overarching coalitions in that his program, urban renewal,
brought money into New Haven and hence was not seen to
threaten the average citizen. Festge's auditorium required
the spending of large sums of money--all to be reflected in
the local tax rate. Lee's program was a virtual gift-horse;
the costs of Festge's project only served to nurture the
opposition. 7 3
This chapter has shown that the differences in the degrees
of success experienced by Festge and Lee can further be attri-
buted to differences in the environment in which each
operated. Two environmental conditions appear essential for
Entrepreneurial success: (1) a partisan system which affords
a mayor the influence which accompanies sufficient patronage,
a strong party organization, and the ability to campaign as
the head of a party ticket, and (2) the absence of severe com-
munity conflict.
The bargaining advantages "partisan" resources afford may
be crucial to the success of the Entrepreneurial leadership
style. Without them a mayor becomes one among equals; without
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them he cannot place himself at the center of intersecting
circles; without them he cannot be assured that a coalition,
if one forms, will be executive-centered. In the absence of
these partisan resources Entrepreneurship becomes an inade-
quate approach to leadership.
The assembly of an executive-centered coalition also
becomes an impossibility in an issue marked by severe com-
munity polarization. The Entrepreneurial model is appropri-
ate only when conditions make bargaining a feasible strategy.
The "situation-restrictedness" of the Entrepreneurial model
was duly noted by Charles Levine and Clifford Kaufman:
It is unreasonable to expect a leadership structure,
such as an executive-centered coalition, that is
appropriate and effective in one context (in this
case, pluralist systems) to be feasible in all con-
texts. By failing to differentiate between contexts
and assuming a pluralist environment, the literature
on mayoral leadership has tended to promote one model
of mayoral leadership as preferable for all communi-
ties: the executive-centered coalition. Mayors have
been ranked--explicitly or implicitly--on a scale that
assumes the conflict patterns of all communities are
similar and that similar strategies should be equally
effective...74
In the absence of sufficient mayoral resources or in
contexts marked by rancorous conflict, leadership strate-
gies other than the Entrepreneurial approach are called for.
CHAPTER TBREE: THE MIXING OF LEADERSHIP STYLES
FESTGE THE ENTREPRENEUR
The picture of Festge as an Entrepreneur is reaffirmed by
the observations of two members of the mayor's office:
Now he (Festge) knew how far he could go. He has
political philosophies as strong as anybody. But
he never pushed those philosophies after they became
unrealistic. He was never one of those guys who would
say "I'd rather go down losing and fight a good fight
... " Otto would take half a loaf and then come back
next year and get another quarter of the loaf, and then
the third year he'd come back and get the last quarter
and end up with the whole loaf.
There was the auditorium issue. Take that as an
example, although he wound up losing all of it...Otto
turned it around, settled an outstanding lawsuit...set
up a new auditorium committee, negotiated a new con-
tract with the Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation and got
that contract through the City Council over the most
vehement opposition. It was almost an unbelievable
bit of maneuvering...And he had to compromise from
here to hell and back to work that thing through.
That was probably the biggest problem in the first year
of his second term. It was a day to day thing keeping
shaky conditions together. Accommodating here, accom-
modating there; gain a foot and lose six inches; gain
another foot and lose six inches. He was the absolute
master.1
He had the ability to bring people together and
resolve issues very often coming up with what most
people would consider a compromise. He did through
this device get things done. His natural bent was to
try to convince the Council rather than use a steam-
roller tactic to try to get items through. Briefly,
he was a negotiator, a conciliator. He was a leader.
But, he very often, using the committee system and using
Council meetings as his method of accomplishing some-
thing, would spend a lot of time in that way, rather
than making a public pronouncement of as to what his
position was...
So I would typify him as being a very good con-
ciliator, a person who was able to bring opposing
86
forces together to get action out, resulting in a com-
promise of what he wanted iý the end. He was a prac-
tical mayor in that regard.
Negotiation, conciliation, and a consensual goal orientation
were hallmarks of the Festge style.
Festge further fits the Entrepreneurial mold in
"pyramiding" his resources. He depended on his personal
relations with other city actors in an effort to surmount the
paucity of power formally given him under Madison's weak
mayor charter. To this extent Festge established extremely
close relationships with the members of the City Council. He
not only left his door open to all aldermen but constantly
sought out meetings with both aldermen and city department
heads to iron out any differences between them that might have
arisen. To earn the obligations of the Council, the mayor
also gave each alderman the courtesy of being told whenever
any administrative action would affect their wards. To trans-
cend the formal limits to his powers, Festge also found it to
his advantage to engage in what Jeffrey Pressman has called
"social lobbying."3 The mayor would often adjourn with both
aldermen and newspaper reporters after Council meetings to a
nearby restaurant for an evening of pizza, card-playing, beer,
and gentle political discussion.
Festge, in short, was a political person. As with his
social appearances he was also quite assiduous in his homework,
and used this control over information, too, to his political
advantage, as one conservative alderman noted:
He (Festge) never went anywhere without his two
administrative assistants... He had full support
and lots of back-up information wherever he was and
whenever he made a presentation... Otto was very
thorough as far as detailing the impact of a budget
and where the money was coming from and where it was
going to be spent on.4
Festge's activism was not confined solely to the home
front. He was primarily responsible for the creation of the
Wisconsin Alliance of the Cities; and as the Alliance's presi-
dent he served actively in the campaign to get municipal tax
relief from the state government. He was also instrumental in
appealing to higher levels of governments for parks, housing,
and auditorium money for Madison.
Festge pursued certain program objectives; but in pur-
suing his priorities he sought to avoid or at least minimize
disintegrative conflict. Capital Times reporter and later-to-
be Festge aide Owen Coyle called Festge "Madison's Consensus
Mayor. " 5  Coalition-building through compromise was Festge's
basic tactic; and to this extent the creation of committees
was a hallmark of the Festge strategy. Committees were set up
to consider the questions of an auditorium, an East Side Hospi-
tal, reform of the city's administrative structure, reorgani-
zation of the finance area, and the length of bond issues and
city insurance practices.
Very often, Otto sold an idea through a committee--
whether it be a special committee he had appointed or
whether it be an existing regular committee. And
very often the public never knew if it was basically
Otto's idea or if it came from a committee. But he did
have a lot of influence. He had been county clerk for
many years and had become accustomed to the committee
system. It was his way of operating. 6
With a personal distaste for "strong-arm" tactics,
Festge rarely forced his will on a committee. He believed
that such imposition "only breeds trouble,, " 7 as direct mayoral
involvement would only serve to impede the committee's ability
to serve as a consensus builder. But this restraint on
direct mayoral intervention did not mean that Festge refrained
from paving the way for a committee, ascertaining whether or
not he had a majority on the committee sympathetic to his
desires, and through formal presentations, social lobbying,
and press statements otherwise making his committee members
aware of his desires.
Festge's actions concerning the length of the city bond
issue and the creation of a finance department are instruc-
tive. The mayor's major concern in the former area was that
if the city continued to issue twenty-year bonds, it would
soon reach its debt ceiling and would be unable to borrow for
future exigencies. Festge believed the problem could be
resolved by the speeded repayment of the loans--a process
which also had the additional advantage of reducing the total
amount the city had to pay in interest. These advantages,
Festge felt, outweighed the argument that people who used
improved facilities in the future should help bear the cost
of their improvement via the repayment of borrowed funds.
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A recommendation on the bond terms was to be made by the
Board of Estimates, a permanent city committee. Stories con-
cerning the mayor's interest in reducing the term of the bond
issues to ten years began appearing in the newspapers soon
after Festge took office. On June 1, 1965, a report prepared
by Festge aide Robert Corcoran showed that during the 1959-63
period, Madison's debt increased over 80% as compared to only
a 35% average increase for Wisconsin's ten other largest
cities. Corcoran commented that the report should also
"serve as a warning that the establishment of a city finance
department was the only logical method of supervising the
city's expenditure and revenue programs."8 Three days later
the Board of Estimates recommended the shortening of the bond
term in order to reduce interest payments, despite the imme-
diate impact such speeded up payment would have in raising
property taxes. Festge noted that new construction and
annexation would help offset the resulting mill rate increases.
At the same Council meeting that the bond term reduction
was approved, a special committee consisting of city depart-
ment heads, aldermen, business officials, and university
experts was charged with the task of recommending desirable
changes in city operations in the finance area. Under the
then existing system, nineteen separate divisions reported
directly to the mayor. Festge sought to combine eight of
them--assessor, auditor, city clerk, civil defense, person-
nel, purchasing, treasurer, and public welfare--under the
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direction of a director of finances. Again Festge aide
Corcoran publicly mentioned the desirability of the move,
noting that the proposed reorganization would "provide for
tighter administrative control."9 Corcoran also observed that
although Festge was awaiting the report of his finance com-
mittee before taking any action, the mayor had given no indi-
cation of being unreceptive to the reorganization proposal.
The new Finance Department was created early in Festge's
first term.
The cases just cited showed how Festge effectively used
committees to gather support behind innovations he saw as
desirable. In one case a permanent Council cmmittee and in
the other a specially established committee recommended what
the mayor wanted. Though the mayor avoided overt manipulation
of the committees, the way was paved for the desired committee
recommendation through both his own statements and those of a
member of his office.
The strategic use of committees is not the only evidence
of Festge 's consensual leadership orientation. Festge had to
deal with an experienced City Council which was not amenable
to blindly following the mayor's policy leads. As a result,
both Festge and his aides informally polled the Council to see
what chances he had of getting his projects approved; pro-
posals were shaped to accommodate the prevailing will of the
city legislature:
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Festge held meetings, informal luncheon sessions, once
a week before Council meetings where he tried to sound
out the Council to see whether a particular issue would
sail. If it wasn't going to go it wouldn't be brought
up. If the opposition was implacable, what was the use
of having a fight on the Council floor... If it was an
issue of some importance, pull it back six months and
see if you can't work out a compromise.10
Festge was a creature of consensus. He would feel out
the Council. He would know where the Council was going
before he would go... He would count the vote and he
would alter his proposals to conform with the Council.11
Festge was thus a pragmatic mayor who sought goal attainment
by finding a common ground on which all factions could agree:
My recollection is that he (Festge) was always continually
working for the compromise--the thing that would not only
pull a slim majority but a sizeable majority--with the
assumption being that if a thing goes through the Council
with a one-vote majority, that's not really consensus.
The split is still bad then. What you ought to do is
shoot for the majority of six or seven.12
A MORE COMPLEX MAYOR
To leave the picture of Festge here would be to distort
things as they really were. Too many respondents in the inter-
views, even Festge supporters, gave responses such as the
following, which, though reaffirming the picture of Festge's
consensual orientation, simply did not describe the mayor in
terms denoting Entrepreneurial direction:
A conservative alderman:
"I think he tried to be too much of a compromiser.
He tried to be friends with everybody. And I
don't think when you are at the top of city or
national or state government you're going to be
friends with everybody."
A moderate-liberal alderman:
"I think his weak point was his inability to make
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a decision and stick by it... When things got a little
hairy he would turn to compromise instead of making a
decision."
A conservative alderman:
"Probably his strong points and weak points will be
the same. I mean he operated by consensus and he
liked to see everybody happy. And itts great to
operate by consensus, but everybody can't be happy
... At times you have to be willing to take an
unpopular position."
A moderate-liberal alderman:
"His weaknesses were caving into pressure. You see he
was first a Democrat and then a mayor... He did cave
in several times to pressure from above and from below,
and he tried to be all things to all people."
A moderate alderman:
"His weakness would be was that he Just didn't know
how to say, 'No!"l13
This lack of a firm mayoral direction is also evident in that
a number of those persons interviewed felt that Festge had no
specific goals other than the building of an auditorium and
the smoothing over the abrupt relations between the mayor and
the Council which marked the terms of his predecessor. From
this point of view, Festge's reliance on committees was not
part of any grand strategy designed to sell the mayor's
policies, but was more an expression of the mayor's inability
to take a decisive stand on any matter.
Festge's Entrepreneurial failings can also be seen in his
disinclination to establish the same degree of control over
the city's administrative departments as had New Haven's
Richard Lee, 14 as indicated by the comments of one department
head, a Festge supporter:
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He himself (Festge) did not profess to be an expert
on transportation movement. He felt that as mayor,
-- the political leader of the community--he would be
more prudent, wise, politically safe perhaps, to fol-
low the advice and counsel of those employed in
salaried as well as citizens advisory positions...
Perhaps Mayor Festge was the last in a chain of four
mayors I served under who gave a great deal of
responsibility--to his administrators... Up until
that time everyone believed that the mayor was to
also ask for advice (from), rather than give advice
or too strong direction to city administrators.15
Festge was quite dependent on his department heads; he was
more inclined to seek advice from and delegate responsibility
to the city's administrators rather than attempt to establish
his clear authority over these civil-service protected offi-
cials. This is not to say that Festge provided absolutely no
direction for the city's department heads, but simply that his
respect for their expertise, coupled with a general unwilling-
ness to force his policy views on anyone, led him not to
exert the potential control he could have over the affairs of
the various departments. He did not pyramid his power in this
regard to the maximum extent possible:
He (Festge) did not pressure them (city department
heads). He disagreed with them, but it was up to them
to make their own recommendations and to stand up for
what they thought was right--even though he might be
awfully upset about it and use his own means to show
his dissatisfaction. He expected every man or woman
would be their own (man or woman). This is not to say
that his administrative assistants over a number of
years...did not lever or push a number of department
heads .16
How can these contradictory interpretations of Festge's
style--as both Entrepreneur and as something less than an
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Entrepreneur--be accounted for? One possible explanation is
that the views of one of these camps is misleading. Either
Festge's staff was too close to, or his critics were too dis-
tant from, the mayor to see the real Otto Festge.
But yet, the argument advanced by both views can be seen
to be partially correct; Festge exhibited Entrepreneurial
leadership, but only inconsistently.
To more accurately determine Festge's general leadership
style, then, it becomes necessary to examine his actions as
mayor in a broader range of issues. Festge's Entrepreneurial
behavior on a number of matters has already been demonstrated.
Yet, if issues can be produced where Festge did not exhibit
Entrepreneurial behavior, it can be conclusively demonstrated
that Festge was not totally an Entrepreneur.
Festge's handling of two major issues--the 1968 school
budget and the demands of Madison's firefighters for wage
parity with the police--as well as his role in a less salient
matter--the building of the Murray Mall renewal project--will
be examined for the further insights they can give to Festge's
leadership behavior. The evidence, as will later be noted,
details a pattern of behavior that, while consensual in nature,
fails to exhibit the clearness of policy direction character-
istic of the Entrepreneur. The argument of a great part of
this chapter is that Entrepreneurship is an extremely arduous
and demanding style, and as such, a mayor will adopt the style
of Entrepreneurship only when his goals are so clear that he
becomes willing to spend his resources on such a leadership
approach.
Otto Festge and the 1968 School Budget. School politics
in Madison is almost totally divorced from the rest of city
politics. As the Madison Board of Education is elected, not
appointed, its members are not beholden to the mayor or any
other political official for their jobs. Their positions
being unsalaried provide few financial inducements; school
board members in Madison serve from a sense of civic responsi-
bility.
All educational matters are the sole province of the
school board save one: the total size of the school budget.
The total size of the school budget, but not the determination
of line by line appropriations, must be reviewed by the
Madison Board of Estimates and finally passed on by the Joint
Fiscal Control Group. Madison aldermen constitute 22 of the
28 person membership of this fiscal authority; the Group's
other six members represent the smaller neighboring communi-
ties that join with Madison to make up school districts.
Board of Education members have not looked kindly upon
city interference in the operation of Madison's schools, with
the result being that, other than at budget time, mayors have
for the most part found it politically expedient to stay out
of school matters. Otto Festge did not attempt to extend his
influence to educational matters other than the budget. He
remained, for example, totally uninvolved in such matters as
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the closing of Central High School--despite a petition with
over 1,000 signatures asking him to appoint a committee to
study the matter--and the appointment of a new school superin-
tendent.
As a former teacher, Festge was basically a pro-
education person inclined to look quite favorably on spending
for educational purposes. Most respondents saw Festge
generally as a defender of school budget requests. The only
qualification that must be made is that Festge's long experi-
ence as county clerk also gave the mayor an awareness of the
political saliency of taxes and the need for fiscal responsi-
bility at budget time. Whatever control over school spending
was to take place was to be accomplished by the mayor or his
finance department's getting a handle on the preparation of
the school budget--a tactic ignored in previous administra-
tions--not by public confrontations with the school board. On
the whole, though, Festge was more pro- than anti-school
spending.
One other item necessary to explain Festge's position on
school spending is an understanding as to the relative condi-
tion of educational programs and city services at the time
Festge took office. Festge's conservative predecessor had
avoided tax increases by severely curtailing city services; he
did not, though, similarly challenge the educational budget
due to the popularity of the programs entailed in the latter.
If Festge was to revitalize traditional services while at the
same time keeping mill rate raises to a minimum, large
increases in the school budget could not be tolerated.
In the 1966 budget Festge was able to keep the overall
property tax increase to three mills without making major cuts
in the school budget. With an estimated overall eight mill
increase needed to cover the 1967 budget requests Festge
noted, "There will have to be major cuts."nl 7 The increase was
kept to two mills overall, with, once again, no major chunk
taken out of the school budget. Meetings between the Board
of Estimates and the Board of Education resulted in a cut in
the proposed tax increase for educational purposes by only
0.3 mills--from 1.8 to 1.5 mills.18
Rising city taxes were obviously on Festge's mind at the
beginning of his second term. The "fiscal irresponsibility"
of the five mill increase of his first two years was the
dominant, if not the only, issue of the 1969 mayoral election
which Festge narrowly survived by only 62 votes (a victory mar-
gin of less than 0.5%). Festge readily admitted that increas-
ing taxes led to his declining popularity, and in a speech to
the incoming City Council vowed to hold the line on taxes.
With spending for education accounting for 26 of the 47 mills
in 1967, the school budget was a likely candidate for new
economies for 1968.
The problem Festge faced was that spending controls in
the educational area could not be unilaterally imposed by the
city as the Joint Fiscal Control Group could only set the
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absolute size of the school budget. As the Board of Education
determines where the outs would come from, there was no assur-
ance that the Board of Education would chop the budget in the
places the Joint Fiscal Control Group desired. Cooperation
between city and school officials was a necessity if a
mutually acceptable budget was to be formulated. In the
spirit of cooperation, a member of the city's finance depart-
ment was allowed to attend budget preparation sessions by the
school board in order to improve the city's understanding of a
document that for the most part remained obscure to city offi-
cials.
At the end of October 1967 Festge publicly announced that
he would recommend acceptance of a $25.4 million school budget
worked out with the Board of Education which reflected
increases resulting only from inflation, increased teachers
salaries, and a larger school population. No new educational
programs were asked for. The mayor acknowledged that he was
impressed with the thought that went into the preparation of
the budget and the cooperation between city and school offi-
cials on the matter. 1 9
But within two weeks Festge reversed his position, as a
unanimous Board of Estimates, with Festge as its nonvoting
chairman, proposed cuts in the school budget totalling
$500,000. The total tax increase for 1968 would be kept to
one mill with the increase resulting for areas (county, voca-
tional school, and sewerage district levies) over which the
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city had no control.20
The school board's reaction was predictably furious. One
board member attacked the mayor for talking "out of both sides
of his mouth,"21 and another threatened to take steps to
establish a fiscally independent school district. School
Superintendent Douglas Ritchie responded, as any politically
sophisticated school official would have, by indicating that
the cuts would have to be made by curtailing such visible and
popular programs as summer sessions, lunch monitoring, school
crossing supervision, and adult recreation activities--as well
as by closing all schools at 4:30 PM daily. An extensive
lobbying effort was initiated; every attempt was made to gath-
er citizen support and to turn out large numbers of both
angry teachers and parents before the Joint Fiscal Control
Group's budget meeting.
Public sentiment had been aroused to restore the money
cut from the school budget.22 Before what The Capital Times
then reported to be the largest crowd ever to attend a
Council meeting, the city restored the funds. Festge hoped to
cover the higher level of spending and still hold the line on
property taxes by enacting two new taxes--the room tax and
wheel tax--the state allowed the city.
But Festge's problems did not end here as the State
Attorney General ruled the city did not have the authority to
enact Festge's proposed nine dollar auto tax until the first
of the new year. Festge tried to circumvent this new tangle
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by calling a special Council meeting for the purpose of
adopting a resolution of intent to adopt the auto fee. But
the Council refused either to support the regressive wheel tax
or to raise property taxes any further and instead, faced with
a $550,000 deficit, rescinded its previous budget action.
Festge vetoed the rescission in order to insure that city
employees would continue to receive their paychecks during the
first weeks of the new year. The budget crisis was finally
resolved when a change in garbage collection procedures
enabled a budget reduction of the $550,000 in question.
The vacillation the mayor showed on the school budget--
first backing the proposed budget, then acquiescing to the
Board of Estimates' cuts, and finally searching for new
sources of finance to support the restoration of the funds--is
inconsistent with the firmness of direction that is charac-
teristic of the Entrepreneur. Two not completely alternative
explanations of Festge's actions can be offered. The first is
given by the mayor himself.
This was the first year that I prepared an executive
budget. In other years, the requests would come in,
the Board of Estimates would meet and morning after
morning the good citizens of Madison would pick up the
newspapers and see "Board of Estimates slashes
$100,000"...and everybody would think, "Say, those
aldermen are great guys. Think of what they're saving
the city..."
We prepared an executive budget and when it went
to the Finance Committee (Board of Estimates) it was
already down to bare bones...Budget after budget I
would have to say, "Look, fellows. You can't cut
this because it's been cut down. And here we are--
this is the bare bones. And if you're going to out
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anything, you're going to have to cut staff; you'll
have to cut out programs." And I could see they werejust frustrated over the prospects of having no news
stories the next morning on how much they had cut
the budget.
So when we got to the Board of Education budget and
somebody made the motion that we cut $500,000 of the
Board of Education budget, I didn't argue, of course,
because I had felt there were sufficient votes to sus-
tain it (to keep the budget at the level previously
agreed upon). That was one time I guessed wrong.23
According to this view, then, Festge supported the budget
worked out with School Superintendent Ritchie, and the nega-
tive vote of the board of Estimates was the result of simple
mayoral miscalculation. But this explanation seems to be less
than complete. If as Festge has noted the aldermen were
"frustrated" at the prospect of having no budget cuts to make,
an attempt at Council budget cutting should have been antici-
pated. Furthermore it seems implausible that a mayor who
continually sounded out the attitudes of his Council members
would be unaware of their feelings toward such an important
issue as the school budget. The Board of Estimates' vote
could not have been the surprise that Festge in retrospect
would have us believe.
The second, and to a great extent complementary, view
also sees the $500,000 to be more the Board of Estimates'
rather than Festge's doing. But according to this view
Festge's short-live acquiescence to the cuts is not simply
the result of miscalculation but the caving in of the mayor to
a board composed of a number of strong-willed aldermen. The
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mayor simply "could not say no"; he was trying to keep every-
body happy. And as a result, for a short period of time, his
policy preferences were supplanted by those of the Board of
Estimates. Such action is more consistent with a low-
direction mayoral style rather than Entrepreneurship. Only
after Festge's pro-school orientation re-emerged did the mayor
join in the lobby effort for the restoration of the cuts.
One final observation concerning the mayor's role in the
budget crisis can also be made. The Entrepreneur avoids power
costly conflict by advancing only those proposals behind which
a consensus can be mobilized. Festge's attempt to enact the
wheel tax--a move so unpopular it drew the fire of the morning
paper and could not gain Council acceptance--is atypical of
Entrepreneurship.
Festge's approach in the final stages of the controversy,
was more Integrationist than Entrepreneurial. Even if the
presence of a consensus could not be ascertained in advance,
it was necessary for the mayor to take action to prevent any
further expansion of the conflict and the costs that it might
impose on his power. The crisis of being unable to pay city
employees in the absence of a budget had to be avoided. Yet a
cut in the school budget or any major program would result in
a loss of part of the mayor's constituency. The search for
new sources of funds was an attempt to integrate the community
by finding some ground which would satisfy both the school
spending backers and the mill rate watchers. Even if advocacy
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of the wheel tax was power costly in the short run, it might
prevent the further drain on the mayor's power that a bitter
budget fight in the new year might produce. When the wheel
tax failed to be the successful middle ground, the savings
from modified garbage collection procedures proved to be the
magic stone that ended the conflict.
The Mayor and the Murray Mall Renewal Project. Festge's
adoption of the Integrationist style apparent in the latter
stages of the 1968 school budget controversy is also evident
in his handling of the dispute over the proposed Murray Mall
project. The University of Wisconsin, in a period of growth
in the 1960's, found itself expanding to the south of its
previous border, University Avenue. The University wanted
the 700 and 800 blocks of University Avenue for the construc-
tion of a communications arts center, student dormitories, and
a shopping mall. The only problem with the vision was that
the merchants on these blocks did not want to be relocated to
make way for the project. The businessmen, fearing they would
not be able to return to their former locations under the
University proposal, petitioned the city to help develop a
project where they could be part owners, not just tenants.
Festge revitalized the dormant City/University Coordinating
Committee to hash out the problems. Both the city and the
University needed the cooperation of one another if any plan
was to succeed: the city could not get federal funds for
redevelopment of the area without University approval; the
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University needed the city not only to buy and clear the land
for them at a written down cost but also to vacate the inter-
vening street, MIurray Street.
Some very hard negotiations between the city and Univer-
sity began in May of 1965. A compromise was finally con-
structed a half year later when the project was expanded to
include the 600 and 900 blocks of University Avenue as well.
The University was to get the 800 block for the site of the
proposed communication arts building--its major interest in
the area--and the 900 block; the other two blocks would be
the province of the private businesses. The shopping center
in the 700 block was to be developed by a corporation formed
by the area businessmen, not the University. 24  The mayor then
met with the businessmen concerned to sell them on the idea.
Festge's approach to the controversy was clearly
Integrationist. Instead of acting on his own goals, he
reacted to the pressure from others--in this case the mer-
chants--and effected a workable compromise for everyone con-
cerned. As a result of this "pre-emptive" action the
merchant's fears were qualmed, the mayor's standing with the
University was preserved and the controversy over the area
never blossomed into the disintegrative struggle that was so
characteristic of the city's attempt during his predecessor's
term to cope with University expansion.25
Festge and the Parity Issue. During Otto Festge's
administration major steps were taken to professionalize the
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city's police department. Under an agreement negotiated by
nationally known mediator Nathan Feinsinger, various incen-
tives were built into the pay structure to encourage policemen
to take advantage of the various training and educational
opportunities available to them.
As is the case in most major American cities, and
Madison was no exception, city firemen argue that as their
work is no less hazardous than a policeman's job they deserve
parity with the wages given the police. In October of 1968,
late in Festge's second term, the city's firemen began a call-
in-sick move to enhance their bargaining position in contract
talks with the city. The firemen were seeking parity with the
police who had received an increase of slightly over $100 a
month under Feinsinger's recommendation. The Council
Bargaining Team countered with an offer of salary and retire-
ment fund increases totalling to a $68 package.26 With a work
slowdown in progress and Firefighters Local President Ed
Durkin hinting at the possibility of strike action--illegal
under state law--the two sides met continuously until a
settlement could be reached. The firefighters voted to strike
on November 15 if the city did not increase its offer by that
time.
As the sick-in continued, Festge called an emergency
Council meeting to get authority to "take the necessary legal
action" to stop the slowdown. The authorization was attained,
and a court order was served on the city's 262 firemen
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prohibiting them from striking in any guise, including
absenteeism or a sick-in. The reaction of Captain Durkin
to the mayor's move was predictable: "Nothing done by the
mayor is inducive to creating pride, dedication, or self-
respect in any firefighter."27 In spurning the city's offer
to submit the dispute to fact finding, Durkin made clear what
he saw the mayor's position to be: "The mayor and bargaining
committee have taken a stand to create unequal pay between
firemen and policemen."28 Durkin announced his intention to
strike despite the injunction.
Festge introduced one compromise wage proposal which was
accepted by the union but rejected by the city bargaining
team. A wage agreement was finally reached on October 9 which
added $30 to the city's original offer in the form of a $70
a month wage hike, a 2.25% retirement fund increase and job
reclassification--giving firemen virtually the equivalent of
the police package, but not formal parity.29
The proposal still had to be ratified by the City
Council in the beginning of the next year. The week after the
firefighter agreement had been negotiated, two-thirds of
Madison's street, sanitation, garage, and engineering
employees called their own sick-in as a means of gaining
leverage in their own contract negotiations. The disruption
of the city's services due to increased labor militancy and
the inflationary effect it had on the city's tax rate, coupled
with a remembrance of how narrowly he had won the past
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election, led Festge to decide not to run for a third term in
the spring election.
In the meantime Festge sought and received Council
authorization to dock the salaries of all firefighters who
participated in the sick-in. Durkin was outraged at what he
saw to be "retaliatory action... a very regressive move"30 by
the mayor, and he threatened a strike if contract negotiations
were not reopened to settle the matter. But Festge insisted
that bargaining with the firefighters was "through" and that
disciplinary action was solely an administrative matter.31 A
court order refraining Madison from docking the salaries of
the firemen in question kept the controversy from evolving to
the strike stage.
But it seemed that there had never really been a clear
understanding as to what was negotiated in October. At the
end of February of 1969, the Council narrowly turned down a
new move recommending parity--a resolution which had Festge's
strong support--choosing to back the bargaining team's version
instead. Durkin accused the head of the city bargaining team
of going back on the verbal deal made the previous November.
With less than three weeks to go in Festge's administration,
the firemen struck,forcing the closing of Madison's schools
as a safety precaution.
An emergency meeting of the City Council authorized the
mayor to seek an injunction against the strike. But Festge
at first refused, choosing instead to continue bargaining
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sessions throughout the day.32 A court order was finally
obtained the next day; but despite the action the firemen
remained off the job. The dispute was finally settled the day
before the city election by presenting the firemen an offer
under which they received only one cent an hour less than the
police.33
Firemen in Madison are far better organized than the
police. The firefighters not only turned out in number for
the Council meetings of concern to them but made a continuous,
concentrated effort to lobby individual aldermen at their
homes. The one cent difference was merely a sop thrown to
the police who had put some pressure on the Council to oppose
the parity move.
Two fairly satisfactory explanations of Festge's
behavior on the parity issue can be deduced. Both, though,
present Festge as taking courses of action inconsistent with
the style of the Entrepreneur. The first explanation of
Festge's behavior is offered by two Councilmen directly
involved in the controversy:
In characteristic fashion, he (Festge) initially backed
up the recommendation of the bargaining committee that
the police be paid a substantial amount more than the
firemen, but that we should upgrade immeasurably the
standards of the police department... That was his
initial recommendation. However, as he got more and
more pressure from Durkin and the labor union he
started to dwindle.. The Council was initially behind
the bargaining committee and (alderman and union repre-
sentative) Leo Cooper was added to the bargaining com-
mittee to put another labor vote in there... Festge
was getting so much pressure from the Democratic party
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to grant parity due to the strenuous lobby and public
efforts of the firefighters...
That was his chief problem. He wanted to be all
things to all men...He would say (to the city's bar-
gaining committee), "Be as tough as you cani Get in
there and fight1"n...Then he would get the pressure
from the other side and say, "Give in to them (the
firefighters). "34
When it came to difficult decisions, he (Festge) tended
to take the line of where the most pressure (was coming
from) rather than what is right.
I can give you an example...I think it was on the
contract negotiations with the police and the firemen
which resulted in a strike--the first and only strike
by firemen in the city of Madison...They (the firemen)
couldn't get it (the desired contract) by negotiations,
so they brought it right on the Council floor, which we
thought was wrong. But the mayor permitted that.
Negotiations were right on the Council floor, which I
thought was wrong and silly. And negotiations dragged
on and on.
There were 200 firemen up there. I don't know who
was manning the stations...I recall there were verbal
brickbats thrown at me and other councilmen who opposed
the increase in wages to what they wanted...at least
until that time a majority of the Council felt the
demands exceeded what the Council wanted to give.
So at twelve o'clock noon, they announced they had
gone on strike. So at the time the mayor--at least
before that time, the mayor--was reasonably with the
Council in trying to prevent that. But all of a sudden
the pressure was on. "We can't have a strike," (said
Festge). And I said, "Why can't we." And he said, "We
can't have one. Think of what will happen if we had a
major fire."
... the pressure then came to give in, to vote for the
contract. I guess the Mayor bit the bullet there; but
he bit it the wrong wy...That pressure would produce
that sort of result.3>
The picture of Otto Festge in this case is that of a mayor
who had no clear policy preferences of his own and who thus
110
caved into pressure--tendencies quite uncharacteristic of
Entrepreneurship. Despite his pro-labor attitudes in
general, Festge was not initially inclined to acquiesce to
all the firefighters' demands. The mayor even attempted to
discipline those firemen who participated in the sick-in,
despite the possibility of a strike such a move might bring.
But when the pressure from the firemen got too great, Festge
ignored any doubts he had concerning parity. The one cent
difference in wages was kept only as the result of the lobby-
ing action on behalf of the police. Festge acted as a
weathervane responding to the prevailing political wind. In
the parity debate, he exhibited elements of both Brokership
and Caretakership.
The second explanation of Festge's actions basically
rises from the beliefs of many of the respondents that Festge
was essentially pro-parity. But parity was not the only goal
the mayor valued; he also desired a stable tax rate. Festge
was caught between and immobilized by his holding of goals
which were at least partially contradictory. Faced with this
sort of conflict, Festge, rather than choosing his preferred
solution and attempting to construct a coalition behind it,
merely sought to find some middle ground where the parties
concerned could come to an agreement.
This failure to resolve incongruous goals can account for
the inconsistencies in the mayor's actions. When his tax con-
sciousness prevailed the mayor's line on bargaining was much
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harder, and little sympathy was shown to labor; the sick-in
callers were punished despite the union's protests. But when
this value receded under the pressure of the firefighter's
lobbying power, the mayor's labor sympathies re-emerged and
he became a parity proponent.
THE COMPLEXITIES OF STYLE AND THE MISUSES OF TYPOLOGIES
Otto Festge's political style thus appears to be quite
a bit more complex than a review of his actions in the pre-
vious chapter seemed to have indicated. Rather than being
totally the Entrepreneur, Festge also appears to be quite a
bit the Broker and Integrationist. This sort of mixing of
leadership styles should have been reasonably expected. Real
human beings are a composite of many different and often con-
flicting motivations and drives. Erwin Hargrove essentially
makes this point in his critique of James David Barber's use
of psychological-based types to classify presidential
character:
These are ideal types and, as such, seldom fit
individuals in their richness. Since we are all
creatures of mixed feelings and uneven development,
it is likely that many of us, including politicians,
are some combination of positive and negative atti-
tudes towards the self.36
If individuals are a repository of complex factors, the
use of ideal-types to represent a political actor's style is
a distortion of reality. Typologies serve useful purposes in
aiding our understanding by specifying what elements of a
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complex reality are of consequence enough deserving of special
focus. But in selecting certain elements which become the
focus of analysis, other elements, possibly also important,
are ignored. The danger here is two-fold. First, the analyst
in his enthusiasm or naivety might mistake the ideal-type for
reality, and as a result slight other possible interpretations
as to why an actor behaved as he did, simply because the facts
necessary to the alternative interpretation were not high-
lighted by the typology. The theory underlying the typology
is not the only or total theory of human behavior. Second,
the analyst blinded by ideal-types might mistakenly force
actors into types when a thorough awareness of and investiga-
tion of the complex characteristics of their behavior might
cast doubt as to whether they should have been classified as
they had been.
Barber, it appears, has committed just the latter mistake.
By fitting his subjects into certain types in his enthusiasm
for demonstrating the explanatory power of his typology, he
has oversimplified and consequently misperceived their
actions. Hargrove again observes:
In my judgment neither Coolidge nor Eisenhower
belongs here (in the passive-negative type). Both
were much more politically ambitious than Barber
admits. Coolidge in particular was possessed by
political ambition. His passivity seems to have been
a deliberate style of leadership designed to draw
support. Eisenhower actually seems very close to an
active-positive. His personality was much freer of
kinks than that of Truman; one can find in him no
lack of self-esteem and very few, if any, instances
of ego-defensive behavior. He was certainly not as
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active and energetic a political leader as the active-
positive Presidents described by Barber, but this
may have been due to Eisenhower's conception of the
office, a role requiring restraint, rather than of
basic personality. Barber frankly admits that
Eisenhower is the most difficult of Presidents to
classify, but we are left with his feet dangling
over several boxes in the typology.37
Barber's typing of John Kennedy as an active-positive is a
blatant distortion of reality in its simplification. Bruce
Miroff takes offense to Barber's notions of Kennedy's healthy
personality; Miroff provides much documentation as to
Kennedy's narrowness of world-view, his desire for greatness,
and his consequent need to move from crisis to crisis--a pat-
tern which Barber insists is characteristic of the active-
negative.
The active-positive is supposed to learn from his experi-
ences, avoiding "rigidity" in thinking. Yet there is doubt as
to how much Kennedy really learned from the Bay of Pigs as
seen in his handling of the Cuban missile crisis. 39 The
option of a non-response, that is taking no action against the
missiles, was almost totally ruled out from the start. 4 0
Kennedy's preoccupation with action, vigor, toughness, prag-
matism, and America's mission in the cold war4 1 is inconsis-
tent with the open-mindedness and lack of rigidity that is
expected of an active-positive.
Barber's reliance on private statements by Kennedy indi-
cating his intentions to de-escalate the war after the 1964
election is a strained effort to explain away Kennedy's
114
Southeast Asian commitment. The fact is that Kennedy helped
escalate military action there and took few, if any, actions
to reverse this commitment.
And even if Kennedy had been fairly serious about his
intent to withdraw there would have been little to differen-
tiate him from other presidents, such as Johnson and Nixon,
on this score. As Daniel Ellsberg has so poignantly shown,
all presidents believed that "Now is not the right time to
withdraw;" there was always another election to wait for. 4 2
And on one final score Kennedy's promise must be criticized:
if he saw the war as a mistake, how moral was it to allow
more and more Asians and Americans to die while he waited out
the next election? Yet, Barber has ignored all this evidence
in shoe-horning a real Kennedy into an ideal-type.
The mistake that Barber has made with Kennedy, Coolidge,
and Eisenhower--and the mistake that all typologists must
avoid--lay with his failure to constantly realize that ideal-
types, despite their neuristic value, are only a simplified
version of reality. Hargrove again comments:
Perhaps the point is that "ideal types" must never be
confused with individuals. We must pick and choose
from the theory implicit in a typology as we seek to
explain an individual, but he must be explained ulti-
mately in his own unique terms. This is not to say
that the propositions derived from an abstract typology
and grouping of individuals are not helpful. They per-
mit us to see common threads in different persons...
The great risk in a typology is that we will be lazy,
relying on the type to explain the individual there-
by distorting individuality...In fact, a typology
is not a substitute for the very hard task of trying
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to understand an individual and in the process trying
to explain historical causation.43
We must be cautious, then, in how we use typologies.
Recognizing the possibility of individuality, an actor should
not be classified as fitting a general type unless the over-
whelming direction of the evidence gathered is such that it
mandates such action. In the case of Otto Festge, this
clearly was not the case. Festge, as noted at the beginning
of this section has behaved as an Entrepreneur, Integration-
ist, and Broker.
Festge's goal-oriented consensual approach in seeking to
build an auditorium and in the matter of the finance depart-
ment and the shortened bond terms fits nicely the Entrepreneur
model. The lack of direction and the waffling the mayor
exhibited on the 1968 school budget and parity matters would
seem to indicate the presence of Brokerage and even Caretaker
elements in his leadership style. And in acting to avert the
city's 1969 budget crisis and in finding a solution to the
Murray Mall project acceptable to both area businessmen and
the University, Festge took the Integrationist course of
heading off exacerbative conflict that might lead to dis-
satisfaction with his role from developing. It is thus impos-
sible to speak of one general Festge style; his approach varied
with the issue.
The Festge case, as analyzed here, then, represents one
possible way of avoiding the possible misuse of typologies.
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Individuals, being complex creatures, are likely to have dif-
fering dispositions towards different issues. If such is the
case, their means of approaching each issue can vary with the
issue. As a political actor may fall into a different cell of
a typology depending on what issue he is dealing with, it con-
sequently makes sense to first type these actors on an issue
by issue basis. Types describing an actor's style in general
should be avoided unless the case by case analysis indicates
a constant tendency for an actor to adopt one distinct poli-
tical style.
The possibilities of case by case variation must be
recognized. To observe an actor's general style is not to
have discovered how this actor has approached or will approach
each unique political situation.
THE CAUSATION OF STYLE ADOPTION
If a political actor's style can vary from issue to
issue, how can we explain why the actor adopts a particular
style on one issue and a different style on another issue?
Otto Festge's adoption of his various styles can be explained
by two factors: his different levels of goal orientations in
each situation.
Entrepreneurship emerges only in situations where a mayor
has definite objectives in mind. The mayor must have a clear
policy or program goal before assembling a broad overarching
coalition becomes a sensible strategy. Brokership would be a
less time and energy consuming consensual strategy for main-
taining a mayor's standing than is Entrepreneurship. Entre-
preneurship is worth the additional costs to a mayor only if
he is not content to pursue only those policies that have pre-
existing consensual backing.
Festge had specific policy objectives in mind in three of
the issues previously discussed--he wanted a Wright auditorium,
preferably at Monona Terrace;4 4 he wanted the terms of city
bonds reduced from twenty to ten years; and he wanted ration-
alized the structure of the city departments concerned with
finances. And it was in each of these that an Entrepreneurial
approach emerged. In each situation Festge used whatever
formal and informal resources were at his disposal to try to
establish the broadest support for each of these projects and
programs.
When a mayor's goal orientation subsides, so corres-
pondingly does his tendency to adopt the Entrepreneurial
approach. Such is the case where a mayor must choose between
conflicting goals. If the mayor cannot choose he either
becomes immobilized and lets other actors determine the out-
come of events, or, alternatively, he starts rolling with the
punches with whichever side happens to be exerting the
strongest influence at the moment. The latter was the case in
the 1968 school budget, where Festge "flip-flopped" his posi-
tions at one point as a result of the tensions between his tax
suppressant and educational advocacy orientation.
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The East Side Hospital case is another example of where
conflicting mayoral goals inhibited the mayor from taking any
clear action. Festge was at once both sympathetic to East
Siders, who demanded the construction of a hospital on their
side of town, and aware of the possibility that existing hos-
pitals in the central city and near West Side could adequately
continue to serve the East Side making the construction of a
new facility an expensive luxury. Festge's mixed feelings on
the subject was seen in his desire to have a private or reli-
gious organization build the facility, rather than having the
city get involved in hospital construction.4 5 When the
unlikelihood of private action became apparent, Festge
appointed a committee of hospital administrators and doctors
to choose an appropriate site--and apparent Entrepreneurial
means of gaining public legitimacy for the project. Festge's
leadership even extended to the actual acquisition of a site.
But it was here in the latter part of his first term that the
project stalled as Festge began to look upon finances as the
city's number one problem--a problem which adversely affected
the city's ability to build a new hospital.46
The Murray Mall controversy is still another instance
where Festge's approach was non-entrepreneurial as he lacked
specific objectives of his own. His intervention in the mat-
ter was a response to the demands of the area merchants; the
mayor was reactive. Acting in Integrationist fashion, the
mayor sought a solution--the expansion of the scope of the
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project--that was fairly satisfactory to both sides, and would
thus prevent the exacerbation of disintegrative conflict. In
order to maintain his standing with both University officials
and the local businessmen, a way had to be found to allow
University expansion without freezing the merchants out of
the area. Such prophylactic action helped preserve the
mayor's stock of influence.
The second condition leading to a mayor's tendency to
stray from the Entrepreneurial pattern of leadership--the
presence of conflict and pressure--is most clearly seen in
Festge's action in the school budget and parity issues; the
mayor wavered when the pressure was on. Even in the auditori-
um issue where Festge's general approach was Entrepreneurial,
elements of Brokership still emerge. Thus at one point
Pestge is willing to allow the auditorium committee to select
a site outside Monona Terrace. Though Festge may have tempo-
rarily abdicated giving direction in the selection of a site,
the mayor never abandoned his primary goal--the building of a
Wright designed facility somewhere. And Festge's personal
commitment on this issue was so strong that action in pursuit
of his original goal--the construction of a Wright auditorium
at Monona Terrace--was soon reasserted.
If conflict and pressure lead to a disinclination to
employ the Entrepreneurial style, how can we explain why
Festge generally adopted such an approach to the auditorium
issue, where community polarization was quite evident? The
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reason simply is that Festge's goal orientation was so strong
that he continued to pursue his goal despite the political
pressures he was subjected to. In determining when an actor
will employ the Entrepreneurial style, then, well-defined
goal orientations take precedence over the degree of conflict
present. A motivated mayor will not be defrayed from pursuing
his goal by countervailing forces; the mayor with doubt or
insufficient motivation, however, will falter.
No political actor, it appears, can adopt an Entrepre-
neurial approach to all issues. The Entrepreneurial approach
to an issue requires a definite sense of purpose as well as
the commitment of a good deal of the politician's time,
energy, and other power resources in the pursuit of the
desired goal. But a mayor, as is true of all politicians, has
only a limited "stock" of time, energy, and other power
resources. All issues cannot be given Entrepreneurial atten-
tion and investment of resources. With his major efforts con-
centrated in these select areas, other issues will be sub-
jected to relatively less initiative, supervision and mayoral
direction. Consequently it is a misnomer to describe a poli-
tician as an Entrepreneur. A meticulously correct descrip-
tion must be much more limited; a politician is an Entrepreneur
only so far as issues X, Y, and Z are concerned. Issues A, B,
and C are of less personal interest to him, and Entrepreneur-
ship fades.
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TYPOLOGIES AS PERCEPTUAL LENSES
If a misrepresentation of reality results when we try to
force the individual into the ideal-type, how then should
typologies be properly used? One way, which has already been
pointed out, is to type an individual according to his actions
and orientations in each separate issue area. Only if a pat-
tern of action is repeated across a number of areas can a type
be reasonably applied to describe an actor's general leader-
ship style.
One other proper employment of a typology would be in
its use as a perceptual lens. In a typology of leadership
styles the ideal types represent model strategies which an
actor might possibly adopt in particular cases. The different
types then give the analyst different frameworks by which to
order into a sensible pattern the actions he actually
observes. There is no necessarily one "right" lens to be used
to explain each particular case. The use of different lenses
puts the actions of the individual in different lights;
alternative--sometimes competing, sometimes complementary--
plausible explanations of behavior can then be established.
Types then should be used as a means of gaining insight
into a person's actions in a particular case; the different
types can be employed or discarded in each separate issue area
according to their apparent ability or inability to explain
observed events. No attempt should be made to force the
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individual to "fit" a particular lens; his actions may better
be explained by the use of another type. Very seldom, if
ever, will the use of any type of lens totally explain an
individual's behavior in all instances.
Graham Allison has successfully employed three different
perceptual models to explain the actions of both the Soviets
and the Americans during the Cuban missile crisis.47 Simi-
larly, Theodore Marmor has relied upon Allisont s models in
order to derive explanations of why Medicare took the shape it
did. 4 8 None of the three models provides the definitive
answer to the question as to why the Soviets or Americans
acted as they did, or why Medicare took the final shape it did
when it did; but each of the models does make its own contri-
bution to explanation and analysis:
The three models are obviously not exclusive alterna-
tives. Indeed, the paradigms highlight the partial
emphasis of each framework--what each magnifies and
what it leaves out, Each concentrates on one class of
variables, in effect, relegating other important fac-
tors to a ceteris paribus clause. The models can
therefore be understood as building blocks in a larger
model of the determinants of outcomes.49
Just as Allison used three models to build an understand-
ing of international relations, the nine types entailed in the
typology of mayoral styles listed in Chapter One (Table 1) can
be used as perceptual lenses in aiding our comprehension of
mayoral actions. Each of the ideal types represents a simpli-
fied model of mayoral action; each assumes that a mayor will
act consistent with assumptions concerning a certain level of
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goal orientation, task accomplishment and coalition mainten-
ance. All that remains is focusing each model on actual
events and determining how well it orders the actions
observed.
A political head's actions must be viewed through all the
lenses in order to see what contribution each can make--or, to
put it another way, what fragments from each style a mayor has
fused together in his own particular style. Festge's actions
on the auditorium controversy will serve as a brief case in
point. Four models--the Ceremonial, Caretaker, Personality/
Individualist, and Ideologue--olearly provide little clue to
Festge's behavior as concerns the auditorium issue. Festge
clearly did not confine his activities to ceremonial duties
on the provision of basic city service. Furthermore,
Festge's willingness to compromise and to work with committees
is inconsistent with the "lone-wolf" style of operations of
the maverick or Ideologue.
The use of the Executive model focuses on the mayor's
reliance on his formal powers to control the city bureau-
cracy. This model would tend to focus on the tactics Festge
used to control the Parks Commission, Plan Commission, and the
Public Works Department. It underscores a valuable but only a
partial approach that Festge took to the auditorium issue; his
means of gathering support far surpassed the simple mobiliza-
tion of his executive resources.
The Partisan is willing to do battle for his cause. But
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as Festge exhibited a great unwillingness to do battle, always
choosing to compromise to gain consensual action instead, the
Partisan model has limited applicability here. Only in the
final days of his administration, when he finally realized
that he either had to fight or lose his last chance to get the
project through, did Festge start to battle for his auditorium.
But with only so few days left in office, Festge lacked the
ability to apply sanctions on the aldermen on behalf of his
auditorium.
It is two of the broad based coalition models that best
explain Festge's actions on the auditorium issue as Festge
operated almost totally from the perspective of consensus.
When this concern for consensus was accompanied by strong goal
orientations the result was Entrepreneurship. When in the
midst of constant political difficulty, the mayor's will some-
times faltered the result was a temporary emergence of
Brokership, with the initiative passing to others. There did
not seem to be any particular instance where Festge clearly
offered an Integrationist solution to avoid disintegrative
conflict--the reason for this was that the mayor was not
content to act to simply preserve his power, but had a defi-
nite project goal in the building of an auditorium which deter-
mined his course of action.
The spurious depiction of Festge generally as a political
Entrepreneur was avoided by examining his actions in a number
of issue areas through the careful application of each of the
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perceptual models. If the analyst carefully transposes each
of the ideal types on the reality, he cannot but note the
possible variations in an actor's style, not only from one
issue area to another, but even within a particular issue
area.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE IDEOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP OF WILLIAM DYKE
William Dyke and Otto Festge were two totally different
types of mayors. Festge was a liberal, long-time Democrat,
who came to the mayoralty only after considerable executive
experience in county government. Dyke, in contrast, was an
attorney active in conservative Republican circles; the
mayoralty was the first really important public office Dyke
held. Whereas Festge had the image of being an "old pol,"
Dyke gave the appearance of being a citizen in politics.
In 1965 Dyke sprang out of virtual obscurity on the
Madison scene by finishing third in the mayoral primary. Two
years later, "Dyke plunged into the race at the last minute
noting that no one else had come forward"1 to take on incum-
bent Otto Festge. This time Dyke sharply defined his image,
making Festge's tax raises the major issue of the campaign.
To the surprise of most Madison observors, Dyke almost won--
he missed by a bare 62 votes!
In 1969, with Festge stepping down under the pressure of
the tax issue, Dyke took on liberal alderman and prominent
local Democrat Robert (Toby) Reynolds, Jr. Again the issue
was taxes, with Dyke relentlessly attacking the Festge admin-
istration as "the four most expensive years in Madison's
history.n"2 Though formally nonpartisan, Madison's elections
have exhibited a fair degree of bifactionalism. Dyke had
Republican support and the endorsement of the conservative
127
Wisconsin State Journal. Reynolds countered with the support
of Democratic and labor groups and the endorsement of the
liberal Capital Times, but he also bore the onus of the tax-
payer's reaction to Festge. Dyke won easily, with his best
support coming from the city's wealthier areas on the West and
far East sides.
The new mayor's major assets were his good looks,
speaking ability (he had once hosted a children's television
show), and a personality with which he could charm anyone if
he chose to do so. Dyke was also a man of great political
ambitions who had his eye on the governorship--he eventually
received the Republican gubernatorial nomination in 1974
despite his defeat a year and a half earlier in his bid for a
third mayoral term.
Dyke saw his term in office as a chance to make Madison
"unique among cities." 3 His overall policy preferences were
strongly conservative, He sought to run city government as
efficiently as possible, to impose a tight management system
on municipal operations, to restrain the city from engaging in
costly activities which he saw to be clearly in the domain of
the private sector, and to make Madison a morally decent place
in which to live--the latter priority as born witness to his
highly visible actions directed against the city's "go-go"
joints. Dyke envisioned Madison, with its physical beauty and
government and university resources, becoming a very special
model city--"a city of culture, and not culture from the
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standpoint of being willing to call 'garbage-can-arti art."
Dyke was not a passive executive content simply to run what
existed in Madison as efficiently as possible; he was an
aetive mayor who sought to reorient the functionings of city
hall in a manner consistent with his conservative policy
preferences.
But just as important as his policy orientations was the
mode of operation Dyke sought to bring to the mayor's office.
Dyke rejected what he labeled Festge's "government by good
guy"5 style of governing:
My motivation was that I felt Otto Festge was an inept
administrator as county clerk...and while he was
effectively functioning (as mayor) in the old-fashioned
county manner--that is of basically secret meetings,
connivances, log-rolling, and so on--he had an almost
total inability to move a community in almost any
political direction at all.6
Dyke, in contrast, would not try to be everybody's friend.
Instead, he ran the city in a very business-like hierarchical
manner with the mayor clearly established at the top--not at
the center of intersecting circles of competing groups. Bill
Dyke was not a compromiser or negotiator; he was not this sort
of "professional" politician.7
Bill Dyke's term as mayor, 1969-73, spanned some very
tense and difficult years for Madison--the days of the student
turbulence in the University community which had its roots in
the growing dissatisfaction with the American course of action
in Southeast Asia. The turbulence was a nation-wide
phenomenon that Madison began to suffer before Bill Dyke
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became mayor. Yet, as will be shown throughout the chapters
on Dyke, the mayor by his actions did much to add to the
atmosphere which prevailed in Madison during this period. And
in two instances in particular (the Mifflin Street disorders
discussed in Chapter Six), it was the mayor himself who chose
a course of action that could only have increased the likeli-
hood of precipitating disorder.
Some observors of Madison politics attribute the mayor's
actions totally to his supposed "malevolence." Bill Dyke was
vehemently detested not just by Madison's sizeable leftist and
student community but by many of Madison's traditional liberal
Democratic elements as well. Yet, it is too simple a theory
to blame Bill Dyke's actions on his being "evil." Such an
interpretation of Dyke's actions must rest on detailed psycho-
history to establish the personality roots of his self-
righteous, combative style.
Such psychological theorizing will not be attempted here.
Rather an alternative, somewhat complementary, explanation of
Dyke's actions will be offered--namely, that Dyke was a person
who reduced government to a set of fundamental beliefs; he
ordered all his actions strictly according to these beliefs.
Dyke very "puristically" would not compromise his principles
to gain support of others. In short, Dyke was an Ideologue.
This chapter begins with a recounting of the mayor's
actions as pertains to the city's acquisition of the bus
company. Dyke, it will be observed, was a mayor with well
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defined goals who, reluctant to compromise his beliefs,
avoided almost every measure of coalition building.
The latter section of this chapter will more fully detail
Dyke's ideology and then use this ideology to explain his
actions in the bus controvery. The chapter will conclude with
some observations on the sources of political purism and the
necessity of positing an ideological analytical framework.
HOW TO ENTER THE BUS BUSINESS?
The initial moves by the city to purchase the privately
owned Madison Bus Company came during Otto Festge's term in
office. A 62-day bus driver's strike in 1967 was ended only
after the negotiation of a new wage pact which included a
promised $65,000 subsidy from local merchants to cover one
year's cost of the new agreement. With the bus company, which
during the strike had threatened to dissolve itself, apparently
nearing the end of private operations, the city began prepara-
tions for its entrance into the bus business.
Two referenda in the spring of 1968 authorized the city
to buy and operate a public bus system and to issue bonds for
that purpose. In June, the city secured an option to buy the
company by November of the next year at a cost not exceeding
$910,000. The city chose the option route rather than imme-
diate purchase in order to gain the time necessary to obtain
federal aid to defray the costs of both acquiring the system
and the purchase of much needed modern equipment. To keep the
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buses running in the meantime, the city agreed to subsidize
the costs of service until the time it actually took over
operation.
When Bill Dyke assumed the mayoralty, he saw the matter
of the bus system purchase as a question of prudent economics:
I didn't want to buy it. Period...No governmental
function has ever been carried out as well or as
economically as that function, if possible to be
carried out in the private sphere, is carried out in
the private sphere of enterprise...And I think it's
being proven true in the bus system (in Madison)
today (1975).
This jerk from the University (Professor William
Dodge, Festge's chairman of the City Bus Utility
Commission and a municipal bus ownership proponent)
had the colossal deceit to stand in front of the
Council on television in Madison and tell the people
that if they would buy the bus system, the defi-
cits will shortly disappear...That was not true then 8and he knew it. And it's been proven not to be true.
Dyke's clashes with Dodge were quite public at the time of the
controversy. The mayor once even walked out of a public
hearing just as the professor was about to speak.9
One of the conditions for receiving federal funds was the
requirement that the bus company employees be no worse off as
a result of city acquisition of the company. But negotiations
of the necessary agreement between the city and the Teamsters
local were halted for the three months after the mayor took
office. 10
In mid-August, Dyke touched off a furor in the City
Council by announcing his intention to "split" the city's
federal aid application into two parts. The mayor proposed
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submitting an aid application for the purchase of thirty-six
new buses which would then be leased by the city to the
company, while detaining action on the application for the
funds for city acquisition of the company. Dyke's motives
behind the move were two-fold. First, he saw the purchase of
the thirty-six buses to be a matter of basic management prin-
ciples:
In management you don't let yourself be faced with
the possibility of having all your equipment going out
of date at the same time. And that's what this oom-
pany was faced with...Let's say seventy-five per cent
of their equipment was out of date. If we had followed
the purchase outlines of Otto (Festge) and then
(Acting) Traffic Director John Bunch...we would have
found by buying all the new equipment at once that it
all would have been phased out at once. And that's
a situation you want to avoid. 1 1
And second, there was a matter of economics. Dyke wanted to
"buy the city time--cheap time--to explore the alternatives
which the previous city administration refused to admit even
existed. "12
And furthermore, I was still hopeful...that we would
be permitted by the federals to acquire it (the bus
company) in an alternate fashion...You see, this was
a distress sale...You don't pay top dollar in a dis-
tress market. You don't pay top dollar in liquidation.
They didn't have any other buyer...That's ridiculous!13
Among the alternatives which Dyke was then considering were
the establishment of a multi-year subsidy arrangement to the
Madison Bus Company, and the bringing to the city of another
bus company to provide service to Madison.I•  And if Madison
was to be eventually forced into the bus business the mayor
hoped the possible availability of alternative providers of
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mass transit would at least give the city the bargaining
leverage to buy out the private company at the lowest price
possible.
The mayor's attempt to split the aid application
effectively killed any chance by the city to purchase the bus
system during that calendar year. The Council's liberals
reacted with outrage, not only to the details of the proposal,
but to the mayor's apparent unilateral decision on the matter
--the setting of a course of action without first asking
Council approval. Already estranged from Dyke as a result of
his handling of the Mifflin Street disorders in the University
area, the Council liberals felt no real need to constrain
their fury on the bus situation. Newspaper stories intimating
that Dyke would not comply with Council resolutions directing
him to pursue all elements of the application and apply for a
letter of non-prejudice--which, though it did not commit the
city to the purchase, would still reserve federal money for
the city even if the city purchased the bus company before the
grant was approved--brought the mayor the appellations of
"Great White Father," and "Big Daddy" from anti-Dyke alderman
Harold Klubertanz.15
Dyke soon relented on the matter of the letter of no-
prejudice. In the intervening week, the stockholders in the
bus company voted to dissolve the company by November.
At the end of August, Dyke proposed to keep the company
in business by offering a new three-year subsidy--with a
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guarantee $1040 instead of the existing $1050 in revenue for
every $1000 in expenses of the bus company, city purchase of
thirty-six new buses to be leased to the company, and the
placement of one city representative on the Bus Company's five
man Board of Directors. The Council modified the Dyke pro-
posal significantly, limiting the subsidy to one year and
giving the city the option to buy the company at any time
during the year. The Council, in contrast to Dyke, had chosen
to keep the door open to immediate acquisition of the system
upon receipt of federal funds. The Bus Company rejected the
modified proposal.
On a fifteen to five vote the Council directed the mayor
to negotiate a six month continuation of the subsidy arrange-
ment to be followed by city purchase contingent upon approval
of the federal aid application. Articles in both the city's
newspapers reported that Dyke by this time had finally
accepted the inevitability of the city going into the bus
business.16 But the mayor was still searching for alterna-
tives to outright city acquisition of the system as he felt
the company was not worth $910,000, the top price the Council
authorized. In order to increase his bargaining leverage over
the price, the mayor consequently raised the possibility of
the city buying its own buses and setting up its own transport
system.17 But this option was soon foreclosed, not only by
the Council's refusal to go along, but by the conditions of
the letter of no-prejudice which specified that federal funds
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could only be used for the purchase of the existing bus
company and not for the starting of a totally new municipal
bus system.18
Haggling over the purchase price began. The company
asked for $860,000, and eventually the city countered by
offering $775,000. The mayor, then, chose a totally new tac-
tic. Rather than continuing to bargain over outright purchase,
Dyke advocated the cityTs purchase of merely a controlling
interest in the company from its stockholders:
And if it fell to circumstances at a future time
that the government should acquire the (bus) system,
then there was a better way to do it than we did,
and one that could have been accomplished from one-
third to one-half less than what we paid. And that
would have been through acquiring it in a freely
traded manner by buying stock in the thing until we
had fifty-one per cent--which was effective opera-
tional control. And that could have been accomplished
for from $350,000 to $500,000. I was, at the time the
Council stampeded the purchase, in court to force the
company to give me the names of the owners of shares
so the city could put together a tender offer to
acquire the shares at a stated dollar price so that
we could have controlled what we paid for that mon-
strosity...(But) the court refused to order, in
timely fashion, the company to disclose to us the
names of its shareholders so that we could make ten-
der for purpose of purchasing the shares. The court
was wrong and we were prepared to appeal it...(But)
the Council was stampeding the purchase.1 9
Not only would the tender offer have likely saved the city
money on the purchase price, but by keeping the company
private, it would have eliminated the necessity under federal
purchase regulations of the city's negotiating an agreement
with the Teamsters union--a labor agreement whose advantageous
terms would likely have escalated the demands of other
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municipal labor unions.
In November of 1969 the Council voted to offer $820,000
for purchase of the bus company, at the same time averting a
threatened driver's strike by underwriting a new wage agree-
ment for the next six months. In April of the new year, the
bus company exercised the option given under the pact thereby
committing the city to the purchase of the system. In order
for the city to be eligible for federal funds the position of
the bus system's employees could not be worsened as a result
of municipal takeover. Federal regulations thus required the
negotiation of a new agreement between the city and labor
specifying the exact wages and benefits of the drivers. Only
negotiation of this "section 13-C" agreement between the city
and the bus drivers stood as a final obstacle to city acquisi-
tion of the system. As noted by Dyke assistant and city
bargaining team member Peter Dohr, the negotiations centered
essentially around the question of driver's benefits:
"13-0" effectively meant that we had to obtain the
consent of the local union, the Teamsters Union,
which was run at that time by Donald Eaton. If the
application by the city was not agreed to by the
labor union, then the Department of Labor would not
be able to get public funding...There was a lot of
discussion as to whether they (the bus company
employees) would be worse off after take-over.
Then you get into a lot of discussion about trade-
offs. If they had to drop the private pension plan,
what do you equalize that with?...Don Eaton (the
Teamsters negotiator) of course took the position that
it (the city's pension plan) was not as good as the
private plan. Our position was "of course it's as
good. In fact it's better. So you aren't any worse
off." But they had the ultimate say--"they" being
Don Eaton and the Department of Labor. And of
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course the Department of Labor is not a disinterested
party. They are not going to support the city of
Madison which was in the management position.2 0
The Teamsters and the city bargaining team had already
reached a tentative agreement with the help of federal media-
tion in Washington. But despite Dohr's recommendation, Dyke
refused to support it.
Dyke's objections to the agreement primarily concerned
two provisions. 2 1 First, the mayor objected to the "New
Orleans Clause" which obligated the city to pay four year's
salary to any driver terminated by the city. Dyke believed
the clause severely restricted the city's ability to manage
the system. The necessity of paying four year's wages to
terminated employees effectively foreclosed the alternative of
the city's leaving the bus business altogether--a route Dyke
felt to be a future possibility--if bus operations proved too
heavy a burden on the tax rate. The mayor further felt the
clause both laid the city open to unknown possible costs and
set a precedent for other municipal unions to demand equiva-
lent job security. Second, Dyke believed that the agency shop
and right-to-strike provisions of the agreement were actions
forbidden to municipal employees under state law--despite the
requirement of Federal regulations that the position of the
drivers not be worsened by the take-over.
The mayor's strategy at this point was to avoid signing
13-C until he could obtain a ruling from the Secretary of
Labor of the United States that the city had bargained away
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more than it had to in the agreement, thereby opening the door
to a modification of the pact. Considering the uncertainty of
receiving federal bus aid at that point, the mayor's move in
bypassing an agreement already negotiated ran the risk of
jeopardizing the city's hopes of receiving any bus aid at all.
On May 1 the city formally purchased the bus company,
making special note that the bus drivers would still be con-
sidered private workers. The next week the labor agreement
was approved by the Council. All that was left was for the
mayor to sign 13-C and federal funds would be on the way.
But Dyke refused. City Attorney Edwin Conrad ruled that
Dyke's signature was in effect "largely a ministerial act" as
the mayor had lost his chance to veto the agreement when he
signed the Council minutes which included a resolution order-
ing him to sign. 2 2 Dyke still refused to sign--a move which
brought the charge from the Council's pro-bus faction that he
was playing "a risky game of brinksmanship" with federal
funds .23
The dispute dragged on. In October, a communication from
the Department of Labor recommended that the mayor give
:strong consideration" to signing the agreement.24  Yet, Dyke
remained adamant, not only in refusing to sign 13-C but also
in refusing to approve the purchase of thirty-six new buses
in the interim, two-thirds of which cost was to be paid by the
federal government.
The period was one of "undisguised hostility"' 2 5 between
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the Council and the mayor, marked by vitriolic Council
meetings filled with shouting and sarcasm, threats by individ-
ual aldermen as well as by the Teamsters to launch legal
action against the mayor, and even momentary moves to have the
Council President sign the agreement in his capacity as acting
mayor whenever Dyke left the city's limits. Many Council mem-
bers, including Mifflin area Alderman Paul Soglin, believed
the mayor's stall on 13-C to be an attempt "to do everything
he could to tie up successful purchase of the bus company."26
Finally, in January of 1971, Dyke was able to announce he
had at last succeeded in receiving word from the Department of
Labor that the labor agreement the city had negotiated was
indeed "excessive:" 2 7  "It wasn't until last week that the
department owned up to the fact that we gave away more than
we had to."28 But the impact of Dyke's coup was mitigated by
the almost simultaneous revelation that the city, as a result
of the prolonged delay in submitting an application, had been
taken off the priority list of potential bus aid recipients.
The city as a result of the mayor's delay, it appeared, had
lost any chance of getting aid until the next fiscal year, if
then, at the earliest.
The day after the city's loss of priority status, acting
Transportation Director John Bunch, a man who entertained a
long-standing feud with Dyke, revealed that Department of
Treasury officials in Washington privately admitted they
could find the money if only the mayor would sign 13-c.29
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Dyke, for his part, dispatched two representatives to
Washington to find out both exactly where the agreement had
exceeded the guarantees that had to be given to the bus
drivers and whether or not federal funding was still somehow
available.
The next day, the conservative Wisconsin State Journal,
which until that point had been for the most part supportive
of Dyke, ran an editorial urging the mayor to sign 13-C. The
editorial noted the mayor's reasons "have not been convinc-
ing," citing specifically his objections to the New Orleans
clause: "The mayor has reservations about the clause which
protects the jobs of bus employees in the event that the city
goes out of the bus business, which is highly unlikely--
Madison needs a bus system."30
Finally on January 19, nearly eight months after the city
officially purchased the bus system, Dyke signed a revised
13-C agreement worked out in Washington; the city was at last
eligible to receive $1.4 million in aid for the purchase of
the bus company and new equipment. Though the mayor claimed
that the "new" agreement eliminated "key obstacles," 3 1 only
three changes had actually been made.32  The provisions of the
agreement were limited to employees hired not more than one
year after final delivery of the buses procured under the
federal grant. This provision drastically reduced the city's
potential liability, as the previous agreement covered
employees hired at any time in the future. Second, the city
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was explicitly given the right to lay off workers for economic
reasons, such as a decline in ridership. The anti-Dyke
Capital Times claimed the Teamsters made no objection to this
provision as it was already written into another part of the
agreement.33 Third, the revised agreement added a clause
guaranteeing the Teamster "the maximum form of union security
(not to exceed the union shop presently existing) permitted by
state or federal law."
The changes, with the possible exception of the first,
were quite minor. Teamsters leader Donald Eaton even claimed
that the "maximum job security" provision left the union
better off than under the original agreement. Referring to
the spring mayoral primary, which was only six weeks off,
Eaton also freely gave his opinion as to why Dyke finally
signed: "But I think the fact that he's decided to run again
must have something to do with that." 34  By signing, Dyke had
defused his opponent's most potent campaign issue.
Postscript. Three days before the spring election,
Dyke's campaign manager revealed that he had received word
"on good authority" that the city's application for bus aid
would be fully funded. The announcement received front page
newspaper coverage, with The Capital Times running it under
the sarcastic headline "U.S. Bus Aid News 'Arrives' In The
Nick of Time."35 Dyke's opponent charged the mayor with using
"shoddy political tactics in now trying to take credit for
something he's fought against during his entire term in
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office. " 6 Dyke easily won the election.
THE IDEOLOGY OF AN IDEOLOGUE
Separation of Powers. As was typical of his leadership
style in general, William Dyke was extremely goal-oriented in
his handling of the bus issue. Dykets antagonism to municipal
acquisition of the bus system was the product of both his con-
servative philosophical belief in limited government, and his
view of the unsuitability of mass transit systems in general
for cities like Madison:
We still have systems on a national level which are
center-focused. In other words, riders get on we
assume at the edge of town and ride to the center...
of the city. If you know anything about the topo-
graphy of Madison, this is not a center-focused
employment city. We have at least five destinations
which are the primary work destinations. And...the
private sector has already made the decisions that
affect the functioning of our municipalities--and
that is to decentralize.
Our cities are in the main, nationally, dispersed
and decentralized. You will not effectively
serve a city like Los Angeles and Madison, Wisconsin,
with a pattern of center-focused transportation...
The people opted for low density building...Now
you don't effectively serve that low density
population with buses on static runs--lumbering,
overblown dinosaurs which wander through our streets,
and which really, for the most part, operate with
maybe one or two passengers over several miles of
route...
Now, our choice today is should we deny people
other alternatives for whatever name or reason, and
thereupon become a more oppressive governmental
system, even though in the process we say we are
serving a desirable end? All tyrants say they serve
a desirable end. And my fear is the fear of
government and the tyranny of it.37
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Dyke attempted to delay as long as possible city purchase
of the system and tried to gain consideration of such alterna-
tives to municipal acquisition as the city's leasing of new
buses to the then operating company or the city's bringing in
a new private firm to operate a transit system. When munici-
pal ownership became inevitable, the mayor sought to acquire
controlling interest through a stock tender rather than out-
right purchase to keep the city's transit costs to a minimum.
He delayed signing the 13-C agreement, if not to jeopardize
the purchase entirely, to attempt to keep the city's liability
to a minimum and maintain its management prerogatives in the
future should the city decide to terminate or severely
restrict a fiscally burdensome service.
But a paradox must here be explained. On the one hand,
Dyke took many extreme goal-oriented actions, such as his
refusal to sign an agreement he would not formally veto
which miffed his opponents. Yet, he also refused to take many
of the relatively costless actions which most political actors
engage in to build support for their programs. Dyke
frequently absented himself from, or walked out of, City
Council meetings. He refrained from any sort of social lobby-
ing. Dyke simply refused to engage in coalition building. In
part this was the result of personal distaste for such
"political" activity. But a more complete understanding of
why he chose to take the actions he did and spurn others in
the pursuit of his policy goals requires an understanding of
his view of government--his political ideology.
Dyke held an adamant view of separation of powers. He
ordered all his actions as mayor according to his belief that
the most strict distinction between the functions of the
executive and the legislative must be observed if government
is to avoid unwise action. Dyke in essence was a believer in
a most extreme form of Madisonian demooracy--a separation of
powers so complete that it allowed no cooperation between the
various branches of government:
I had a continual battle with the City Council, by
both accident and perhaps by design. But I frankly
comnitted very little to the process of log-rolling
or the playing of the legislative game. And I want
to add this degree of explanation.
I believe I understand the cheeks and balances
system of government. And I believe that under this
model of government the executive should stay out of
the legislative function. I tried to permit myself
a doorway out of the legislative function. The mayor
has a responsibility to initiate and reflect upon
legislation that has been passed. I do not believe
that can be done effectively when you are part of the
legislative process. I think the initiation end of it
can be done without much damage, because I think that
is part of an executive responsibility--to propose.
But I do not feel that when the executive participates
in the debate, participates in the compromise, parti-
cipates in all the events that lead to the compromise,
can he then responsibly exercise the veto extensively.
And I should have used it more often.
But I do not think it is consistent with a
system of government that I understand that the
legislative function be comingled with the executive
function in a municipality the size of Madison...
I think it's poor process and I tried to change it.
I did it in a less than tactful fashion perhaps, but
nevertheless there are times when a job in my opinion
should be done and the tactics left to somebody else
to interpret, maybe left to somebody else to evaluate.
But I think that frankly there has been too much
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temporizing in government, and I was more inclined to
take the action necessary and worry about the conse-
quences later in that particular frame. And the
consequences...were harmful in the election (referring
to his defeat in P973 in a bid for a third term) and
I'd do it again.3
The purist element of Dyke's style expressed by the mayor in
the above quotation--his emphasis on moral duty, his disdain
for compromise, and his choice of moral correctness over
electoral victory--will be explored in a later section of
this chapter. It is the rigidity of Dyke's self-imposed
divorce from the legislative function--a philosophy which was
never quite understood by the aldermen and which consequently
only served to increase friction in an already polarized com-
munity--that is of immediate concern to us here.
Dyke's aloofness from the City Council--as witnessed by
his constant absences and early departures from Council
meetings--infuriated both members of the Council and others
who expected the usual pattern of mayor-council cooperation in
resolving problems on the city's behalf. One city hall
reporter summed up Dyke's action as it appeared to him and
most city hall observers, including members of the Council:
He (Dyke) stopped attending the (Council) meetings
because he really thought they were a waste of time.
The meetings were long (and)...emotional...(with)
lots of arguments. I think his not attending was a
way of saying, "I got a lot of better things to do
than to go to these City Council meetings. I've got
to run the city. I've got to be up in my office.
Sometimes he would come down, show his head, and
then go back up to his office--in the evening (during
a Council meeting). You know, "I'm upstairs working
on city business while the Council is fiddling."
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That whole kind of approach was a oalculated sort
of teohnique.3 9
Dykets divorce from Council proceedings was also quite evident
in areas other than the bus controversy, as witnessed by the
limited role he would allow for himself in the formulation of
the school budget.
I attempted to provide information in a very limited
fashion (to the Board of Estimates and the Joint
Fiscal Control Group). In other words I did not
sponsor forums for the aldermen. I did not call them
in...I did not lobby it. I didn't try to and I would
not again. That is a legislative function, and I
accept it. But I spoke against it. And I tried to
utilize the powers which I felt were within the execu-
tive range of powers to inveigh against it. And I did
use the powers available to me on the Board of
Estimates to cause the Board of Education to be put
through its paces and to be questioned as closely as
possible on some of the budgeting amounts...
It would not be consistent in my opinion with
what my responsibilities were to bring aldermen in and
sit with them in closed door sessions and lobby
against the education budget. I did talk with alder-
men and I never refused counsel with an alderman who
sought to come in and talk about it. But I did very,
very limited amount of initiating of any meetings on
the education budget. I felt then and I feel now that
those things are properly public discussions. And I
caused them as much as possible to be public discus-
sions...40
In the matter of school budgets, just as in the case of 13-C,
Dyke extensively used only those "powers" such as public
invective which he assumed to be the mayor's; he ignored those
he saw to be the province of the legislature. Not adminis-
tering his signature to an agreement, constant use of the veto
(see Table 1), vehement questioning of the school superinten-
dent, the use of public pronouncements to try to mobilize
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Table 1
Mayoral Use of the Veto in Madison
(number of mayoral vetoes
Mayor
Henry Reynolds
(conservative)
Otto Festge
(liberal)
William Dyke
(conservative)
Years in
Office
1961-65
1965-69
1969-73
in four years)
Number of Vetoes
18 in four years
16 in four years
47 in four years
Source: Office of the City Clerk
Madison, Wisconsin
148
opinion--all these were part of a mayor's prerogative. But to
work with the aldermen--that was another matter.
Dyke s self-imposed separation from the legislature meant
that he made no attempt to pyramid his influence with that
body. This failure is readily noticeable in the mayor's
refusal to aid a conservative alderman friendly to Dyke in
securing a desired project for his district:
Bill (Dyke) knew that I wanted that very bad...Bill
knew the plan; he supported it; it would have been
very easy for that to be in the budget when it comes
out of the mayor's office. But his philosophy was,
"If you want it, you can fight for it." So the
budget came with a moratorium on it and I had to get
the money...from the Board of Estimates and fight
for it.
Politically, it would have been very easy for him
(Dyke) to put the money in that time and get me
beholden to him. That's just not the way he worked.41
Dyke was very moralistic. Council conservatives were not
rewarded for being part of the team, but were expected to back
the mayor solely because of the merits of his stance. Dyke
was even-handed--politicking with the aldermen was avoided
with both conservatives and liberals alike.
As would readily be expected, the mayorts conscious
choice not to maximize his power potential with the Council at
times wound up impeding his ability to gain the actions he
desired. Even simple things could wind up backfiring, as the
following recounting by a liberal alderman of a Council deci-
sion to reject the mayor's proposal to transfer the city parks
system to the county underscores:
Dyke fancied himself as a strong executive. He had
the idea that if he ran things with an iron hand that
things would get done. And he forgot, I think, that
he had to have vote on the Council. For example, he
wanted to consolidate the parks systems in Dane County.
He went around and discussed this with the chairmen of
the other boards of the other municipalities and the
village presidents. But when he introduced it to the
Council, it was a bolt out of the blue. And of course
the whole thing fell apart...If we had been able to lay
some groundwork, the job could have been done.42
A simple failure to "lay some groundwork" with the Council, a
process Dyke saw clearly not to be part of the executive func-
tion, led to a defeat which Dyke saw to be one of the major
failures of his four years in office. 4 3 And, as the mayor
himself freely admits, public weariness over the constant
intra-city governmental battles helps account for the city's
turning him out after two terms in office.
But perhaps it is unfair to equate success with an
electoral victory for Bill Dyke. Bill Dyke was not inter-
ested solely, or even primarily, in winning an electoral
majority; he was more interested in issues. And even when it
came to issues, he was willing to sacrifice winning if it
meant foresaking his conception of democracy. Any theory that
attempts to explain the actions of political heads solely in
terms of a maximizing vote or any other benefit calculus will
be totally unable to account for actors such as William Dyke.
Bill Dyke's actions can only be understood by recognizing the
ideology which underlay them.
Maximization of the Executive Function. The other side
of the coin of Dyke's belief in the strict separation of the
powers of the legislature and the executive was the emphasis
he placed on internal administration and management:
I early chose not to seek the bricks and mortar
monuments to an administration. Otto Festge had
no management concept at all. He didn't understand,
or, if he did, chose not to utilize management
systems...The debt had grown in similar fashion.
And getting down to the base of all of it, the
(number of) city employees grew from 1400 in his
administration when he came in to 1800 when he was
leaving.
So these are things I felt had to be controlled
(by) developing a management system.44
In the concept of management, Dyke's ideology of separation of
power and his belief in fiscal conservatism became fused.
Dyke's management perspective was so all-embracing that by the
end of his second term he even advocated that Madison return
to a city manager form of government--a form which Madison
briefly introduced in 1947 only to be repealed by a referendum
four years later. The task of the executive, according to
Dyke, was to be an administrator, not a politician.
The mayor's enthusiasm for management led to his support
for the introduction of a Management by Objectives (MBO)
program:
There was no management system at all prior to that
(1MBO). To me a system cannot function unless you know
where you are and you know where you want to be. And
in essence that's what MBO is. It gives those charged
with management responsibility the opportunity to state
their goals and compare them with the goals of elected
officials, in this instance. It's an adaptation from
private industry. It gives the elected official the
opportunity to present his objectives--those things
which he wishes to be filled...to those department
heads responsible for carrying them out, and (to)
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match them up with whatever department goals and
responsibility might be.45
In his enthusiasm for MBO, Dyke's private sector perspective
on the job of the mayor becomes readily apparent.6 Dyke
tried to run the city just as any manager would run a busi-
ness. Compromise and coalition-building were ignored.
Dyke's management orientation was not limited to his
instituttuting of the MBO system. In fact, in contrast to the
pattern of self-denial of powers that characterized the
mayor's relationship with the legislature, Dyke aggressively
utilized any power that he saw to be even marginally within
the executive realm:
I believe very much in a strong mayor system...I think
we have to understand that the American system is based
on a very real jealousy of the power we extend to the
executive. However, when one occupies the executive
office and when one recognizes the Job that has to be
done, you do have that very human and very realistic
need to utilize that power which in a gray area may or
may not be yours...
What I am talking about in a philosophical or academic
sense is the same pattern that is the argument between
the strict construction of the Constitution and the
more liberal construction of the Constitution...And
I think an executive in government...has a tendency
to use which powers are yours realizing in some
areas there are some powers which are not well defined
but which conceivably are part of and proper to the
executive functioning. And in some cases they are
utilized even though they may not be clear.47
Dykets actions in the bus controversy can well be under-
stood in light of his conception of management and "the execu-
tive functioning." It was his job as the chief executive of
the city to, unilaterally if necessary, keep the city from
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purchasing a bus system that would require future subsidiza-
tion, or when that failed to acquire it in an alternate manner
than that advocated by the Council. The timing of the pur-
chase of the thirty-six new buses similarly was seen by Dyke
to be a question of management--a good manager does not let
all his stock go out of date at once. Likewise, the mayor saw
13-0 to be a question of management "prerogative" and the
powers allowed an executive in a democratic system:
The commitments 13-C carried with it were so, that
you gave away...some very important prerogatives.
You give away, as an example, powers over your
employee workforce, so you were severely limiting
your latitude of management to manage. You were also
faced with vesting rights in the employee organization
which continue for time immemorial and which I felt
were properly subject to bargaining, but which were
not properly subject of a condition to get federal
funds.
Now it's a very wise move on the part of the Teamsters
to have that included in the federal funding pro-
visions and give them the right to veto any money
that comes to your community. But it's damn poor
systeming for government to give away those powers.
And I believe itts an improper delegation as well.
You eantt give away to somebody else the powers
which you are elected to fulfill...It isn't some
employee organization which is accountable; it's the
elected official. And if you're going to have a
system of accountability in government, you can't
give those powers away. And increasingly those powers
are being given away. So you end up with this hydra-
headed monster that we call government today, where
no one is accountable for anything...
The ability to utilize equipment can be affected
by that (13-0): the ability to terminate the system;
the ability to terminate employeep--all of these
things are affected through 13-0.48
Dyke saw his refusal to sign the 13-C agreement to be one of
those "powers" which falls in that "gray area" which a wise
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mayor has a right to utilize. To Dyke, the power to withhold
his signature from 13-C was similar to his prerogative to
prepare an executive budget; these were prerogatives common to
all executives that he had the right to utilize despite the
fact that no mayor before him had done so:
All executives in government have the duty to sign the
minutes and the right to call for them at the time
they choose to sign them. So, I used a power which is
inherent in the office. And simply because it was
inherent in the office and they (the Council) couldn't
get at it, it infuriated them. But that's what the
governor does all time...4 9
Dyke chose the route of "non-signing" as opposed to the
simpler option of a veto as the latter might have been over-
ridden by a Council seemingly committed to the transit system
purchase .50
In still another matter, and again to the outrage of
Council members, Dyke saw it as his prerogative to order all
city departments to keep secret all information concerning the
preparation of the budget51 and to clear with him all requests
they received for information--even those coming from council-
men.52 Dyke saw his attempt to "limit the dissipation of
departmental activities" to be an administrative act which lay
beyond the Council's domain.53 The mayor's efforts to run the
city were put almost solely on administration: relations
with the Council were consciously sacrificed.
Dyke sought to "start constructing those units which form
the chain of command" which would report to the mayor.54
Management groups were developed which, according to the mayor,
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met with him on a weekly or bi-weekly basis. Yet, one city
department head, antipathetic to Dyke, observed:
We used to have staff meetings every week under
Mayor Dyke...Everybody was organized into groups
and we met all week long. The only common thread
throughout that whole thing was that the mayor was
never at any of them. They were always run by
somebody from his office. Staff meetings with top
level peo le without the mayor being there...they're
useless.5
The mayor's personal absences at these meetings represents a
failure on his part to maximize his influence even in the
realm of internal administrative matters. To this extent, the
mayor exhibited the Ideologue's lack of coalition building
even in the area of administration. Convinced of the correct-
ness of his own course of action, the Ideologue feels no need
to convince others to go along. He feels the merits of the
issue or the situation to be clear enough to insure coopera-
tion.
Occupying the top of the city's administrative hierarchy,
did not mean that Dyke interested himself in every problem.
In typical business fashion, he felt only issues of policy
deserved his attention: "I don't pay a guy $25,000 a year for
me to make their decisions."5 6 Thus, Dyke tried to a great
degree to make starkly clear who had responsibility for
handling what matters, as reported by one of the members of
his office:
He (Dyke) formalized relationships with department
heads. And I think, to his credit, he did a lot of
work in the area of driving down decisions to
departments--technical decisions which should have
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really been made at the department level, which Otto
(Festge) was more inclined to take on as his own
responsibility. Bill did a lot more delegating than
Otto had done...Something would come in (such) as a
letter of complaint from a citizen and Bill would just
buck it right down to the departme• head and make the
department head make the decision.0
The contrast with Festge, who personally handled such citizen
complaints, is evident. Dyke, for the sake of rationaliza-
tizing the decision-making process in Madison, chose to
forego the virtually "costless" opportunities to increase his
stock of influence that handling of citizen complaints
allowed.
Even in the way he ran his office, Dyke's managerial
orientation is evident--this time in the adoption of "block
time scheduling" from the private business world:
If you had asked me what my biggest problem was in
office, my biggest problem was in controlling my
schedule. You see, I believe in block time
scheduling. I believe that the day can be divided...
And during the course of my day I had certain times
which were open times and certain times which were
closed times (times in which the mayor was in con-
ference or working by himself and not to be disturbed)...
But because I believed in block time scheduling,
I tried to live by it. I tried to say, "Okay, if I'm
in conference that means I don't take phone calls."
I used to tell Time magazine, Newsweek, and all the
rest of them to" suff it in their pIpe, because I had
time for them: "You could come to the press conference.
It's Wednesday afternoon. I1ll see you then. So
long."
You see, if you can't control your schedule, you
are not going to get your work done. Whether it's a
conference or time for research or developing posi-
tion papers--whatever it is I have to have time to do
that. And when I'm working on those things, I can't
get interrupted and get my job done. Sg on that basis,
there was a stopper in the front hall.5S
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Once more, in typical purist fashion, it is the "style" that
is important to Dyke. 5 9 He "believes" in block time schedul-
ing and this belief cannot be compromised. All interfer-
ences with the mayor's schedule, even those that would have
built public or aldermanic support for his administration,
were given the same amount of consideration--little.
This is not to say that people with problems could not
see the mayor. Anyone, even many of the more liberal mem-
bers of the Council, could. Arrangements, though, had to be
made in advance. Nobody, but nobody simply dropped in on
the mayor. From Dyke's point of view, this again was simply
another of the prerogatives that any executive was entitled
to:
And people also, after a few times, realized
that it wasn't a matter of just strolling down the
hall. We tried to run it how an office should be
run. You don't expect to stroll down the hall into
the governor's office...60
Other than complaints about not being able to immediately
see the mayor, complaints about accessibility came mainly
from a small group of the city's more liberal aldermen:
I couldn't have gotten no more through Bill Dyke's
door unless I had a tank (sic). By the time I
headed for his corridor, you had thirteen people
jumping up and down saying, "Hey, you can't do
that," and somebody on the phone saying, "Hey,
somebody's coming in your office," and he'd be
out the back door.61
Though a great deal of the blame for this breakdown of com-
munication can be placed on Dyke's shoulders, a major part
of it also belongs to the few aldermen who found this
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polarization either ego-gratifying or constituent-
satisfying the highly charged politics of the Vietnam era.
Polarization is by definition a two-way street. As Dyke
himself observed: "Most of those people were so tightly
drawn, and they were pretty uptight about one, that I don't
think they really wanted to talk with me. And frankly I
preferred not to waste my time with them because they were
timewasters."162
Some readers may be misled by the mayor's emphasis of
internal administration to conclude that Dyke's leadership
style was that of an Executive, not an Ideologue. Yet, Dyke
does not fit the description of the Executive in two
important ways. First, he was not willing to engage in even
the moderate degree coalition-building activity, both inside
and outside administration, which characterizes the Execu-
tive. And second, the degree of Dyke's goal orientation was
much greater than that expected of the Executive, who
possesses a more limited sense of direction for his city.
Dykets concentration on management activities springs
from a conception of separation of powers which guided his
actions in almost every area. Bill Dyke was not an
Executive mayor, but an Ideologue who made management part of
his ideology.63
IDEOLOGUE AS PURIST
In their book Presidential Elections, Nelson Polsby and
Aaron Wildavsky summed up the purist style as representing:
a virtually complete privatization of politics. The
private conscience of the leader--rather than his
public responsibilities--becomes the focal point of
politics. Internal criteria--possession of, devotion
to, and standing up for private principles--becomes
the standards of political judgment. Constituents
disappear, and we are left with a political leader
determining policy on the basis of compatibility
with his private principles.64
The Ideologue, strongly motivated by his faith in his own
convictions clearly privatizes politics. Coalition building
by means other than exhortation and appeal to the correct-
ness of the desired goal is spurned as a sacrifice of purity.
The following observations all underscore the purist
elements of Bill Dyke's style:
Staunch pro-Dyke alderman:
"He (Dyke) had a very unpolitical attitude...He took
his viewpoint as being the only correct viewpoint...
He felt it was his job to exercise strong leadership
and he wasn't going to obtain a consensus at all.
If his position, he felt, was correct, he wasn't as
concerned in bending it to make sure it would pre-
vail..."
Member of the mayor's office:
"...he as an individual was convinced of the correct-
ness of some of his concepts and his ability to stay
by those, and that permeated all of his activities
as mayor..."
City Hall reporter:
"Dyke was a very rigid, moralistic guy. One guy
described him to me as an Old Testament Christian
...KHe had really kind of structured view as to
what was literally good for the city and what was
bad...This vision of right and wrong, of black and
white, pervaded everything he did*"
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Liberal alderman:
"His beliefs were very adamant...Unfortunately he
just had no means to bend."
Moderate alderman:
"It had to be his idea his way...There was no
compromising with Bill Dyke...He had 'I-itis t--
I, I, I, I,--and the inability to compromise." 65
Dyke himself recognized that with his almost obsessive manage-
ment orientation, he had passed up whatever opportunities
might have existed to broaden his political base:
Certainly a major part of my responsibility as mayor
was to install a management system where there was
none. I wish it hadntt been so. I would have liked
to have been...a mayor who had the opportunity and the
time to really get out with the people in an on the
job situation and be an effective communicator of what
government is and what it can be. But this was not my
privilege.
I could have played that game. And I think I
could have played that game as well as anyone who
occupied the office. But this was not my job as I
saw it. I would have liked to have been that, as
the communications aspect I permitted to go by by
forfeiture. (sic)
In other words, I didn't even hire a PR man. My
assistant (Bob Heck) was not a classical press
secretary. The man before me had a press secretary
from the day he went in and he had one the whole time
he was there. The man after me had a press secretary.
The man I hired as my assistant was a state trooper
from Massachusetts whom I hired as a specialist in
the criminal justice system, who didn't know zip
about press relations, who was a good man. 6 o
Dyke's lack of orientation towards the press was seen not
only in the appointment of an assistant with no prior
experience, but also at one point during his administration,
in his discontinuance of the holding of weekly press con-
ferences. The mayor, though well at home with the televised
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media, simply refused to maximize the influence such communi-
cations channels offered him.
Dyke's purity of belief, coupled with the polarized
setting at the time, led the mayor to view his antagonists
in the Council as a disreputable enemy and to even enjoy the
conflict he engaged in:
I look back and have a feeling that by your enemies
you shall be known. And I don't mind having the
enemies I do...I believe that there are certain
powers in the office which are there without defini-
tion (referring to his refusal to sign 13-C), and the
fact that I saw some of them and utilized them to the
advantage of the situation frustrated some of my
opponents. They did plenty to frustrate me. And I
look back on it and I'm not sorry I used that device. 6 7
The combat between mayor and Council was conducted on a
highly personal level. Instead of muting antagonisms with the
Council and recouping some possible influence with the city's
legislature Dyke moralistically chose to enflame the situa-
tion. Not only did Dyke publicly call some Council members a
bunch of "dingalings," but he further insisted that his past
experience as host on a children's television show had helped
prepare him for his duties as presiding officer at Council
meetings.68 Dyke's clashes with Council liberals, expecially
the four aldermen who had their roots in the student community,
were particularly vehement, with the mayor even asserting at
one point that Alderman Paul Soglin had "lost his mantle" as
the "extremist leader" of the Council.69 Liberals returned
the fire in kind with such jabs as labeling the mayor "Captain
Kangaroo of City Hall." 7 0
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Dyke's purism is most evident in his unsuccessful bid
for a third term, running against his primary antagonist,
Paul Soglin. Refusing to campaign extensively and refusing
to even show up at candidate forums until the closing weeks of
the campaign, Dyke seemed to view the race not simply as an
election to be won but a test of his personal beliefs:
You see, I felt this way, and this is dumb, and I
know it, but it's (an election is) a test also of a
political system. And I wanted to do that...One
who's written a record...should be able...to stand
for re-election without intensive campaigning. I
found you can't. But I wanted to know. I happened
to believe that should be the case.71
Even more than that, Dyke saw the election as representing the
ultimate test--between good and evil, between the ideals repre-
sented by himself and those represented by Paul Soglin:
The basic question of this campaign is about the kind
of community we want this city to be. I don't want
to just let it fold into the mold of Berkeley (where
a radical group had recently been victorious in local
elections) or of the other cities that can't keep up
with the 70's.72
I think what was at stake then was some of the questions
of what will be the direction of the city. Shall we
seek to impose by the actions of the people through
government some standard which is simply above the
lowest common denominator. That's what's involved. 7 3
For Dyke the choice was self-evident on the merits of the
case. Faced with a choice between right and wrong, people
would choose the right way. Or, as he put it in his first
campaign forum appearance in a remark which touched off a
public furor, "I think there are enough decent people in this
city, concerned with our future, that our campaign has a real
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chance of success."74 (emphasis my own).
The oft-repeated "decent people" remark which alienated
many undecided voters helped to defeat Dyke. Other factors at
work were the dissatisfaction of many voters with the toll the
polarization of Dyke's four years in office had taken, the
fact that the mayor had reached the third term juncture, and
the fortuitous inheritance by Soglin of an existing McGovern
campaign organization looking for a new cause to fight.
Even in defeat, Dyke was typically purist: "We probably
could have won if we'd been willing to change our beliefs.
But I'd rather go down proudly fighting for what we
believe." 76 Having been rejected by the city on a pristine
clear question, Dyke absented himself from the final Council
meeting of his term from City Hall during the period between
the election and Soglin's inauguration, and even from the
inauguration ceremonies themselves.
Postscript. In 1976, conservatives upset at the lack of
principled choice offered by the candidacies of Gerald Ford
and Jimmy Carter met in Chicago. Lester Maddox was chosen as
the American Independent Party's presidential candidate; Bill
Dyke was chosen as the vice-presidential candidate. Dyke's
willingness to join this nascent issue-oriented party, stands
as yet further testimony to his purist adherence to his
beliefs and his ignoring of any pragmatic considerations.
Goal-Oriented Purism. While all Ideologues are purists
not all purists are Ideologues. Jeffrey Pressman has
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identified a mayor, Oakland's John Reading, who was purist
without being goal oriented, at least in those areas that
involved potential conflict.77 Reading's leadership style,
as described by Pressman, appears to be that of Caretakership.
But other than Reading's lack of a clear sense of direction
and his distaste for conflict, his orientation toward politics
is essentially that of Bill Dyke. Both mayors privatized
politics, tending to "deal with problems in a moralistic
way."78 Both were "private men in public office" 79 who tended
to take a "businessmants approach to politics," seeing problems
in terms of "economics" and bringing "private and business
standards" to city hall rather than as the interaction of
competing groups within the city.80 Both also failed to
pyramid whatever power resources they had available to them.
Both Reading and Dyke were purists. Yet only Dyke was
sufficiently goal-oriented to be categorized an "Ideologue."
Reading adept at conflict avoidance, was a Caretaker who
provided his city with only limited policy direction.
THE NEED FOR AN IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
It is evident that the standard models of mayoral influ-
ence discussed in Chapter One, Brokership and Entrepreneur-
ship, are totally incapable of explaining the actions of a
political head such as Bill Dyke. The failure is not simply a
matter that Dyke chose a non-consensual approach toward
achieving his objective; there is a more basic failure in the
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assumptions implicit in this framework. The Broker-
Entrepreneur framework suffers from two major deficiencies,
first, in its assumption that a political actor behaves
"rationally," and second, in its definition of "rationality."
As far as the first objection is concerned, many political
actors do not behave rationally. People bring their psychic
predispositions to their job with them. To fully understand
their actions it becomes necessary to understand their per-
sonalities.82 Actors responding to their personality needs
may act in a manner inconsistent with their attainment of any
specific policy goal. A political head lacking self-assurance
may refrain from engaging in any actions involving conflict
whereas another may be compelled to take immediate action,
even self-defeating action, in order to cover his own inner
anxieties. The actions of mayors acting on such impulses
cannot be accounted for by the Broker/Entrepreneur framework.
Though the Ideologue may have its roots in such psycho-
logical factors, no attempt has been made to explain in this
chapter the actions of Bill Dyke in these terms. The author
has chosen to forego this route as a matter of both personal
disposition and a lack of psychological training. Conse-
quently, it is the second objection that will be dealt with in
the remainder of this chapter.
The Broker/Entrepreneur approach defines rationality in
terms of re-election and power maintenance. 3 The wise mayor
chooses a consensual approach simply as the best means of
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insuring his re-election. The Broker initiates no programs of
his own as they might arouse hostile factions. The
Integrationist proposes solutions only when necessary to head
off exacerbated conflict which can potentially endanger his
job or his influence. The Entrepreneur advances only those
"safe" projects capable of gaining community-wide support.
But mayors such as Bill Dyke and New York's John Lindsay
are not concerned solely with re-election. Though re-election
is certainly of a high priority to them, they have other goals
which cannot be sacrificed to the pragmatic necessities of
electoral politics.
As such, any theory which seeks to explain political
action in terms of a rational vote-getting calculus--whether
it be winning re-election, or maximizing an electoral
margin--84 cannot be applied to all political actors. Politi-
cal actors who are willing to subordinate electability to an
intense goal or issue orientation must be explained in other
terms. An ideological alternative to the electability frame-
work is needed.
In identifying an ideology, an analyst cannot simply
label the actor's goals his ideology and use them to explain
themselves.8S The actor's ideology must first be identified
from other sources. Only then can it be adequately used to
explain a specific course of action.
William Dyke's political ideology embraced three basic
elements: political conservatism, a strict interpretation of
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the separation of powers doctrine, and an aggressive manager's
view of politics. Dykets conservatism can be established by
looking at his policy views across a wide range of issues.
Dyke's activity in conservative Republican circles would also
tend to support the placement of the mayor along the liberal/
conservative dimension. Only then could Dyke's conservative
impulse be used to explain his actions on the bus controversy.
Similarly, the other components of Dyke's ideology--his belief
in the strict separation of powers and the active aggrandize-
ment of executive powers--had to be independently established
both through the mayorts detailed elaboration of his own
political philosophy and his actions in other areas before it
could be used to explain his motives in the bus controversy.
Thus in modifying the rationality model, it must be
realized that political actors can have goals other than
winning or simple vote maximization. This has already been
done to some extent in the dichotomization of purists and
professionals. It has also been done to the extent that there
has been the realization that "benefit seekers" might seek a
"minimal winning coalition" rather than vote maximization in
order to maximize their program claims on an office-holder.8 6
The motivations of "benefit-seekers" cannot be explained in
the same terms appropriate to "office-seekers." 87
In searching for ideologies which explain political
behavior it is blatantly necessary to go beyond the usual
left/right, conservative/liberal dimension. An ideology might
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be organized around different, and even more limited, themes
than the role of government. Bill Dyke's ideology, for
example, was not so much concerned with the outputs of
government or the role of government, but with a principle of
operation of government. Researchers seeking to explain
actions in ideological terms must be open to the many differ-
ent forms that an ideology can take and not restrict themselves
searching only for standard conceptions of what constitutes
an ideology.88
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE IMPACT OF AN IDEOLOGICAL LEADER
The mayor achieved very little of what he wanted in the
bus controversy. Not only was the bus system purchased
despite the mayorts objections, but the system was acquired in
a manner--outright purchase--the mayor did not approve.
Dyke's nine-month battle over 13-C gained only relatively
minor changes in the agreement at the high cost of further
estranging his relationship with the City Council.
Yet, the relative degree of success Dyke had moving a
city in the direction he desired, though, cannot be judged
solely from this one case study. This chapter will look at a
broader spectrum of issues in order to attempt a more general
evaluation of the impact of the Ideological leadership of Bill
Dyke. To anticipate the findings, though the evidence is
somewhat murky, Dyke through his Ideological approach appears
to have succeeded in putting the imprint of his conservative
preferences on Madison.
THE FISCAL IMPACT OF WILLIAM DYKE
Lon-Term Debt. The elaboration of ease studies suffers
serious deficiencies as a tool for analyzing mayoral impact.
One deficiency is that determination of mayoral success or
failure in the case study approach winds up being nothing more
than a subjective reading of purely qualitative evidence.
Where at all possible case studies must be supplemented with
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quantitative measures of mayoral impact. If a mayor's goals
can be put forth in measurable terms, changes in such indica-
tors can provide a relatively "hard" peg on which conclusions
as to mayoral effectiveness can be hung. As many of Dyke's
major priorities centered around notions of fiscal conserva-
tism, changes in Madison's budget in that direction during his
years in office can serve as confirmation of mayoral impact.
One such indicator of Dykets performance is the degree
of change in Madisonts debt situation during the four budget
years of his administration. In order to help restore a sense
of fiscal responsibility to the city through tightened manage-
ment systems, Dyke felt it necessary to establish some sort of
control over what he saw to be an alarming growth in the city
debt. The city, in Dykets eyes, was imprudently too near the
bonding limit allowed under state law.
As Table 1 unambiguously shows, Dyke succeeded in
markedly improving the city's debt situation. By the end of
his last budget year, December, 1973, Madison's outstanding
General Obligation debt for both city and educational purposes
were returned, in absolute dollar terms, to approximately
their December, 1968 levels. Even more clear, and possibly
even more important, the debt in terms of percentage of the
statutory allowable ceiling was reduced from sixty-eight per
cent at the end of Festgets last budget year to forty-one per
cent by the end of Dyke's last budget year. Dyke's success in
the bonding area was so evident that in 1973, Moody's raised
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Table 1
Outstanding Long-Term Debt, Madison, Wisconsin
1967-1973
Year
(As of
Dec. 31)
Debt for City Purposes
% In- % of
Outstanding crease Allow-
General over able
Obligation Pre- City
Debt vious Debt*
Year
Debt for
Education Purposes
SIn-
crease
Outstanding over
Debt Pre-
vious
Year
Festge Budget Years
$35,010,000
39,231,000
42,890,000
(last three):
NC12.1%
9.3
64%67
68
$30,061,000
27,602,500
32,013,000
Dyke Budget Years:
$42,14 6,0004, 6,oo000o
43,143,000
36,363,000
-1.1%
5.0
-3.2
-15.7
60%
57
5241
$4.0,294,500
36,940,000
33,715,00030,495,000
NC-not calculated
*State statutes limit the allowable debt for city purposes,
excluding education, to 5 per cent of the value of
property located within the city as equalized for state
purposes.
SOURCE: 1967-71 debt figures obtained from statement of
"Outstanding Long-Term Indebtedness" found in the
1971 Budget, adopted by the Common Council,
December 9, 1970.
1972 and 1973 debt figures calculated from
Prospectus, Ct of Madison Bonds, Series 1972 and
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
NC
-10.0%
16,0
25.9%
-8.3
-8.7
-0.2
_I _ _ __ __ _ ___
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Madison's bond rating from AA to AAA.
One small qualification in regards to this picture of
mayoral success must be made. Part of the difficulty in using
quantitative indicators of mayoral impact is in the problem in
deciding what part of the change in the indicator can be
attributed to a mayorts leadership and what part of the change
should be considered the result of situational factors beyond
the mayor's control. Though Dyke's anti-spending orientation
towards education helped account for the decline in the school
debt in his latter budget years, the necessity for extensive
borrowing during these years was also mitigated by the huge
eleven million dollar school bond issue of September, 1970.
As one anti-Dyke school board member noted in regards to the
process of school expansion: "We were just about over that
hump when we got to Dyke." 1
udget Size and Priorities. When the focus of analysis
is shifted from debt control to control over the city's over-
all spending (Table 2), the pattern of mayoral success is much
less clear. Though spending under Dyke increased at a lower
average annual rate (11.66 per cent per year) than under
Festge (14.10 per cent per year), it still increased at a rate
beyond that which can be accounted for by inflation. Further-
more, if the exhorbitant increase of the first Festge budget
is discounted--an increase which many observers felt was
forthcoming after the "tight-fistedness" of the previous
administration-- 2 total city spending increased at a faster
172
Table 2
Actual Spending for City Purposes,
Madison, Wisconsin, 1965-1973*
% Increase Over
Year Amount Spent Previous Year
Last Reynolds Budget Year:
1965 $15,544,592 NC
Festge Budget Years:
1966 $20,524,916 32.0%
1967 21 ,895364 6.7
1968 23,673,037 8.1
1969 25,9-41,881 9.6
Dyke Budget Years:
1970 $28,s568,277 10.
1971 30,989,755
1972 32,650,098 5.4
1973 38,0843 2 16.5
Mean yearly increase, Festge = 14.1%
Mean yearly increase, Dyke 11.7%
NC-not calculated
*inoluded in the classification of "spending for city
purposes" are the following areas: general government,
public safety, health, streets and sanitation, public
welfare, recreation, debt service, capital budget,
and miscellaneous expenditures. Library and education
expenditures, supported through separate property
taxes, are not included here.
SOURCE: Annual city budgets, Madison, Wisconsin, 1967-1974.
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annual rate during the Dyke administration than during the
last three years of Festge's term in office! Despite Dyke's
attempt to put a lid on city budgets, spending continued to
increase substantially during his time in office.
Even if Dyke's influence is not readily perceptible in
regards to overall budget size, perhaps it can be noticed in a
shift in the allocation of budget funds in accordance with the
mayorts conception of priorities. To examine this possibility,
it is necessary to identify those specific policy areas where
the mayor had unambiguous pro- or anti-spending orientations.
As regards to Dyke, only three such areas--welfare, police,
and data processing--can be readily identified.
Dyke was definitely anti-welfare spending. He saw city
welfare to be an emergency program in the strictest sense, and
did not believe that the program should be a "giveaway" to
people who would not take care of themselves: 3
First of all, city welfare is not designed to be the
continuing welfare program. City welfare is designed
by law to be only a temporary stop-gap form of welfare
assistance. The continuing programs are administered
by the county and the state...Yet, throughout the four
year term I had, we had people on the Council who were
trying to turn city welfare into a parallel agency with
the county, state, and federal assistance programs.4
Being a relatively minor emergency assistance program, then,
city welfare occupied only a very small portion (approximately
two per cent) of general fund expenditures. Nonetheless,
the amount of money spent in this area increased greatly
during Dyke's first term, before stabilizing in his latter two
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years in office (Table 3). The growth in welfare spending
during Dyke's first term would on the surface indicate that
the mayor "lost" the welfare game during this period, But as
Dyke himself commented, "The question is where would it (the
welfare budget) have been without the controls we did apply."5
Dyke's assertion is not without validity. The major
part of the jump in welfare spending during Dyke's first term
was the direct result of declining national economic condi-
tions coupled with the impact of extreme state welfare budget
cuts. Liberals on the Council failed in a move to get the
city to add an additional $300,000 to the welfare budget to
supplement AFDC recipients for the recent state cutback--a
move Dyke actively opposed. The Council finally wound up
allocating an additional $178,200 for welfare--a figure which
matched the amount just added to the police budget for riot
control.6 But the conservative-dominated Welfare Board in
mid-year cut off the eight dollar per person per month grant
the city was giving AFDC recipients. The mayor vetoed a
unanimous Council resolution restoring the cuts. Only after
a sit-in by welfare rights people at the mayor's office, did
Dyke compromise with a four dollar to eleven dollar per family
per month supplemental schedule with the rate depending on
family size. Most families received less under the Dyke plan
than under the previous plan.7
Thus, Dyke's effectiveness in the area is a matter of
interpretation. The welfare budget grew, but to a great
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Spending for City Welfare, Police, and Data Processing,
Madison, Wisconsin, 1966-1973
Welfare
Amount
Year Spent
SIn-
crease
Over Pre-
vious
Year
Pol
Amount
Spent
ice Data Prooessing*
% In- $ In-
crease crease
Over Pre- Amount Over
vious Spent Pre-
Year vious
Year
Festge Budget Years:
$357,040
339,931
323,989
441,908
Dyke Budget Years:
653, 41
797,363
765,134
802,157
NC
-4. 8%
3.4
47.9%
22.0
-4.0
4.8
$2,216,995
2,370,296
2,588,77?4
.3,272,952
4,037,839
,372,073
,679,025
,305,909
NC
6.9%
9.2
26.4
$ 28,926
47,525
105,282
230,283
23.4 287,362
8.3 375,310
7.0 529,456
34.8 1,020,290**
NC
64.3%121.5
118.7
30.6
41.4
92.7
*Data processing expenditures listed
inter-agency billing.
here are pre-
**The 1973 data processing expenditure is the budget estimate.
All other figures represent actual expenditures. The Jump
in the expenditures for data processing in 1973 is the
result of the department's offering of new and expanded
services, and is not the product of the different basis of
that year's figure.
SOURCE: Annual city budgets, Madison, Wisconsin, 1968-1975.
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
----
-- --
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degree this growth was the result of environmental factors.
But the mayor effectively helped keep it from growing any fur-
ther than it did.
Dyke was very much pro-police. As noted in the last
chapter, Dyke appointed a former Massachusetts state trooper
to be his mayoral assistant as a result of his strong concern
with police matters. As a consequence Dyke supported increases
in police spending for additional personnel and various other
purposes, such as the procurement of special riot equipment.
Under Dyke the number of authorized positions in the police
department grew from 381 in 1969 to 439 in 1973--an increase
of 15.2 per cent, as compared to a 5.2 per cent increase in
the total number of all city positions during the same time
period. As Table 3 shows, there were non-incremental jumps
in the police budget during the first and fourth Dyke budget
years. Yet, as with the welfare budget, these jumps in the
police "indicator" represent a response to more than simple
mayoral influence. Situational factors also help to account
for the non-incremental growth in police spending. As the
figures show, the first major jump in the police budget came
in 1969--the last Festge budget year. Budget increases during
this period, then, are clearly the product of something more
than Dyke's influence--and that "something else" was the neces-
sity of the city's handling of the university student dis-
orders of the period. In other words, Dyke's pro-police
orientation was only one of the two major factors accounting
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for the expansion of that department's budget.
Finally, Dyke was very much behind the continued develop-
ment of data processing services, which he saw to be a valu-
able management device, not merely an accounting tool.9 Dyke
saw Madison's development of a computer assistant capability
for law enforcement to be one of the major achievements of his
terms in office. Computers were to be used to "institution-
alize planning." Crime patterns were geographically coded in
order to help allocate manpower in anticipation of crime
patterns. Records of stolen property were computerized, and a
forty-five second response to police calls on automobile
license verifications was developed. Outside of the law
enforcement field, Dyke hoped eventually to develop computer-
ized annual reassessment of all property, to avoid the
inequities and sporadic jumps in the tax bills which outraged
home owners.
The number of authorized positions in the data processing
department expanded from twenty-one in 1969 to forty-four in
1973.10 Total spending for data processing expanded sharply
during the Dyke years, when the costs of service provided to
other departments, such as the police department, are included
in the figures. Once again, though a great deal of credit for
the expanded use of computer services must be placed with
Dyke, the modernization of the city's record keeping was begun
before Dyke (note the growth in the data processing budget in
Table 3 prior to 1970). It is in the expansion of computer
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usage to more management/planning activities that Dyke
deserves the most credit.
In summary, then, although Dyke clearly brought Madison's
debt situation under control, his impact in other areas is
somewhat more ambiguous. Overall city spending and welfare
spending continued to increase despite Dyke's objections, but
would probably have increased further had it not been for the
active opposition of the mayor. City spending reflected the
mayor's police and data processing priorities; but the pres-
ence of situational variables clouds the picture of just how
important mayoral influence was in the growth of these budget
areas.
Taxes and School Spending. If William Dyke had any
success in impressing his fiscal conservative philosophy on
Madison, the results should be apparent in the area of his
number one policy concern--taxes. If Dyke is to be considered
successful in terms of his own goals, then he must have suc-
ceeded in reversing, or at least in slowing, the rate of
increase in the city's property tax rate.
Three figures are relevant to a mayor concerned with
taxes. First, there is the Total General Property Tax rate,
or the total rate of all property tax levies. This is the
most politically salient tax figure, as a mayor will likely be
blamed for a rise in property tax, even if much of the increase
is mandated by bodies not directly under his control. Thus a
tax conscious mayor will try to adjust the rate of city and
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school taxes in order to keep the total tax bill under
control.
Second is the tax rate for the General Fund--those
revenues which constitute the city's operating funds. As the
mayor in Madison partakes in both the revenue-producing and
spending decisions in this area, it is the General Fund over
which the mayor has the most direct influence. Finally, there
is the separate tax allocated for educational purposes--a tax
which comprises over half of the total levy. The mayor's
influence in the area is less than in the general fund area,
as the Joint Fiscal Control Group (of which the mayor is a
member) has control only over the absolute size of the educa-
tion budget. Decisions concerning the actual allocation of
these funds for specific programs remain solely the province
of the Board of Education, and as such are beyond the mayor's
direct reach. The mayor and the Fiscal Control Group threaten
cuts, but cannot be sure that the Board of Education will make
them in the places they desire. The setting of the school
budget and tax rate for educational purposes thus winds up
being an annual bargaining game between the mayor and the
Joint Fiscal Control Group on the one hand and the Board of
Education on the other.
Which service areas will suffer the most under a tax con-
scious mayor's demand for economy will depend on his priori-
ties. Bill Dyke's spending priorities were clear. The city
government part of the budget provided the funds for much
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needed basic services. Any radical belt-tightening that was
needed would be done primarily in the area of education,
where, according to the mayor, no solid justification could be
found for continued increases in spending. Dyke, in fact, was
quite hostile to how he saw the school budget being spent:
In my opinion, the education budget is so badly warped,
it's not a matter of cutting fat out. It goes beyond
that.
The problem of education today, in my opinion, is
that most educators...in fact so far as I know there
isn't a qualified national point of view nor is there
qualified national discussion, as to the learning
process (sic). We go on talking about quality in
education, but we never get to what quality means.
That's that undefinable lovely word that we use as a
label every time an educator's budget is in jeopardy...
I believe it would have served the community very
well had we caused the Superintendent of Schools to
have retrenched and retreated from some grandiose
notions of education and get to what causes a child
to learn. If you are acquainted with the Moynihan
Report...we found, as an example, that the most
important factors on why children learn and why they
don't learn are things like home life--and they are
not teachers' numbers.
We have spent so much time looking at the physical
structure of our schools, that we have not permitted
ourselves enough time to look at what's going on inside
them. We've now almost gone full circle. We're back
now in one room schools...That's nonsense.11
Looking at actual tax rates in Table 4, it would appear
that Dyke had a measure of success as far as school taxes were
concerned. In his first two years, the tax rate for educa-
tional purposes increased at a lesser rate than it did under
the Festge administration; and in his latter two budget years,
the actual tax rate for educational purposes actually dipped.
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Table .
Actual Property Tax Rates (in mills),
Madison, Wisconsin, 1966-1973
Education
. Increase
Mill Over Pre-
Year Rate vious Year
Festge Budget Years:**
1966
1967
1968
1969
25.01
269.
27.67
29.13
NC
5.7%
4.7
5.3
General Fund
Mill
Rate
9.27
9.608.29
11.96
& Increase
Over Pre-
vious Year
NC
3.6%
-13.7
44.3
Total General*
- Increase
Mill Over Pre-
Rate vious Year
.. =-Nmmm
45.00
7.00
.00
53.00
NC
4.4%
2.1
10.4
Dyke Budget Years
1970
1971
1972
1973
30.17
31.34
31.1630.28
3.6%
3.9
-0o.6
-2.8
13.31
13.99
15.77
14.48
11.3%
5.1
12.7
-8.2
56.36
56.83
60.00
54.70
6.3%
0.8
5.6
-8.8
eTotal General Property Tax includes state, county, sewer
distriot, board of education, vocational school, library,
and general fund taxes.
4**Tax levied at end of previous calendar year.
SOURCE: Annual city budgets, Madison, Wisconsin, 1966-1975.
_ __ ~_ _
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Taxing for General Fund revenues increased during the first
three years of Dyke's term, before declining sharply in his
last term. The total General Property Tax increased at a
moderate rate during the off-year budgets, while either
decreasing are exhibiting little change for the budgets passed
immediately prior to the spring mayoral elections. The data
presented in Table 4 would thus seem to indicate general Dyke
success--stabilization of the overall property tax rate pri-
marily via controlled taxation for educational purposes.
Actual rates are important areas of mayoral impact as
these are the rates property owners react to on election day.
However, actual tax rates do not tell the complete tax burden
story. Increases in property valuation may allow a mayor to
increase his tax revenue without raising tax rates. As a
comparison of Tables 2 and 4 show, this indeed, did happen--
overall spending for city purposes increased while increased
valuation allowed the rate to remain relatively stable.
Similarly, a mayor may be able to cut local property
taxes only because of the fortuitous intervention of increases
in state and federal aid. The extent of the 1973 tax cuts to
a great extent reflects the use of federal revenue sharing
funds into Madison's budget for the first time. In fact, the
City Council used 1973 revenue sharing funds in addition to
1972 revenue sharing money to gain an immediate drop in the
tax rate, despite Dyke's argument that the 1973 funds should
be used to defray the tax burden of the 1974 budget.
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The influence of such situational factors can be
controlled if we compare the changes on Madison's tax rate to
those in other cities in Wisconsin. Only the deviation from
the statewide trend or the "unexplained variance" can be
attributed to city decisions in Madison. Because of varia-
tions in the percentage of full-value that property in each
jurisdiction is taxed, the only appropriate figures for cross-
municipal comparison are those calculated at full-value rates.
The annual changes in property tax rates for Madison and
Wisconsin's 12 other cities are listed in Table 5. As far as
the most potentially salient tax figure, the Total General
Property tax, is concerned the evidence as to the possibility
of any unusual mayoral impact is quite mixed. Changes in
Madison's total tax bill are more conservative than those by
Wisconsin's other large cities only for those budgets which
were set in the months preceding the spring municipal elec-
tions. In the two off-year budgets, 1970 and 1971, Dykets
conservative tendencies are not apparent as the increase in
Madison's total tax levy outdistanced that of the staters
other cities. Only a tax/election year cycle, not a markedly
conservative overall taxing pattern, is apparent during Dyke's
term in office.12
As far as control of taxing for local purposes is con-
cerned, the impact of Dyke's conservative fiscal orientation
is even less apparent. In only one of the four budget years
is the trend on local taxes in Madison more conservative than
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Table 5
Annual Change in Full Value Rate Property Taxes,
Madison and Other Wisconsin Cities
1965-1973
Educationa Local Total Generalb
Budg- 12 12 0 12
et largest largest Madi- all largestd
Years Madison eities Madison cities son cities cities
Festge Budget Years:e
1967 3.4 -0.3% 0.9% 0.5% 2.6% 1.8% 1.7%1968 5.1 10.4 -11.2 0.6 1.7 6.9 8.1
1969 5.6 15.0 39.4 1.6 4.7 8.8 10.8
Dyke Budget Years:
1970 -2.2% -o.5% 5.3 9.3 7.9% 14% 1.7
1971 7.3 4 . 0  5.1 1 .4g 3.6 2.3 3.61972 0.5 2.0 17.I 11.3 8.6 4.1 7.1
1973 -3.5 -2.7J -9.8 -10 3k -10.3 -5.3 -5.1
a-Education tax includes vocational as well as public educa-
tion taxes. The publio education component, however, is
by far the more sizeable.
b-Total General Property Tax includes only state, county,
local and school taxes. It does not include special
assessments.
c-This is the mean Total General Property Tax Rate for all 200
or so jurisdictions in Wisconsin classified as cities.
d-The twelve largest cities in Wisconsin, other than Madison,
are Milwaukee, West Allis, Eau Claire, LaCrosse, Sheboygan,
Appleton, Green Bay, Oshkosh, Racine, Kenosha, Wauwatosa,
and Janesville: for Appleton, Eau Claire, and Milwaukee,
cities located in more than one taxing district, compu-
tations in this table were based on rates to the district
in which the major part of the city's people reside.
e-Tax levied at end of preceding calendar year.
f-In order to avoid distorting the significance of the mean
for a sample size as small as twelve, deviant cases were
eliminated from the computation. "Deviance" was arbitrar-
ily defined as any city which experienced a greater than
100% increase or decrease in its tax rate. The figure here,
consequently, is an 11-city average, as Green Bay experi-
eneed a 137% increase in its equalized local property tax
rate and was excluded from the analysis.
g-l1-city average as Janesville experienced a 435% increase
in its local property tax rate and was excluded from the
analysis.
h-1l-city average as no figures were available for Racine.
i-9-city average; no figures available for Racine;
Sheboygan with a 122% increase and Wauwatosa with a 128%
increase in their local property tax rates were excluded
from the analysis.
J-11-city average as no figures were available for Racine.
SOURCE: Figures computed from data provided by the
Wisconsin Department of Revenue, "Town, Village
and City Taxes," 1965 through 1973 issues.
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that experienced by Wisconsin's other large cities. Madison
taxpayers even faced a large 17 per cent increase in local
taxes, in terms of full-value rates, in the third Dyke budget
year. The large decrease in taxing for local purposes
exhibited during Dyke's final budget year is consonant with
the state-wide city trend. Madison's tax cuts for 1973 thus
reflect the introduction of revenue sharing funds more so than
the impact of mayoral leadership.
As Dyke believed general fund services were important
enough to permit controlled expansion of taxing for these pur-
poses, moderate increases in general fund tax rates, then, do
not really provide evidence that disconfirms the picture of
effective Dyke leadership. Madisonts taxes for local
purposes do not appear to be out of line with those experi-
enced by Wisconsin's large cities.
If Dyke was not against all the growth in taxing for
general fund services, he was, as has already been detailed,
totally hostile to increases in taxes for education. Tax
changes for education in Madison during Dyke's term in office
are for the most part consistent with Dyke's anti-school
spending practice. In three of the four Dyke budget years,
school taxes in Madison grew at a slower rate than in
Wisconsin's other major cities. Yet, the differences between
Madison and the other cities is not overwhelming; in fact, the
two years that saw a reduction in full-value tax rates for
education in Madison also saw a similar state-wide city trend.
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Though Madison shows some conservative tendencies during these
years, its school tax rates are not so different as to hint at
the possibility of some unique factor at work on the Madison
political scene.
An evaluation of Dyke's impact on taxes on the whole,
then, is again a bit ambiguous. In terms of actual rates Dyke
was fairly successful. But when put in comparative perspec-
tive with other cities in the state to control for statewide
trends, no unique pattern of tax-restraint emerges. The full-
value comparisons do not show any clear evidence of effective
mayoral leadership. Increases in property valuation coupled
with changes in state and federal aid for the most part,
enabled a stabilization of actual tax rates during the Dyke
administration.
But even the full-value rate comparisons, however, do not
tell the whole story. These tax figures represent only sum-
mary outcomes. They can tell whether changes in Madison's tax
levies were more conservative or liberal than the statewide
trend. They cannot, however, tell what the mayor's impact was
in setting the tax rate. The relevant question is: what would
the tax rates and the spending levels have been had Dyke not
been present? The quantitative indicators cannot give the
answer to this question and must be supplemented by a brief
description of Dyke's actions on each year's budget.
The 1970 Budget. In October of 1969 homeowners in
Madison faced the possibility of a property tax hike somewhere
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in the ten mill range. The proposed school budget entailed a
2.32 mill increase, the county budget a 1.5 mill increase.
The proposed 6.4 mill raise in the city budget prepared by
the City Finance Department reflected increased capital
improvement, debt service, welfare, and employee salary
costs.13
Dyke responded to this apparent forthcoming tax jump
by immediately handing the city finance director a list of
places where he wanted cuts. The move, if followed, would
have eliminated the entire mill rise in the city side of the
budget. The cuts were fairly extensive. The proposed welfare
supplement to recipients facing state welfare cutbacks was
eliminated in its entirety. Capital improvements in the area
of parks and streets were curtailed, as were lakeweed harvest-
ing, snow removal, and street salting. A reduction in the
number of lifeguards at the city's beaches as well as the
closing of one firestation with the elimination of twenty-four
firefighter positions were also proposed. The police depart-
ment was the only major department not subjected to the
mayor's cutting knife. The mayor even supported the addition
of ten new policemen to the force.14 Most of the money Dyke
out was never restored by the Council.
Dyke then turned his attention to the education budget.
The conservative-dominated Dyke appointed Board of Estimates
reduced the proposed mill rate increase for education from
2.32 to one mill by cutting the education budget $1,250,000.
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Two thirds of this cut, the Board of Estimates suggested,
could be effected without reducing the quality of education in
Madison if the $850,000 received in the sale of school proper-
ty would be reallocated from the school construction account
to the operating budget. Members of the Board of Education
called the cuts "a staggering blow to education in this
community" and accused Dyke of "playing a little game at the
expense of the kids."15 Despite the vociferous objections of
school officials that the $850,000 transfer as directed was
illegal, City Attorney Edwin Conrad ruled with the mayor and
the Board of Estimates. The cuts then received the approval
of the Joint Fiscal Control Group, the final authority on the
overall size of the education budget.
The budget produced a series of small aftershocks. The
Board of Education, outraged over the cuts, publicly mulled
over the possibilities that it should both hire its own legal
counsel and seek the establishment of a fiscally independent
school district whose budget would not be dependent on the
Council-dominated Fiscal Control Group. In December three
hundred people jammed a Board of Education meeting to protest
the closing of two schools and the Madison community center--a
meeting place for the elderly financed out of the school
budget. The closings were averted only by the school board's
raising of student fees, the elimination of some summer pro-
grams, and the deferring of a computer purchase.16 The fee
increase was labeled by one school board member as a disguised
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mill rate increase for families with children.17
Dissatisfied with the school board's having taken opposi-
tion to his cuts, the new year saw Dyke endorse the proposal
of sympathetic Alderman James Gill to expand the composition
of the Board of Education from seven to nine members, with the
mayor appointing the two new members to serve a year and a
half term until the next election. This "stacking" move,
though, was rejected by the Council.
The final budget included a 3.36 mill increase for
Madison homeowners. The 1.35 mill increase in the city
service side of the budget represented Council restoration of
some Dyke cuts--primarily the keeping open of the university
area fire station, the restoration of $178,200 to the welfare
budget, and increases in the areas of lifeguards and snow
removal--as well as a rejection of the mayor's proposed nine
dollar wheel tax.1 8
On the whole the 1970 budget was a Dyke victory. Though
taxes rose, they did so at a moderate rate. As a result of
constant mayoral pressure, an imminent drastic rise in taxes
for city services was averted and the proposed tax increase
for education was more than halved. Backed by the apparent
anti-tax mandate in his election, Dyke proved capable of
cowing spending proponents on both the Council and the School
Board.
The 1971 B et. Passage of the 1971 budget was a
relatively quiet affair. In an attempt to prevent a repeat
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public outcry over cuts in such popular services as lifeguards
Dyke labeled all departmental budget requests for 1971 "top
secret."19 Both the public and the aldermen were to be
allowed little input into the budget until after the document
was formally presented by the mayor.
Dyke's budget required no mill rate rise in the city
share of the property tax. Increased city spending would be
covered by the rise in property valuation. According to the
mayor the budget "carefully equates the growth in tax base
with growth in city expenditures."20 Major cuts were proposed
in the health, welfare, and capital budget areas while a
$138,000 increase was recommended in regards to police
expenditures.21
Dyke's hopes for a no-tax increase were soon dashed as
the result of a $300,000 drop in expected state aid (seven
million dollars from the state had been expected).22 The tax
line received a second jolt when the Board of Estimates recom-
mended a $480,000 increase over Dyke's budget to cover the
hiring of thirty police officers, increased payroll insurance
for city employees, and increased aid to the bus system. Con-
sistent with his views on the distinction between executive
and legislative functions, Dyke absented himself from the
Board of Estimates meetings.
The education budget as submitted by the school adminis-
tration required a 1.67 mill increase. Acting on the
recommendation of Dyke and the Board of Estimates, the Joint
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Fiscal Control Group ordered a modest $381,026 or one per cent
cut in school spending. Though school officials claimed the
cuts seriously hurt, even such liberal aldermen as Paul Soglin
and William Offerdahl, who in the past had supported increased
school spending, now were in the lead in the fight to make
cuts. Soglin was not the only one who saw the budget to be
"padded," 2 3 as witnessed by the comments of the following
school board member:
By that time (the 1970 budget) we had learned to
budget long.
(Question: In other words you were padding the
budget?)
That's what I say. Up until then I know I for one
had been demanding a clean budget...At one point
I was naive in saying, "Give them a clean budget.
Let's give them one in which there's nothing to take
out"...We did and it caused a lot of consternation in
the ranks (as a result of the cuts which followed)...
So I'm confident that the professional staff was
sliding in a little lard in every item.24
The process of "sliding in a little lard," according to this
board member, had begun during the Festge administration and
continued through the Dyke years.
Dyke remained dissatisfied with the remaining 1.3 educa-
tion mill rate increase. According to the mayor the Board of
Education budget was forcing any reduction in taxes "to come
out of the hide of city services."25 "How long," the mayor
objected, "can we continue to dilute city services in order to
provide broadened educational services to our children."26
But in contrast to the previous year and despite his concerns,
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Dyke seldom raised his objections in public.
The 1971 budget, then, was a mixed outcome for Dyke. The
Board of Estimates spent more than Dyke recommended and the
school budget increase counterbalanced tax cuts effected else-
where. Still the total actual mill rate was quite moderate as
the result of the relatively low level of his own proposed
budget for city services as well as his successful exhortation
to the county cut its own budget.27 The mayor accepted the
resulting .5 mill increase in the total tax rate, noting that
"further limitations on the budget would impose severe hard-
ship on service levels."28 On the whole, the 1971 budget
would have to be considered a Dyke victory as it is reflected
in his anti-tax increase orientation.
The 1972 Budget As he did with the previous year's
budget, Dyke sought to impose a five per cent ceiling on the
increase in any portion of city spending. This year, though,
the county refused to acquiesce to Dyke's wishes in regard to
its tax rates. With a raise in the county budget of about
eleven per cent and nearly a two mill increase expected in the
tax rate for Madison homeowners, it was clear that any effort
to hold the line on taxes would have to come in the city and
school budgets.
Dyke immediately ran into problems with School Super-
intendent Douglas Ritchie as the education budget, though it
provided for no increase in tax rates, called for a 7.7 per
cent increase in spending. Ritchie warned that a cut down to
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the five per cent level might force school closings and
reductions in teaching staff. 2 9
Dyke soon began to talk in terms of a one million dollar
cut in the proposed $40.7 million education budget. Later,
though, he scaled the figure down to $500,000.30 Reflecting
Dyke's self-imposed divorce from formal legislative proceed-
ings, it was conservative aldermen and not the mayor himself
who formally proposed the cuts. The Board of Estimates, with
fiscal conservatives occupying four of the five seats on the
Board, repeated its routine of the previous year, again recom-
mending a budget cut of one per cent ($407,000). Such a cut
represented a .4 mill reduction in a budget that already called
for no tax increases. At the conclusion of one Board of
Estimates meeting, an outraged Ritchie demanded of Dyke
"Which is more important, city services or education?" "City
services, there's no question at all," Dyke responded. 3 1
In contrast to the previous year, though, the school
board and Ritchie were ready to fight and pleaded for citizen
support of their stance. Citizen mobilization was abetted by
speculation over a list of likely service cuts that would
follow if Dyke's proposed education budget would be imple-
mented: lunch room supervisors would be cut in half, study
halls eliminated, text book fees would be increased, high
schools would be closed at six o'clock, one or more elementary
schools would face closing, health services would be cur-
tailed, and the number of crossing guards would be reduced. 3 2
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At a meeting before which 250 people registered to
speak, the Joint Fiscal Control Group voted to reduce the
education budget by $120,000 (or .2 mills) instead of the
$407,000 recommended. The mayor researched the possibility
of using his veto, but found that as the school district
included areas outside the city's limits he lacked the prerog-
ative. The restoration of most of the school money cut
represented a defeat for Dyke.
To complete the analysis of the 1972 budget two questions
must be answered: why did Madison's school board choose to
fight back in this third Dyke budget year and not before?
and why did Dyke lose on this issue? The various school
officials interviewed answered the first question by referring
to the surplus from previous years, the presence of some
"padding" in the initial reports, and the lateral transfer of
surpluses from one account to other areas of need--all of
which helped to mitigate the actual impact of the mayor's cuts
in his first two budgets. One school board member even felt
the Dyke proposed outs were "token" in that "one per cent of
any budget can be cut."33 This was especially true of an
education budget where salaries are usually overbudgeted due
to the inability to see in advance Just how experienced, and
thus well paid, new teachers will be. But perhaps even more
importantly, the seeming anti-tax mandate of Dyke's election
and the support he found among tax-conscious Council members
which had made the school board reluctant to take the mayor
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head on in his first year in office, was now beginning to wear
off.
By the third year, school officials were beginning to
feel that Dyke was beginning to establish adverse precedents.
This pattern of school budget cutting had to be stopped before
it really hurt:
We thought we had things pretty well in hand, frankly
(during the first two Dyke budget years). And when we
became aware that maybe this budget cutting was going
to become a pretty popular sort of thing, we went out
after it.34
We thought we could counteract it (Dyke's proposed cuts
in the second budget) with the good thinking of people
in the City Council and the Joint Fiscal Control Group.
And quite frankly you don't like to go to war...But by
the third year we decided that's enough of that...So we
declared war.35
Paradoxically, Dyke's success in his first two budget
years seems also to help explain his defeat in the third. The
effect of school budget cuts on the first two years helped
raise public dissatisfaction with the level of education ser-
vices provided in the community. This growing dissatisfaction
provided the fertile ground which the school board effectively
tapped in its countermobilization.
But shifting public concern and effective lobbying by
pro-school spending groups still do not explain all the fac-
tors that helped defeat Dyke in regards to the 1972 budget.
The attitudes of Madison's aldermen, who comprised twenty-two
of the twenty-eight votes on the Joint Fiscal Control Group,
also changed, to the disadvantage of Dyke's potential
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influence. For one thing, as a consequence of an extreme
Council turnover in the 1970 and 1971 elections, where 14 new
aldermen were elected to a possible 22 seats, Dyke was con-
fronting a more liberal council than he had immediately after
his first election. But even beyond that, the polarized
atmosphere that Dyke to a great extent helped to create also
took its toll on the mayor's potential influence. One school
official remembered the reaction of Council members to the
undisguised hostility that Dyke confronted educational spokes-
men with that year:
He'd (Dyke) fly all over the place at you at a
meeting. You'd never know where he was coming from.
And held ask the same questions over and over again.
And that exasperated me. And the aldermen in that
Fiscal Control Group meeting that year...when he kept
up that inquisition, several of the aldermen lashed
back at him.3 6
Dyke's strength in his convictions and unwavering goal deter-
mination, which were so important in explaining his first
yearts budget success, were thus somewhat counter-productive
in this third year of confrontations.
In regards to the city budget, Dyke's proposed wheel tax,
which he hoped would be used to finance the bus subsidy, was
again defeated. As money for this purpose now had to come
from the general fund, even spending for city purposes now
exceeded the five per cent increase ceiling Dyke originally
proposed as a guideline. The final addition of $145,000 by
the Board of Estimates over the mayor's recommendation for
the Parks Department budget further prompted Dyke to comment,
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"I can't help but believe that it looks like Christmas came
today." 3 7
The 1973 Budget. Despite Dyke's insistence that each
year's funds from the newly enacted federal revenue sharing
be used to defray the following year's expenditures, both the
county and city legislatures applied the 1973 as well as the
1972 shared monies to the 1973 budget to get a big immediate
"splashl" The introduction of all this new found money into
the city arena permitted the city simultaneously to cut taxes
while expanding spending for services (note the 1972-1973
changes in Tables 2 and 4). As revenue sharing increased the
total amount of rewards to be distributed, most groups in the
city were satisfied to the point that no major controversy
developed during the budget period. The 1973 budget thus
proves to be an inadequate test of the impact of William
Dyke's leadership style. The mayor's only salient action
concerning the city part of the budget was to reduce the num-
ber of authorized new buses from twenty-eight to ten.
Dyke's major run-in during 1972 was not the result of
next year's budget deliberation, but of his refusal to sign or
veto the placement of a $6.4 million dollar school bond
referendum in the November ballot. Dyke believed both that
the referendum was far too much money and that a November
ballot insulated the school board members, who are elected in
the spring, from public accountability for their spending. 3 8
Dyke refrained from taking any action on the proposal
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until after the November ballots were printed, thus making a
fall referendum an impossibility. Just as he did with 13-C,
Dyke was denying the City Council any opportunity to reverse
his decision. When the deadline passed and the mayor finally
chose to act, he mustered enough votes on the Council to
sustain his veto.
CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF AN IDEOLOGICAL LEADER
A fair interpretation of all this evidence is that Dyke
did have impact. He put the city debt under control; he
increased city spending for police and data processing
services; he acted to suppress tax increases and city spend-
ing, particularly in the areas of education and welfare. Dyke
generally moved Madison closer to his view of fiscally
responsible government--which is not to say, however, that
Dyke won every one of his budget battles. The 1972 education
budget, the city's acquisition of the bus system, and the
restoration of some of the welfare cuts are blatant instances
where the mayor's priorities were for the most part pushed
aside.
Dyke's success was to a great degree dependent on the
leadership style he utilized. Dyke was an extremely goal-
oriented mayor; he had definite directions in which he wanted
to lead Madison. Even Entrepreneurship, one of the three high
direction styles identified in Chapter One, could not provide
Dyke with the policy impact he sought. The Entrepreneur seeks
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to put his imprint in the city domain without jeopardizing
his power position. He attempts to do so by structuring broad
overarching coalitions behind policy initiatives which embrace
a latent consensus. But Dyke was not content to confine his
influence to solely those areas where a latent consensus
existed. Dyke's anti-school spending preferences were so
strong that he sought to adopt budgets that were nowhere
acceptable to the school board and its allies. Dykets goals
could not accommodate his playing of consensus politics.
Dyke's definite conservative policy preferences precluded the
construction of a broad overarching coalition.
Only two styles, then, the Partisan and the Ideologue,
allowed Dyke the opportunity to pursue his goals in situations
where a latent consensus was lacking. The Partisan style,
whereby a conflict-oriented mayor seeks to mobilize only a
portion of the community behind his goals, will be discussed
in detail in the later chapters of this dissertation regarding
Paul Soglin, Dyke's successor. It is to the advantage of
Dyke's solo-action, high direction style--the Ideologue--that
the discussion is now directed.
The foremost advantage of the Ideologue is that it is the
most goal-oriented of all leadership styles. The Entrepreneur
as already noted, can only act in those areas where the
potential for consensus polities exists. The Partisan, as
will be shown in the Soglin chapters, will not act if such
intervention adversely affects his long-term power position.
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The Partisan, like the Entrepreneur, is restrained by
practical considerations.
The Ideologue, in contrast, is not constrained by any
coalition maintenance or power conservation considerations.
The result of such unfettered action is an impressive consis-
tency in effort that can achieve results in areas where
"wiser" leaders might refrain from action.
Bill Dyke reaped just such benefits from his ideological
approach. No matter what the political opposition--be it from
Council liberals, welfare recipients, outraged school board
members, or citizens concerned with maintaining service levels
--Dyke could not be deterred from his individualistically
established goal of fiscal responsibility. The result of
such uncompromising sense of purpose was that Madison, with
few exceptions, continued to move only in the direction Dyke
desired. This control over direction that resulted from the
Ideological leadership of Bill Dyke stands in sharp contrast
to the lapses in guidance which resulted from his predecessor
Otto Festge's vacillation during the 1968 education budget and
the police/fire wage parity controversies.39
One further advantage of the Ideological approach is seen
in that other actors, faced with the unrestrained fervor with
which the mayor pursued his fiscal goals, became uncertain how
to respond. As one school board member explained during his
first term, "I think we were just all sort of feeling our
way. "40 Dyke's refusal to bargain like a politician, thus,
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had the advantages of disorienting and intimidating his
opponents. Only after budget cutting in successive years had
produced public dissatisfaction with the level of education-
related services provided did the school establishment feel
confident enough to seriously challenge the mayor's initia-
tives. Obstinancy, or the refusal to play the political game
the way others expect can at times be a very important
resource. And Dyke used these tactics to the maximum extent
possible.
Finally, Dyke almost virtually by himself created a
"political atmosphere" during his first term which was con-
ducive to budget cutting and tax control. In both his elec-
tion campaigns and his public actions in office, Dyke helped
raise the tax-consciousness of the Madison community to the
point where it became a potent political force. Dyke
expressly tried to cause the questions of taxes and budgets
"as much as possible to be public discussions. " 4I The impact
of this consciousness-raising was clearly noted by at least
one of the city reporters interviewed:
Dyke was running on the heels of a big tax increase
and said, "I'll put a stop to that." And that's why
he was elected.
And so the momentum...and so the school board people
and administration and elected officials would per-
ceive the current mood of the voters was not to have
school taxes go up so much...People who are affected
by that are going to say, "This really is not the
year. We're going to have to tolerate some tax cuts.
We're going to have to make some cuts. We're going to
have to accept some cuts because that is the political
climate in town."
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So, I think, Dyke can get credit. If he had not been
mayor it is conceivable that taxes would have been
higher than it otherwise happened.42
STYLE AS STRATEGY AND PERSONALITY RESPONSE
The next chapter of this dissertation will be devoted to
the identification of the costs of the Ideological leadership
approach. Yet, from the evidence presented in this chapter,
the primary drawback to the Ideological leadership approach
can already be identified. The Ideologue so alienates other
political actors with his individualistic issue-orientations
that he jeopardizes his power standing, and hence possibly
with it the position of the causes for which he is fighting,
in the long run.
Bill Dyke's Ideological combat with the school board
proved productive from the mayor's standpoint during his first
two years. Yet in his purist actions, Dyke had so alienated
some aldermen, school board members, and Madison citizens that
he paved the way for the school board's successful counter-
mobilization against his proposed third budget year education
cuts. Dyke's Ideological approach on the school issue also
helped exacerbate the community antagonisms which denied him a
third term as mayor. The Ideologue, while a potentially
potent strategy in certain contexts in the short-run, runs the
risk of being a self-defeating approach in the long-run.
Bill Dyke's failure to fully recognize the possible
dangers inherent in the Ideological leadership approach helps
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underscore the complex determinants of style adoption. Style
can be treated as conscious strategy; it can be viewed as the
means which a political head chooses to his goals. Yet, the
degree to which a political head really can exert his "choice"
of style is a matter of question. Personality factors influ-
ence both the choice of goals a mayor makes and the inclina-
tion of a mayor to "go it alone" or seek the cooperation of
others in attempting to reach these goals. The process of
style adoption is not totally rational.
Yet individuals will not admit such a lack of free will
as overstress on personality theory might imply. Bill Dyke,
for example, would argue that he chose to pursue his goals as
a solo actor. Similarly, the name "Ideologue" has been used
to identify the sources of such extreme goal-oriented
individualistic behavior. The mayor who disdains compromise
and network building in pursuit of such definite goals does
so in the name of some higher truth or ideology. Perhaps the
more correct name for this mayoral type should be
"Ideologieal/Individualist." Such a name, though too awkward
to use, would avoid the unnecessary implication that this is
the only mayor who can possess a fixed all-consuming truth.
The Ideologue is not simply anyone with an ideology: he is a
purist whose faith in his ideology mandates his acting as a
loner.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE COSTS OF IDEOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP
As the preceding chapter has shown, the Ideologue can be
an effective goal oriented leadership style. The Ideological
approach, however, is not without its costs. Dyke's purist
adherence to his principles, for example, alienated members of
the Board of Education, the City Council, and the general
public. The mayorts incessant questioning of one school offi-
cial only served to antagonize some Fiscal Control Group
members. On the Council, votes reportedly were often cast
against a proposal simply because the mayor supported it.
Dyke's Ideological style also proved inefficient to the
extent that the mayor ignored all possible coalition-building
opportunities. Conflict-oriented leadership is appropriate in
situations where broad overarching community coalitions cannot
be built. But to discard any coalition approach to all policy
areas is to forego opportunities for influence where such an
approach might prove effective.
Dyke's failure to get elected to a third term is the most
conspicuous evidence of the "failure" of his conflict style.
Had Dyke not by his own actions helped add to the polarization
and the "combat fatigue" of Madison in the Vietnam era, he
would have, faced with an opponent as far to the "left" as
Paul Soglin, likely been elected to another term in office.
Dyke's Ideological orientations achieved short-run success, in
areas such as in the school budget battles, which could not
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have been won with a consensus style. But in the long-run
the style took its toll in denying Dyke another two years to
impress his sense of direction in the City of Madison.
This chapter will attempt to further evaluate the
Ideological leadership approach. Of particular focus will be
the impact that William Dyke had on the level of polarization
of Madison given the contextual situation that existed there
in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
STUDENT RIOTS IN THE VIETNAM YEARS
The period of student unrest that plagued Madison
actually began before Dyke assumed office. The blame for the
wave of student unrest cannot be placed at the mayor's feet.
Madison first began to witness student demonstrations in
1967--two years before Dyke's election. In February, anti-
Vietnam students attempted to block the on-campus recruiting
at the University of Wisconsin by the Dow Chemical Corpora-
tion. Dow, as the producer of napalm, merited a special
animosity from students who opposed American intervention in
Vietnam. Dow was seen to be an immoral corporation acting in
support of an immoral war. When the police attempted to clear
the demonstrators from the building where the reoruiting was
taking place, a clash ensued between the police and the
students. Seventeen persons were arrested by the police in
the first day of rioting.
The politicized atmosphere created by student antagonism
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to America's Vietnam policy spilled over to issues that had
nothing to directly do with the war. Under Madison's new
traffic plan, University Avenue, the main thoroughfare through
the campus area, was converted into a one-way street; four
lanes of traffic flowed out of town. A separate lane for
buses, however, went in the opposite direction. Students
crossing the street tended to look in the direction of major
traffic flow and remained insensitive to the danger of the
occasional bus that approached from the other direction. In
May, student dissatisfaction peaked after the crippling of a
female student who proved unaware of the oncoming bus and was
hit by it. An estimated 2,000 students gathered as some
blocked the bus lane and jostled buses, demanding that the
wrong-way lane be converted into a bicycle path. Twenty-five
students were arrested.1
In October 1967, major disruption flared again as person-
nel recruiting for the Dow Chemical Corporation returned to
campus. Seventy persons were injured as helmeted, club-
wielding police attempted to clear the demonstrators from the
building; tear gas was used to clear the crowd outside.
Students responded with verbal indignities and rock-throwing.2
In 1969, students occupied the University's administra-
tion building to protest the University's holding of securi-
ties in financial institutions that provided support to the
white regime in South Africa. The protestors also demanded
the establishment of a black studies program and other efforts
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to make education more responsive to the needs of blacks. The
usual pattern of setting up barricades and police dismantling
them and firing tear gas ensued.
Madison, as a result of student reaction to the war, was
a city in the late 1960's and 1970's where politics was
characterized by bitterness, manifest hostility, paranoia, and
fear--by both anti-war and establishment elements. Tensions
were taut; persons were polarized into competing camps
according to their perspectives on the Vietnam war and the
growth of the student counterculture. All issues--race, wel-
fare, civil rights, student rights, and even pornography--
became politicized. As a result of the anti-war "trashings"
where more extreme anti-war elements broke the windows of
downtown businesses, State Street began to take on the look of
a battle-worn city. Broken windows were boarded up with ply-
wood; renovated stores presented primarily brick facades with
only the smallest of windows to serve as targets for possible
rock-throwing.
It was into such an atmosphere that William Dyke stepped
as mayor. Politics during his terms continued to be dramatic.
In May of 1969, only eighteen days after Dyke took office, the
predominantly student Mifflin Street neighborhood, the
counter-culture center of the University community, erupted
over the question of a "block party." The next year welfare
demonstrators occupied the state capitol. A major riot was
precipitated in May 1970 by the American incursion into
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Cambodia and the killing of the four students at Kent State.
The violence of this period seemed to culminate in the August
1970 Sterling Hall bombing where one University physics
researcher, Robert Fassnacht, was killed in a blast so large
that it blew many windows out of the building. Major out-
breaks of violence declined in the post-Sterling Hall spectre.
Nonetheless a second riot in Mifflin (or "Miffland" as it came
to be called) capped Dyke's first term, and street skirmishes
continued to blot Dyke's second term in office.
Politics in such an atmosphere were quite strained.
Resolutions concerning the war, themselves a sign of polici-
zation, often brought packed Council chambers, with some
spectators vocally intruding on Council proceedings whenever
they saw fit. Meetings were sporadically disrupted by the
necessity of clearing the chambers as the result of bomb
threats. The life of Bill Dyke, a firm supporter of Nixon's
Vietnam policies, as well as the lives of members of his
immediate family, were continually threatened. Police
routinely checked the mayor's car for the presence of explo-
sives.
It is the two major incidents with their direct roots in
city affairs, the Mifflin riots of 1969 and 1971, that will be
of most concern to this study. As both incidents were a
direct response to the actions of city officials, as well as
being indirectly a reaction to the tensions of the Vietnam
era, these are the areas of violence in which the impact of
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mayoral action can be expected to be most apparent. The
thesis of this chapter is that the style of the Ideologue not
only added to the polarizations that plagued Madison during
this era, but was reponsible for the level of disorder during
the two Miffland outbursts--conflicts which might have been
minimized if not avoided had the mayor not viewed politics in
an unbending moralistic manner.
The 1969 Mifflin Riot. The Mifflin area of Madison is a
mix of young and old. Located between the University and the
state capitol, the area consists of old, somewhat deteriorated
housing predominantly occupied by students. Mifflin Street,
with the Mifflin "Co-op" (an alternative-style grocery store)
as its symbolic center, became a center of anti-Vietnam
sentiment and an anti-establishment life-style. Mifflin,
however, is not entirely a student area. Mixed in among the
students are a number of elderly residents who have lived in
the area a good portion of their lives and who refused to move
when the complexion of the neighborhood changed from its
family to student character.
With the coming of warm spring weather, student residents
of Mifflin announced that a block party would be held in the
street on May 3. The block party was to be an expression of
a freedom of spirit, openness of the community, and inter-
human feeling--values which Mifflin residents saw to be
lacking in a dominant society engaged in extensive military
operations in Southeast Asia.
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On the Saturday of the block party, two police officers
were sent to Mifflin Street in response to a telephoned
complaint by "a sickly, elderly woman"3 that a stereo was
being played excessively loud (more than likely the music was
being blasted from a porch into the street to help provide
music for the "party"). Relations between the students and
Madison's police force, which for the most part at that time
was still dominated by "old guard" officers, were already
strained as a result of previous street confrontations.
A back-up police team approached the people on the porch,
an argument ensued, and a crowd of block party participants
gathered. The police proceeded to bolster their strength
according to their automatic procedures for such incidents.4
The incident touched off a three day riot marked (as were
almost all such episodes during this period) by rock-throwing
by students and the use of clubs and tear gas by the police.
Mayor Dyke was out of town with his son when the preci-
pitating incident and the immediate escalation occurred.5
Police Chief Wilbur Emery and County Sheriff Jack Leslie made
the decision to declare the block party an unlawful assembly
as no permit to close off the street had been secured.6
According to Dyke the decision to call for help to disperse
the crowd was made by the officer in charge of the scene.7
Whether Dyke had actually been involved in the decision to
disperse the party lies in the realm of conflicting
testimony.8
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By the second day of the disturbance, eighty arrests
had been made. Among those arrested were two aldermen with
student constituencies: Paul Soglin (arrested twice, once
for obstructing an officer and once for unlawful assembly)
who resided in and represented the Mifflin area, and Eugene
Parks. Dyke made a brief day-time visit to the Mifflin com-
munity where he spoke via bullhorn to a large assembled crowd
before the Mifflin Street Co-op. According to both the mayor
and the students, little, if any, actual communication took
place. The mayor refused to concede to the student demands
that all charges against those arrested be dropped and that a
block party permit be immediately issued. Dyke's view of the
meeting was that only "total capitulation" would satisfy the
rioters and "it was obvious there were no negotiations
possible." 9
Dyke saw the whole question as a matter of principle and
law: "We can't let any group set up a no-mants land with a
different code, different morals, and different responsibili-
ties which are entirely outside the total community." I 0  In
the mayor's eyes there was simply "no provision in the city
ordinance for the type of block party"ll the students had in
mind. Dyke's objections failed to mollify the block party
proponents who pointed out that streets had been routinely
closed in the past for American Legion parties, "soap box
derbies, sledding, carnivals, and parades.nl2 That Monday,
though the mayor expressed his willingness to support an
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ordinance generally providing for street-closing for block
parties, he still refused to grant an immediate permit. The
student-police street clashes continued for a third night.
Tuesday saw calm finally return to the Mifflin community as
Soglin and Parks made pleas to keep the scene quiet and Dyke
withdrew the police from the area.
Dyke was conciliatory at a Council Committee of the Whole
meeting acknowledging Park's and Soglin's concern over the
situation and asking Council members to support Soglin's
motion authorizing a street dance the following week-end.13
But in an emotionally charged meeting two days later before
an overflow crowd, the Council refused the permit by a lop-
sided seventeen to three vote. Dyke said if a confrontation
erupted the upcoming weekend it would be "because the students
chose to force it."IJ  But the week-end, when it came,
remained calm as four hundred students "partied" instead at
the farm of Fire Captain Ed Durkin, who had helped arrange
Soglin's bail.15 Dyke even helped arrange bus transportation
to the farm in order to avoid the outbreak of new trouble.16
Under Dyke's instructions three city department heads
began drafting a stringent block party ordinance. Block
parties would be permitted only between eight A.M. and sunset
upon application by seventy-five per cent of the residents
over twenty-one in the affected area and the posting of
$10,000 bond for possible damages. The age and bond require-
ments gave the proposed ordinance a definite anti-student
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flavor. But the question of even such an ordinance soon
became somewhat clouded as the result of a ruling by city
Attorney Edwin Conrad that the closing of streets for purposes
of "adult recreation" was in violation of state law.17 The
Council consequently passed the buck to the state legislature
to enact the appropriate enabling legislation.
The 1969 Mifflin controversy came to an end when on
Sunday, May 25, less than three weeks after the initial out-
burst, two block parties were held in town under "parade"
permits. One was for a Shrinerts parade around Capitol Square
which concluded with a block party-type event in front of the
Masonic Temple. The other was for a one-block "parade" along
Mifflin Street. The latter "parade" lasted until five P.M.,
when the permit expired and people went home without distur-
18bance. Consistent with his managerial view of delegation,
Dyke did not partake in the actual making of the decision to
allow the parties, but merely backed up the advice of his
subordinate, Police Chief, Wilbur Emery. As Emery had already
granted the Shriner's permission for a parade, a permit for a
similar event on Mifflin Street could not at that point be
reasonably denied, as one member of the City Attorney's office
observed:
I believe he (Dyke) had nothing to say about it.
Emery had put himself in a box...The mayor was not
involved in that at all. 1 9
The Intervening Period. In January, 1970, the City
Council approved a block party ordinance, specifying that
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applications for such parties be filed with the city clerk,
and that the mayor, police chief, fire chief, and public works
director give their recommendations to the Council before the
Council itself would make a decision.
April of the year saw an outbreak of anti-war "trashing"
in the campus area with the necessity of police having to
overturn student erected barricades on Mifflin Street and in
the surrounding area. Damage totalled $100,000 and twenty
arrests were made.20 Dyke reacted by proposing a thirty day
moratorium on parades and street demonstrations be enacted,
and that sponsors of demonstrations be required to post bond
to cover possible damages.
Two weeks after these incidents students in Madison, as
in other college communities, spasmodically exhibited their
outraged reaction to the Cambodia invasion and the Kent State
shootings. A local supermarket was firebombed, street action
commenced and the National Guard was called in. At the
request of his police chief, Dyke submitted his resolution
banning parades on State Street (the University business
district) and requiring the posting of bond for all demon-
strations. The Council spurned the bond requirement, but
accepted the parade ban in light of the damage "trashing"
inflicted on businesses in the campus area.
August brought with it the Sterling Hall bombing. Two
Mifflin block party permits were also approved that summer.
The 1971 Mifflin Riot. In October of 1970 the State
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Supreme Court ruled against the city's granting to the Bus
Utility exclusive use of the "wrong-way" lane on University
Avenue on the basis that all city streets must be kept open
to all traffic unless otherwise provided for under state law.
City Attorney Edwin Conrad ruled the decision voided Madi-
son's block party ordinance as such closing of streets was
not specified in the state statutes. 2 1
The spring 1971 mayoral primaries showed the shakiness
of Dyke's electoral position as the result of the turbulence
of his first term in office. Though the mayor led the field
with nearly forty-three per cent of the March primary vote,
he was outpolled by the combined vote of his two liberal
opponents, Leo Cooper and Paul Soglin. His opponent for the
April election was Cooper, who actually finished only 520
votes, or one percentage point, off the lead.
With less than a week to go to the election, Dyke, citing
Conrad's opinion, vetoed a permit granted by the City Council
for a Mifflin Street block party to be held the week-end
preceding the spring election. Also taken into consideration
by Dyke was Police Chief Emery's view that the holding of a
block party would be imprudent in light of his estimate that
a thousand radicals would be coming to Madison as part of an
announced "New Nation Conference."22 The conference was in
fact more public relations on the part of some elements of the
left than substance. Other than the tacking of wall posters
publicizing the event, the conference never materialized.
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Dyke's opponents considered the mayor's action to be
politically motivated. A Capital Times editorial called the
veto "a coldly calculated political act deliberately designed
to provoke a response from sponsors of the party in order to
bolster the mayor's flagging re-election campaign."23 The
anti-Dyke newspaper further proclaimed that, "Instead of
trying to conciliate and defuse a situation that has the
potential for disaster, he (Dyke) is deliberately set upon a
collision course."'24
With aldermen, fearing possible political repercussions
of being identified with Mifflin Street violence, the Council
reversed its previous fifteen to five vote granting the
permit. Some sort of a confrontation appeared inevitable.
Emery cancelled all days off for city police and asked the
assistance of other law enforcement units in the area.
April 5, the date of the scheduled illegal block party,
was a strange day indeed. Police lined Mifflin in order to
keep the street "open." Yet, because of the danger poten-
tial of the situation and the presence of an extraordinarily
large number of law enforcement officials, no traffic actually
went through Mifflin. Meanwhile a large crowd of students
watched from and danced on the sidewalks throughout the day.
Dyke in the meantime remained at what he called "command
headquarters" in the City-County building.
The day was tense but peaceful. At nightfall, however,
after the crowd had thinned and the music stopped, the
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disorder finally happened.2 6 Compared to the level of
violence Madison experienced in similar situations in the
past, the disruption and especially the precipitating inci-
dents were of a relatively minor nature. Some students
engaged in rock throwing; the police commenced a steady bar-
rage of tear gas. The usual "hit and run" situation followed.
To Dyke the responsibility for the incident was clear:
The confrontation was caused by a small group of
willful people who were determined to subject the
city to a bad day in the streets, permit or not...
This type of planned coercion and willful confronta-
tion cannot be condoned, nor can it be the basis of
city acquiescence.27
Two days later Dyke won re-election with fifty-three per
cent of the vote. According to both The Capital Times and
Cooper supporters, the Mifflin incident was an important
factor contributing to Dyke's unexpected strength in the blue-
collar near east side of Madison.28 Dyke campaign workers
even hastily distributed a pre-election brochure on the East
Side underlining Cooper's role in supporting the block
party.29 Dyke carried four of these "industrial" wards which
had eluded him in the previous election.30
THE VIEW FROM THE MAYORtS OFFICE AND THE SPECIAL COSTS
OF IDEOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP
To Dyke the riots on Mifflin Street were not simple
disturbances but rather were the expression of a more far-
reaching "attitude" which could not be tolerated:
219
What happens is an attitude develops and then you test
it...And you find out whether you have reason to
believe what your senses and your information indicates
to you to be the case. In the first case (referring to
the first Mifflin incident), what (it) seemed to me (to
be) was a simple, almost family-type disturbance...We
simply had a disorderly scene, Period. A disorderly
scene is something that should be wrapped up without
additional difficulty...But what happened here was that
we found that this was not just an incident but was a
pattern of repeated incidents and a commitment to
repetition.31
To put this in the context of the times, we had in
Madison simply one chapter of a volume of national
character which was almost in a sense like guerrilla
theater.32
Dyke is certainly correct in his assessment that the funda-
mental cause of the Mifflin riots were then to be found in
the national arena.
But the existence of a powderkeg is not a sufficient
condition for a riot. There must be a "triggering incident"33
or a fuse. And the fuse in both Mifflin incidents was within
the reach of the mayor. With advance knowledge of the 1969
block party, the mayor, had he wished, could have issued
instructions to the police which might have minimized the
chances of a major incident. The 1971 riot itself was the
direct result of mayoral action. Had Dyke not chosen to veto
a Council-passed block party permit or had he shown restraint
in reacting to the rook throwing incidents in the thinning
evening crowd, the disruption would have never taken place.
Both riots, then, might have been avoided. But instead of
trying to avoid confrontation, Dyke almost sought it out.
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To Dyke a simple question of respect for the law and
authority was at stake. In the first incident, as the block
party participants had not sought formal permission for the
event from the streets or police departments, the gathering
could not be tolerated. As far as the second incident was
concerned, a major factor in Dyke's decision to veto was his
belief that the Mifflin people "don't end their parties when
they say they are going to."0  The mayor thus felt that not
only did students disturb their elderly neighbors by con-
tinuing their parties into the evening, but they showed an
intolerable disrespect for authority by doing so. In the
eyes of the mayor, respect for the authority had to be main-
tained even if the enforcement of this respect led to a dis-
orderly scene. Thus when asked in the interview why he chose
not to follow a course of action which would have diffused a
potentially violent situation, Dyke concluded:
I knew I had potential conflict if the permit was
granted. I knew I had potential conflict if the
permit was not granted. But must we presume we live
in a society where (if) people dontt get their way
they will, like little children, throw a tantrum in
the streets.35
Dyke demanded of himself the same respect for the law
that he demanded of others. Dyke's reliance upon the City
Attorney's voiding the city's block party ordinance is thus
crucial to understanding his 1971 Mifflin veto:
If I choose to participate in an action that I know
to be against the law, then am I upholding what I
swore to uphold? I think what it gets to then is
could I knowingly, after I had been advised that it
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was unlawful, acquiesce to the granting? And I
believe I don tt have the power to do that...we are
talking a little bit about Watergate (if) you know
what the law is and don't abide by it...36
Dyke might have used his discretion to underenforce the
law (or to ignore the City Attorney's ruling) had he believed
that the Mifflin residents were an integral part of the
Madison community. But to Dyke they were outsiders. Accord-
ing to one member of the mayor's office the Mifflin students
were seen as a "minority" which was "not generally looked upon
with favor in the city.n3 7 Other block parties in the city
had been carried out by respectable segment elements of the
community. But to Dyke the Mifflin Street happenings were
not real parties, but were events which "were simply planned
as a method of causing confrontations.38
Dyke, then, can be seen to be a man guided by principle.
Juist as his separation of powers ideology structured all his
dealings within the city government, his firm commitment to
respect for law and authority structured his response to the
Mifflin situation. Dyke is once more the purist whose actions
are individualistically determined. The Mifflin riots could
have been avoided. But Dyke's purist adherence to his prin-
ciples not only precluded his taking any action to defuse a
potentially violent situation but led the mayor to take
actions which helped precipitate the confrontations.
Even Dyke's appearance before the Mifflin Co-op during
the 1969 incident was no real attempt at compromise. Dyke saw
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the demands for his appearance to be simply a test of his
determination:
They (the rioters) had asked me to come down there.
It was a test of whether or not I would. It was a
test to see whether I had the courage to go in there
It was designed to bring me out there, perhaps in a
show of force maybe to force me to my knees and cause
them to be able to have their demands acceded to--
which wasntt going to be the case.39
With the mayor refusing to consider demands concerning amnesty
for rioters or the immediate issuance of a block party permit,
the riots continued for a second and third night.
Dyke t s actions in the Mifflin riots, then, can be success-
fully explained by the principles to which he adhered. Such
an explanation does not necessarily compete with the alter-
native view that Dyke sought the 1971 confrontation in order
to further his election chances. Mayors, like all men, are
complex creatures who act as they do for complex reasons. It
is conceivable that Dyke acted as he did in 1971 to force the
confrontation both as a matter of principle and as a means of
advancing his electoral chances. The evidence on this score
is not clear enough to allow any observer an accurate view as
to just what the mix of motives was behind Dyke's 1971
approach to the Mifflin "party."
Yet, only the "principles" theory can explain Dyke's
attitude toward both the 1969 and 1971 Mifflin outbreaks.
Confronting the Mifflin problem the week just before the
spring election, Dyke could conceivably have sought to shore
223
up a shaky electoral position in 1971. But in 1969, Dyke
approached the Mifflin riots only eighteen days after he had
won a fairly easy election. With the next election still two
years away, he had no immediate need to adopt a tough law and
order posture.
Using the typology of mayoral leadership styles pre-
sented in Chapter One as a perceptual lens, it appears Dyke's
actions can fit the requirements of both the Ideologue and
the Partisan. Dyke's actions fit the model of the Ideologue
to the extent that they were the result of his individualisti-
cally established views of the Mifflin community and his
belief in the principle of obedience to authority. But Dyke
can also be viewed as a Partisan leader in that he advanced
the law enforcement goals of the more conservative elements of
the Madison community. According to the Partisan perspective,
Dyke simply defined his constituency, which was less than
city-wide, and continued to advance its interests, no matter
what dissensus might be the result.
No matter which is the correct description of Dykets
style in the Mifflin incidents, Ideologue or Partisan, the
important factor to note is that his actions served to
increase the conflict. Whether Dyke's goal orientation was
individualistically determined or rooted in a sense of con-
stituency which constituted only a partial segment of the
local community, his actions helped induce violent confronta-
tions where such occurrences might have been avoided. And
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once these outbreakes occurred, attempts to mitigate their
extent were for the most part subordinated to a law enforce-
ment approach.
Dyke was successful in terms of his own goals; he
established a law enforcement, no-nonsense attitude towards
dissident elements of the Madison community. In terms of his
own priorities, Dyke gained what he sought in the handling of
the Mifflin disturbances; a tough law and order orientation
toward the Mifflin community was maintained. Yet, Dyke's
conflict-oriented leadership style had the consequences of
increasing the levels of both tension and explicit violence
witnessed by Madison. To Bill Dyke and his supporters the
benefits of instilling of respect for authority among members
of the student community outweighed whatever costs in terms
of an increased level of polarization might have occurred.
Still, Dyke's action brought with it the costs of so increas-
ing the polarization of the city that it must be noted. And
as far as the mayor's long-term influence was concerned, as
one member of the mayor's office recognized, Dyke's Mifflin
actions helped create an image of the mayor as a "divisive
person" which severely plagued him throughout his four years
in office.40
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THE ISSUE DIVISIBILITY CONTINUUM AND THE
APPROPRIATENESS OF CONFLICT LEADERSHIP
A leadership style, such as that of the Partisan or the
Ideologue, which does not require the assembling of a
community-wide coalition may be the only way to advance a
political actor's goals in a conflict setting. A mayor who
achieves his goals through such an approach must be judged
a success. However, as this analysis of the Mifflin Street
riots and the previous description of events surrounding the
13-C bus controversy make clear, such leadership also has a
potential for greatly increasing the level of polarization in
the community. Whether or not the benefits derived from such
action are desirable in light of the polarization which might
result is a subjective judgment dependent upon an observor's
weighing of the relative costs and benefits which result from
the specific actions undertaken.
But the potential for rancorous conflict in a community
is not determined solely by the style of leadership a city's
political head chooses. The potential for conflict is also to
a great degree dependent on the nature of the issue in ques-
tion. Issues can be seen to occupy a place along a continuum
ranging from those which involve only divisible rewards to
those which involve only indivisible rewards. When a divisible
policy is at stake, benefits can be apportioned among the
competing political groups in such a manner that each group
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can be made to feel that it has achieved its objectives to a
certain degree. The apportionment of some "piece of the pie"
to every group concerned thus lessens the degree of grievance
a group suffers when it is denied any success in the political
arena. An indivisible policy involves an "all or nothing"
benefit; either a group gets the total rewards it sought or
nothing at all.
The divisible/indivisible dimension presented here is not
the equivalent of the famous "distributive"/"redistributive"
typology formulated by Theodore Lowi. 4 1 According to Lowi,
as distributive policies are "made without regard to limited
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resources, there is no necessity for one group to directly
confront another in order to secure its share of political
rewards. Redistributive policies, on the other hand, involve
a limited universe of political rewards, thereby creating a
zero-sum game in which each group advances its interests only
to the disadvantage of another group. But a policy can be
divisible and distributive on one level without being divisi-
ble on another level. A "pork barrel" harbors program, for
example, can be considered distributive on the national level.
But as a specific harbor proposal cannot satisfy both con-
stituents who want something for their district and environ-
mentalists who may oppose it because of its adverse ecolo-
gical impact, the program's benefits can be viewed for the
most part as indivisible on the local level.
Similarly, divisible policy can be, but does not
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necessarily have to be, distributive in nature. The setting
of Madison's school budget provides an example of a policy
that is simultaneously divisible and redistributive. The
issue was redistributive in the sense that two groups saw
their interests in mutually exclusive policies--increasing
or decreasing proposed school expenditures. However, as the
dispute involved dollar and cent figures which can be fairly
easily manipulated, the budget was marginally adjusted so that
everyone was able to walk away with something. The school
board and its supporters, for example, received an increase
over the previous year's appropriations; the mayor and tax-
conscious citizens were able to point with satisfaction to the
outs in the proposed programs which were effected. Despite
the redistributive nature of the budget controversy, then,
"benefits" were successfully "divvied" out to the competing
groups.
Where benefits can more easily be divided among competing
groups, the potential for exacerbated conflict is minimized.
A mayor with a conflict-oriented style runs less of the risk
that his actions will lead to prolonged exacerbated conflict
when the issue he is acting on is divisible by nature. The
divisibility of benefits of the issue tends to act as a sort
of safety valve; every group can be somewhat mollified by
being granted part of the policies they desire. A mayor then
can follow the conflict-oriented strategy in regards to such
divisible issues without his actions necessarily engendering
228
divisive rancor.
No such hope can be taken by a mayor who adopts an
Ideological or Partisan approach in an indivisible issue
arena. When such an issue is at stake, the community is
likely already polarized into competing groups. Bitter antag-
onisms likely prevail as each group recognizes the possibility
that it may be the one whose wishes are for the most part
ignored when the issue is finally resolved. The mayor who
adopts a conflict approach in this situation is only likely to
heighten already existing antagonisms. The conflict will
become even more severe as the mayor personalizes the dispute.
The camp which opposes the mayor's objectives may see him as
the personification of evil. He may become an easy figure to
hate, and the conflict may shift from the level of issues to
the level of personality. The mayor's conflict style then
will only serve to throw gasoline on an already potentially
inflammatory situation. The potential for all-engulfing,
community polarization a conflict style engenders when indivi-
sible policies are at stake cannot be overstated.
This is not to say that the approaches of the Ideologue
and the Partisan are suited only to policies that can be con-
sidered to be part of the divisible, not the indivisible,
type. A mayor may choose to adopt a conflict style in an
indivisible arena when issues such as busing, for example, are
of such concern to him that he will not accept the immobilism
a consensual leadership strategy will likely produce.
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Conflict in a community can be engendered by a leaderts style.
A mayor who wished, for example, might take such a staunch
moralistic stand against welfare patronage practices, that
sectors of the public become embittered from the defenders of
these operations; he would have, then by his style alone have
generated a good measure of community conflicts on issues
which are not indivisible by nature.
Yet, as has been theorized in this section of this
chapter, the deployment of a conflict style is more likely to
risk bringing latent or manifest tensions in a community to an
intolerable level when the issue approached tends more toward
the indivisible end of the divisibility continuum. Whether
the specific goals a mayor is trying to achieve are worth
risking such a danger is a matter for individual value judg-
ment. But the danger is there nonetheless; it constitutes
an extra cost that a mayor must consider when he is calculating
the costs and benefits of any action insofar as both com-
munity harmony and his own political future are concerned.
Of the three major issues--budgets and taxes, the acqui-
sition of the bus company, and the Mifflin block parties--
William Dyke confronted as mayor, only one, budget and taxes,
was easily divisible by its nature. Even when Dyke's severe
cutting of the school budget became the center of city focus,
the total fate of the program was not at hand. There was no
either/or question concerning the fate of education in Madison.
The process of education would continue more or less as it
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always had. What was being debated was the less potent
question of how large a marginal adjustment in appropriations
should be. And this margin was manipulated in such a manner
so that all parties involved could claim at least a partial
victory.
The questions over acquisition of the bus system and the
proper reaction to the Mifflin block parties could not as
easily be adjusted at the margins to everyone's partial
satisfaction. On the major question, there simply were no
margins. Either the city bought the bus system or it did not;
either the city permitted the block parties or it did not.
Any attempt to resolve the dispute would leave one side out-
raged as it perceived that its major interests were being
ignored.
Yet, even these issues were not totally indivisible.
Though the major question could not be resolved to the satis-
faction of all factions, the issues could still be approached
in such a manner as to attempt to give something to everybody
concerned. If Madison had entered the bus business via the
contracting out of service or through a stock option tender
as opposed to outright purchase, both sides could have claimed
limited victory; the city would have bought the system over
the mayor's objections but yet have done so in a manner Dyke
preferred.43 Similarly, the granting of permission for
student block parties upon the enactment of a city ordinance
and the receipt of an application for a permit would have
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given both sides claim to victory--the students would have
their party, and the anti-student faction could claim a
victory for respect for the law.
From his own perspective, Dykets leadership must be
judged a success--the city did not bow to the demands of the
students. Yet the impact that his conflict oriented approach
had on escalating the hostilities of that period must also be
noted. The determination as to whether the policy outcomes
achieved were worth the costs of increased community polariza-
tion remains a value judgment. The matter of engendered
rancorous conflict, though, is less likely to become a nega-
tive factor in assessing the Ideological or Partisan styles
when the issues approached are more easily divisible by
nature.
A NOTE ON DECISION-MAKING MODELS IN URBAN POLITICS
Paul Schulman has perceptively noted that there exists a
whole range of issues that because of the "indivisibility in
the political commitment and resources they require for
success" do not fall within the decision-making paradigms of
incrementalism or the divisibility of public goods,44
(emphasis in original). Schulman points out that the
initiation of an entirely new program sometimes entails such
great "start-up" costs or that the expansion of a program
might sometime be "beset by organizational threshholds or
'critical masat points" 5 that initiation or expansion must
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either be approved or denied en toto and are not subject to
adjustment at the margins. Two cases Schulman cites as
examples are the initiation of the Kennedy space program and
the redevelopment of the inner city.46
In addition to programs with great start-up costs or
critical mass points, one further category of indivisible
policies had been noted in this chapter--policies which entail
benefits--whether they be tangible or symbolic47--which by
their nature cannot be "divided up" to keep everyone totally
happy. There is just no simple way to enact half a school
busing, police review or open enrollment plan or to permit
half a block party to take place. The major stakes in the
program are for the most part indivisible; limited busing and
police review represents not so much the distribution of
benefits to both sides but the loss by one of the factions in
the dispute disguised by symbolic rhetoric.
More and more it is these indivisible issues--whether the
issue be indivisible as a result of its start up costs or by
its nature--which are beginning to dominate the arena of urban
politics. The major issues which consumed Madison in the
1965-1973 years were for the most part indivisible. Both the
building of an auditorium and the purchase and operation of a
bus system entailed huge start up costs. The auditorium issue
also tended to be indivisible by its nature as a result of the
extreme polarization between the Monona Terrace and anti-
Terrace factions. The Mifflin Street issue exhibited a
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similar indivisibility as did the question of tolerance of
pornography in Madison (a question which was not dwealt upon
in this thesis).
Models of decision-making such as incrementalism and the
pluralist bargaining over distributional benefits4 8 have only
limited applicability to arenas characterized by the indivisi-
bility of the policies at stake. Incrementalism and pluralist
decision-making do not adequately describe policy making
across the whole range of urban issues and should not be taken
as the descriptive or behavioral norm. The limits to the
applicability of these models must be recognized. Much more
systematic work is needed in the field to understand how
policies which entail large start-up expansion costs or
principles which do not lend themselves to easy compromise get
enacted.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE PARTISAN LEADERSHIP OF A MELLOWED RADICAL
A FORMER STUDENT-ACTIVIST COMES TO POWER
In 1968 Paul Soglin, elected from the Mifflin Street
neighborhood, was the first of what was to be a series of
Madison aldermen who had their roots in the University student
community. Soglin clearly saw himself as something other than
a traditional politician:
"What extra income I need comes from driving (taxi),"
says Paul. "I can't take a job that would co-opt
me--make me an accomplice of the system."l
It was this sort of self-conception as well as an outspoken
style which separated Soglin from the city's more established
liberal elements.
As alderman, Soglin seemed more often than not to be at
the center of controversy. He actively participated in anti-
Vietnam and anti-racism demonstrations and advanced resolu-
tions concerning these topics at Council meetings--despite the
outcries by Council conservatives that these matters were
irrelevant to city business. As a result of constant verbal
jostling with Mayor William Dyke both on and off the Council
floor, Soglin gained the image of being the mayor's chief
antagonist on the Council.
Soglin was arrested twice during the Mifflin distur-
banoes. He sponsored a community meeting which featured
speakers from the infamous Weatherman faction of the Students
for a Democratic Society, a leftist student group of the
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1960's, which resulted in some damage to the school adminis-
tration building in which it was held. When he felt Madison
police officials were preoccupied with arresting users of soft
drugs instead of pursuing the purveyors of harder narcotics,
he publicly released the names of nineteen city undercover
narcotics agents. As a result of these and other similar
actions, Paul Soglin to many Madison citizens became the sym-
bol of the leftist leaning student constituency of the city.
Thus it is somewhat amazing that despite this radical
background, Paul Soglin in the spring of 1973 was, at the age
of 27, elected mayor of Madison. To a great extent Soglin's
election was a lucky shot--"lucky" that four fortuitous
forces came together to create a brief moment that allowed
this alderman with a "downtown" (as student-inner city roots
are referred to in Madison) background to assume the mayor-
alty.
First of all, only a three-way split in the liberal vote
allowed Soglin to squeak through Madison's three-way primary.
Dyke garnered 16,243 votes to lead the primary field, while
Soglin and two more traditional liberal candidates, David
Stewart and Leo Cooper, gained 11,485, 10,350 and 6,150 votes
respectively. Considering the narrowness of Soglin's margin
over Stewart, it seems likely that had Cooper not been in the
race, Stewart, not Soglin, would have gained the ballot spot
against Dyke in the general election.2
Second, in the primary and especially in the election,
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Soglin benefitted from the efforts of what had been George
MoGovern's efficient Madison 1972 campaign organization. Only
five months previous to the mayoral election, the McGovern
people had turned out a 50,137 to 30,931 vote landslide in
Madison for their candidate. This organization of skilled
electoral practitioners divided among the three liberal can-
didates in the primary but pulled behind Soglin in the general
election.3
Soglin's 1973 victory was also the result of the lop-
sided general election margins Soglin rolled up in the down-
town student districts. While lagging approximately 5,500
votes behind his opponent in the 18 districts of the rest of
the city, Soglin blasted Dyke by nearly a 9,000 vote margin
in the four downtown predominantly student districts.
Recently relaxed resident requirements as well as newly
enfranchised 18-year old voters were likely contributors to
Soglin's margin in these areas.
Finally, Soglin won the final election because, amaz-
ingly enough, the issue of the election was not Soglin. The
issue was Bill Dyke. As has been pointed out in previous
chapters, Dyke's Ideological governing style had so con-
tributed to the polarized nature of Madison politics that many
non-radicals were willing to vote for Soglin as the only
alternative to Dyke. Dyke's "decent citizens" comments and
the spectre of Berkeley-type radicalism he invoked during the
campaign only served to fuel the emotionalism of the campaign
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and further keep himself, and not Soglin, the center of
controversy during the election. Had a more moderate, less
ideological or less controversial mayor been Soglints
opponent, it seems fair to say that Soglin's radical roots
would have lost him enough centrist voters to have precluded
his election.
Soglin's election, then, occurred only because of the
"uniqueness" of Madison's electoral situation in the Spring of
1973. But the question after Soglin's election was how true
to his radical roots would he be as mayor. Some of Soglin's
more ideological supporters expected radical change. Simi-
larly many of the city's more conservative spokesmen saw
Soglin to be the same person he was when he first came to the
Council; and they expected the worst.
But the Soglin campaign effort perhaps belied something
a little different. Though Soglin is a self-styled political
independent who has refused to identify with either of the two
major political parties as neither seems to express his poli-
tical philosophy, Soglin's campaign promises differed little
from what would have been expected from a traditional liberal
Democrat. No outlines of specific radical programs were
given. Soglin's promise to represent the "whole city"4  and
not just his downtown student constituency was possibly some-
thing more than simple campaign rhetoric:
I've mellowed over the past five years. I'm more
patient. I've seen that people are really scared--
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soared of change and what's going to happen to them.
They've got their homes and their families and they
don't know what the future will bring.5
Some members of Madison's left remained skeptical. Ken
Mate, writing a pre-election staff column for the University's
leftist leaning newspaper, The Daily Cardinal, criticized:
Paul Soglin is in reality and has always been an
opportunist. He's a left-winger, don't get me
wrong; he 's generally come out on the right side of
issues, and he's defended our interests well in the
city council. He's done this not because he holds a
principled position, but because he knows we elected
him, and he's beholden to us. 6
After excoriating Soglin for having crossed the community by
advocating non-violence during the Mifflin riots and for
failing to speak to such radical concerns as "the connections
between...high rise apartment development in the central city
and the real estate companies that control that development"
or the defense of Karleton Armstrong, accused of the bombing
of Sterling Hall, Mate concluded:
Paul's stand is really immaterial. It is we who must
take a principled stand and go to the polls with our
eyes open. Paul Soglin is the best candidate for us,
not because he can lead us, but because we can exert
the most control over him--which is the way it should
be.7
At his inaugural ball, the new mayor removed his dress
shirt to reveal a T-shirt bearing the inscription "Mellow
Man." The act was clearly something that a traditional poli-
tician would never have done. But the substance of the
message on the shirt seemed to contradict the symbolism of
the act.
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The purpose of this chapter will be to identify the
governing style of Paul Soglin and to begin to determine just
how "radical" his orientations and actions have been as mayor.
The focus of this analysis will be of the mayor's handling of
the four major controversies of his first term in office--the
building of the Atwood Bypass, the construction of public
housing in the Triangle redevelopment area, the settlement of
the auditorium dispute, and the defense of Police Chief David
Couper. In each case the same basic pattern emerges; the
mayor exhibits extremely strong action orientations which are
moderated by pragmatic concerns for the enactment of his pro-
grams and the protection of his own power position. The
general argument of this chapter will be that, in terms of the
typology presented in Chapter One, Paul Soglin's actions are
consistent with those of the high direction, conflict-oriented
Partisan leadership approach.
THE ATWOOD AVENUE BYPASS CONTROVERSY
The downtown area of Madison is located on an isthmus
between two fairly large lakes--a topographic situation which
acts to restrict the number of street approaches to the city's
central business district from the residential centers on the
East and West Sides. Atwood Avenue is the major thoroughfare
to the downtown area for residents of the city's far East Side
and the neighboring town of Monona. By the time Paul Soglin
took office in 1973, the city had developed plans, awaiting
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only final City Council approval, for the construction of a
four-lane bypass to relieve the rush-hour traffic bottleneck
which formed at the intersection of Atwood Avenue and
Winnebago, comaonly known as Schenk's Corner. The mayor's
decision on the project precipitated the first crisis of his
administration.
Reflecting his leftist student roots, Soglin was per-
sonally committed to an environmentalist viewpoint which
emphasized the development of mass transit as opposed to the
building of new roads, which were seen to compound the air
pollution and traffic problems experienced by downtown resi-
dential neighborhoods. Soglin was thus personally inclined
against the Atwood project as it would, in his words, "hurt
mass transit." 8
But Soglin was hesitant to veto the project if it gained
Council approval, fearing that such a move on his part would
jeopardize the good working relationship with the City Council
he had been working so hard to establish. Soglin was well
aware of the fervent desire for the project by East Side
aldermen who felt that the transportation needs of their con-
stituents had been routinely ignored while the city had built
new highway projects on the city's West Side one after
another.
Soglin was also reluctant to use his veto as he wished
to avoid the divisiveness, especially the polarization
between the Council and the mayor's office, which plagued his
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predecessor's two terms in office. Soglin saw his approach
to governing to be totally different from that of William
Dyke: "You will not see me using the veto 44 times."9  Soglin
thus decided to shelve his environmental concerns in favor of
his desire to maintain rapport with the Council, and announced
in advance of the Council vote that he would abide by whatever
decision on the project the Council reached.
When the Council at last finally approved the construc-
tion of the bypass, the mayor once again found himself torn
between his environmentalist views and his desire to maintain
a harmonious working relationship with the city's legis-
lature. This time his leftist instincts won out. One day he
suddenly emerged from his office and announced to the surprise
of his office members that despite his earlier statement he
had now decided to veto the bypass. The process by which he
reached this decision was totally individualistic; members of
Madison's left were not even informed of the decision in
advance in order to have them organize expressions of public
support for the mayor's action.10
The veto, in light of the mayor's previous promise to
abide by the Council's action, took most city hall observors
by surprise. East Side aldermen were intensely bitter; one
member of this bloc observed, "The honeymoon is over between
the mayor and the Council."ll The move to override the
mayor's veto fell only two votes short of the necessary three-
fourths Council vote.
242
But the mayor's victory was short-lived as East Side
aldermen threatened to hold Soglin's major project hostage if
the Atwood decision was not somehow reversed:
It was made quite clear that if I wanted to get anything
done as far as major things I was interested in the
next two years, the Capital Concourse, the State Street
Mall, some of the planning things, the Atwood Avenue
Bypass couldn tt be totally junked. That message got
to me loud and clear.12
It wasn t just the Mall, though. It was two years that
was at stake...a working relationship between the
Council and the mayor's office.13
Under the threat of this severe sanction, Soglin abandoned
his purist environmentalist stance and formulated a compro-
mise; a two-lane bypass would be constructed instead of the
previously approved four-lane project. In the words of some
city political wags, Soglin had with the wisdom of Solomon
split the baby in two. In order to gain approval of the
compromise "halfpass," though, Soglin was put in the very
strange position of urging the City Council to reconsider
their previous failure to override his veto. This was accom-
plished when one previously absent alderman and one close
aldermanic friend of the mayor were convinced to vote for the
override.
Soglin's compromise, though successfully instituted,
alienated many of the city's leftist activists, including one
alderman who caustically observed, "Put a little heat on a
politician and he'll fold up--to hell with principles.'"'
East Side aldermen, still fuming over Soglin's initial veto,
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were at least propitiated enough by the halfpass proposal to
refrain from severing cooperative relationships with the
mayor. Said one East Side alderman, "We showed we're willing
to work with him, and he showed he's willing to work with
uso.15
The bypass consisted of only two lanes, both going out-
bound from the downtown area. Soglin took satisfaction that
by not adding a traffic lane inbound to the city, he had done
little to add to the traffic flow downtown and had secured the
best feasible arrangement considering the circumstances. East
Side aldermen took satisfaction in that, at last, something
had been done for their side of town. Evening rush hour con-
gestion was relieved, and a re-timing of the traffic signal at
Schenk's corner in light of the reduced volume of outbound
traffic at the intersection as a result of the bypass, had had
even eased the flow of morning traffic into the city as well.
They considered the two-lane project the most that they could
obtain, considering Soglin's continued staunch opposition to
any four-lane proposal.
Doctrinaire environmentalists remained unappeased by the
mayor's actions. They believed the mayor had abandoned his
principles and had gained little in return. What sense did it
make, they pointed out, to improve the downtown environment by
building the Mall and Concourse if projects like the Atwood
Bypass brought more traffic to the inner city? Furthermore,
they pointed, that the path cleared for the bypass was wide
2h14
enough to accommodate possible expansion of the roadway to
four lanes some time in the future.
The mayorts action in this first controversy he faced in
office offers us insights into the two major elements of his
political style--his sense of direction and his pragmatism.
Soglin had a definite commitment to those leftist/liberal
principles he brought with him to office. His environmental-
ist goal orientations finally overwhelmed his initial
inclination to, in Broker-like fashion, simply reaffirm what-
ever consensus the City Council reached on the project. The
totally dissimilar views of the environmentalists and the East
Side aldermen, foreclosed any mayoral attempt to build an
overarching consensus behind a possible solution. Soglin
clearly understood that any action he took would only serve to
embroil him in conflict: "From a political standpoint the
most foolish thing I could have done was veto these bids. It
would have been easier to let it roll merrily along."16 Paul
Soglin's goal orientations led him to seek, not avoid,
conflict.
But despite the mayorts environmentalist outlook, he was
a political realist. He had other programs and goals which he
wanted to achieve which he was unwilling to sacrifice for the
sake of an ideologically correct stance on the Atwood ques-
tion. He also wanted to maintain a good working relationship
with the Council. Consequently, when the resolve of the pro-
bypass aldermen was made blatantly apparent to him, he sought
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a compromise--a compromise which he felt achieved as much of
his environmentalist goals as possible without sacrificing his
concerns in other areas.
It is in his willingness to compromise when he recog-
nized the power realities of a situation that distinguishes
Soglin's governing style from that of the Ideologue. The
Ideologue, concerned only with his purist commitment to his
principles, would have rigidly persisted with what he saw to
be the "correct" stance, despite however strident the opposi-
tion became. Paul Soglin definitely did not show this purist
rigidity in his handling of the Atwood matter. But it is for
this ability to be flexible that Soglin is attacked for by
members of the city's left who see only the mayor's sacrifice
of principles.
THE TRIANGLE REDEVELOPMENT CONTROVERSY
The question of the Triangle redevelopment project is the
second longest running controversy in Madison, ranking only
behind the decision concerning an auditorium for duration on
the city's political agenda. In 1954 renewal of the "Bush"
neighborhood, an area slightly south of the University, was
begun when 7.5 acres of land and forty housing units were
cleared for the construction of a housing project.17 In 1963
the entire Bush neighborhood was raised in a massive land
clearance program, with the area's predominantly Italian and
minority population dispersed through the rest of the city.
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The project in destroying an entire neighborhood and letting
most of the land remain vacant represented the worst of urban
renewal. The project engendered such hostility among dis-
located residents and people of other areas who feared that
their neighborhoods might be targeted next that a citizen's
initiated referendum banning future redevelopment projects was
only quite narrowly defeated at the polls.
Of particular concern to city officials was the question
as to what exactly should be done with the remaining piece of
triangular-shaped land which remained vacant. Former resi-
dents of the neighborhood believed that the city had promised
that housing would be constructed on the site and that all
former residents who wished would be allowed to return to
their old neighborhood. Though as the years passed few, if
any, of these citizens exhibited any desire to return to the
area, they still believed that the city had made a moral com-
mitment to them that it ought to fulfill. As the question of
the Triangle dragged on through the 1960's and early 1970's,
members of Madison's left also chimed in with the demand that
people would best be served if low-income and elderly housing
were to be constructed on the site.
Inflation, a tight money market, and the drying up of
federal housing funds during the Nixon administration made
housing plans for the area less and less feasible. Low-income
housing simply could not be constructed with the fiscal
constraints of the time. And Mayor William Dyke was less
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than enthusiastic for housing which he feared would soon be
occupied by university students--a group whose costs of educa-
tion he felt should not be subsidized by city taxpayers.
Still Dyke was insistent that something be built in the area
in order to return the land to the city tax rolls. Thus in
1972, much to the outrage of the housing proponents, a section
of the Triangle was designated by the City Council as a site
for a "hotel or motel and unified grouping of retail stores,
shops and businesses which are compatible with the Triangle
area's functions as a major medical center and urban living
area." Backers of the plan felt that a hotel built across the
street from Madison General Hospital would accommodate people
from outside the city who came to visit their relatives in the
hospital.
The actual question of rezoning the parcel from resi-
dential to commercial use came to the City Council's agenda a
half year after Paul Soglin became mayor. Soglin, true to his
leftist/liberal principles, had fervently opposed the hotel
project as alderman. Now, members of Madison's left expected
the mayor to veto the rezoning and put an end to the much
hated hotel plan.
But despite his own convictions for housing and despite
the constant pressure he received from the left, Soglin
expressed concern for the "very serious legal problems"n18
city rejection of the Holiday Inn proposal would incur. The
major problem, as the mayor saw it, concerned developer's
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rights over the land:
We could have terminated it (the hotel plan)...But the
important point was to make the developer waive the
right as a private developer to change the use of the
land. We could have cut the developer off and taken
the site from them so that they could not have devel-
oped it. But because the site was designated for a
hotel--once that happens any person who has once been
a developer on a project can change the proposed use
of the land; so that if they lost the land, the rights
to develop it, it still would be designated a hotel
site.
The only way you could change it from a hotel site to,
say, housing, would be to get the permission of every-
one who had developer's rights to the parcel. I felt
it wouldn't do much good to take the land away from
them if it still had to be a hotel...19
The mayor also feared that a veto would bring court action
which would tie up the parcel in question foreclosing any
opportunity to build housing during his term in office.
Hence, much to the outrage of the city's left, Soglin
refused to veto the rezoning. Instead, he sought to mani-
pulate the matter in such a way as to insure that it would be
the developer, and not the city, who failed to meet its legal
obligations. In the words of Madison Redevelopment Agency
Director Sol Levin, the city had to "get around to the posi-
tion where we (the city) were the injured party and not the
'injurers. ,"20
The city granted the rezoning, which Soglin and the city
attorney had felt they were obligated to do by past actions,
only after the developers agreed to a June 30, 1974 deadline
by which they would have to have their financing for the pro-
ject in order. According to the signed agreement, if
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financing was not obtained by the specified date, the devel-
oper would surrender all rights over the parcel in question.
As the city could have legally taken the land away without the
agreement (though the developer would still retain controlling
say over the designated use of the land), the developer,
believing that financing could be obtained, acquiesced to the
mayor's proposal.
Soglin believed that in light of both the tight money
market and the recent construction of other hotels in the
city, there was little chance that financing would be arranged
by the date specified. As one member of the mayor's office
explained the strategy:
We knew that the hotel business in this city was over-
built...The Sheraton was about to go into bankruptcy
...The Hilton was about to be finished and everybody
knew that the Hilton was going to be empty...We knew
that Opitz (the developer) could not raise the money
to build the hotel, because we knew there had been a
study showing the hotel industry had been overbuilt
in this town. And we knew that if we found out about
this study, the chances were better than ever that
Holiday Inn Corporation probably knew the results of
that study too...
There's no way that Holiday Inn is going to lay out that
kind of cash at steep interest rates to build a hotel
that's going to be empty. 2 1
To Soglin, the agreement was a "gamble; " 2 2 construction of the
hotel would continue if financing would be arranged by the
date certain. But in the mayor's words the path he chose was
also the surest way "to make sure we'd be able to stop the
project. " 23
The strategy proved to be a total success. The developer
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failed to produce final plans and financing details by the
June deadline, and control over the property reverted without
a court fight to the city. Soglin immediately announced his
recommendation that plans be commenced for the construction of
low-cost housing, preferably for the elderly, on the site of
the ill-fated hotel. Within two months plans for 175 units of
elderly housing and 20 units for persons with spinal cord dis-
abilities were revealed. Housing now occupies the once contro-
versial parcel.
Faced with the results of the mayor's actions, Madison's
left, which had been quite sharp in its criticism of Soglin
for not vetoing the project, admitted the strategy to be a
success. But despite their overall satisfaction with the
results of the mayor's actions, members of the left still
expressed their dissatisfaction with the way Soglin handled
the matter. The University student newspaper, The Daily
Cardinal, ambiguously titled its article on the outcome of the
Triangle controversy "Soglin's Kindest Cut of All?"24
The Dai~ Cardinal article: "Since last September he
(Soglin) had staunchly and stubbornly defended the
Council's rezoning on moral and legal grounds. The
city is committed, he said, because of its original
agreement with the developers and therefore I cannot
veto the zoning change."
"Well, there weren't many who were impressed with the
moral weight of that argument. Not Kay Phillips
(the al-erman leading the anti-hotel fight), not the
vast majority of Paul's left constituency, and not the
old and tired people of the Bush, displaced by the
city over 12 years ago on the promise they could
return to their land and live in new, better homes
someday."25 (emphasis my own).
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An aldermanic member of the left: "I felt it (Soglin's
strategy) was a ridiculous chance to take. It was
a matter of principle."26  (emphasis my own).
Another aldermanic member of the left, who, in retro-
spect, admits that Soglin's strategy succeeded:
"But he didn't make his reasoning clear...He devel-
oped his reasoning after he did it. Again, that's
the stylistic thing I object to."2 7 (emphasis my
own).
The left's objections to Soglin, then, even in victory, was
with the mayorts lack of principle. They felt he had a moral
obligation to veto a proposal which was against their
"people's" philosophy. But this Soglin refused to do.
According to one member of the mayor's office, Soglin's
refusal to veto the rezoning "was an example of (the mayor's)
not taking a symbolic act which was going to end up being
detrimental to the city, and detrimental politically."28
In the Triangle redevelopment controversy, then, Paul
Soglin saw himself as a leader of the faction which wanted the
city to develop "people's" programs. The path of action that
the mayor finally chose to take was individualistic to the
extent that it alienated even members of the coalition who had
the same program goals as he. But this is not to say that
Soglin was an Ideologue who acting on the basis of his own
principles spurns possible coalition-building. He was not
blinded by his own values, but merely was reacting to the
legal realities of the situation. Refusing an expression of
his purist commitment to correct principles, he chose instead
a strategy with greater chances of obtaining tangible success.
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THE AUDITORIUM
The Mayor Backs Law Park. The building of an auditorium
and civic center does not as clearly deserve to be labeled a
"people's" program as does the building of low-income housing
or the furthering of mass transit. Still Paul Soglin was a
strong proponent of bringing an auditorium to Madison. Soglin
believed that "the arts play a very important part not only in
the social but the political development of a community." 2 9
Soglin revived the auditorium controversy when, two
months after his election, he announced the formation of an
Auditorium Committee. At the same time that the mayor
announced his support for a facility at Law Park (the now more
common name for the area below Monona Terrace), he also
expressed his willingness to listen to other alternatives,
including the possibility of the city's acquiring and totally
renovating the old Capitol Theater on State Street--a proposal
which had the strong backing of the Central Madison Committee,
an offshoot of the Chamber of Commerce, as well as a number of
aldermen. The chief advantage of the State Street proposal
was one of greatly reduced costs. Acquisition and renovation
of the Capitol Theater was estimated at a $3.6 million to $6.8
million cost;30 construction of a Law Park facility, still the
goal of the proponents of the old controversial Monona
Terrace proposal, was estimated at a cost of at least a
whopping $10.6 million.31
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Still, Soglin, albeit with some reservation, supported
Law Park: "If I see that the Law Park site isn't feasible,
I'll make a commitment to the State Street site."32 According
to the mayor, Law Park offered "much more in the way of
esthetics and simply more in the way of tangible, physical
assets."33 When the City Council deadlocked on an 11-11
vote, the choice of site selection rested solely on the shoul-
ders of the mayor. Soglin broke the tie in favor of Law Park.
An $8.5 million auditorium bond referendum was placed on
the April 1974 ballot to finance the additional costs of
building the Law Park project. Together with the $5.5 million
the city still had available in the old auditorium and parking
fund accounts, passage of the new referendum would ensure that
the city could construct a facility for as much as $14 million.
Soglin admitted the figure was inflated and that the full
amount of the money requested was not likely going to be
needed for the project; he just wanted the flexibility the
margin allowed. 3  In light of the rancorous controversy the
question of funding an auditorium always provoked in Madison,
Soglin simply wanted to avoid the difficult task of requesting
additional funds if the initial bond request came up short of
covering the actual costs of the project.35
Immediately, the old factional lines in the controversy
were re-energized. Former Mayor Otto Festge was granted use
of Soglin's office to announce the formation of a citizen's
group urging a "yes" vote in the referendum. The Capital Times
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joined in the campaign with its constant editorial bombardment
behind its pet project. The leaders of the anti-Terrace
faction in the past--Henry Reynolds, George Forster, Carrol
Metzner, and Harold "Babe" Rohr--once more led the fight
against the facility, urging with bumperstickers that citizens
"Vote No on the $14 Million Blunder." And the Wisconsin State
Journal, too, eventually resumed its position against the
project.
The only new addition to these old factional lines in the
age-old dispute was the entrance of a group of "downtown"
leaders who organized "Central City People for a No Vote."
This element of Madison's left believed that an auditorium
would benefit residents of Madison's wealthier suburbs who
were not even contributing toward the costs of the facility's
construction. They wanted the money which the city was pro-
posing be spent on the project used for more people-oriented
priorities. Soglin's response to this criticism was that
Madison's citizens were not going to raise $8.5 million for
other purposes if the auditorium was not built. Soglin, for
his part, believed the money would be available for the audi-
torium and for nothing else.
Just before the referendum, Soglin requested that the
Council obtain a second cost estimate of the Law Park facility.
Leftist alderman Ray Davis, representing Soglin's old Eighth
Ward student constituency, charged the securing of a second
estimate was a "set-up" designed to obtain a lower cost figure
in order to gain voter approval.36 The new estimate put a
final tab on cost at $12.4 million--$1.6 million less than
what would be available if the bond referendum passed.
After a much heated campaign, the bond referendum
received an almost two to one drubbing at the polls.
Madisonts East and West Sides voted overwhelmingly against the
project; the central city split with only the three predomi-
nantly student districts approving the referendum. 3 7
Madisonians, concerned with troubled national economic condi-
tions, were unwilling to make the huge tax commitment the bond
referendum called for. The old polarizations which had re-
emerged during the campaign also took their toll.
Mary Lesacohier, long-time supporter of a Frank Lloyd
Wright Foundation designed facility, blamed Soglin for the
defeat: "Mayor Soglin supported it, but not actively. He let
it fall on its face."38 According to Lescohier, Soglin "never
attempted to articulate support for it in any definite way,
outside of saying that this was a majestic project."39 Soglin
himself admitted to a lack of full-fledged enthusiasm on his
part for the project:
I don't think I was as enthusiastic as some people
who looked at it as an all-or-nothing proposition,
and still today are looking for some sort of
Law Park facility.40
But despite whatever reservations he had that tempered his
enthusiasm, Soglin did take those actions which were necessary
to the advancement of the project. It was he that re-awakened
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the possibility of a Law Park auditorium. It was he who cast
the tie-breaking vote for Law Park instead of killing the pro-
posal then and there. And in his public statements and the
obtaining of a second cost estimate, it was he who tried to
gain voter support for the referendum.
Still, Soglin, it appears, was aware of the political
difficulties of the Law Park proposal and did not give it the
energetic, day-to-day public backing he could have had it been
his number one priority. But given the margin of the anti-
Law Park vote, it is unfair to place the major responsibility
for the failure of the referendum on the mayor's shoulders.
As Soglin is quick to point out, the anti-Law Park atmosphere
and the tight economic times, rather than his alleged lack of
enthusiasm, were the primary determinants of the project's
defeat.41
The Mayor Shifts Position and Madison Finally Gets an
Auditorium. With the Law Park site repudiated at the polls,
the State Street theater became the only game in town if
Madison were to have any civic auditorium at all. Still some-
what shell-shocked by his defeat on the Law Park question,
Soglin tried to keep his distance from tying himself to any
further auditorium commitment.
But with City Council support mounting behind the Capitol
Theater proposal, Soglin within a month became a backer of the
State Street site. The Council passed a resolution, co-
sponsored by Soglin, endorsing the concept of a State Street
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auditorium. The mayor then flew to New York to begin pur-
chase talks with RKO, owners of the Capitol Theater.
Two independent appraisals of the property were obtained,
but were not publicly released as, the mayor admitted, they
differed incredibly by more than 100 per cent. After a bitter
dispute, the Council on a 12-8 vote, authorized, on Soglin's
recommendation that the city pay up to $650,000 for purchase
of the theater. Supporters of the move pointed out how a
State Street auditorium would add to both the vitality of the
downtown business district and the atmosphere that would be
created by the State Street Mall. Opponents of the purchase
objected that the city would be overpaying for an "old, ugly
building" that had no prospective buyers other than the city.
Furthermore, they pointed out that costs for acquisition and
renovation were underestimated and would, in their minds,
likely run "as much if not more than" costs for a Law Park
facility. 4 2 As an example, they cited that the purchase price
did not include the title to the land under the theater's
entrance which RKO did not even own. Under the Soglin pro-
posal, the city would take over the 99-year lease for the land
under the theater lobby with an eye to exercising the option
to buy the land after the remaining fifty-one years of the
lease expired, if not sometime sooner.3
The Capital Times, still fervent in its support of Law
Park, revealed the estimates Soglin had kept from the public
in a front-page article headlined "Capitol Theater Worth
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$280,000" and subtitled "Much Less Than City's Offer 'Secret t
Appraisal Says."144 Only deeply imbedded in the text of the
article was there any mention of the second $800,000
appraisal figure--a valuation higher than the purchase price
authorized by the city. Soglin claimed the differences in the
appraisals resulted primarily from the different estimates
that had been placed on the depreciation and income-generating
potential of the property. He also cited that the higher
appraisal was closer to the $695,000 valuation the city had
placed on the property for tax purposes.
The mayor also lashed out at the Times and central city
Alderman Eugene Parks, who had given the figures to the news-
paper, for the difficulty the release would bring the city in
negotiations over the property as, according to Soglin, RKO
now knew it could get $800,000, the higher figure being the
price the city would have to pay if it acquired the property
through condemnation proceedings. Parks was quick to note how
Soglin had seemed to have lost at least one of the radical
principles he had held as alderman:
Soglin is the same guy who two years ago released
pictures of undercover agents because he said the
public had a right to know who they were. Now here
he has been refusing to release information the
public had to pay for.L5k
The mayor finally negotiated a purchase price of $600,000
for the theater; the city would actually pay $650,000 for the
property, but RKO's Matthew Polon would buy two $25,000
tickets to the auditorium's inaugural performance. Despite
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the vehement objections of opponents of the purchase, the City
Council approved the agreement.
But the celebration proved short-lived when Circuit Court
Judge William Jackman issued an order restraining the purchase
in order to hear the suit brought by Alderman Thomas George
which claimed that the bond money which the city had used for
the purchase was tied by the wording of the original 1954
referendum to Law Park. RKO, upset at the antics of the city,
withdrew its offer to sell the building. Soglin again met
with RKO officials and came back from the meeting with the
belief that the theater would still be for sale only if the
city moved quickly enough.46
With seven of the twenty-two aldermen firmly set against
the theater purchase, there appeared little chance of the
mayor's getting the three-fourths Council vote to make the
purchase out of general funds not specifically appropriated in
the budget. Soglin, in consultation with Department of
Administration Director Andre Blum, then hit on a scheme that
would circumvent the George lawsuit. The city would take
$200,000 from its land acquisition account and pay it to RKO
as "earnest money" in a "land contract." The remainder of the
originally negotiated price plus interest would be paid the
next year when, twenty years after the 1954 bond referendum,
the money presently in the auditorium account reverted back to
general funds and was no longer subject to the restrictions of
the original referendum. And as the $200,000 downpayment
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came from existing account, only a simple majority vote of the
Council was needed to approve the move. Despite the howls of
some theater opponents who objected that under the mayor's
"devious" scheme money intended for the purchase of other
property was being "illegally" used for the acquisition of the
theater, the Council approved the land contract on a twelve to
nine vote,47
Madison's longest running controversy had at last been
resolved. Madison finally had its auditorium--not the
prestigious facility envisioned in the Frank Lloyd Wright
Foundation proposals, but an auditorium nevertheless.
Soglin's Style. Paul Soglin's approach to the auditorium
is essentially that with which he approached the two contro-
versies previously discussed in this chapter. He had a goal-
orientation which precluded his adopting a bystandership
approach to the dispute. He wanted an auditorium, preferably
a Law Park, built. And because of this goal he entered into
an issue area which in the conflict it entailed had swallowed
up previous mayors in Madison since 1954.
Just as in his handling of the Atwood and Triangle dis-
putes, Soglin again showed flexibility. Once Law Park was
defeated, Soglin shifted his support to a State Street civic
center. He did not in Broker-like fashion await the building
of a consensus but instead provided direction in the dispute
as the Partisan leader of one of the factions--first the Law
Park faction, and later the State Street faction.
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As in the two previous controversies, the mayor again
drew a lot of flak from his erstwhile supporters. Some of the
activist leaders split with Soglin claiming the auditorium was
not a people's project. Downtown alderman Eugene Parks, a
supporter of the Law Park auditorium, was enraged by the move
of the theater to State Street. Similarly, Soglin severely
strained his relationship with The Capital Times by shifting
his support to the State Street theater. Once again, Soglin
had alienated members of his coalition in refusing to exhibit
a rigid, puristic commitment to goals.
But it was this same lack of rigidity that enabled the
mayor to become a State Street auditorium supporter and use
his leadership for the purchase and "recycling" of the old
Capitol Theater, Had Soglin been ideologically committed only
to what the left considered to be "people's" programs or had
he been inflexible in his pursuit of the Law Park auditorium
dream, Madison would still not have an auditorium today.
THE CONTROVERSY OVER MADISON'S POLICE CHIEF
The Mayor's Goals and the Charges Against Chief Couper.
Soglin as mayor intended to establish a Police Department more
civil than the one that had confronted students during the
Vietnam protests and the Mifflin Street disturbances. More
generally, his goals as far as the city's police were con-
cerned were to
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end any taints of discrimination in law enforcement,
which is not to eliminate discretion. To eliminate
any validity to the charges of harassment of any
special groups or individuals. To make sure that
there is even-handed law enforcement.4 8
Under the direction of newly hired Police Chief David Couper
Soglin saw the possibility that his hopes would be generally
achieved.
David Couper had been hired as police chief during the
waning days of William Dyke's administration by the cityls
Police and Fire Commission (commonly referred to as the PFC)
despite the strenuous objections of the then mayor to the
liberal reputation Couper had earned as chief of the
Burnsville, Minnesota, Police Department. But under Madison's
weak mayor form of government, the mayor had little to say in
the hiring process. All personnel matters concerning the
police department, including the hiring of the chief, were
placed by state statute in the hands of the PFC, whose five
members were appointed to staggered five-year terms. Couper
was hired on a three to two vote; two of Dyke's appointees,
much like Supreme Court justices exerting their independence
from the executive who appointed them, voted with the sole
remaining Otto Festge appointee to hire Couper.
Couper's management of the Department upset many of the
officers who liked the way things had been run prior to the
new chief's arrival. The primary source of dissatisfaction
was Couper's revised promotional procedures which emphasized
"merit" rather than seniority as had been done in the past.4 9
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The new chief's promotional tests, which emphasized subjective
essays and oral examinations, resulted in several more experi-
enced officers being bypassed for promotion in favor of
younger, more community-relations oriented officers. Offi-
cers critical of the examination procedure charged that as
objective measures of performance were lacking, the revised
evaluation process allowed the chief to handpick promotions
from his "inner clique '50 of officers who agreed with the
David Couper philosophy of law enforcement.
Couper's reorganization of the Department, which involved
both the reassignment of duties and a rescheduling of shifts
51to put more policemen in contact with the public, rankled
those officers who over the years had worked themselves into
positions they found to their liking. Of particular relevance
in this regards was Couper's termination of the distinction
between traffic and patrol duties; now personnel from what was
the traffic department found themselves on patrol duty, and
officers on patrol duty found themselves handling traffic
matters.
Couper also removed the two full-time officers that had
been serving with the County Drug Abuse Program. Publicly,
the chiefts rationale was that as no studies had shown the
need for police officers on a drug abuse team the personnel
that had been assigned there could be better utilized for
other purposes. Though one officer was later assigned as
liaison to the program on a part-time basis, Couper had
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effectively killed the "baby" of Detective Roth Watson, head
of the Metropolitan Drug Commission, with whom he apparently
had a recent falling out. Watson soon became one of the more
vocal anti-Couper leaders. The shake-up here had the full
support of Mayor Soglin who viewed the police's presence in
the program essentially as a "good PR job"53 by his predeces-
sor, William Dyke, who had sought to make a name for himself
in the area of drug abuse treatment.
Further dissatisfaction with Couper also resulted from
the feeling of some officers that the chief could not be
trusted. This credibility gap in part emerged as the by-
product of "bitch sessions" the new chief held with the rank
and file, in which some officers felt the chief would promise
them to do one thing and then later would proceed to do the
exact opposite.54 Many officers also felt that Couper had
shown a lack of faith in them by ordering that they no longer
carry an additional weapon, which he feared could be misused
as a "drop gun."55
Finally, many of the old guard officers were also wary of
the new directions in which Couper seemed to be leading the
Department.5 6 The new chief sought an approach to law
enforcement "based strongly upon a human relations model
rather than a military model."57 Of particular concern was
the chief's soft line in handling student demonstrations. Fur-
thermore, Couper, with his mustache and quite casual style of
dress which sometimes included blue-jeans and overalls, did
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not fit their picture as to what a police officer should look
like. This wariness on the part of old guard officers was
only increased by the apparent chumminess they saw between
the new police chief and the new mayor (the two and their
wives had even had a midnight supper together the night
Soglin was elected); these officers still saw Soglin as the
radical of the Mifflin riot days.
Couper was still serving his one-year probationary period
when in August 1973, four months after Soglin's election, 103
of the 272 members of Madison's police force presented the PFC
with a petition charging that "serious morale problems" and
"serious rumors about fraud, mistrust, and mismanagement" had
plagued the Department since Couper assumed control.58 No
allegations more specific were given at the time.
The Mayor Intervenes and the Dispute Drags On. Firm
expressions of support for Couper came from the mayor's office.
Soglin said he saw no legitimacy to the charges against the
chief, and put the matter quite succinctly when he said he'll
"be damned" if he was "going to see a decent police chief run
out of town.n"5 9 Citing Couper's admirable goals, Soglin swore
that any move to oust the chief would be "fought with all the
resources" he had. 6 0
As three of the five PFC members were still Dyke
appointees--including the two who had originally voted against
hiring Couper, and one who, though she had voted for Couper,
was now dissatisfied with the turn of events in the Police
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Department--Soglin believed that in order to defend the chief
he had to put jurisdiction over the complaints before a body
that was more likely to be sympathetic to Couper than was the
PFC. Soglin consequently informed the PFC that the mayor as
the administrative head of the city's departments under state
statutes, and not the PFC, had the responsibility for investi-
gating charges of "mismanagement" levied against a department
head. The PFC, according to Soglin, was charged with investi-
gating only specific charges brought against specific officers
--and, as he pointed out, no formal "verified complaint" had
been filed against Couper.
But FC0 President Andrew Somers believed that as the
Commission had the right under state law to hire the chief
then it also had the obligation to investigate any charges
bearing on his retention during the probationary period.
Consequently, in one of the long series of three to two votes
which marked the controversy, with the Dyke appointees
aligned against the Soglin appointees, the PFC voted to hire
an investigator to probe the validity of the allegations con-
tained in the petition.
But the City Council, with most aldermen apparently sup-
portive of the type of change Couper seemed to be bringing to
the Police Department, refused the PFC funds for the investi-
gation. The mayor even tried to put some heat of his own on
the PFC by publicly mulling over the possibility of bringing
charges against the three Dyke appointees on the Commission
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for having engaged in possible "influence peddling:"
I've heard that the chief has been told by commis-
sioners that certain groups of promotions could go
through the PFC easier if certain people were to be
included. 61
Somers responded to the influence peddling charges by filing a
$1.5 million libel suit against the mayor--a suit which was
eventually dismissed in court.
Ignoring both the seeming intent of the Council vote and
the city attorney's ruling that the Commission lacked author-
ity over the Couper matter, the PFC proceeded to act. In an
incredible move, the PFC accepted the volunteer investigative
services of former county judge Russell Mittelstadt. A
Republican, super-patriotic, hard-line judge, Mittelstadt had
a record number of "affadavits of prejudice"--one hundred times
more than the number filed against any other Dane County
judge62--brought against him by defendants who felt they could
not obtain a fair trial before him. Mittelstadt as judge had
sternly moralized defendants who had shown disrespect for such
patriotic symbols as the American flag. And it was he who had
found Soglin guilty of obstructing justice during the 1969
Mifflin Street riot and had shown the then-alderman little
sympathy when Soglin complained that the police had unneces-
sarily cut his long hair during his quite short stay in
jail. In light of his background no investigation conducted
by Mittelstadt could likely have been accepted by a broad
spectrum of the Madison community as unbiased.
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Soglin countered the PFC probe and the Commission's
consequent hearings by appointing his own investigatory panel
of three reserve judges. The City Council then gave the mayor
two overwhelming votes of confidence authorizing the formation
of the panel and the mayorls hiring of legal counsel in the
Somers libel suit. At the same time, the Council slapped the
PFC by refusing to authorize funds for either the Mittelstadt
probe or legal counsel for the PFC in its dealings with the
three-judge panel and the courts.
The Mittelstadt report, released in December, contained
a series of potentially damaging charges against Couper.64
The report pointed to Couper's promotional policy changes as
the largest single source of the morale problems, and also
underscored the concerns older officers had in regards to the
chief's "mod" look, his disregard for the rights of Madison's
citizens as exhibited in his soft response to student demon-
strations, and his "being overly solicitous of the ultra-
liberal elements of the Madison community." The report also
contained a series of charges against the chiefls personal
conduct, including: that he swore at police officers, even
calling one a "Nazi" and another an "asshole;" that he engaged
in nude swimming at a party; that while "half in the bag" he
had tried to pull up a girl's sweater at a party; that he had
taken his wife and two guests who engaged in caressing
activity for a ride on a police boat; that he filed improper
moving expenses; that he discriminated in hiring against
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officers with military reserve affiliations; and that he
showed favoritism towards friends in hiring.
Couper blasted the report as "defamatory" and criticized
Mittelstadt for failing to make a substantial effort to deter-
mine the validity of the charges. The chief denied most of
charges outright. To the others he responded: the nude
swimming incident occurred with the husband of a married
couple behind a high fence while the women remained inside the
house; his brother and sister-in-law engaged in no improper
personal conduct when they accompanied him when he was unexpec-
tantly needed for lake patrol duty; he used "colorful"
language with officers only in private; and the lack of vio-
lence resulting from student demonstrations served as a testi-
monial to his proper handling of those incidents. Even the
Wisconsin State Journal, which had and would continue to
criticize Soglin's meddling into the Couper probe, denounced
the Mittelstadt report:
It contains second-hand, hearsay allegations, not
cross-checked. It contains vicious rumors and
statements which have since been repudiated by the
persons who reportedly made them.65
At the end of the year, seven members of the Police
Department finally filed a verified complaint, along the lines
of the allegations contained in the Mittelstadt report,
against Chief Couper. With a verified complaint finally
levied, jurisdiction over the matter, as decided by a local
court ruling, now clearly rested with the PFC and not Soglin's
three-Judge panel.
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Still, political support for the Commission remained
weak. The City Council not only continued to refuse legal
counsel for the Commission, but at one point even directed
the city attorney to prepare a report on "the procedure and
method for removing members of the Police and Fire
Comiassion."
The PFC hearings were only a rehashing and fleshing out
of the allegations contained in the Mittelstadt report. In
May, the ninth month of the controversy, several of the minor
charges against Couper were dropped.
The Soglin-appointed three-judge panel, when it finally
released its findings, "totally exonerated" 6 6 Couper; no
impropriety was found in the chief's promotional procedures or
in his personal conduct, except for his use of indiscreet
language toward subordinates. But the report meant little as
resolution of the matter now legally lay with the PFC. 67
The Waters Muddy and Then Clear. Only one of the five
PFC members had ever received Council confirmation of his
appointment to the commission. Mayor William Dyke had experi-
eneed continual problems in getting the City Council to
approve his list of appointments to Madison's many boards and
commissions. When the Council rejected his appointment of
Andrew Somers to the PFC, Dyke informed the city's legislature
that a section of the state statutes had exempted PFC
appointments from the requirement of Council confirmation.
Dyke had set the precedent, and since then PFC appointments
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were no longer submitted to the Council for its review.
In June of 1974, Circuit Court Judge W. L. Jackman ruled,
in response to a suit brought by three citizens upset at the
PFC's actions in the Couper case, that all nominations to the
68PFC required Council confirmation. That ruling clouded the
status of the four members who had never received such con-
firmation,
Soglin believed that PFC appointments were exempted from
the confirmation requirement. Still, he had to act within the
constraints imposed by Jackman's ruling until the court's
action could be appealed. Somehow, the status of the four PFC
members in question had to be solidified if the Commission's
investigation into the charges against Couper--a quasi-
judicial matter which necessitated that any commissioner
listen to the full range of testimony presented to the
Commission in its hearings--was not to be begun anew in its
entirety. Soglin thus ordered that the city appeal Jackman's
ruling. In the meantime, Soglin urged that the Commission
continue to meet despite its befuddled status.
Soglin did not want to go the route of submitting the
names of the four disputed commissioners to the City Council.
He feared that in light of the Council's past hostility
towards the actions of the Dyke appointees that one or both
of these people would not receive the vote of Council support
and the prolonged Couper hearings would have to be begun anew.
But PFC President Somers, who wanted the status of the
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four members in question cleared by Council action, forced
Soglin's hand. Somers refused to convene the PFC for the
hiring of twenty-seven new firefighters, a necessary move as
the city had reduced the work week of the firefighters from
56 to 48 hours, until the legitimacy of the Commission's
actions was determined. If the new firefighters were not
hired within a week, the city would be forced to pay about
$1800 a day in overtime to existing personnel;69 a two-month
delay in the hiring process would cost the city a net $70,000
in extra wages.70 Soglin looked at the finances of the matter
and commented: "Somers has got me in a box--he's got me over
a barrel. It's a damned shame that he's got this kind of
attitude, playing these kinds of politics. ' 7 1
Soglin consequently submitted the names of all four per-
sons in question for Council confirmation. Strictly political
reasons kept the mayor from taking the opportunity of "dump-
ing" the two Dyke appointees:
A member of the mayor's office: "You had to have one
sort of standard. It would have looked a little
too heavy-handed to say, 'Look, I'll remove the two
others (the Dyke appointees) by not sending their
names down (to the Council).'"72
Soglin: "From that point on, if I had refused (to submit
the names of the Dyke appointees for confirmation),
it would have been construed as my trying to stack
the Commission on behalf of Couper."73
Still, the mayor took great pains in the memorandum he sent to
the Council to point out that he submitted the names "under
great duress and (that) the submission of such names should
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not be taken to imply support for any individual commis-
sioner."74
The mayor was less than clear regarding the outcome he
desired. Publicly he mulled over the possible legal morass
that would result if any of the names were rejected. But be-
hind the scenes he did nothing to garner Council votes behind
the submissions; nor did he actively discourage such a vote.
Capital Times correspondent Rosemary Kendrick described
the Council meeting:
The scene was among the most tense in recent Council
history. One by one, the aldermen rose to bitterly
chastise the PFC for its alleged abuse of power and
flaunting of the public will. 5
The two Soglin appointees, who had generaly dissented from
the actions of the PFC majority, were overwhelmingly approved
by 20-0 and 19-1 votes; the two Dyke appointees in question
were rejected on 9-11 and 8-12 votes.
Conservative Alderman Michael Ley, who had urged
"statesmanship" and had voted for the confirmation of all four
nominees, apparently expressed the view of many of the alder-
men when he noted that he was less than happy with "the power
play thrown at the mayor" by the PFC majority. But Ley was
also incisive in his pointing to Soglin's ducking from having
to make a politically difficult decision as to the composition
of the PFC: "In turn, the mayor is putting the monkey on the
back of the Council." 7 7
With the balance of political forces now clear, Soglin
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escalated his attacks on the Dyke appointees. Though all the
commissioners were still legally serving unless a definitive
court ruling against the city's appeal of the Jackman order
was handed down, Soglin suggested that the resignations by the
two coammissioners in question was "one way the air could be
cleared."7 8 Mayoral Assistant James Rowen noted that even if
only the three remaining commissioners continued to meet,
there would be enough members present to constitute a quorum
in order to continue business.
Somers handed the presidency of the Commission to Soglin
appointee Melvin Greenberg and announced that he was now ready
to resume attending meetings, despite the fact that nothing
had been done to dispel the clouds over his legal status on
the commission. Soglin bitterly attacked Somers:
He (Somers) owes the community an explanation for what
he's put the City Council and the city through the past
three months. If he's now ready to resume meeting,
he's got to explain what happened last month.80
When the hearings were reconvened, Somers was now, according
to The Capital Times, lauded by reporters covering the final
stages of the hearings for his "even-handed" and "fair"
handling of the proceedings.81
In September of 1974, the thirteen-month controversy came
to an end when the PFC on a series of three to two votes, with
Somers voting with the two Soglin appointees, cleared David
Couper of eighteen of the charges against him and retained him
as chief. Couper was unanimously reprimanded for four minor
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violations regarding his use of profane language towards sub-
ordinates, his use of a patrol car after engaging in drinking
at a local bar, and his allowing members of his family to
accompany him on lake patrol. Somers, reflecting his back-
ground as an attorney, had decided the case on the merits of,
or rather the lack of, the evidence. Somers insisted that
he had allowed the PFC's investigation to continue as this was
the only way he believed the evidence in the case could be
amassed. Within two months, Somers and the other Dyke
appointee in question resigned from the Commission.
The controversy for Soglin lasted a little bit beyond the
date of the decision when it was finally revealed that Soglin
had, without obtaining Council approval, authorized the
attorney for the three-judge panel to continue with his
investigations, despite the fact that the $5000 spending limit
the Council had placed on the probe had already been reached.
Soglin admitted the move was a "political mistake"8 3 and
offered a tortuous explanation for his action. He insisted
that no laws were violated as no funds were actually dis-
pensed; he had, in his eyes, only promised to give his full
support to the counsel's bills when they would finally be
submitted to the Council. The mayor had feared that the
Council, already upset at the vast amounts being spent on
legal action in the Couper matter, might disrupt the work of
the three-judge panel.
The Council, upset at Soglin's "high-handed" handling of
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the matter, initially rejected the legal bill when it was
finally submitted to it. However, after the protest was
registered, payment of the fees was ultimately authorized.
Soglin's Style. Soglin's entrance into the Couper matter
was determined by the strength of his goal orientations. The
reform of the police department was an essential element of
his liberal/left philosophy; and David Couper was the man whom
he believed could produce such reform. Not having had
appointed a majority of the members of Madison's police and
Fire Commission, Soglin faced the possibility that if Couper
were dismissed, another chief less to the mayor's liking might
be appointed in his place. Soglin consequently publicly
plunged to the defense of Couper and even attempted, albeit
unsuccessfully, to bring review of the charges within his, and
not the PFCts, jurisdiction.
The Wisconsin State Journal accused the mayor in taking
these actions of abrogating the domain of the PFC, of attempt-
ing to interfere in the operations of the Police Department;
and in immaturely messying what should have been a quite
orderly process of reviewing the complaints against the chief.
Soglin's entrance into the dispute clearly posed potential
dangers to his public standing and his influence on future
issues. But his strong goal orientation in regards to the
policies of the Police Department precluded his taking the
safest response to the dispute--nonintervention.
But Soglints commitment was tempered by pragmatic
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political concerns; the actions he was willing to take in
defense of Couper were subject to an outer limit posed by the
mayor's concern for the legal and personal political conse-
quences of his actions. In most all his actions he had the
support of both a majority of the City Council and the City
Attorney's Office. Had this support been lacking, Soglin
might possibly have exhibited more caution in the actions he
took to protect Couper.
Soglints sensitivity to the legal and political con-
straints of a situation also helps explain the leadership, or
rather the lack of leadership, he showed when a local court
ruling clouded the status of the four PFC members who had
never received Council confirmation of their appointments. An
Ideologue, subject solely to his goal orientation, might have
seized the opportunity to remove the two commissioners in
question who had kept the PFC probe alive despite the mayor's
wishes. But Soglin feared taking such action would both
befuddle the legal status of the hearings and open himself to
charges of unprincipled partisanship. A scathing Capital
Times editorial after the City Council vote rejecting confir-
mation for the two Dyke appointees chided Soglin for the
sudden trepidation he showed:
It (the Council vote) also indicated dissatisfaction
with Mayor Soglin's role in the legal challenge.
Soglin, who fancies himself a smart politician,
misjudged the depth of resentment against the anti-
Couper campaign. His tippy-toe attitude was
emphasized when he turned down an invitation to
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become a party in the court challenge (to the status
of the unconfirmed commissioners). His hesitancy in
waiting until the last minute to send up the PFC
names for Council action also indicated his timidity.
We suspect that Soglin was amazed as anyone at the
Council vote.84
A "smart politician," Soglin restrained his purist urges.
In his handling of the Couper case, as in his actions in
the Atwood Bypass, the Triangle redevelopment, and the audi-
torium matters, Soglin again did not ideologically adhere to
the views of some of the leaders of Madison's left, and he
suffered their criticism. These leaders saw Couper as a
traditional cop with the usual policeman's biases, who, by
his liberal veneer had hoodwinked Soglin and Madison's liberal
community.85 The chief, in their view, had simply demon-
strated no respect for citizens' rights. Takeover, an
"underground" Madison newspaper, even drew a caustic front-
page editorial cartoon showing the mayor and police chief
engaging in a quite compromising sexual act.
Soglin, thus, as a result of his goal orientations
entered into a conflictual situation that posed possible
threats to his long-term influence. He saw himself as the
self-appointed leader of the pro-Couper faction of the com-
munity. His leadership, though, was not Ideological; he
showed pragmatic political concerns that demonstrated that his
frame of reference was broader than his own philosophical
principles.
Paul Soglin, by his actions, did not determine the
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outcome of the Couper question. No direct connection can be
drawn between the mayor's actions and the PPC vote that
finally produced the action he wanted--clearing Chief Couper.
But the question of ascertaining mayoral impact is a
distinct question from determining a mayor's leadership style
towards an issue. Goal-oriented, conflict-oriented, his
advocacy restrained only in the outer limits by an unwilling-
ness to totally jeopardize his coalitional support in the
city, Paul Soglin once more exhibited the leadership style of
a Partisan mayor.
CONCLUSION: RADICAL PRAGMATISM
As seen in the four case studies cited in this chapter,
Paul Soglin was a conflict-oriented mayor who pursued objec-
tives designed to make Madison a more humanistic place in
which to live. He took the environmentalist position in
opposing the construction of the Atwood Avenue Bypass; he took
the "people's" position in favoring the building of low- and
moderate-income housing instead of a hotel in the Triangle
area; he sought a Police Department more concerned with
citizen rights under the direction of Chief David Couper. And
he even justified the funding of an auditorium and civic
center as a means of enabling all people to have access to and
the opportunity to express themselves through the arts. As
will become even more clear in the following chapter, Paul
Soglin was a Partisan mayor who sought to advance the position
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of generally disadvantaged groups in Madison.
Still, despite the actions that Soglin took toward the
realization of these generally liberal/leftist goals, the
mayor drew the fire from elements of Madison's left in each of
the eases cited in this chapter. In two of the cases, these
elements of the city's left even doubted the "radicalness"
of Soglin's goals. They believed that the money which the
mayor proposed be spent on building an auditorium could better
be spent in areas dealing with more basic human needs than the
arts. And in the Couper controversy, this part of Madison's
left believed that Soglin had misplaced his faith in a police
chief who, despite his progressive rhetoric, was, to their
mind, obstructing instead of furthering the major redirection
of priorities they believed was needed in the police depart-
ment.
But even more significant than any disagreement between
Soglin and these elements of Madison's left over specific
objectives was the distance between the mayor and these
critics as regards the question of proper political style.
They thought that Soglin did not approach his humanistic goal
orientations--inclinations with which they basically agreed--
from the perspective of possessing a correct ideology. Soglin
was no Ideologue; he had no absolute principles so important
that they could not be compromised in some part if situational
constraints so demanded. As the mayor himself admitted he was
not "dogmatic:" "I don't see the world in terms like
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Imonolithic.' That's where the radicals and I have
separated."86 Soglin was flexible; and it was just this
flexibility that outraged those elements of Madison's left
that demanded rigid ideological purity.
Thus the primary objection of this part of Madison's left
to Soglin's performance in office concerned the mayor's
apparent abandonment of leftist principles which they felt
should have guided his actions. These concerns were for the
most part stylistic. In the Atwood case, they not only criti-
cized Soglin for his abandonment of the environmentalist
cause; but, even more important they excoriated the mayor for
behaving like just another politician who covered his own rear
end whenever the heat became too severe. In the Triangle case
they again believed Soglin took the politician's way out,
taking a secretive, behind-the-scenes politician's route to
the problem rather than the forthright principled approach of
vetoing the hotel rezoning as simply not being in the people's
interests. And they also objected to the manner by which
Soglin rushed through the purchase of the Capitol Theater
without giving the public adequate time to register its feel-
ings on the matter.
In all three cases just cited, this faction of Madison's
left objected to Soglin's individualistic style of governing.
In each case they believed that the mayor took the expedient
rather than the principled "leftist" approach to the resolu-
tion of the problem.
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But these criticisms go too far if they define
"politician" as a person concerned solely with the health of
his own political standing. For Soglin had only tempered his
goal orientations as far as required by the pragmatics of a
situation; he had not simply sacrificed his goal orientations
to protect his own stock of influence. Soglin still possessed
a vision as to which direction he should move the city. He
proposed realistic strategies for attaining these goals and
spurned courses of action which would have served only as
visible expression of his purist faith.
The flexibility Soglin exhibited in each of the four
controversies of his first term was not an abandonment of a
leadership role. Rather than representing a withdrawal on the
mayor's behalf from situations that had become potentially too
power-costly, Soglints shifts represented an easing away from
idealistic solutions, which had proved to be unfeasible in
light of the way events evolved, to goals which he thought
were more attainable.
In only one of the four cases reported did Soglin ever
forego a leadership role out of concern for the political
repercussions of his actions. Only when a local court ruling
threw the status of four members of the PFC into question did
Soglin momentarily let a dispute drift without direction from
his office. But this one instance aside, Soglin did not
otherwise shrink from conflict in the rest of the Couper
controversy or in any of the other situations described in
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this chapter. His flexibility in each case was not a simple
strategy devised to protect his power situation. Rather than
an abandonment of mayoral direction, such flexibility repre-
sented a pragmatic attempt to maximize goal attainment.
Soglin's conflict-oriented, goal-oriented leadership
style fits almost exactly the model which Saul Alinsky has
termed "radical pragmatism.'"87 Soglin's behavior as mayor is
consonant with the outlook Alinsky has prescribed as essential
for community organizing success:
As an organizer I start from where the world is, as
it is, not as I would like it to be. That we accept
the world as it is does not in any sense weaken
our desire to change it into what we believe it
should be--it is necessary to begin where the world
is if we are going to change it to what we think
it should be. That means working in the system.88
Soglin's statement of his own approach is strikingly close to
that of the Alinsky philosophy:
I dropped the luxury of being able to pontificate
about desirable societal goals. There are worthwhile
things that can be done that are better than chasing
after windmills.9
In Alinsky's terms by launching a "pragmatic attack on
the system,"90 Soglin has shown himself to be a "realistic
radical" as opposed to a "rhetorical radical." 9 1 And it was
from the rhetorical radicals of Madison who saw Soglin's
realism only to be evidence of a sellout of principles that
Soglin drew his most criticism.
Soglin is an example of Alinsky's "political relativist"
who lacks a "fixed truth" but who "has a far greater sense of
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direction and compass than the closed-society" leader "with
his rigid political ideology."92 Soglin chose to forego play-
ing the role of the Ideologue, and like Alinsky's organizer,
"free from the shackles of dogma" he could "respond to the
realities of the widely different situations our society
presents."93
But just how radical can any form of relativism and
pragmatism be? One critic, Charles F. Levine, has even
charged Alinsky with being a "conservative" in that his method
lacks "plans for the transformation of the American system in
any important sense..." 94 Rather than seeking a fundamental
restructuring of society, Alinsky only sought to incremen-
tally improve the positions of "the Have-Nots" and the "Have-
a-little, Want Mores" at the expense of "the Haves." 9 5
This criticism is just as applicable to Soglin as to
Alinsky. Soglin's critics on the left felt the mayor was
lacking a guiding ideology which would have kept him going in
the right direction in such difficult situations as the Atwood
controversy. They also felt that the mayor was not attempting
the total systems change they desired. Radical pragmatism
does not involve changing society in any comprehensive manner.
As one leftist alderman observed dryly: "If you apply the
standards of a good liberal Democrat, he's a good liberal
Democrat, which I suppose is not the most evil thing in the
world."96
But Soglin chose to forego idealistic radical solutions
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for programs which, though far less comprehensive in their
impact, proved more attainable and still represented measur-
able improvements in the lives of people whose causes he iden-
tified with. A realistic,balanced street construction and
mass transit policy would be implemented; more housing would
be built for the elderly and low-income groups; the arts would
be brought to the people; and the police would be more
respectful of the rights of citizens.
Paul Soglin was a "radical" mayor only in the Alinsky-
defined sense of the word. Just how much of an impact this
pragmatic radical had as mayor will be further discussed in
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE IMPACT OF A PARTISAN MAYOR
In the preceding chapter, the four major controversies of
Paul Soglin's first term in office were analyzed both to
identify the mayor's leadership style and to begin to assess
the impact of his administration on policy outcomes in
Madison. As noted in the first chapter, a mayor who wishes to
bring effective change to a city must be concerned not only
with the more visible allocative disputes but with the innum-
erable routine functionings of city hall which never command
great public attention.
This chapter will attempt a more complete portrait of
Soglin's leadership approach and impact by concentrating on
the mayor's actions in policy areas which were of interest to
him but yet never developed into large-scale public contro-
versy. The changes brought to six areas in which the mayor
expressed desire for change--housing code administration,
housing assistance, the development of "human resources,"
affirmative action, mass transit, and the restraining of the
policel--will be surveyed.
The first part of this chapter will outline the successes
of Paul Soglin's leadership in each of the policy areas, and
as will be readily apparent, those successes were consider-
able. The second part of this chapter, however, will point
out the limits to Soglin's success, especially as viewed by
persons who for the most part shared the mayor's "people's"
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and social service orientations--Madison's left. Their argu-
ment, put simply, is that Paul Soglin, the "liberal," did not
attempt all the change he could have. Also, as will become
apparent, the mayor suffered from a personal distaste for the
managerial side of city politics which helped make his
administrative leadership intermittent.
SOGLIN'S IMPACT
Housing Code Enforcement. Inspections to insure that
Madisonts residential housing is up to code standards is the
work of the city's Building Inspection Division. Upon finding
that a building is substandard, the department issues a work
order which usually requires that the property be repaired
within thirty days. Enforcement of lapsed work orders is the
job of the City Attorney's Office.
Table 1 details the monthly referrals made to the
Attorney's office for the 1973-75 period. Most readily
observable from the table is the fact that for the months
preceding Soglin's ascension to the mayoralty in April of
1973, monthly figures on code referrals are not even avail-
able. Code enforcement prior to Soglin's election was simply
not a major priority. As one member of the City Attorney's
Office readily admitted, Madison landlords "got away with a
lot." 2 Not only were referrals of lapsed work orders not
always forthcoming, but not many of those which had been
referred were even prosecuted. The prosecution of housing
288
Table 1
Number of Housing Work Orders Referred by the
Buildings Inspections Department to the City Attorney's
Office for Legal Action, 1975-76
S1973 1974 1975
January * 10 36
February * 16 26
March * 13 31
April 5 23 35
May 12 21 27
June 12 39 49
July 26 36 61
August 39 33 51
September 28 36 35
October 35 61 56
November 25 47 22
December 73 32
301** 387 461
Important Dates:
April 15, 1973--Soglin assumes the mayoralty;
July 1973--Building Inspections Department implements new
procedure for dealing with lapsed work orders;
November 30, 1973--Soglin delivers his memorandum concerning
the referral and prosecution of lapsed work orders.
*Monthly records regarding the referral of lapsed work orders
were not kept by either the Buildings Inspections Depart-
ment nor the City Attorney's Office during the Dyke
administrat ion.
**The Buildings Inspections Department lists 301 referrals for
the year 1973. The April to December figures listed in
this table for 1973 total only 255. It is possible that
the three months for which figures are not available may
account for the 46 missing referrals. Such confusion is
indicative to the lack of precise record-keeping in the
housing code area prior to Soglin's taking office.
SOURCE: Monthly reports from the Buildings Inspections
Department to the Mayor, 1973-74, and Annual Report of
the Buildings Inspections Division, 1975.
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code violations was a relatively time-consuming Job which the
Attorney's Office did not consider high status legal work.3
Soglin, reflecting his "downtown" background, had made
code enforcement an issue in his mayoralty campaign. He
particularly blamed the City Attorney's Office for delays in
prosecution.4 Soglin's election reportedly filled the
Attorney's Office, and the Buildings Inspection Divisions as
well, with an attitude that bordered on "terror."5 Antici-
pating the new urgency that they expected the new mayor to
communicate in this area, the Attorney's Office began to
elevate the priority of code enforcement. No longer were
housing code violations routinely put in the bottom desk
drawer of the assistant city attorney assigned to the area,
where, except for the sending of a threatening letter, they
received only that action allowed by the time constraints
imposed by the attorney's other assigned duties. Accurate
record-keeping regarding case referrals from the Inspections
Department was begun almost immediately.
Soglin's first real move in the code area came in June,
Just two months after his election. The new mayor met with
officials from the Building Inspections Division, the City
Attorney's Office, and the Health Department for the purpose
of bringing about, in his own words, "sharp improvement" in
the enforcement of the housing code. No longer was the
Inspections Division to send two or three intermediary warning
letters in the case of outstanding violations--a past
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procedure which not only tied up the Division's limited man-
power with the constant need to reinspect the same property
but allowed recalcitrant landlords time for delay. Now, one
and only one official notice of a code violation was to be
sent. If corrective action was not gained within the usual
thirty days allotted in the work order, the file of the case
in question was to be immediately forwarded to the Attorney's
Office for action.
These procedural reforms instituted the next month, had
their effect. As Table 1 shows, the monthly referral rate
from July to November of 1973 was double and triple that of
the two months previous to the change. The total number of
referrals, 301, made during 1973 was up over 43 per cent over
the previous year. 6 Soglin's guidance was beginning to
bridge the breakdown in communications between the Inspec-
tions Division and the City Attorney's Office which greatly
impaired the city's ability to take legal action against
code violators.
Still, Soglin was not totally satisfied that the June
conference had removed all the slack in the code enforcement
process. He wanted a virtually automatic system whereby
property owners would know that the ignoring city work orders
would with certainty result in court action. Any discretion
in the referral process undermined the automatic nature of the
system and thus had to be eliminated.
Soglin was also concerned with the large backlog of
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lapsed work orders which had not yet been forwarded to the
City Attorney's Office for action. Consequently, Soglin
issued the following November 30 memorandum to the City
Attorney, Public Works Director, and Building Inspections
Superintendent:
Attached you will find a list of properties as pre-
pared for my office on August 24, 1973. The list
comprises buildings which, as of that date, had work
orders that were more than 30 days old. Without
exception every property on this list which is still in
violation and has not yet been sent to the City
Attorneyts Office for prosecution is to be forwarded
to the City Attorney's Office no later than Monday,
December 10, 1973. Every property on the list, without
exception, is to be prepared for prosecution. Prosecu-
tion on all violations is to be commenced no later than
Monday, December 24, 1973. All cases are to be actively
pursued. The city will not agree to a dismissal of
charges simply because the long-standing violations
have been corrected prior to the final determination
by the Court.
VIOLATORS OF CITY BUILDING CODE ORDINANCES ARE BEING
PROSECUTED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITHIN THE TIME
SPECIFIED IN WORK ORDERS WRITTEN BY THE BUILDING
INSPECTION DIVISION. IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE IF THE
VIOLATIONS ARE CORRECTED AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE
WORK ORDER DATE. (Emphasis Soglints).
The last paragraph underscored Soglin's employment of code
enforcement as a deterrent strategy. As court action would
continue even if properties were repaired sometime after a
work order expired, landlords would now find delay costly. No
longer could they without cost wait until court action was
imminent before deciding to make repairs. Both the referral
of work orders and the commencement of legal action was to be
automatic.
The immediate impact of Soglints directive on referrals,
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as seen in Table 1, was dramatic. The Inspections and
Attorney's Offices worked at almost a crisis pace as a result
of the clearly demarcated deadline the mayor had set; 73 work
orders were referred in December alonel
The degree of Soglin's impact on code enforcement in the
long-term can also be seen in the monthly rate of referrals of
lapsed work orders to the City Attorney's Office. In the
first three months of Soglin's term, referrals averaged only
9.7 per month. The July 1973 conference raised the rate
dramatically to 30.6 over the next five months. For the 25
month period following the mayor's November 30 directive, the
monthly rate increased slightly more to 36.8.
These figures seem to indicate Soglin's major impact on
the referral process came with the July 1973 conference. The
long-term impact of the edict was much less than the huge
number of referrals, 73, for December 1973 would seem to
indicate. The huge December output included many referrals
that would have likely been made during the new year had the
crisis routine not been invoked, as witnessed by the extremely
low number of referrals for the first three months of 1974.
The importance of the November 30 edict, though, was two-
fold; it sped up the code enforcement process and it helped
remind landlords of the tough and automatic nature that
housing code enforcement in Madison was now taking.
In response to the mayorts priorities, City Attorney
Edwin Conrad assigned Assistant City Attorney Robert Olsen
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full-time to the code enforcement area. The "hard-nosed"
approach which Olsen had earned as a traffic violation prose-
cutor was carried to the housing code enforcement area:
Upon re-referral of a file from the Building Inspections
Department, suit is instituted. It is my policy, and
it has been from the time I first began handling any of
these cases, that once a case is commenced it is not
dismissed simply because compliance is had at any stage
of the court proceedings.7
Olsen, like Soglin, did not believe landlords who delayed
compliance should be let off with the same work required of
those who readily obeyed a work order. The city's policy was
now to seek monetary forfeitures in each Judgment of convic-
tion--even if the property was finally repaired by the date of
trial.
As court prosecution and the imposition of fines was
nearly automatically forthcoming, it was no longer profitable
for landlords to ignore the directives of the city's code
enforcement personnel. Soglin's revitalized program likely
resulted in the increased willingness of some landlords to
fix up their property without awaiting city action. Concen-
tration solely on the referral and prosecution rates in code
enforcement as a result, then, likely underestimates the true
extent of the mayor's impact in this area.
Initially, Soglin, trusted the Attorneyts Office in the
code area little, if at all. City Administrator Robert
Corcoran, working out of the mayor's office, was assigned to
"watchdog" the code program. Monthly reports to the mayor
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from the Attorney's Office on the status of all cases con-
cerning lapsed work orders were mandated. And still Soglin
held one more "club" to ensure that the Attorney's Office
cooperated with his directives:
...several months ago a vacancy was created in the City
Attorney's Office. I refused to have that vacancy filled
because I did not feel that city priorities were being
met, namely that insufficient attention was being given
to building code violations. After consultations with
the City Attorney's Office I have allowed that position
to be filled on a temporary full-time basis. At the
end of six months, I will examine the City Attorney's
Office work in the area of building code violations.
If building code violations are given the attention I
think they deserve, then I will allow that to become a
permanent position. I am not really concerned whether
the new person hired handles building code violations
or whether it is somebody else in thg City Attorney's
Office, as long as the work is done.O
Despite his initial reservations, Soglin came to appre-
ciate Assistant City Attorney Robert Olsen's work in the code
enforcement area. The mayor even proved receptive to Olsen's
modification of his November 30 directive. According to
Olsen, Soglin's "meat-axe" approach of the November 30 memo
had to be avoided. The courts simply were not in the habit
of imposing forfeitures on landlords if the property was
repaired by trial date. Olsen had to "sell" the judges on the
deterrent capacity of the revised code enforcement procedure.
Attempts to secure large forfeitures and indiscriminate prose-
cution of all 150 or so outstanding violations would only
confirm fears that Soglin was out to get the landlords and
thereby destroy the city's credibility in court. Olsen, with
Soglin's consent, hence decided both to ask only for reasonable
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fines and to act only on those "decent" oases necessary to
build the city's credibility. Olsen chose to forego prosecu-
tion where city administrative foul-ups, the trivial nature
of the violation, or the financial hardship of the home-owner
made a sympathetic court verdict improbable.
The Building Inspections Division felt that with its
closer knowledge of the condition of the property in question,
it, and not the Attorney's Office, should have the discretion
of determining when a case mandated prosecution. But the
general suspicion among Madison's left was that the Inspec-
tions Division had built up too comfortable a relationship
with certain landlords over the years. 9 Soglin soon came to
trust more the judgment of the Attorneyts Office, as Olsen not
only dedicatedly pursued court action but routinely sent the
mayor the reasons underlying any decisions he had made not to
commence legal action in specific cases. Soglin, quite
satisfied with Olsen's performance, made it clear that it was
the Assistant City Attorney, not the Inspections Division, who
was to decide when circumstances exempted a case from legal
action.
Table 2 bears witness to Soglin's impact on the resolu-
tion of housing code cases once they reached the City
Attorney's Office. Again the lack of record-keeping in this
area prior to Soglin's administration stands as testimony to
the lack of attention paid to this activity before Soglin's
election. Accurate record-keeping was really begun only
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Table 2
Status of Housing Code Violations Referred to the
City Attorney's Office*
Cases Commenced Cases Closed
Monthly Monthly
Period Total Rate Total Rate
June-December 1973 (6 months) NA NA 321* 4.6
January-Dec. 1974 (12 months) 17 "*** 14.6 146 12.2
January-June 1975 (6 months) 173 28.8 142 23.7
NA--not available.
*No figures were kept by the City Attorney's Office
concerning the status of housing code cases prior
to June 1973.
*:As no cases were closed after Soglin's November 30
memorandum, this figure represents the state of
code enforcement prior to Soglin's action.
***This figure is accurate within five cases due to the
impossibility the Attorney's Office had in discerning
whether a few cases were commenced at the end of 1973
or the beginning of 1974.
SOURCE: Figures made available through the courtesy of
the City Attorney's Office, and the Annual Report
of the Buildings Inspections Division, 1975.
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starting with 1970. As Table 2 makes clear, the monthly rate
of commencement and closing of code cases linearly increased
during Soglin's first years in office. The figures for the
first half of 1975 serve as evidence of Soglin's continued
impact in the housing area--the number of cases commenced and
closed in that half year nearly equalled the number of cases
commenced and closed during the entire previous year of
Soglin's terml
On the input side of the code enforcement program,
Soglin's impact was equally impressive. The mayor was able
to staff three new housing code inspector positions for 1975.
The result was the per cent of the Building Division's time
spent on housing code enforcement rose to 54% in 1975 from
43% the previous year. The number of units inspected, like-
wise, jumped from 6,891 in 1974 to 9,381 in 1975--an increase
of 36 per cent.10
Housing Assistance. If attention is focused beyond the
inspection area to the area of housing in general, the Soglin
record is even more impressive. For the year 1975 alone a
$4 million commitment, through both direct appropriation and
the city's bonding power, was made for public housing.11
Though most of the approximately 400 planned housing units
were targeted for the Triangle, fifty new or rehabilitated
units scattered throughout the city were also to be sold or
leased to low-income families. 1 2
Soglints first budget also contained the city's first
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allocation for housing counseling. Under this service the
city was now to assist in landlord-tenant disputes, provide
information on tenantst rights, aid in making emergency hous-
ing repairs, help locate rentals, and otherwise abet home
ownership. Soglin's concern in the area of tenants' rights was
further seen in his human resources budget allocation to the
Madison Tenants' Union.
The matter of improved housing rehabilitation also showed
Soglin's imprints. In February 1 974, at the mayor's request,
Madison set up a totally locally funded $225,000 low-interest
revolving loan fund for homeowners of one-to-four unit struc-
tures who lacked the money to make basic repairs. The funds
were to be loaned at a low 6j per cent interest rate to home-
owners in declining areas who either could not afford the 9
to 12 per cent interest rates of private loans or who were not
considered good risks by private lending institutions. The
program was the first of its kind in the nation.
Madison's actions in housing rehabilitation were
advanced the next year when Madison Redevelopment Authority
Director Sol Levin informed the mayor that a federal home
rehabilitation program thought to be dead was suddenly
revived. Levin advised that if the city acted fast enough,
Madison residents could receive a good share of the federal
money to be loaned at three per cent interest. Soglin imme-
diately gave Levin the use of the mayor's office to announce
to homeowners the deadline for filing applications for the
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funds. By the end of the year, the city had distributed to
more than 65 homeowners the approximately $350,000 received
under the program. 1 3
Soglin's actions in the housing rehabilitation area did
not stop here. As one member of the City's Department of
Housing and Community Development observed, "We ran into a lot
of people who could not afford to pay back 60 per cent loans,
or 3 per cent loans, or anything." 14 To help alleviate this
problem, in the spring of 1976, the beginning of Soglin's
fourth year in office, the city allocated $80,000 of its com-
munity development block grant funds to be dispensed as no-
interest loans to low-income homeowners who otherwise could
not finance much needed repairs. Recipients of these loans
were not even obligated to repay the principle, except at the
date the house was ever sold.
Human Resources and Day Care. Paul Soglin wanted two
items more than anything else in his 1975 budget.15 First,
Soglin wanted the city to enter the day care field by both
subsidizing the costs of day care for low income families and
by monitoring the quality of day care services. Second, he
sought to allocate money to certain private groups and agen-
cies whom he saw to be providing "human resource services"
consistent with the public's and therefore the city's
interest. As both programs represented entirely new munici-
pal intrusions into the social welfare domain they mobilized
the opposition of fiscal conservatives concerned with limiting
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the scope of government activity, and soon came to occupy the
center of the 1975 budget battle.
In November of 1974 Soglin submitted to the City Council
a $50.8 million budget which included a recommendation for
$198,000 to start up a city day care program. The day care
request had been drawn up in consultations between the mayor's
office and a day care committee previously set up. The
request included $117,000 to be given as direct subsidies on a
sliding scale basis to low and moderate income families. The
rest of the money was to go for administration, including the
establishment of the necessary administrative machinery to
certify which day care facilities were of sufficient quality
to be eligible to receive the city vouchers.
If such transfers for day care were controversial, the
human resources budget was even more so. The budget was the
result of a Soglin-appointed task force which had sifted
through the numerous pleas for aid which were annually made to
the city. They recommended that the city allocate nearly
$354,000 for the purchase and evaluation of services consis-
tent with the public interest from private independent
agencies.
Both the day care and human resources proposals were
slashed drastically by the Board of Estimates. The $117,000
in direct day care subsidies was kept, but the $81,000 for
administration of the program, including the certification
process, was cut. Nine of the proposed fifteen human
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resources grants were deleted entirely, including the grants
to four agencies dealing with problems of the elderly
($25,900), the Madison Tenants' Union ($10,000), the Spanish
American Organization ($14,000), and the Executive Agency for
Cultural Awareness ($41,000). Two other recommended grants
were reduced slightly. Finally, the $100,000 Human Relations
Contingency fund was eliminated. This last action, if sus-
tained by the City Council, would mean that proposed new addi-
tions to the human needs area made during the forthcoming year
would not be provided for by the budget and would thus require
a three-fourths rather than a simple majority City Council
vote.
Soglin had misread the social and fiscal orientations of
one, and possibly two, members of this important Board of
Estimates. After the forthcoming spring elections, Soglin
would change the composition of the Board of Estimates to be
more consistent with his own priorities. But the more
pressing question at the time for the mayor and the human
resources and day care proponents was how to get the monies
back into the budget. An intensive mayoral and citizen
lobbying effort was directed at the entire City Council to
restore the cuts.
The results on the Council floor were a major victory for
Soglin. The full $198,000 day care budget was approved, and
over $150,000 of the $197,000 out by the Board of Estimates
from the human resources budget was also restored. Only the
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proposed $41,000 allocation for the Executive Council for
Awareness, "a self-help plan for minority groups," was not
approved as being too "vague"--and even then this money was
placed in the contingency fund. 1 6
The exact nature of the successful lobbying effort merits
closer attention. Constituents favoring the programs in each
aldermanic district communicated the urgency of their desires
in each of the program areas to their representatives. This
grass-roots constituency campaign proved productive. One day
care proponent guessed that the organized phone campaign to
aldermen turned around at least three votes on day care.17
And as one mayoral aide further relates:
I know that there were aldermen who voted for day care
only because they could not take the pressure any
longer...they were people who were philosophically
(opposed) to day care...These are people who Just to
literally get out from under the barrage of phone calls
and personal contact from people throughout the city--
groups, organizations, coalitions, individual parents,
users of day care--that they literally just threw
their hands up and said, "All right! Enoughl If ,18everybody wants day care this badly it's fine with me.
Soglin himself talked to nearly every alderman regarding the
day care and human resources budgets.19 And as Wisconsin
State Journal reporter Michael Baumann noted the campaign was
put together with a great deal of sophistication:
Tactics were orchestrated carefully, to the point
of deciding which council member would introduce
proposals to achieve the greatest impact.
In the case of day care, Alderman Betty Smith,
Dist. 19, took the lead because of her support of the
program combined with her generally moderate politics
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figured to give the issue credibility.
The result was a series of delicate coalitions that
shifted slightly from vote to vote, but which always
gave Soglin a minimum of 11 votes to work with.20
One mayoral aide even further details the delicacy with which
the mayor's victory was put together; Soglin's strategy:
... on the Council floor the night of the budget was to
put together coalition after coalition after coalition
as each item came down. And we knew in advance if there
was an alderman that was a swing vote we would not ask
him or her to be a swing vote more than once...We would
sort of spread out for that group of aldermen and women
-- we spread out what they would see to be the political
difficulty for supporting part of the mayor's budget.
So we didn't ask anybody or expect anybody to take all
of the heat.21
The success of this coalition juggling act was apparent on
the votes concerning the three most controversial items--the
Tenants' Union, Spanish American Organization, and human
reserve funds. On each of these issues Soglin managed to
muster exactly half the votes of the entire Council. He, him-
self, then, cast the tie-breaking vote to restore the items to
the budget.
The creation of the day care and human resources budgets
was one of Soglin's most satisfying victories, as again noted
by reporter Baumann:
These restored programs were crucial for Soglin be-
cause they were the type of "people" programs he
pushed in the 1973 mayoral campaign. The budget
victory showed he could deliver, and he accepted the
council gift gratefully.
"In terms of, if you don't like the way a vote goes
it's a loss, and if you like the way a vote goes
it's a win, we had a lot of wins," a smiling Soglin
said Tuesday. 2 2
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Affirmative Action. One of Paul Soglin's major goals as
mayor was to "open up" city hall. In contrast to his predeces-
sorts reclusiveness, Soglin readily availed himself to City
Council members--liberal and conservatives alike--the press
and even citizens desiring to see the mayor. In fact, Soglin
was so open to all comers that a number of persons interviewed
in this study felt the mayor's schedule was so clogged that he
could not always be reached by city officials as problems
arose.
But Soglin's promise to open up city government trans-
cended the style of operation he brought to the mayor's office
itself. Soglin wanted increased direct citizen participation
in government affairs, and he created five districts with nine
citizen-member planning boards to this purpose. Even more
specifically, Soglin further wanted to open up city government
to groups--women, racial minorities, inner city people--he
felt were unfairly denied representation in the past.
In the area of citizen appointments to various city com-
mittees and commissions, Soglin accomplished just what he
promised. As Table 3 shows, Soglin appointed a dispropor-
tionate number of members of racial minorities to these com-
missions. Women, who constituted only one-fifth of his
predecessorts appointments, comprised nearly half of Soglin's
appointments.
Geographioally, Soglin's appointments approach propor-
tional representation. The disproportionate representation of
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Table 3
Breakdown of City Committee and Commission Appointments
(in percentages)
% Population
in General
Work Area
Mayor Making Appointments
(Committee Status as of:
Dyke Soglin Soglin(March (November
1973) (May 1973) ) 1974)
% Women
% Racial
Minorities
% West Side
% Central City% East Side
% South Side
3
35
2435
6
19
NA
48
13
30
9
47
NA
36
29
32
6
31
25
34
10
NA--not ascertained
SOURCE: Articles by Rosemary Kendrick in The Capital Times,
March 26, 1973; May 8, 1973; and D~ cber2, 17.
"Affirmative Action Plan for Equal Employment
Opportunity, 1974," City of Madison Mayor's Office.
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the West Side, the city's relatively more affluent area, under
Mayor Dyke receded under Soglin. Central City people, who
were not part of Dyke's constituency, were severely under-
represented during the latter days of the Dyke administration
--and half of these appointments can even be accounted for by
the membership composition of the one committee dealing exclu-
sively with a central city project, the proposed State Street
Mall. 2 3
Soglin's commitment to the women's cause is underscored
even further by his actions in two specific instances.
Despite the fact that upon his election only five women served
on Madison's 22-member City Council, the new mayor appointed
three to the six-person powerful Board of Estimates--the first
time in history of the city that this board had been sexually
balanced. The sexual balance, though, was not to last through
Soglin's entire tenure as mayor. As a result of the retire-
ment of one of the Board's female members, and another, Pat
Zimmerman, proving more conservative than anticipated, Soglin
proved unable to find three women with both the necessary
expertise and liberal credentials to maintain the three-to-
three balance. Soglin accepted a four-to-two male-to-female
ratio.
Even more demonstrative of Soglin's commitment was his
appointment of women's rights activist Judith Pederson to
the Police and Fire Commission. This appointment received
opposition from two quarters--the local firefighters' union
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who feared Pederson would push for the hiring of female fire-
fighters, and a group of leftist aldermen who, concerned with
police matters, wanted a person of substantial leftist creden-
tials appointed to the Commission. To the latter group,
Soglin pointed out that as the Police and Fire Commission's
jurisdiction was only over personnel, and not policy
matters, placing a member of the left on the Commission was
not all that urgent. When the Council referred the Pederson
appointment back to the mayor, Soglin made clear his intention
of sticking by Pederson. The appointment was soon thereafter
approved.
The area of municipal hiring also reflects Soglin's
equal opportunity orientation. The city's affirmative action
ordinance, adopted only months after Soglin's election, was
reaffirmed by a strongly worded statement of policy issued by
the mayor at the close of 1973. As seen in Tables 4 and 5,
the numbers of women and members of racial minorities in
Madison's municipal work force increased markedly--by 19 per
cent and 75 per cent respectively over their previous levels--
during Soglin's first term in office. The mayor's hiring
policy, it can be deduced, was responsible for this--from
September 1973 to July 1974, half of all hires were female,
and another 19% were members of racial minorities (Table 6).
Particularly noteworthy was the entrance of women into the
protective service field.
Yet, as Tables 4 and 5 also show, and as was noted by the
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Table .
Analysis of Madison's Full-Time
Work Force by Sex
Number of
Female
Employees8/30/73 V11,74
Off icials/
Administrative
Professional
Technicians
Protective Service
Paraprofessional
Office/Clerical
Skilled Craft
Service/
Maintenance
7
69
7
2
16
125
0
18
9
81
20
148
1
25
8
74
19
60521420
21
Number
of
Males6/1/74 8
99
227
186355
14
25
167
353
Female
6/1/7h
8.3%
26.3
9.7
3.8
73.1
85.6
0.1
6.6
SOURCE: "Affirmative Action Plan for Equal Employment
Opportunity, 1974," City of Madison Mayorts
Office, and other information provided through
the courtesy of the affirmative action office.
--- -- - --
4122M75
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Table 5
Analysis of Madison's Full-Time
Work Force by Race
Number of Employees
June 19 1
%Minority
June 1, 1974
Officials/
Administrative 10
Professional 29
Technicians 20
Protective Service 36
Paraprofessional 5
Office/Clerical 16
Skilled Craft 16
Service/Maintenance 36
172
Total Minorities:
6
5
3
1
8
7
3
0
August 30, 1973
June 1, 1974
April 30, 1975
2
11
6
1
115
42
1.9%
3.6
0.5
1.6
1.9
2.9
0.6
4.0
29
42
51
SOURCGE: "Affirmative Action Plan for Equal Employment
Opportunity, 1974," City of Madison Mayor's
Office, and other information provided through
the courtesy of the affirmative action office.
_ _ I_ __
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Table 6
Hires to Madisonts Full-Time
By Sex and Race,
September 1, 1973 to July
White
Black
Spanish Surname
American Indian
Oriental
Male
51
6
1
0
0
Total % Hires Minority:
Total % Hires Female
Work Force,
1, 1974
Female
50
8
0
0
1
-- 101
-- 14
-- 1
-- 0
-- 1
13.7%
50.4%
SOURCE: "Affirmative Action Plan for Equal Employment
Opportunity, 1974," City of Madison's Mayort's
Office.
__
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City's Affirmative Action Report for 1974, Madison's municipal
work force still could not be said to be well-balanced.
There are no females in the official administrative
category; nor is this category likely to change in
the next six months as there is little turnover
and those eligible for promotion are all white men.
Women, for the most part, are under-represented in
all of the categories except in the office, clerical
and paraprofessional areas where traditionally they
have always been accepted. The professional category
in which they seem fairly well represented (33%), it
must be noted that this includes nurses, social workers
and librarians, low paying professions which tradi-
tionally have been attractive for women (sic). In
total, women constitute 19.1% of the City's work force,
a figure which is far below their representation in the
Madison area work force which is 4;0% It should also
be noted that there are a negligible number of women in
decision-making positions.
The overall statistics with respect to minorities
is (sic) also misleading. Again it is essential to look
at the compositional breakdown. Minorities now consti-
tute 2.4% of the total work force of the City as com-
pared to their representation in the larger Madison area
of 2.9%. It should be noted that they still appear dis-
proportionately at the low skill and wage end of the
spectrum. The situation has improved somewhat with
respect to the professional category...24
Specific goals were set to try to improve female and racial
minority representation in the higher level Job categories.
In April of 1974 the city enacted a contract compliance
ordinance. All contractors, vendors, and suppliers who
employed 10 or more people and who contracted with the city
for $5,000 or more business annually had to submit for city
approval affirmative action programs of their own. 2 5
For these achievements, Madison was name the 1974
Wisconsin Equal Employment Opportunity Association City of the
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Year. Among the achievements cited in the reward presentation
were the cityts hiring of three black and one Spanish-
surnamed firefighter where none had been hired previously, the
cityts attempt to recruit female firefighters, and the city's
hiring of its first six female police officers.
Only one qualification may be made concerning Soglin's
impact in this area. As by the 1970's, affirmative action had
become a national movement, gains in Madison may not simply
represent the result of the mayorts initiatives but a secular
trend. Yet Tables 3 and 6 underscore that Soglin within one
year did much to change the sexual and racial composition of
Madison's commissions and full-time work force. Such
quickened change clearly reflects the impact of a unique
factor on the Madison scene--mayoral direction.
Mass Transit. As observed in the Atwood Avenue Bypass
controversy Soglin brought to the mayoralty a strong environ-
mentalist commitment, including a belief in the desirability
of mass transportation as opposed to automatic transit. With
this orientation it was no surprise that Soglin cited as one
of his most prized achievements of his first term in office,
his laying of the groundwork for a light rail system as a
result of a city study of the possible uses of existing rail-
road corridors and the beginning development of a oompre-
hensive land use plan.2 6
Of a more immediate nature was Soglin's impact on the
vitality of Madison's bus system. As Table 7 demonstrates,
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Table 7
Gross Operating Expenditure for
Transit Related Activities*
Madison Metro
% Increase
Over Pre-
vious Year
Streets %Increase
and Over Pre-
Sanitation vious Year
Dyke Budget Years:
$2,164,362
2,270,037
2,575,315
2,828,989
14.913.69A6
$2,984s572
4,643,7153,906,9594,v643.61
Soglin Budget Years:
$3,459,4744,207,570
4,869,360
22.3%
21.6
15.7
5,008,074
5,669,180
5,963,540
*Figures for 1976 represent budgeted amounts. Figures for
1975 represent estimated spending based on budget and
actual expenditures for first half of 1975. All other
figures represent actual expenditures.
*-As Madison first took over the bus utility in 1970, there
exists no equivalent city expenditures for the previous
year upon which to base a meaningful measure of increase
in spending.
NC--not calculated.
SOURCE: Annual city budgets, 1972-76.
1970
1971
1972
1973
NC18.8%
10.3
18.8
1974
1975
1976
7.8%
13.2
5.2
-- - -- --
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appropriations for operating funding of the Madison Metro not
only increased at a greater annual rate than they did during
the Dyke budget years, but they increased at a proportionately
greater rate than spending for streets and sanitation and
traffic engineering (the automobile-related categories of
the city budget).
A number of innovations were introduced to increase bus
ridership. At the mayor's initiative, the rates of the city's
five and ten hour meters were doubled and day-long parking on
private lots and ramps by non-downtown residents was banned
in order to discourage automobile commuting by workers to the
city's business district. Also to encourage bus ridership the
city purchased a large number of new buses (68 in the 1974-76
period)27 changed route lengths and frequencies, established a
downtown transit information center and introduced such
reduced fare promotions as senior citizen bus cards, a five-
cent downtown shuttle and a 55-cent shopper's pass. Coupled
with the effects of the nation-wide energy crunch, these inno-
vations resulted in a marked increase in both ridership and
operating revenue during Soglin's administration (Table 8).
The extent of this somewhat unanticipated increase in pas-
senger revenue coupled with continued federal aid even allowed
the city to reduce its subsidy to the system without curtailing
service. The budgeted subsidy for 1976 was even below that
given for 1971 (Table 8). All the signs pointed to the
operation of a healthy bus system during Soglin's term
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Table 8
The Health of Madisonts Bus Utility
In-
Passen- crease
gers(In Over
thou- Pre-
sands) vious
Year
Operating 7o In-
Revenue crease
and Inter- Over City
Agency Pre- Subsidy
Bill- vious
ing Year
Dyke Budget Years:
NC
2.8%
9.9
9.7
$1,585,o051
1,560,931
1,752,601
1,909,688
NC
-1.5%
12.3
9.0
$498,947
709,106
823,054
919,295
Soglin Budget Years:
$2,961,401
3s,707,690
4,318,810
55.1%25.2
16.5
$498,073
499,68055o,55o
*Figures for 1976 represent budgeted amounts. Figures for
1975 represent estimated spending based on budget and actual
expenditures for first half of 1975. All other figures
represent actual expenditures.
NC--not calculated as Madison did not own the bus utility
the previous year.
SOURCE: Annual city budgets, 1973-76, and Madison City
Planning Department, "Planning Profile 34," 1975.
crease
Over
Pre-
vious
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
5,7985,962
6,551
7,187
1974
1975
1976
NC
42.1%
16.1
11*.7
8,152
8,912
NA
13.4%
9.3
-45.8%
0.3
10.2
_ _ ___ _ _ __ ___
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as mayor.
The Police. As already observed in the account in the
preceding chapter of the controversy over the status of Chief
David Couper, Paul Soglin desired a police department more
respectful of citizen rights. One specific area of concern
which resulted from Soglin's ties to the Mifflin community
was the matter of drug law enforcement. As one member of the
mayor's office observed:
I know that one of the biggest problems he (Soglin) had,
and other people had, when he was representing the old
eighth ward--which is a "downtown" ward--was that the
police department was putting a tremendous amount of
time and money into trying to control the use of mari-
juana for what were essentially private purposes. It
meant that there was a tremendous police presence in
the form of undercover agents in the community. And
it meant that there wasn't a great deal amount of work
going on trying to stop the flow of hard drugs, especi-
ally heroin, into the city.
I dontt have the statistics at my fingertips but I
know there has been a dramatic reversal of these two
activities. And that's been the result of a special
instruction from the mayor's office to the police chief
that their first priority as far as drug investigation
goes was to be investigation of the heroin traffic, and
that it was not to be a high priority to investigate
and arrest people for the possession of marijuana for
private purposes.2f
The statistics, presented in Table 9, basically confirm
this interpretation of events. Soglin's first year in office,
1975, witnessed a drop in all categories of drug arrests by
the city. Though arrests for hard narcotic offenses exhibit
an increase over the next two years, the number of marijuana
arrests still continued to decline. Though the decline of
marijuana arrests in Madison was not precipitous, the
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Table 9
Drug Law Arrests in Madison
Opium* Marijuana DNND**
Dyke Years:
1969 5 54 37 -- 96
1970 12 49 105-- 166
1971 13 93 91 -- 197
1972 20 206 176 -- 402
Soglin Years:
1973 7 159 88 -- 254
1974 28 121 54 -- 203
1975 34 106 62 -- 202
*The opium category includes arrests for opium, cocaine and
its derivatives--morphine, heroin, codeine.
**Dangerous Non-Narcotic Drugs. As of July 1, 1972, arrests
for glue-sniffing were officially listed under the DNND, not
the opium, category. For the sake of cross-time comparisons,
in this table all glue-sniffing arrests are listed under the
DNND category. The number of glue cases recategorized are
25 (1969); 11 (1970); 3 (1971); and 12 (1972).
SOURCE: Annual Report of the Madison Police Department and
other information provided courtesy of the Police
Department. As there existed some small discrepancy
between the Annual Reports and the mimeographed
handouts, and the number of arrests for glue-
sniffing was contained only in the handouts, the
total number of yearly DNND arrests listed in this
table may be very slightly off.
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direction was counter to the increased arrest activity in this
area exhibited by police nationwide (Table 10). Apparently,
Madisonts de-emphasis on marijuana possession is the product
of some city systems characteristic and not the result of a
nationwide secular trend. The mayor's priorities in the drug
enforcement area--continued emphasis on narcotic enforcement,
decreased concern with soft drugs--apparently was implemented,
though, it must be noted, that in each of the Soglin years for
which figures are available, the number of marijuana arrests
still vastly outstrips the number of heroin related arrests.
The enforcement of laws against pot-smokers quite apparently
was not totally overlooked by the police despite the mayor's
priorities.29
Still, it is problematical to what extent Soglin merits
credit for the reordering of the priorities of drug law
enforcement. The revised priorities also reflect the direc-
tions in which new Chief David Couper desired to take the
police department. The resulting policy change is likely the
work of both the chief and a mayor who clearly communicated
his wishes to him. To the extent the work is that of Couper,
Soglin still merits credit for his actions in the controversy
over the chief's status which helped to keep a person of such
conviction in the chief's position.
One other specific change in police operations brought
about during Soglin's term in office concerned the handling
of rape victims to decrease women's inhibitions in reporting
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Table 10
Trends in Marijuana Arrests,
Madison and the United States
Madison Nationwide
1972-73 -22.8% +43.9%
1973-74 -23.9% + 5.9%
1974-75 -12.4% NA
NA--not ascertained.
SOURCE: Annual Reports of the Madison Police
Department; and Uniform Crime Reports
for the United States (Wasigton, D7.C. :
TPF7-fo'r tF e' years 1972, 1973 and 1974.
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rapes. Under the new intake procedure, female officers were
assigned the task of interviewing rape victims, who were
immediately afterwards taken to a local hospital for care.
Soglin's general desires in the police area extended far
beyond the style of narcotics policing and the processing of
rape victims. However, judgments as to the mayor's success
in these other areas is much less certain. The mayor's
further actions in the police area will be detailed later in
this chapter.
THE LIMITS OF SOGLIN'S LEADERSHIP
Reviewing the evidence presented in both this and the
preceding chapter, Paul Soglin's influence on the outcome of
Madison's politics has been considerable. Yet, it must be
asked: did Soglin achieve all that he could in terms of his
own priorities? But the answer to this question is tauto-
logical; Soglin achieved what he wanted and did not go any
further as he did not want to go further.
Such an answer is not very illuminating. Soglin's actions
in each instance would be used to explain themselves. Hence,
it becomes necessary to find other standards by which to
evaluate Soglin's policy performance.
One such standard is posed by the views of those persons
who shared with Soglin a basic "people's" orientation.
Criticism of the mayor by this group should underscore any
instances where Soglin by his actions, for whatever reasons,
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deviated from a strict "people's"program. Yet, the evalua-
tive standards implicit in the "nyardstick" must be made clear
--they are not strictly the values of the mayor (otherwise we
would be back to unrevealing tautological explanation) but the
values of others which the mayor, as seen in his past state-
ments, seems generally to share. It is to the sources of
dissatisfaction among this group of people that this chapter
will now turn.
Housing Code Enforcement. Despite the changes brought
about in the housing code area during Soglin's term in office,
some insiders in the code area insist that much of the credit
for the change rests not with the mayor but with leftist
Alderman Michael Sack. Sack was a fanatic when it came to
making the city bureaucracy perform, and code enforcement was
one of his particular areas of interest. Sack used his City
Council position to obtain information on the status of
inspections and prosecutions of lapsed work orders and to
publicly lambast the appropriate department for whatever
laxness in enforcement arose. Sack, more than the mayor, rode
herd over the bureaucracies charged with housing code enforce-
ment.
The problem was neither with Soglin's inclinations nor
with the direction of his initiatives in the area, rather it
stemmed from his failure to fully supervise the day-to-day
administrative working of code enforcement. Sack constantly
had to bring notice of bureaucratic failings in the area to
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the mayor's attention, something the alderman felt he should
not have had to do: "I had to push him (Soglin). He just
doesn't do things on his own. You have to push him."30
According to Sack, the mayor would respond to his requests in
the area "fifty percent" of the time without Sack's having to
threaten to call a press conference.31
The difference between Sack and Soglin stemmed essen-
tially from the different perspectives each had on the
bureaucracy problem in general. Sack saw bureaucracies as
slow, self-interested organizations which had to be constant-
ly pushed. "Sack," city hall reporter Michael Baumann
observes, "has built a reputation by attacking the city bureau-
cracy and Mayor Paul Soglin's relationship to it." 3 2
According to Sack and other critics of the mayor, Soglin,
while comfortable with symbolic issues, was simply not
interested enough in the necessary supervision of daily
departmental workings to insure effective program operation.
Soglin saw the bureaucratic problem differently--in
personal and political terms. According to Soglin, the dif-
ferences that developed between himself and Sack were the
product of the alderman's failure to recognize what had to be
done to bring about effective administrative change:
Maybe that (the conflict between himself and Sack) is
because Mike Sack doesn't get what he wants all the
time and does not understand the process completely...
For one thing, youtre dealing with human beings; you're
dealing with people. And for another thing, some of
the decisions are political and you have to have support
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to implement them. We've got a weak mayor, strong
council form of government.33
The mayor, then, took a more pragmatic view of bureaucratic
relationships that emphasized developing personal networks and
building political support behind desired change. Soglin's
critics saw such reasoning only to be a rationalization far
the mayor's reticence to confront bureaucrats head-on for
their lack of performance.
Criticism of Soglin's unwillingness to demand stricter
standards of bureaucratic performance became particularly
apparent in the dispute over the status of the city's 1974
ordinance mandating the annual inspection of all non-owner
occupied rental housing in certain inner city preservation
districts. The program, which was passed with the strong sup-
port of the mayor's office, could have been the "cap" to
Soglin's initiatives in the inspection area. However, as the
Building Inspections Department freely admitted, the law was
never fully implemented:
As predicted in the 1974 (Building Inspections Depart-
ment) report, difficulties were experienced in complet-
ing the annual inspection of property in preservation
districts due to a shortage of help. About 2,000 of
the estimated 8,000 units were inspected and orders
written on the majority. Because it was impossible to
complete all, the inspectors were instructed to take
what appeared to be the "worst" first, accounting for
the high percentage of orders.34
Sack found intolerable the mayor's inability to lean on the
Department and gain full compliance with the unanimously
passed city ordinance. Soglin's inability to bring about
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total inspections of preservation district housing despite a
clear Council mandate must be counted as a mayoral failure.
One other program is worth recounting to underscore both
the innovativeness of the mayor and the limits to his action
in the code enforcement area. The mayor worked hard to
negotiate a three-way agreement between the University of
Wisconsin, the Inner City Action Program (ICAP) and the city
under which ICAP volunteers would assist the city's building
inspectors by checking out the condition of all housing listed
with the University's Campus Assistance Center. The ICAP
volunteers were taught the basic rudiments of housing inspec-
tion but were given no official powers to their own; they were
only to refer observed code violations to official city
inspectors for further inspection and the writing of work
orders.
However, the program ran into serious trouble before it
even really began. During the 1974 student pre-registration
period, the ICAP team placed an advertisement in the campus
newspaper intimating that violations could be found in all
rental units if tenants would only look hard enough. An ICAP
poster tacked up around campus even caricatured a landlord
holding a machine-gun, and was captioned, "The landlords are
ready, why aren't you?"
Skeptics of the volunteer inspector concept charged the
ICAP people had "politicized" the program and that their
objectivity could no longer be counted on. The University
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quickly withdrew its sanction. Without access to the housing
listed with the University, the program proved ineffective and
fell apart.
Soglin had few public words to say in defense of this pet
program of his; the program had simply gotten too hot for this
politically pragmatic mayor to be publicly associated with.
Thus effectively ended one unique approach to housing code
enforcement. Though ICAP was not in any sense a major program,
its death must also be counted as a Soglin failure in the code
area.
Hous Assistance. It would seem that with all his
achievements in the housing area, Soglin could not run into
criticism from people who generally shared his priorities in
this area. Yet, amazingly enough, he did--and the problem was
basically of his own making. The rift that developed was
between Soglin on the one hand, and on the other Madison
Housing Authority chairperson Nancy Kelley (a Soglin
appointee) and some members of Madison's left. Kelley, whom
Soglin had asked in February of 1974, in Kelley's words, "to
develop a clear set of goals and program directions for
publicly-sponsored and funded housing activity,"35 bitterly
declared that Soglin had done more than anyone else to hurt
the cause of public housing in Madison. She further accused
Soglin of a "lack of sophistication, non-decision, and refusal
to provide leadership."36 The source of Kelley's rage was the
absence in the mayor's 1975 budget of the housing expediter
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position and the various leasing programs the MHA plan had
proposed. Kelly fumed:
The 1975 Soglin-style budget makes it abundantly clear
that he not only has no commitment to low-income people,
but that he condones manipulation of city employes by
(Director of Administration Andre) Blum and that he
immorally violates agreements with his own political
appointees. 37
The mayor was not that disinclined to make the moves
Kelley advocated. The desired budget changes were almost
immediately announced, including a provision of $1.5 million
to be financed by mortgage revenue bonds for the purchase and
rehabilitation of 50 units of scatter site housing to be
eventually sold or leased to low-income families.38 With
the budget additions the criticism quickly abated. But what
made it necessary, as one member of the left put it, "to
politically push him (Soglin) to the wall?"3 9 Capital Times
reporter Rosemary Kendrick explains how the dispute began:
What happened was that somewhere during the review
of departmental requests by the Department of
Administration, certain proposals contained in the
housing work plan got left by the wayside.40
One Soglin critic elaborates further:
I think what happened was first he (Soglin) administra-
tively did not follow through on what he said he would
do. He had to make sure those items were not out from
the budget by his analysts. He did not do this.
This indicates he has a lack of concentration. He
doesn't follow through on things administratively. He
doesn't have a sense on how details are supposed to get
done or how administratively when you are dealing with a
lot of organizations in city government you have to stay
on top of it..,he's not interested in that kind of thing
*..He won't do the necessary kind of pushing of budget
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analysts to make sure the things get in there.41
The problem then lies not so much with Soglin's inclina-
tions in the housing area but with his failings as an
administrator. The 1975 housing dispute would never have
flared had the mayor both fully understood the concerns of his
task force and stayed on top of the development of the city
budget. A simple lack of administrative attention by the may-
or was the precipitant of this short-lived dispute.
Human Resources. Soglin was generally commended by
members of the left for his actions on his human resources
budget, especially his willingness to stand firmly behind the
controversial proposed disbursements to the Madison Tenants'
Union and the Spanish-American Organization. The only source
of dissatisfaction in this area among liberals was with the
delay in disbursing the vouchers as a result of the time
required to hire a program director and establish the stan-
dards that day care centers would have to meet to be eligible
to receive the city money.42
Affirmative Action. Soglin's opening of city commis-
sions and city employment to minority group members and women
received the near unanimous acclaim of Madison's liberal and
left-leaning communities. Still, despite the mayor's clear
success in this area he was not without his detractors.
Of particular note was Soglin's failure to appoint a
minority group member as director of the city's Manpower
Office or as Contract Compliance Officer. Soglin insisted
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that Rick Petri, a young white male, had been given the con-
tract compliance appointment as a result of the speed with
which the city had to act in order not to jeopardize federal
funds. Others, though, criticized the mayor for not insti-
tuting a truly open hiring process in the Petri case; they saw
Petri's transfer to be a convenient way out for the mayor to
end the friction between Petri and the Director of Personnel,
under whom he had been serving. Black Alderman Eugene Parks
labeled the Petri appointment "a racist ripoff."43
Parks leveled similar criticism against Soglin for
allowing, in the alderman's view, Chief David Couper to
appoint a handpicked friend for a high police post without
giving minorities an equal chance for the job:
When you have people like (former Mayor) Dyke, then
you can criticize and castigate. But if you have
somebody who's called a liberal, a progressive, and
the same thing happens, then nobody says anything.
And that's wrong.L4
Soglin further earned the ire of some of Madison's black
community when he bypassed Kwame Salter and selected soft-
spoken Bettye Latimer, a black woman, to fill the vacancy as
the city's Affirmative Action Officer. Salter, who as the
former head of the University of Wisconsin's Afro-American
Center carried a somewhat militant tag for his outspoken-
ness, was the number one choice of a panel set up to screen
the applicants for the position.45 Yet the mayor chose to
bypass Salter. Salter charged that he was "politically
mugged" in that he believed prospects of his appointment were
329
used only to round up votes for Latimer. 4 6
One black leader saw the Salter incident to be particu-
larly indicative of the limits to Soglin's perspective on
minority rights:
He (Soglin) goes about choosing minorities in a very
racist fashion. He deliberately looks for minorities
that meet his white perceptions as to what minorities
ought to be.
I'll take a classic example. He discriminated
against Kwame Salter in the appointment of the
Affirmative Action Officer...It was political dis-
crimination on racial grounds because he didn't want
a black in that Job who was politically aware, politi-
cally aggressive, and community oriented. That was the
last thing he wanted...
What he wanted was somebody whom he thought was
easily handled, politically immature...not community
directed and (with) no concept of community organiza-
tion. That was Bettye Latimer. Kwame Salter ranked
at the top of every step. Kwame Salter was in fact
an activist.47
This search for soft-spokenness did not extend to Soglin's
white appointments. The mayor's assistant, James Rowen, was
a person with strong credentials among the city's left who
continued his quite individualistic course of political action
while serving in the mayor's office.
Finally, Soglin's lack of decisive action regarding the
alleged discriminatory use of a polygraph test in pre-
employment screening by the police department is one last mark
in his affirmative action record. Though Soglin was dis-
appointed in the manner in which the polygraph was used, 4 8 he
expressed no firm conviction on the matter. Initially he
did little more than to order an investigation into the
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problem. It was not until six months later, and then only
after City Council action, that Soglin ordered the discon-
tinuation of the polygraph's use by the department.
Alderman Parks, the mayor's severest critic on the poly-
graph matter, had constantly kept the question of the
propriety of the polygraph's use before the Council. But the
Council received no firm guidance from the mayor. Parks
particularly accused the mayor of "footdragging" 4 9 in the
matter of resolving the grievance of the five black police
applicants who had filed an unfair employment practice suit
against the city:
Soglin would not take a vocal stand either in favor
or against that damned thing (the use of the poly-
graph)...Soglin's got the power to end that controversy
and won't...Soglin's got the power to offer the people
who were discriminated against the job...That's the
kind of issue where he just "cops-out."50
Mass Transit. Soglin's record in promoting mass transit
in Madison is undeniable. Still when it came to the matter of
impeding the flow of automobiles into the city, Soglin showed
the same ambivalence he exhibited in the Atwood Avenue Bypass
controversy. The Marquette area traffic plan raised one of
the same basic questions that the Atwood controversy did:
through whose neighborhood should traffic be routed? The
mayor refused to take a public position on the Marquette plan:
I didn't take one (a stand) because I live smack, dab,
right in the middle between the two areas (where traffic
could be routed). And no matter what I had done, some-
body would have accused me of doing it for personal
reasons...If it had been another neighborhood I would
have certainly said something. 1
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Soglin refrained from a leadership role in this controversy
from fear that his entrance into the matter would only
jeopardize his power position. Pragmatic concerns domi-
nated; the mayor had learned well the lesson from the Atwood
fiasco.
Soglin showed a similar passivity on the question of
broadening the South Beltline to a multi-lane highway.
Though the existing road was already the site of heavy traffic
congestion and would clearly be incapable of meeting traffic
needs in the near future, environmentalists opposed the road's
expansion as it would abet automobile usage and would have
an undesirable ecological impact on bordering wetlands.
The project originally envisioned a six-lane highway
with six additional collector-distributor lanes at major
interchanges. The South Beltline Study Committee eventually
modified the original plan by eliminating the collector-
distributor lanes. Opponents of the compromise plan felt the
acquisition of the road corridor as originally proposed and
accepted by the study group would still allow the future
expansion of the highway to full twelve lanes when projected
traffic increases would finally occur.
Though Soglin's inclination was to be against the propo-
sal, he admitted he was "not going to take a leadership role
fighting it.'52 The mayor, looking at all sides of the matter,
simply did not find the six-lane compromise to be all that
objectionable: "I don't like it. But I don't consider it to
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be as horrendous as some people describe it."' 3
Soglin was not a reflex environmentalist. He believed a
person could be an environmentalist without opposing every
new piece of road construction. For him it was a "question of
absolutes"5h and the absolute here did not exist. In the
matter of highway construction, Soglin did not possess any
overriding ideological conviction to spur him to action. This
lack of moral vision allowed him to sit on the sidelines and
allow others to determine the fate of the South Beltline.
One other brief flurry in the area of highway develop-
ment occurred when the Traffic Department embraced plans for a
new Highway Q, a project opposed by area residents and environ-
mentalists as well as the mayor. The project was finally
killed by the Mayor's Public Works Improvement Committee. As
with the 1975 housing budget, Highway Q represented a contro-
versy that could have been avoided had the mayor overseen the
actions of the staff of the relevant city department.
The Police. As already noted, under the direction of
Paul Soglin and Chief David Couper, Madison's Police Depart-
ment developed a less militaristic, more community relations,
style of law enforcement. Specific changes were also made in
the pursuit of drug law violations and in the processing of
rape victims. Yet, the actions of the police department were
constantly made a bone of contention by much of Madison's left
community. These critics questioned whether any real reform
had been brought to the police department; they questioned the
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extent of both Soglin's and Couper's reformist intentions.
The mayor refused to automatically take certain of the
actions in the police area members of the left expected of a
person of principle. The more extreme members of the left
were disappointed that the mayor had not even attempted to
disarm the police. The disappointment of other members of
the left had to do with the mayor's lack of decisive action in
policy matters far less radical than stripping officers of
their weapons.
Soglin did not take the "reflex" positions of the left
in police matters. As previously noted, he was somewhat
ambivalent about the use of a polygraph in employment screen-
ing and did not immediately order the termination of its use.
The fate of the Police Departmentts SWAT squad also became a
source of difficulty.
The existence of a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)was
not even known by the mayor until the heavily armed team
charged the apartment of innocent students upon receiving
information, which proved to be unfounded, that members of
the Symbionese Lyberation Army, the group which had gained
national attention in the Patricia Hearst case, were holding
hostages at that address. Despite the outcries of Madison's
left in the wake of the raid, Soglin refused to disband the
SWAT team. He sent Chief Couper a detailed list of questions
concerning the set-up, funding, operations, and guidelines of
the SWAT team. Soglin for the most part was convinced by the
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chiefts reply that the squad was needed and that sufficient
bureaucratic protection existed to prevent general misuse:
I don't know if it ought to be put out of business...
The obvious abuses with a SWAT squad (are apparent)...
(But) I still got a question as to what do you do
if, say, you get a situation like a Texas tower (a
mass sniping incident) or something of that sort.
Well, you say we don't have a SWAT squad, but we just
happen to bring in four or five officers heavily
equipped--the equipment is probably the same as a
SWAT squad. And in effect, even though you have dis-
continued the SWAT team, then you've got it but with-
out a name.55
During one budget hearing, the mayor mused over the possi-
bility that the squad should change its name because of the
over-dramatization of the SWAT squad of television fame. He
did not, however, suggest that the SWAT funds be removed from
the budget.56
Soglin thus saw the SWAT question in more complex terms
than did the liberal left. Again, for the mayor, there were
no absolutes to guide his actions.
The same pattern repeated itself on the question of the
use of hollow point, or "dum-dum," ammunition by the police.
Though the mayor retained a "gut feeling that hollow-point
bullets are an extra-deadly weapon,'"57 he refused to immedi-
ately post a ban on their use. Soglin pondered whether the
impact of a hollow point was that more lethal than that of a
solid point bullet. He also noted that the pattern in other
cities was that where the police had been denied "dum-dum"
ammunition they had usually successfully campaigned for the
use of .357 magnum ammunition with its increased stopping
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power.5
Members of the left criticized the mayor for being overly
involved with the technicalities of the debate, especially
with the ballistics of the matter. Soglin, lacking an ideol-
ogy to guide his actions, lost sight of the broader question
as to whether or not the police should deploy guns to kill
people.59
The mayor once more saw both sides to the issue--a
"liberal" trait often criticized for leading to paralysis
instead of action--when two visible members of the left,
Alderman Ray Davis and former Daily Cardinal editor Patrick
McGilligan, were arrested at a demonstration for Karleton
Armstrong of the Sterling Hall bombing infamy. Members of the
left charged that the police department, and Chief Couper in
particular, overreacted to the disruptive situation. The
mayor's view of the incident clearly did not satisfy the left:
I was generally pretty happy with how they (the
police department) handled the demonstration.
There's some disagreement obviously between Davis and
McGilligan and the Department as to what they were
doing. I don't know what I would've done if I was
sitting on the jury listening to both sides... 60
Soglin's estrangement from the purified left in the
police area, though, goes beyond his unwillingness to see
total justice lying with the views of the left. Even where
the mayor's inclinations did lead him to question policy, he
still refused to take the action his critics demanded if he
felt it would prove counterproductive in gaining results.
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Just as with his action in the Triangle Hotel controversy,
Soglin resisted pressure to take the purist stance as he felt
a different approach would be more likely to gain results.
Soglin was interested in pragmatic change, not action which
would serve only to testify to his purity of faith.
When the SWAT squad was still a question in the mayor's
mind, power realities helped dictate mayoral inaction, as one
member of the mayor's office recounts:
I think he's (Soglin) still kind of leery of the con-
cept, and there really hasntt been any decision yet
whether to proceed with the dismantling of the SWAT
squad or its fundamental reorganization. We're trying
to see what the City Council thinks of this. I think
we know that if we sent a resolution down to the
Council suggesting that the SWAT squad be dismantled,
that it would fail. So what we have to find out is
what the rest of the Council wants to do with this
before any kind of political move is made. If we don't
do it and 4on't have the political support, it will
fall flat.l1
The same sort of political considerations led to the
mayor's strategy for banning hollow-point bullets. The
assessment of the mayor's office was that the City Council
would likely overturn a mayoral ban on hollow-points if
handed down as an edict. Consequently, Soglin set up a study
group on the matter hoping that the report would add a degree
of legitimacy to the anti-hollow-point position.62 The
mayor's faith that any "rational" group upon reviewing the
evidence would conclude that the dum-dums were extra-deadly,
however, proved unfounded. After a year's study, the commis-
sion split four-to-three in recommending the ban of the
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hollow-points. The City Council "filed" the commission's
report on a fifteen-to-six vote. Soglin's indirect commission
strategy had failed.
The purified lefts' dissatisfaction with Soglin was
rooted not only in what they perceived to be the mayor's
lack of an ideological approach to police reform but in the
mayor's reticence to confront the city's police chief.
According to many of Madison's left, Chief David Couper,
despite his reformist appearances, was just not all that pro-
gressive. One left spokesman observed:
Couper is far more professional than he is political.
He sees his job more as a police chief and not as
someone yho is here to rock the boat and make major
changes.63
One other leftist spokesman was even far less charitable:
I think the left is way ahead of the rest of the city
and The Capital Times, particularly, in judging Chief
Coupe•-for what he N--which is (as) damned near a
fascist as you want to get. 64
According to this latter critic, the chief in his actions
exhibited "a clear pattern of what I would consider a police-
state mentality, except it's masked in a lot of good P R (sic)
rhetoric."65
The left's irritation with Couper stemmed from many
sources, among them the chief's refusal to immediately make
public the reports of past undercover operations conducted
against the anti-war movement (the "affinity files"), his
ordering the use of hollow-point ammunition, his defense of
the SWAT team, his continued employment of the polygraph test,
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his handling of the Karl Armstrong demonstration, his refusal
to crack down on automobile speeding through residential
neighborhoods, and his endorsement of the stationing of police
in the public schools. Also a particular object of scorn was
the department's indiscriminant interrogation of all black
males near the Capital Square area after a downtown bank rob-
bery. Local civil rights groups were outraged, but the chief
defended the questioning of all persons who came close to
fitting the description the police had of the supposed
robbers. Soglin, upon learning of the incident, ordered the
discontinuation of the practice, warning the police that they
did not possess "carte blanche authority" to stop and frisk
anyone just because he "happens to be a member of a minority
group."66
Couper's professional police orientation even led him to
oppose the mayor on two specific issues--the removal of the
shotgun mounts from the front seat of patrol cars and the
creation of a citizen Police Policy Advisory Committee.6 7
From the perspective of Madisonts left, these latter two
incidents were exceptional for the mayorts degree of action.
To members of Madison's left, the mayor just did not appear
to be all that interested in reviewing the operations of the
city's police department and in battling the department's
chief.
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THE LIMITS OF PRAGMATISM
As has been pointed out in both this and the previous
chapter, Paul Soglin proved capable of implementing an impres-
sive degree of policy change. However, as the second part of
this chapter underscores, there were also limits to the change
he was willing to strive for. Soglin's successes in office
can be accounted for by the strong sense of goal orientation
he possessed in general. Though Soglin's Partisan posture
accounts for his successes, it is the pragmatic orientation
of that style that also helps to account for the limits to
his achievements.
Soglin as mayor did not pursue radical policy changes;
instead he attempted only those changes which he thought
politically feasible. It was just this sense of political
realism that the more experienced Soglin sounded at the begin-
ning of his campaign for a third term:
A lot of times in campaigns, candidates raise expecta-
tions and they go beyond the realm of reality. I
think we should have very high expectations. But I
also think it's a very cruel deception to give people
the impression that within a given period of time
certain things can be done when it's literally impos-
sible to do them in that period of time.6b
It was with this "realistic" attitude that he approached
the workings of city hall. Rather than battling bureaucrats,
Soglin, as already noted, saw city officials as "human beings"
whose support he had to obtain. According to one member of
the mayor's office, Soglin saw the "civil service bureaucracy
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to be "so strong" that if he spent all his time fighting it
he would lack the time to develop innovative policies.69
The perceived strength of the bureaucracy then posed the
boundaries within which the mayor chose to work. He accepted
the assistant city attorney's view that forfeitures had to be
small if the court was to accept Madison's code enforcement
program; critics saw the size of these forfeitures to be too
small to act as a deterrent to recalcitrant landlords. The
mayor accepted the Building Inspections Division claim that
they lacked sufficient manpower to annually inspect all
housing in the city preservation districts; Alderman Michael
Sack viewed it simply as the Division's refusal to fully carry
out the new program. The mayor accepted the view that com-
plete change could not be brought to the police department as
long as many of the "old guard" officers remained,70 and
chose to focus on the successes of Chief Couper's community
relations approach; members of the left attacked what they
perceived to be the mayorts reticence to make the department
even more respectful of civil rights and liberties.
This reticence to take on the bureaucracy was also
apparent in the mayor's handling of complaints concerning
Welfare Director Lowell Messerschmidt, a Dyke appointee. The
City Welfare Board complained that Messerschmidt was simply
incompetent--that he could not develop a policy manual, pro-
vide the Board with information it requested or otherwise run
the department. The attacks on Messersohmidt for the most
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part concerned his administrative capacity and transcended
ideological lines.71 Messerschmidt, from his viewpoint,
viewed that the Board was illegally traversing from what was
their area, policy, to what under statute was his, administra-
tion.
Despite constant requests from members of the Welfare
Board, Soglin time and again refused to dismiss Messerschmidt.
The mayor, well aware of the problems entailed in firing a
civil servant, refrained from action until he had built a case
he felt would be beyond challenge. Only when the case was in
hand, and the spring 1975 elections had passed, did Soglin
dismiss Messerschmidt. Messerschmidt immediately appealed
the dismissal.
Soglin's sense of political realism also embraced a
concern for his own electoral position. As just noted, the
Messersehmidt firing was delayed until after the mayoral
election had passed so it would not be an issue. Two other
instances of such pragmatic politics have also been observed
in this chapter. The mayor let his support for the ICAP
inspection program slide not only because the University had
withdrawn its cooperation but because as a result of the pro-
gramts politicization it had become an embarrassment. Simi-
larly, the mayor sat out the Marquette traffic plan dispute
for fear of getting embroiled in another Atwood-type contro-
versy.
If Soglin's pragmatism--his willingness to compromise and
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his reticence to jeopardize his long-term power position--
proved the foundation of his success, it also provided the
self-imposed limits to his action. Soglin's critics from the
left felt such limits precluded Soglin from obtaining the
full measure of results that he could have. Had Soglin pos-
sessed a true vision rather than a sense of limits he would
have pressed for even more reform in such areas as housing
code enforcement and police policy. Had Soglin been an
ideological environmentalist, he would have helped lead the
fight against the South Beltline. Had he possessed what the
left saw to be a sense of "class politics," he would have
intervened in the Marquette area traffic dispute to prevent
the funneling of traffic through Williamson Street--which the
left perceived to be the poorer of the two neighborhoods.
The area of affirmative action, an area of notable
Soglin success, is also an area which shows the limits to
Soglin's actions resulting from his lack of ideological per-
spective. Rick Petri, a white, was made Contract Compliance
Officer to end a dispute between Petri and his former boss in
the Personnel Department; the city did not go through an open
recruitment process to identify qualified minority applicants.
Similarly, Soglin chose to appoint a soft-spoken black woman
rather than black activist Kwame Salter to the Affirmative
Action Director position. And finally, for a long time, the
mayor refrained from any attempt to end the police department's
use of the polygraph in pre-employment screening.
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Consequently, despite the achievements obtained by
Soglin's pragmatic approach, Soglin's sense of pragmatism can
also be seen to be, in a sense, a conservative influence on
Madison's politics. Madison is an unusual city--a city in the
1970's which, as a result of its Progressive heritage, large
population of students and well educated government employees,
and the legacy of the activism of the 1960's and early 1970's,
was receptive to policy initiatives which would have been
anathema in most other cities across the country. Madison
proved receptive to many of Soglin's changes. Yet by the
mid-1970's Soglin was no longer even the spokesman for the
most socially-liberal change-demanding groups in the city.
In the 1977 primary, Soglin was challenged from the left by
his vocal critic, Michael Sack.
Whether Soglin had accurately read the mood of Madison
and initiated only as much change as the city would accept
remains unclear. To the extent that his pragmatic orientation
accepted a large measure of bureaucratic inertia and to the
extent that he himself limited his policy initiatives, the
full measure of change that possibly could have been was not
brought to Madison. To the degree that Soglin accurately read
his environment, his style represents a successful matching of
executive action with the context in which a mayor must
operate.
3W4
PERSONALITY AND STYLE
Soglin's administrative failings represent not so much a
failure of his general Partisan orientation as they do a
personal incapacity. Soglin did not reap the full benefits of
his general Partisan approach as his personality precluded his
total deployment of this style in certain contexts.
Many of the persons interviewed, Soglin supporters and
opponents alike and even members of the mayor's office,
recognized that the mayor did not enjoy supervising the
details of program implementation:
Member of the mayor's office:
"He does not take care of the day to day business of
city hall. He doesntt like to meddle in the affairs
of the departments."72
Member of the mayor's office:
"I think the mayor is not the best administrator. A
good administrator has to make decisions. At some
point he has to make a decision and move on it. And
I think the mayor has a problem in making decisions."73
Liberal alderman:
"Paul, I think, works very well with people. But his
problem is, I think, that he is not a strong enough
administrator. He is not on top of everything all
the time. I don't know whether it's a lack of atten-
tion or a lack of interest."W7
City department head:
"Paul Soglin is definitely not an administrator. He
doesn't like administration. 7e avoids it. He
delegates it...to everybody."?7
Soglin's limitations as an administrator are in part the
result of his dislike for interpersonal conflict. Soglin
could enjoy conflict, to the point of even at times deliber-
ately choosing a path of action that would precipitate rather
than mitigate conflict. 7 6 In each of the major issues of his
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first term in office--the Atwood Avenue Bypass, the redevelop-
ment of the Triangle, the building of an auditorium and the
defense of the status of Chief Couper--Soglin willingly
entered into combat. This combative orientation was also
apparent in the mayor's strong defense of the more controver-
sial items in his human resources budget.
But all these instances in which Soglin willingly entered
into conflict were the more public of the controversies of his
term in office. It was in approaching these major issues that
the combative style of the Partisan emerged. But on less
salient issues, on administrative matters that did not clearly
contain symbolic overtones, the mayor was less inclined to
combat. In the administrative sphere, rather than seeking
conflict, Soglin often avoided it. The less visible, less
symbolic duties of the mayoralty just did not engage the mayor
as did major controversies or symbolic gestures.
When it came to administrative matters, both aldermen and
department heads observed that the mayor simply could not say
"no." City officials reported meeting with Soglin and
receiving the impression that he agreed with their proposals
only later to learn that the mayor never committed himself to
a course of action. As one alderman observed: "He says
things that he doesn't follow through on."' 77
Soglin's unwillingness to directly confront bureaucratic
problems is exemplified by the approach he took to administra-
tors who had become problems. Soglin chose to deal with such
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problems by establishing a system under which the mayor would
grade the performances of the various department heads and
recommend appropriate pay raises for each. By recommending
only the most minimal salary hikes for the forthcoming year,
Soglin could punish those administrators with whose per-
formance he was less than satisfied.
But Soglin could not dismiss administrators who clearly
proved incapable of performing their duties. Instead of dis-
missing these administrators, Soglin chose to go the route of
lateral transfers by which these persons could be eased into
less responsible positions. The parks director and city
administrator were both given less demanding assignments.
Rick Petri was made contract compliance officer in order to
alleviate conflicts in the Personnel Department. Such lateral
transfers, in essence, then, amounted to an "end run" by the
mayor around having to make the hard decisions concerning an
administrator's tenure or prerogatives. Soglin simply was
reluctant to directly confront administrators on a personal
level. Only Welfare Director Lowell Messerscbmidt, whom
Soglin saw as particularly inept, received constant rebukes
from the mayor's office; but even then, Soglin proved reticent
in dismissing Messerschmidt despite the heavy pressure from
the City Welfare Board to do so.
Soglin's inability to perform with excellence as an
administrator stems not just from his disdain for inter-
personal conflict but also from his general disinterest in
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the detailed workings of the city's administrative machinery.
A number of the persons interviewed in this study reported
feeling that the mayor appeared bored with the more routine
responsibilities of his office. Paul Soglin was much more
comfortable in his role as the public mayor, not the adminis-
trative manager. His interests lay with symbolic issues;
the managerial duties of his office, lacking such clear
symbolic overtones, could not always command his attention.
In the housing code area, then, Alderman Michael Sack
had to constantly bring to the mayor's attention the presence
of certain bureaucratic problems. A more managerial-
oriented mayor would not have needed such reminders. Simi-
larly, had Soglin been more intent in supervising the city's
departments, the unnecessary Highway Q and 1975 housing budget
flare-ups could have been avoided.
Soglin's disinclination in the managerial area meant
that, for the most part, the operations of the city depart-
ments were free from mayoral interference. The mayor's
appointment of a Director of Transportation from with the
ranks of the Department, despite the many criticisms from
Soglin and the left that the Department had been too
automobile-oriented, is evidence of the relative free reign
that the mayor gave the departments, as noted by one depart-
ment head:
What that showed, I think, more than anything else, was
in the end even though he (Soglin) might have some prob-
lems in the way some of these people were coming about
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the issues, in the end he wanted somebody to administer
because he couldn't. He wasn't going to sit on top of
that issue (transportation) forever.
So, transportation was going to be run by the Trans-
portation Department, publio works by the Public Works
Department--police, fire, and administration down the
line. So he was going to count on those people getting
the job done. He would stay on top for whatever policy
issues (there were). 7 9
One department head whose influence particularly grew
under Soglin was Finance Director, and later to be Director
of Administration, Andre Blum. The close working relation-
ship between the two began with the director's befriending the
newly elected mayor--giving Soglin the assistance during the
transition that the outgoing mayor refused. As preparer of
the city budget, Blum also knew more than any other city
official about the workings of the various city departments.
Blum's managerial influence under Soglin was formalized
and extended into even further areas, including personnel, by
the creation of a new Department of Administration in the
place of the old Finance Department.
Madison's left was generally critical of the growth of
Blum's influence under Soglin who, as seen in the preparation
of the 1975 housing budget, had no roots in the left. Soglin,
from his perspective, though, was well served by the advice he
received from Blum and grew to lean on his Director of Admin-
istration beyond administrative matters for policy advice in
general. The use of the city's land acquisition account to
circumvent budget restrictions in purchasing the Capitol
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Theater, for example, was Blum's idea.
The reasons behind the growth of Andre Blum's power
during the Soglin administration, then, are two-fold. First,
as one city hall reporter noted, Blum has served Soglin well:
I can point to people like Blum--who has really
prospered under his (Soglin's) administration; who
has worked well with him; who has developed kind of
an independent fiefdom over there in Administration
under Soglin because he has done the job very
responsibly. He has done what Soglin has asked of
him. He has given him good advice. Soglin's been
able to lean o0 him...(Blum's) a real partner in run-
ning the city. 0
But equally as important is the impact of Soglin's person-
ality. Soglin had to lean on someone for administrative
matters; neither his background nor his interests lay in the
area of administration. The City Administrator did not, in
the mayor's eyes, seem capable of handling the job. Andre
Blum, as a result of his command over the city budget and his
compatibility with the mayor, filled the void.
Soglin's reliance on Blum can, in part, then, be seen to
be the product of the mayor's own administrative failings.
Such failings were the result of both the mayor's disin-
terest with the administrative details of policy formulation
and execution and his inability to make tough decisions and
otherwise directly confront administrators.
Such personal failings unnecessarily constricted the
impact of Paul Soglin's more general Partisan posture.
Administrative matters lacked the symbolism which both sus-
tained his interest and compensated him for whatever ill
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feelings he felt as the result of engaging in interpersonal
conflict.
The mayor's personal disinclination to strict bureau-
cratic oversight, then, imposed limits to the changes the
mayor was able to bring to the areas of police policy, housing
code enforcement, transportation and affirmative action.
Soglin provided optimal leadership only at the adoption stage
of the policy-making process. Lacking a taste for bureau-
cratic supervision, Soglin at times failed to do all he could
to ensure that policy formulation and administration would be
consonant with his own policy goals. Soglin ts guidance at the
administrative level was intermittent--sometimes it was there,
sometimes it required a push from other political actors, and
sometimes, as in the case of police policy, it was noticeably
absent.
TWO LESSONS
Two lessons to improve the study of political leadership
emerge from this chapter. First, the over-generalization of
an actor's style must be avoided. Much insight into a politi-
cal leader can be obtained by categorizing him in general as
fitting one or another type. Yet, the style with which a
leader approaches one problem may not be that with which he
approaches another problem. Otto Festge, as noted in
Chapter 3, played the role of the Entrepreneur on the finance
reform and auditorium matters, but was something less than an
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Entrepreneur in his approach to the school budget and
firefighter-policemen pay parity matters. Paul Soglin, though
generally a Partisan in advancing his "people's" goal orienta-
tions, did not in administrative matters always provide the
firm program direction characteristic of that style. The
style a political head exhibits generally is not the style he
will exhibit universally.
Students of the field of political leadership, then, must
maintain a vigilance to the possible variations in style an
actor may exhibit from one problem to another. General obser-
vations as to an actor's style can profitably provide clues as
to what to focus on when studying the making of a particular
decision. Such general observations, however, must not be
uncritically accepted as an accurate portrait of the leader's
approach to any particular case unless confirmed by by further
analysis.
Second, students of political leadership must become more
sophisticated in their assessment of the impact of an actor's
predispositions on his actions. Too often the recognition of
the impact of personality has gone no further than the docu-
mentation of how an actor's general style has been determined
by psychological forces. But just as a leader's style may
vary from case to case, so may the impact of the dynamics of
his personality.81
Different personality factors can emerge as important
in different contexts. Whatever personality attributes led
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Paul Soglin to develop an aggressive, combative stance on
major policy questions were to a certain degree submerged in
his approach to administrative matters. Studies which do
no more than identify a political actor's general personality
approach the problem of the impact of personality only at the
most broad level. More thorough personality analysis requires
both a recognition and explanation of an actor's changing
personality dynamics in different situations.
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CHAPTER NINE: THE MAYOR AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY:
SUBSTANCE, SYMBOLS AND COALITIONS
In this chapter, many of the "loose ends" concerning the
Paul Soglin mayoralty not covered in the preceding chapters
will be tied together. First, trends in local property tax
rates during the Soglin years will be analyzed, with the con-
clusion dispelling any notion that the mayor was a "free-
wheeling" spender in the pursuit of his social visions. Yet,
as will then be noted, many in Madison's business community
continued to view Soglin with great suspicion despite the
mayor's fiscal moderation, the roots of this distance between
the mayor and the business community will then be laid clear.
Finally the concluding words of this chapter will be devoted
to the much broader question of clarifying the concepts of
personality and leadership style.
SOGLIN'S FISCAL CONCERN
Taxes. An examination of the trends in local taxes
during Paul Soglin's term in office will provide quantitative
data to further assess the degree of Soglin's "radicalness."
Major tax increases during his term in office would paint the
picture of a mayor willing to spend in a free-wheeling manner
in pursuit of his social programs; a pattern of tax decreases
or moderate increases during his term would paint the picture
of a mayor who felt the need to exhibit fiscal restraint
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despite his avowed "peoplets" orientations.
If actual tax rates are used as a measure of the mayor's
commitment (Table 1), the pattern is clearly one of modera-
tion. By Soglin's third budget year, actual tax rates in
Madison were all below those of the last year of his tax con-
scious predecessor, William Dyke. Only tax rates for the
general fund (city operations excluding education and the
library services) exhibited a rise in as many as two of the
three years included in this table; and even these rate
increases were counterbalanced by the large 12 per cent
decrease in Soglin's second budget year--despite the funding
of the mayor's new human resources and day care programs for
the first time in this budgetl
The mayor's generally moderate spending proclivities
were recognized by some City Hall obervers. Soglin's first
budget, with its 1.7 per cent decrease in the total property
tax rate despite the near 5 per cent increase in taxing for
general fund services, was labeled by one city hall reporter
a "cautious approach."1 One antagonist of the mayor on the
City Council noting that the mayor's proposed first budget
contained little to criticize even claimed it to be "basically
the same kind of budget as Dyke put out." 2
The only sources of criticism to be found in the mayor's
second budget were his human resource and day care proposals.
Despite these programs this budget was otherwise so tight that
despite their funding the actual tax rate for general fund
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Table 1
Actual Property Tax Rates (in mills),
Madison, Wisconsin, 1974-1976,
Soglin Budget Years
Budget
Year**
1974
1975
1976
Education
7In-
Mill crease
Rate Over
Pre-
vious
Year
29.72
29.17
29.441
-1.8%
-1.9
0.9
General Fund
' In-
Mill crease
Rate Over
Pre-
vious
Year
15.1913. V 4.9%-12.26.3
Total General*
% In-
Mill crease
Rate Over
Pre-
vious
Year
53.7551.21
51.90
-1.7%
-4.7
1.3
*Total General Property Tax includes state, county, sewer
district, board of education, vocational school, library
and general fund levies on property.
**Taxes for the new budget year are levied at the end of the
preceding calendar year. For example, taxes for the 1974
budget year were levied in December of 1973--the first
budget proceedings to take place during Soglin's mayoralty.
SOURCE: Annual city budgets, Madison, Wisconsin.
_ _ _ __
- -- --
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spending was substantially decreased from the preceding year.
Only Soglin's third budget provoked any major public
outcry that the mayor was spending too much. Though Soglin
had proposed only a 2 per cent increase in city spending for
that yeair, a large 2.7 mill increase was required to finance
city services as a result of a drop in the surplus, especially
when contrasted to the five million dollars applied to the
previous year's budget. Faced with the citizens' furor at
the spectre of such a tax raise, Soglin proposed about a mil-
lion dollars in spending reductions. The Board of Estimates
and City Council chopped city spending by over two-and-one-
half times the amount Soglin suggested, reducing even police
and fire service levels below those which Soglin desired.
Still the mayor's pet projects--including funding for the
auditorium, day care, and human resources (with the exception
of funding for the Spanish-American Organization) survived
essentially unscathed.3
Soglin resisted the temptation to use revenue sharing
funds to reduce the third year tax levy as he believed such a
move under the state's new levy limit law would lessen the
city's ability to raise needed tax revenues in the future.4
Soglin also preferred that revenue sharing be used for capital
outlays rather than operating expenses, thereby lessening the
city's need to borrow money and saving on interest charges.5
The mayor was disappointed in this matter, however, as the
City Council used one million dollars in revenue sharing funds
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to lower the tax levy then under consideration. Only for this
third budget year, then, can the pattern of tax moderation
apparent in Table 1 be viewed to more the product of Council
as opposed to mayoral influence.
Critics of the mayor charge, however, that Soglint s tax
concern is more apparent than real in that the decreases in
the actual tax rates of his first two budgets were more than
offset by increases in property valuation. A comparison of
valuation increases with the changes in actual tax rates con-
firms this charge (Table 2). Soglin was able to increase city
spending while lowering actual tax rates only because of
fortunate increases in property valuation; the result was
still a real tax boost for the homeowner.
Still, the question that must be answered is whether or
not these real tax increases were mandated or were excessive
to the point of indicating a lack of fiscal constraint on the
part of the mayor. Considering that nation-wide inflation
continued at annual rates of 6 per cent, 11 per cent and
9 per cent for 1973, 1974 and 1975, respectively,6 much of
Soglin's real tax increases during his term did not go to fund
new city spending but was required to maintain city services
at the previous year's level. In fact, in 1975 the combined
actual tax rate reduction and inflation rate outweighed any
growth in Madison's tax base; Soglin is in fact spending less
in constant dollar terms for this year than he had the pre-
vious year!
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Table 2
Property Valuation and Actual Rate Tax Increases,
Paul Soglin's First Three Years
Budget
Year*
Total Increase in Change Over
Assessed Valuation Over Previous Year,
Valuation Previous Year TGPT+*
(in millions)
1973
1974.
1975
1976
$1,100
1,215
1,305
1,420
NC
10.5%
;. 0
NC
-1.7%
-4.7
1.3
*Budget and tax rates adopted at the end of the preceding
calendar year. The 1974 budget, hence, was adopted at
the end of calendar year 1973 and represents the first
budget set during Paul Soglin's term in office.
-*Total General Property Tax is expressed in the actual
rate of the levy, not full-value rates.
NC--not calculated.
SOURCE: Annual city budgets. Madison, Wisconsin.
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Table 3 further provides evidence as to Soglin's fiscal
restraint; whenever taxes did increase during Soglin's term in
office, they did so only quite moderately. Changes in
Madison's full value tax rates (the only rates that can be
used for comparisons between jurisdictions) during Soglin's
term in office do not appear to be out of line with those
exhibited by Wisconsin's other large cities. For the 1974
and 1975 budget years, changes in Madison's local tax rates--
those over which the mayor has most control--were even more
conservative than the average change exhibited by the twelve
other largest Wisconsin cities. And as Table 2 also shows,
taxes in Madison for each of the categories--local, educa-
tional, and total general revenue--increased at a lower annual
rate during the first three years of the Soglin administration
than they had during the administration of his tax-conscious
predecessor.
The overall picture of Paul Soglin then is that of a
mayor who had reconciled his social priorities with a concern
for taxes. Soglin's own words, as he discussed his plans for
his second budget, show just such a balancing of priorities:
The target, the goal I have set for next year's budget
at this time is a no-mill increase. That I think I
can realistically work for 1975 and still institute a
number of programs in 1975. The secondary goal would
be--and this would then depend a good deal upon what
the county, the school board and so on do--would be to
have a mill decrease sufficient to offset any increase
in assessed valuation so that net taxes that people
would pay in 1975 would be the same or at least no
higher than what they paid in 1974.7
Annual Changes in Full Value Rate Property Taxes,
Madison and Other Wisconsin Cities, 1970-1976
(expressed as per cent increase over previous year's full value tax rate)
Educationa
Madison
12
largestd
Cities
Dyke Budget Years:
-2.2%
7.3
0.5;
-3.5;
Soglin Budget Years:
-1.2
-0.3
-0.5%
4.0
- 2 . 7 i
-10.4%
-0.2
-4.0
Local
Madison
5.3%
5.1
17.1
-9.8
8.0%
-11 * 7
2.0
12
largest
Cities
9.3%
1.4f
-10.3J
14.4%
2.7
-1.0
Total Generalb
Madison
7.9%3.6
8.6
-10.3
1.9%
-4.0
-1.2
a-The Education category here includes levies for vocational education as well as
for local education. Consequently, this category differs somewhat from the
category in Table 1 which only included the levy for local education. The more
traditional education component, however, far outstrips the vocational levy.
b-The Total General Property Tax rate includes state, county, city and school
levies. It does not include special assessments.
Budget
Yearc
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975;
1976
alle
cities
1.4%
2.3
4.1
=8.5%
-1.2
-4.3
12
largest
cities
1.7%
3.6
7.1
-5.1
-6.8%
-1,6
-4.2
c-Taxes for the new budget year are levied at the end of the preceding calendar
year. For example, taxes for the 1973 budget year were levied in December of
1973--the time of the last budget proceedings to take place under the Dyke
regime.
d-The twelve largest cities in Wisconsin according to population, other than
Madison, are Milwaukee, West Allis, Eau Claire, La Crosse, Sheboygan, Appleton,
Green Bay, Oshkosh, Racine, Kenosha, Wauwatosa and Janesville. As Appleton,
Eau Claire and Milwaukee each embraced more than one taxing district, the
computations in this table were based on the rates levied in the district in
which the far major portion of each city's population resided.
e-This the mean Total General Property Tax Rate for all 200 or so jurisdictions
in Wisconsin classified as cities.
f-ll-city average; Janesville experienced a 435% increase in its local full value
property tax rate and was excluded from the analysis.
g-ll-city average; no figures were available for the city of Racine.
h-9-city average; no figures were available for the city of Racine; Sheboygan
with a 122% increase and Wauwatosa with a 128% increase in their local
property tax rates were excluded from the analysis.
i-11-city average; no figures were available for the city of Racine.
j-10-city average; no figures were available for the city of Racine; LaCrosse with
a 101% increase in its local property tax rate was excluded from the analysis.
SOURCE: Figures computed from data provided by the Wisconsin Department of
Revenue, "Town, Village and City Taxes," 1969 through 1975 issues.
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For Soglin there was no necessary choice to be made between
his "peoplets" priorities and his concern for taxes. He did
not see them as exclusive. He believed he could have beth:
"I believe it is possible to do things we've been talking
about and still have no increase in the budget."8
Paul Soglin, then, was extremely tax conscious. This
tax-consciousness, though, was not so all pervasive that it
required the sacrificing his human resource programs or his
applying funds in the old auditorium accounts to city operat-
ing expenditures to reduce the tax levy. Still it was a gen-
eral tax-consciousness on the part of the mayor that
restrained spending during his first two terms in office and
gave his administration a liberal as opposed to an unre-
strained radical tone.
Labor and the Taxpayer. Soglin's new found tax conscious-
ness as mayor and the resulting "moderateness" of his orienta-
tions readily surfaces in a review of his dealings with
organized labor. One might have predicted that Soglin, with
his "people's" orientation, would idealize to working man and
act to facilitate the wage desires of the municipal unions in
Madison. As a City Council member, Soglin was clearly in the
pro-labor camp. He urged municipal takeover of the bus
utility to raise the wages paid drivers; he supported parity
in the wages between firefighters and policemen. In fact,
it was as a result of the bond that developed between himself
and the firefighters that the local firefighters' union posted
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bail for Soglin after the alderman's arrest during the Mifflin
Street disorders.
When the issue was symbolic, and not one that directly
affected the Madison taxpayers, Soglin as mayor was still
vehemently pro-labor. When Hortonville, Wisconsin, dismissed
its striking school teachers, Mayor Soglin walked a picket
line in their support--despite the outcry he knew it would
bring from certain elements of Madison's population, including
the more conservative members of Madison's own Board of
Education. Yet, when it came to dealing with the city's own
unions and therefore the money of Madisonts taxpayers Soglin
was not reflexively pro-union,
In 1974, the Teamsters' local authorized a bus drivers'
walk-out if their demands for an 11.3 per cent wage increase
(51 cents an hour) were not met. Soglin stood by the city's
6.9 per cent (31 cents an hour) offer, despite the strike
threat and the criticism of leftist aldermen that the city's
proposal did not even provide wage boosts that equal the rise
in the cost of living. Soglints concerns in the controversy
are underscored in the following report by Capital Times
reporter Tom Foley of an exchange between Soglin and Alderman
Michael Sack at what was supposed to be a secret City Council
meeting:
At one point, Sack shouted, "Then what you're doing is giv-
ing the workers (bus drivers) a pay cut. If they don't get
it (a cost of living boost), then they get a pay cut."
"What about the (expletive deleted) $3 million to the
taxpayers. That's a pay cut to them," Soglin replied.
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Soglin's "$3 million" referred to an estimate by the
cityts labor negotiator, Barry Ott, that any pay boost
of 10 per cent or more to the bus personnel would set
a guideline for labor agreements for all the 1,800
city employees next year, requiring a $3 million
increase in property taxes.9
The mayor was not adamant in his position, noting the
cityt s offer could be improved in mediation, as long as the
union did not "continue to insist on 51 cents or nothing."l0
Though Soglin insisted that his position was "definitely not
anti-labor," he was quick to add, "If we simply accept their
demand, with the magnitude of its effect on next yearts mill
rate, then all Madison workers would have to pay."ll When
asked about the possibilities of a strike, Soglin quipped,
"I've got my bike and I got my license."12
A strike was finally averted when the union, on the day
the strike was to begin, accepted a 9 per cent (37 cents an
hour) increase with the addition of an additional floating
holiday. Wages were to be raised another 14 cents an hour
with the beginning of the new year, still over six months
away. Union spokesman Donald Eaton insisted the new offer was
accepted despite the fact that he did not see it as that
substantially better than the city's previous offer.13
The next year, though, a strike was not averted. The
Teamsters demanded an immediate 8 per cent wage increase to
be followed by another 10 per cent increase the second year.
The city responded with an offer of only a 5 per cent (25 cents
an hour) increase coupled with increased health benefits.
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Again some aldermen criticized that the city's offer did
not even keep up with the eight per cent annual inflation
rate. The mayor responded by noting that in light of the
recently imposed levy limits by the state, the city could not
raise the taxes to cover too high a settlement.14  For the
first time in eight years, Madison's bus drivers walked off
the job.
Despite the mayor's warning of the likelihood of a pro-
longed strike,15 the strike was settled the next day with the
union accepting a two-stage wage raise totalling 6.3 per cent
(30 cents an hour) coupled with increases in its health
benefit package. Soglin expressed satisfaction that the 4.7
per cent increase the settlement entailed for the first year
remained within the stringent five per cent ceiling he had
mandated for all city wage bargaining that year.16
Soglin's stance on the matter of bus driver negotiations
was tougher than what should have been expected based on his
past labor sympathies. As mayor he had tax and service con-
cerns which mitigated whatever sympathies he felt toward bus
drivers. Soglin's attitude was heavily criticized by
Madison's liberal evening newspaper, The Capital Times:
Evidently, he is not the fast friend of labor he was
before his re-election...
...the mayor allowed the bus drivers to go on strike
with only a 5 per cent offer from the city on the
table.l7
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Soglin clearly empathized with the middle-class resident
who had a hard time meeting the mortgage. "Putting" money in
citizens' hands by not raising taxes became a new brand of
"people's" program for Mayor Soglin; service programs were
selectively advocated so as not to overly burden the Madison
home owner.
THE MAYOR AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY
The moderation Soglin showed in the pursuit of his social
priorities was not generally recognized by Madison's business
community. More than any element in the Madison community,
except perhaps the purified left, members of the business com-
munity looked askance at the Soglin mayoralty. Members of the
business community felt simply that they did not have a friend
in city hall. 1 8 As Soglin's taxing and spending programs were
not all that extravagent, the strained relationship between
the mayor and the business community cannot be accounted for
direct impact Soglin's program had on the tax bill of
business.
To a great extent the mayor was the victim of his past
reputation. No matter how moderate or reserved he in sub-
stance proved to be as mayor, a number of businessmen still
persisted in perceiving Soglin as the student radical of old.
If the spillover of the mayor's past actions hurt him
with Madison leaders, this radical reputation hurt even more
when to attract new industry to Madison Soglin found it
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necessary to deal with businessmen from outside the Madison
area. Business decision-makers from outside of Madison had
little opportunity to view the transformed or mellowed Soglin.
Rather, their view of the mayor continued to be shaped more by
the sporadic stories which appeared in such business publica-
tions as The Wall Street Journal and The U.S. News and World
Report which continued to play up the theme of the radical
coming to power. In one particular instance, Soglin's past
haunted him even more directly; Dow Chemical Corporation
refused to consider Madison as a potential development loca-
tion as the result of the mayor's past anti-Dow actions during
the Vietnam activism days. 1 9
But if the impact of the mayor's past was beyond his
ability to correct, there were still other actions which the
mayor took in office which only served to reinforce the busi-
ness community's suspicions of him. A prime irritant to
business leaders was what they saw to be unsympathetic staff-
ing of the mayor ts office itself, as one business leader
scored:
Phil Ball (the mayor's committee coordinator) has no
credibility at all with the private sector. (James)
Rowen (the mayor's administrative assistant) has very
little...He (Soglin) doesn't have anyone on his staff
who relates to or understands (business). (He needs)
to find somebody with good credibility with the private
sector and who could be a spokesman for him. 2 0
Both Rowen and Ball had solid credentials with the city's
left, and both continued with their outspoken advocacy of
leftist causes while serving in their new positions. As a
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result, neither was able to serve as an effective staff link
between the mayor and the city's business community.
Similarly, business leaders felt shut out of the
appointments made to the various city committees and commis-
sions. Soglin, as previously noted, had opened up these
committees to persons whom he felt had previously been
excluded from the city's policy-making councils. But in doing
so he also failed to give adequate representation to the
city's more traditional business leaders. One business
leader, a former alderman, complained that he hardly knew a
person serving on the committees:
I think they're too young, and they're way too liberal,
and they are not capable of reflecting and maintaining
differing views...They are not balanced in repre-
senting the differing views of this community. 2 1
If Soglin's appointments did not generate any confidence
in Madison's business community, the problem was only aggra-
vated by certain specific actions the mayor took which were
perceived by some to be blatantly hostile to business. The
mayor's stepped up housing inspections program and land use
policies were seen to be evidence of his general suspicion of
and his willingness to limit free enterprise. Particularly
irritating to businessmen, also, was Soglin's attempt to block
the construction of a high-rise condominium on the Mendota
lakeshore--despite the fact that the building had already been
cleared by the City Planning Commission, legally the final
city authority on such matters, and that the developer had
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made a number of concessions to the city concerning public
access. Businessmen felt their needs were being subordinated
to whatever environmental or other policy concerns the mayor
had.
The deteriorating relationship between the city and
Oscar Mayer and Company, the city's largest private employer,
only served to underscore the private sectorts lack of faith
in Soglin. In 1973 the city revised its sewage billing rates,
eliminating the volume discounts formerly given to large
effluent producers. The meat-packing company called the new
rates "unreasonable and unjustly discriminatory" 2 2 in that it
took no notice of the company's pre-treatment of its wastes.
The stakes involved in the dispute were substantial. Under
the old sewage rates in 1973, Oscar Mayer paid $128,464; had
the new rates been in effect, the company would have been
charged $271,432.23 In 1974 the City Council in approving a
10 per cent increase in city sewer rates, defeated a motion to
exempt Oscar Mayer from the new increase, despite Alderman
Thomas Parker's complaint that the city was not giving indus-
try any incentive to locate in Madison.24
The sewage rate increases had their consequences. The
president of Oscar Mayer called the city "unfriendly;" 25 but
even more important, the company announced that its new
$8 million subsidiary plant, employing 75 to 100 persons with
future employment possibly reaching as high as 400, would be
26constructed only three miles north of Madison. WISM radio
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commentator Wayne Wallace without reservation pointed his
finger toward the mayor's office:
He was obviously reluctant to say it, but Oscar Mayer
and Company president Robert Bowles has been the
latest and most important business leader to question
the city of Madisonts approach to the business com-
munity...The firm was announcing its plan for its big
subsidiary plant in Waunakee. Oscar Mayer rejected
Madison as a site for the plant and we asked why.
Reluctantly, Bowles said it was because Waunakee made
the firm feel welcome. Madison did not.
This is not the first time someone in the business
community has questioned whether Mayor Soglin and the
city bureaucrats really want business in the city. But
it's the first time that someone of the unquestioned
stature of the president of the city's largest industry
had made the charge. And we think it is serious...we
are concerned that there really is an attitude towards
business in city hall that drives companies away... 27
Soglin also earned the suspicion of Madison's private
sector in his, and his assistant Rowen's, constant calls for
municipal takeover of the Madison Gas and Electric Company.
As one business official noted, "that really shakes them
(businessmen) up."28 Not only did businessmen fear that the
price of takeover would be reflected in increased taxes, but
they saw the mayor's calls for MGE ownership to be another
philosophical statement of his lack of faith in the private
sector. The mayor, in his calls for municipal takeover to a
number of businessmen sounded "more and more like a social-
ist.n29
Tax-conscious businessmen were also fearful of the burden
they would have to bear for Soglin's spending--despite the
fact, as has already been shown, that taxes were not raised
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excessively during the mayor's first years in office. The
human resources and day care budgets particularly weighed
heavily on their minds as a cause of these anxieties as these
businessmen objected to being taxed for increasing city social
services.
Even Soglin's auditorium proposals drew fire from parts
of Madison's business community. The Chamber of Commerce had
attacked the original Law Park plan, which the mayor backed,
as being both too costly and too physically removed from the
State Street business area. But the mayor's move behind the
State Street (Capitol Theater) plan did not mollify all his
critics. The business community split, with the Chamber and
downtown merchants for the most part backing the proposal, and
with some non-downtown businessmen still fearing the impact on
taxes the conversion of such a facility would bring.
Still, all that has been said thus far regarding Soglin's
business policies does not fully explain the suspicions of
many members of Madison's business community regarding Soglin.
A great deal of their distance from Soglin rested on their
reaction to mayoral actions which had nothing at all to
directly do with questions of business.
Paul Soglin often took symbolic actions that quite upset
Madison conservatives. Most of such actions expressed his
opposition to the Vietnam war. He refused to attend tradi-
tional Memorial Day observances, choosing to attend anti-war
activities instead. He permitted anti-war activists to use
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his office to publicize their report concerning the Army Math
Research Center at the University. He spoke at a rally for
the defense fund for Karleton Armstrong, who was on trial for
the bombing of Sterling Hall. He readily profferred the key
of the city to anti-war activists Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden,
but refused to tender it to hawkish announcer Paul Harvey. He
refused a routine request to receive a representative of the
South Vietnamese government. Beyond the war, the mayor's
symbolic activities extended to such things as walking a
picket line to support the striking Hortonville teachers and
sponsoring a resolution endorsing the boycott of non-United-
Farm Worker's lettuce and grapes.
The major controversies of Soglin's second-term centered
not so much around his programs as around the more symbolic
actions of both himself and his administrative assistant.
First of all was the public's reaction to his assistant James
Rowen's defense of David Fine, another of the accused Sterling
Hall bombers. Rowen gave Fine great assistance during the
latter's trial, including housing the accused while out on
bail. Capital Times reporter Rosemary Kendrick surveyed the
reactions of a number of city hall observers:
A city labor leader said he feels Rowen "has hurt
Soglin real bad politically. I think he did the
mayor an injustice."
Except for a couple of persons who said the Fine inci-
dent is irrelevant to Soglin's performance as mayor,
all of those interviewed felt it would take Houdini-
like skills for Soglin to escape from severe political
consequences as a result of Rowen's actions. "There's
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no way out of Fine," stated the East Side official
bluntly.30
Soglin did not choose to cut his losses on the Fine affair,
To him it was simply a matter of principle:
I've basically got a rule I've made for myself up
here: Itm not going to interfere with the personal
or political beliefs of anybody in the office.
As long as they're doing their job as an employe,
they're free to do as they want. 3 1
The second major incident of Soglin's second term as far
as public reaction was concerned had to do with the mayor's
trip to Cuba. Rowen, George McGovern's son-in-law, had pre-
viously visited Cuba with the Senator and laid the groundwork
for a visit by Soglin--the first by any American mayor to the
island under Castro's regime. Soglin's trip drew flak from
members of both Madison's left and right who charged the whole
thing was nothing more than a Soglin publicity coup. 3 2 Under
public criticism, the mayor termed the trip a "non-official
fact-finding visit." 3 3 The City Council adopted a resolution
specifying that such international trips by the mayor were not
official. The Council also rejected a Soglin sponsored reso-
lution authorizing him to discuss "Madison's social, political
and economic life" with Cuban officials.
Soglin's symbolic stances undercut whatever initiatives
he had made with the business community. As one business
official observed, "Every time he makes some progress, some-
thing like this (in this particular case, Rowen's public sup-
port for Karleton Armstrong) happens."34 This official
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further noted that such symbolic actions as giving the key
to the city to Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden were covered by The
Wall Street Journal and only helped to further estrange
businessmen outside the city: "But you can't take a step this
way and then cover your flank by taking two steps back."
A MATTER OF COALITIONS AND PERSONALITY
Much of Soglin's alleged estrangement from the business
community, it should be apparent from this chapter, was a
"bad rap." Paul Soglin was not a big spender. The sums spent
for his human resources and day care programs were relatively
small, totalling only one per cent of the city's 1976 budget
(1.3 per cent if expenditures for debt service and capital
outlays are excluded). City taxing and expenditure policies
under Soglin showed no radical departure from past patterns--
a fact that often brought sharp criticisms from those members
of Madison's left seeking more fundamental change. To this
extent, then, the adverse reaction of Madison's business com-
munity to Soglin was based not on an evaluation as to what the
mayor had actually done, but on fear--fear based on his past
reputation and fear as to where the mayor was taking the city
and what he might do in the future. The mayor's human
resources and day care programs, for example, became "conden-
sation symbols"35 on which the business community displaced
their anxieties. Hence, the business community itself must
bear part of the responsibility for whatever gulf existed
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between itself and the mayor.
Still Soglin took a number of actions that showed him to
be less than a close friend of business. The fight against
the lakeshore condominium, the revision of the sewage rates,
the step-up of housing code enforcement, the call for the
municipal take-over of Madison Gas and Electric--all repre-
sented an attitude that clearly cannot be labeled pro-
business. To the extent that he adopted the policies and to
the extent that he manipulated symbols that made it easy for
businessmen, both in and outside of Madison, to perceive him
as anti-business, Soglin too must bear part of the responsi-
bility for the breach that developed between himself and
business leaders.
Before evaluating Paul Soglin's failure to satisfy the
needs of Madison's business community it is fruitful to first
look at Charles Levine's observations on the style and impact
of Gary, Indiana, Mayor Richard Hatcher:
The leadership behavior of Richard Hatcher resulted in
the centralization of politics, the mobilization of com-
munity resources, and substantial innovation. However,
Hatcher's coalition did not include jhiteston equal terms
with blacks. Instead, the mayor developed a coalition
that differentially incorporated whites as minority par-
ticipants and recipients of political rewards and benefits.
From a pluralist perspective, Hatcher's failure to
integrate white interest groups and institutions into a
biracial coalition would be an indicator of the mayor's
ineffective leadership. However, a conflict orientation
would regard his ability to activate innovative programs
and exclude these groups and institutions as a sign of
effeioive mayoral leadership (emphasis original).36
Richard Hatcher's relationship to Gary's white population is
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closely paralleled by Paul Soglin's relationship to Madison's
private sector. Soglin's failure to satisfy business demands
is a failure only from an integrationist or pluralist frame-
work. But Soglin consciously chose to spurn such a framework
and adopted a conflict orientation instead. Soglin viewed
business interests as hostile to the "people's" oriented
innovations he desired. To effectively pursue his new pro-
grams he had to both consciously exclude businessmen from the
power positions on city commissions and committees and to
subordinate their interests to those of the disadvantaged
groups for whom he believed he was fighting.
Paul Soglin, then, like Richard Hatcher, was a true
Partisan. He perceived that the interests of the group he
represented could not be advanced while integrating the
interests of Madison's business community. Paul Soglin saw
himself as the leader of a coalition that differentially
incorporated various city groups; rewards were to be dis-
pensed primarily to the city's disadvantaged and central resi-
dents. The business community's clear second-class status in
this coalition was a necessity for effective program
initiatives in such a conflict context.
The only amendment to this position that must be made
concerns whether or not Soglin denied the business community
rewards to a greater degree than even his conflict orientation
required. If Paul Soglin, for whatever reasons, denied the
business community benefits which did not jeopardize the
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status of his policy initiatives in other areas--this can be
taken as evidence of mayoral failure.
The record, to a certain extent, supports just such a
claim regarding Soglin. According to one business leader,
Soglin simply did not expose himself enough to the business
eommunity. 3 7  Intermingling with business leaders would have
been a relatively costless act; surely it would not jeopardize
any of his specific programs. Yet he apparently did not do
this simple, costless act often enough and he reportedly felt
uneasy when talking to corporate officials in their offices.3 8
To the extent that the mayor's own disinclinations helped to
maintain the lack of confidence the business sector had in
Soglin, the mayor himself must bear responsibility.
Business' suspicions of Soglin, as has been seen in this
chapter, were reinforced by their adverse reactions to the
symbols--Hortonville, Cuba, Karleton Armstrong, Jane Fonda,
etc.--which the mayor constantly threw at them and the general
public. To the extent that these symbols were unnecessary for
coalitional maintenance, Soglin again can be seen to have
unnecessarily alienated members of the business community. It
is to the explanation of Soglin's constant engagement of sym-
bols, and the determination as to what extent they were really
necessary, that this chapter now turns.
To a certain extent, Soglin found the dispensation of
symbols necessary to the maintenance of his popular support.
Soglin, as a mellowed radical coming to power, found himself
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in a precarious position. To maintain his electoral position,
he now needed the support of a constituency larger than the
student left; and he found such a constituency ready to be
tapped in the city's liberal Democratic elements. Soglin then
could not afford to adopt a purist leftist approach to issues
if he was to solidify his standing among these more tradi-
tional liberal voters. The fact that he saw politics in
pragmatic rather than ideological terms only helped abet the
moderation of his policy approach that was required to main-
tain his electoral position.
But in broadening his appeal to the liberal center, the
mayor still faced the problem of maintaining the allegiance of
at least a good part of the city's left, for to gain new sup-
porters only at the price of losing many of his former sup-
porters could still cost him the margin needed to win the next
election. In the dispensation of symbolic rewards, Soglin
found the answer to his constituency cross-pressure problem.
Soglin could satisfy the city's liberal elements with his
pragmatic innovations and still "prove" to many of the city's
left that he was still their type of radical by taking the
proper symbolic stance to which they readily reacted.
Soglin, then, became a master juggler; his coalition act
was kept together by giving the liberals substantive policies
and the left symbolic rewards. Not all the members of the
left bought Soglin's act; a number of visible spokesmen of
the left charged that Soglin as mayor had not gone beyond what
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could be expected of any good liberal Democratic politician.
Yet the voting left, the student wards, responded quite posi-
tively to Soglin's mixture of pragmatic tangible programs and
symbolic rewards.
Still, were Soglin's symbolic actions rooted solely in
his need to maintain the votes of Madison's voting left? An
alternative explanation is that Soglin himself had a felt need
to dispense symbols. Soglin, ever the self-styled radical,
had to constantly prove to himself that despite his pragmatic
compromises he was still a true radical. He used radical sym-
bols to assuage any fears that he entertained that he had
indeed deteriorated into only a liberal politician.
There exists no possible way to determine to what extent
Soglin's actions were determined by value-expressive person-
ality factors as opposed to his need to maintain the diverse
elements of his coalition. But to the extent that symbols
were dispensed beyond what was needed to balance his constitu-
encies, Soglin's radical gestures were unnecessary sources of
aggravation to the city's business community. Soglin's fail-
ure to warm up to business leaders and his constant dispensa-
tion of symbols, then, were both rooted to a great degree in
his personality. Soglin's failure to incorporate the business
community into his coalition was not totally dictated by the
conflict approach of his Partisan style.
As should be apparent by now from the preceding discus-
sion of Paul Soglin's relationship with Madison's private
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sector, personality can act as an influence on a political
head's actions independent of its impact on the adoption of a
general leadership style. Even after a general leadership
approach is settled upon, personality forces still exert an
influence on a political head's actions. Such personality
factors may deter a political head from deploying his general
leadership style in a specific instance; in some circumstances,
personality factors may induce a leader to a course of action
at variance with his more generally characteristic leadership
approach.
Paul Soglin's leadership style was generally that of the
Partisan. Whatever psychological forces led him to adopt the
goal-oriented, conflict-oriented style of leadership is beyond
the scope of this study; only a clear precise psycho-biography
can give us insight here. However, Soglin's personality fur-
ther affected his actions independent of the influence they
had on his general style determination. Soglin's Partisanship
necessitated the subordination of the interests of the busi-
ness community to advance his "people's" causes. Yet, Soglin
in his affinity for the symbolic gesture and his discomfor-
ture in traditional business situations alienated the business
community beyond what was seemingly necessitated by even his
coalitional outlook. Soglin's need for symbols, his concern
for his privacy39 and his unwillingness to make himself more
available to the business community were all rooted in his
personality; and none of these were necessarily dictated by
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his Partisan posture.
Researchers in the area of political leadership will do
well to keep aware of the different impact of personality and
style. Personality must be studied not just to explain a
political actor's general style adoption but also to explain
an actor's deviation from his general style and even his
inabilities to employ his general style to its maximum impact.
Postscript. In the spring of 1977, Paul Soglin survived
the "third-term crisis" gaining 63 per cent of the vote to
easily beat back the mayoral bid of doctrinaire conservative
Alderman Anthony Amato. Such a victory stands as testimony
to the popular success of Soglin's governing style. Yet,
Soglin finished only second behind Amato in the primary where
Soglin critic Michael Sack and moderate Michael Duffy also
garnered part of the vote. Though it is difficult to trans-
late election results, such a second-place finish by Soglin
likely underscores the tensions resulting from the mayor's
tangible and symbolic postures and the limits to the extent of
change that would be accepted in Madison.
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CHAPTER TEN: THE POSSIBILITIES OF MAYORAL LEADERSHIP
THE IMPORTANCE OF MAYORS
Are mayors capable of leading? The answer to this ques-
tion based on the results of this study of Madison politics in
the late 1960's and early 1970's must be a qualified "yes."
Two of the three mayors in this study succeeded markedly in
putting their imprint on Madison's domain. Under William Dyke,
Madison's politics for the most part reflected his conserva-
tive orientations--the general obligation debt was reduced,
tax increases were moderate, management and data processing
systems were implemented, and the police force was streng-
thened. Under Dyke's successor, Paul Soglin, Madison's pro-
grams were reoriented in a manner consistent with the new
mayor's "people's" orientations--housing code enforcement was
stepped up, public housing was built, mass transit was
expanded, the downtown State Street Mall and Capitol Concourse
projects were moved ahead, human resources and day care pro-
grams were funded, and even a civic auditorium was finally
acquired. The successes of these two men were not universal.
Each mayor suffered his defeats. Yet, on the whole, it would
be fair to say that both Dyke and Soglin succeeded markedly
in pushing the city in the directions each desired as mayor.
Even Madison's third mayor during the time period covered
by this study made some attempts at leadership. Otto Festge
attempted in an Entrepreneurial manner to mobilize a
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consensus behind the construction of an auditorium and civic
center. Festge failed, though, as he utilized a style inap-
propriate to a setting marked by a high level of community
polarization and a paucity of formal mayoral powers. Still,
Festge had the personal inclination to act and must be con-
sidered a mayor who attempted leadership--and in the creation
of a Finance Department and the shortening of the bond terms,
Festge's leadership efforts brought success. It is only when
the focus of analysis is placed beyond these few issues that
Festge's failure to provide general policy direction becomes
apparent.
Perhaps the presence of goal-oriented leadership in
Madison is a result of the city's atypicality. Both Madison's
large university population and her large population of well-
educated professionals working in Wisconsin's capitol for the
state government have acted to produce a polity and hence a
government with an unusual degree of civic awareness. This
seems to be the conclusion of one study of Madisonts politics:
Two characteristics of Madison public life seemed to be
connected to domination by the educated middle-class
and public norms stressing both bureaucracy and participa-
tion. These were a pervasive moralism and a concern with
aesthetics and public amenities. Middle-class political
activism was usually connected with moralist politics.
The city reform movements, like the temperance movements,
had a vision of cities purified of dirty politics and
corrupt parties, replaced by upright, efficient men
devoted to civic responsibility and the public interest.
Madison's culture, then, may have acted to generate a series
of mayors concerned with pursuing their own moralist
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conservative or liberal visions of the public interest rather
than simply preserving their own electoral position.
An observor might also tend to advance the proposition
that as Madisonts population was quite homogeneous--only about
three per cent of the city's population is black--the severe
fractionalization and polarization which might cause a mayor
in larger heterogeneous cities to be cautious, were absent in
Madison. But this argument is fallacious to the extent that
it assumes severe factionalism arises only in cities with a
racially and ethnically diverse population. Despite Madison's
demographic homogeneity, the city was constantly plagued by
severe polarization during the time period of this study--and
still Madison's mayors attempted leadership. Otto Festge
pursued his dream of an auditorium despite the rancorous con-
flict which surrounded this issue. William Dyke pursued his
policy orientations despite the stringent and emotional
opposition of the city's more liberal elements. And Paul
Soglin, in his attempts to handle the four major controver-
sies of his first term, faced active and impassioned resis-
tance from a combination of factions on both the left and the
right in each instance. Thus, though Madison was fortunate
enough not to have been embroiled by racial issues, it still
experienced severe polarization. The presence of goal-
oriented mayoral leadership cannot be explained by the absence
of rancorous conflict.
An alternative view is that the degree of goal-oriented
385
leadership that characterized Madison in the 1965 to 1975
period is not that atypical of that which has characterized
other cities. According to this perspective, mayoral action
in Madison can be seen to a greater degree to be representa-
tive of the leadership attempted in other cities.
The high direction mayor, then, may not be that rare a
species. Many mayors have goals. The generally celebrated
"innovative" mayors--Richard Lee, Richard Daley, Joseph Clark,
Richarson Dilworth, Jerome Cavanagh, John Lindsay2--may be
more typical than unique. Recent studies by Charles Levine3
and Paul Peterson and J. David Greenstone4 have identified a
number of major cities where the sense of direction of and
actions taken by the mayor explain much of the outcome of
political conflict.
Though only systematic study of a large population of
mayors can determine with any certainty whether leadership is
the exception or the rule, it appears that there exists a
number of mayors willing to push their own agenda and lead
their cities. The failure of the literature to recognize the
presence of mayors who do lead can be accounted for by:
(I) the insensitivity of researchers to differing leadership
styles, (2) the unquestioned acceptance by researchers as to
the dominance of the mayor's electoral concerns, and (3) the
exaggerated picture drawn in the field as to the "dead end"
nature of the mayor's job.
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NEED #1: AN INTELLECTUAL OPENNESS
As already observed in Chapter Four, researchers have
too often judged political officials solely according to the
sense of goal direction and values preferred by the
researcher. Mayors who did not maximize the researcher's
preconceived subjective notions of leadership were classified
too easily as low direction Caretakers--mayors who attempt
little more than to maintain what exists. These researchers
have not readily recognized an alternative definition of
leadership effecotiveness--the ability of the mayors to maxi-
mize their own values and not those of the researcher.
This lack of cognizance by mayoral analysts is probably
to a great extent the results of their social liberal atti-
tudes. Mayors with social liberal orientation were easily
recognized as having a strong sense of direction; the equally
strong conservative goal orientation of other mayors, however,
which did not conform to the researcher's notions concerning
innovation went ignored. Instead of recognizing the possi-
bility that these mayors were political activists trying to
impose conservative policy on a city, such political heads
were only considered to be "passive" ministers afraid of doing
anything which would upset the status quo. Little awareness
was given to the possibility that the preservation of the
status quo might become a goal in and of itself.
Such a failure to recognize the status quo goal-
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orientation of a mayor accounts in one instance for the mis-
taken classification of Cleveland's Ralph Locher as a
"Caretaker" mayor.5 According to Kotter and Lawrence, Locher
tended to create only short-run agendas by choosing
among the initiatives made by others. He dealt with
what "came up." He did not initiate changes or
projects but tried to effect vely maintain, or take
care of, that which existed,.
Yet the totally different picture of a high direction mayor is
given by another analyst, Charles Levine:
Civil-rights activism raised tensions between Cleveland's
ethnic or "cosmo" (for cosmopolitan) population and the
cityts blacks. In response, Mayor Ralph Locher adopted
a partisan posture, favoring white demands that he resist
black pressure for school integration, greater partici-
pation in the local OEO funded poverty program, and more
and better city services. In the summer of 1966, riot-
ing broke out in the Hough section, one of the city's
four black ghetto areas. Locher adopted a "get tough"
policy toward all black protestors, including nonviolgnt
protestors, offending many white liberals and blacks.
The picture Levine paints is that of a Partisan mayor who as
a result of his conservative goal orientations spurned liberal
innovations. Locher did have goals of his own that the ana-
lystcan recognize. To the extent that other mayors like
Locher have been approached from a liberal-based analytical
framework, a re-evaluation of their styles may be in order.
The failure to recognize goal-oriented leadership,
though, is not totally the result of the liberal biases of
some of the researchers. Mayoral researchers in the 1960's
were enthralled by the Broker/Entrepreneur model. Socialized
by the acclaimed writings of Edward Banfield8 and Robert
Dahl,9 mayoral analysts were blinded by the Broker/
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Entrepreneur ideal and were insensitive to the existence of
other effective leadership approaches. Mayors were measured
according to how well they stacked up to standards of
Entrepreneur/Brokership.10 Mayors who did not fit this model
were not judged to be leaders.
Both the liberal bias of researchers and the unques-
tioned acceptance of one general leadership model, then, can
help account for the apparent dearth of mayors considered to
be genuine leaders rather than figureheads or Caretakers. The
alleged general lack of leadership orientation by modern
mayors, however, may be more the product of the faulty percep-
tions and inadequate analytical tools of city hall observors
than reflections on the personal failings of the mayors them-
selves.
NEED #2: AN AN LTERNATIVE PERCEPTUAL MODEL
The key assumption of Banfield and Dahl which mayoral
researchers blindly accepted was that mayors were primarily
motivated by concern for their own political power--that they
would do nothing to adversely affect either their electoral
position or their stock of influence. The Broker advanced no
policy initiatives of his own, and chose instead to expedite
only those program desires approved by a consensus of all con-
cerned. By this reactive style, the Broker hoped never by
his own volition to offend any political actor of power. The
Entrepreneur, in contrast, did advance policy initiatives of
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his own--but only if those initiatives were capable of gaining
the support of a broad overarching coalition of community
groups. Only those programs which tapped a latent consensus
were considered safe enough for the Entrepreneur to advance.
Peterson and Greenstone have labeled this model of
policy formation the "electoral/organizational model."ll
According to the authors
This familiar model sees public policy as the
product of influence exchanges among organized
groups and ambitious politicians seeking to maxi-
mize their own political interests.1 2
Yet, in their study of New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Detroit
and Philadelphia, Peterson and Greenstone found that the
electoral/organizational could not by itself adequately
explain mayoral behavior in the Community Action Program of
Lyndon Johnson's war on poverty. Hence, Peterson and
Greenstone generated "an alternative model--one that views
actors as if they were making choices in order to maximize
ideologically determined goals."l3
This study of Madison mayors supports Peterson and
Greenstone's contention that neither the electoral/organiza-
tional model nor the ideology model adequately explains the
behavior of all political actors; rather a combination of the
two models is required. William Dyke, for example, was so
committed to his strict separation of powers and conservative
fiscal philosophies that they virtually dictated his style of
operation. Dyke recognized and accepted the possible costs of
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his strict ideological commitment. He lost standing not just
with the City Council, but ultimately even with Madison's
voters. Yet for Bill Dyke this purist adherence to prin-
ciple was more important than the maintenance of his power
or electoral position.
Paul Soglin, too, proceeded with actions that clearly
antagonized a number of the cityrs legislators and voters.
His people's orientations mandated that he veto the Atwood
Avenue Bypass, that he refrain from vetoing the much-hated
Triangle Hotel plan, that he give his full support to Police
Chief David Couper, and that he push for city provision of
"human resources" and day care services. Soglin's self-
styled radicalism even led to his constant dispensing of
symbols--Cuba, Jane Fonda, Hortonville, David Fine--which he
knew would still further arouse the wrath of certain segments
of the City Council and the electorate.
Yet the ideological model does not totally explain Paul
Soglin's actions, for Soglin did entertain pragmatic power
considerations which tempered his ideological impulses. In
the Atwood Avenue controversy it was the mayor himself who
urged the override of his veto and the adoption of the "half-
pass" compromise. The mayor was willing to moderate his
strong environmentalist concerns in order to maintain his
standing with the city's East Side aldermen--a group whose
vote he would need to get many of the other key programs of
his agenda passed. It was this concern for his power and
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electoral position that also led Soglin to sit out the con-
troversy over the Marquette Area Traffic Plan.
Similarly, as a result of his concern for his standing
with the voters Soglin momentarily refrained from leadership
in the dispute over the status of Chief Couper. When the
status of the four Police and Fire Commissioners was cast in
doubt, Soglin submitted the names of the two commissioners
with whom he had problems for Council approval. He feared
being viewed as arbitrary if he submitted the names of his
appointees for confirmation and not those of Mayor Dyke. And
even when the list of names was given to the Council, the
mayor provided no indication of how he wanted the Council to
vote, He was afraid of the political repercussions of becom-
ing entangled any further in this legal morass.
Paul Soglin, then, represents a fusing of Peterson and
Greenstone's two models. He is primarily motivated by his
people's-oriented ideology, yet his actions are tempered by
power and electability concerns.
Political scientists must recognize that their ingrained
"rationality" assumptions are not all determinative. Ideolo-
gical concern also dictates a political actor's actions. A
sensitivity to the possible forms that ideology can take is
necessary if the power of this model as an explanatory tool
is ever to be fully realized. Ideologies do not have to fall
simply along the conservative/liberal dimension. William
Dyke's style of governing, for example, was determined more
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than anything else by his purist adherence to a strict separa-
tion of powers philosophy. Peterson and Greenstone have even
identified the ideology of the machine politician in the
1960's--an ideology which seeks "to maintain the pluralist
bargaining principle"3 4 which produced "a viable urban policy
that respected a diversity of important interests: "nl
In defending themselves against the reformers' outraged
moral indictments, the machine politicians acquired an
ideological commitment, just as previously an ideological
conservative such as Edmund Burke articulated an ideology
in self-defense against liberal-rationalist critiques.
By the 1960's the machine politicians came to believe
that attacks on, or even disregard for, pluralist bar-
gaining procedures should be resisted as a matter of
principle, even at the expense of one's immediate
electoral interests, because they threatened the sta-
bility of the regime itself.16
Machine politicians, then, were devoted to the maintenance of
power via the dispensation of divisible benefits. They
resisted demands by minority groups on redistributive issues
as these would eventually threaten the machine. Machine
politicians, consequently, acted not just out of concern for
their immediate power position, but out of an ideological
defense of the machine. As Peterson and Greenstone observe,
"their pragmatism had become principled."17
HEED #3: A REVISED VIEW OF THE NATURE OF THE MAYOR'S JOB
Mayors, it appears, may often be leaders. In Madison,
both William Dyke and Paul Soglin not only provided a clear
sense of direction but succeeded fairly much in putting their
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stamp on the city's functionings. Even Otto Festge attempted
leadership on the one issue of utmost importance to him--the
building of an auditorium. And as Charles Levine and Paul
Peterson and J. David Greenstone have observed, mayors in this
nation's larger cities can be seen to have acted on the basis
of their ideological orientations even in situations marred by
potentially debilitating conflict.
The fact that many mayors have attempted to be leaders
and that a number have even succeeded in terms of achieving a
number of their own ideological goals is at variance with the
generally accepted view of the mayor and the mayor's job, as
expressed by Marilyn Gittell18 and Raymond Wolfinger. 1 9 The
mayor's job has been traditionally assumed to be incapable of
generally attracting persons of vision, talent, and ambition.
The nature of the job is supposedly such that not only does it
attract persons of lesser capability, but that the web of
forces placed on any mayor once in office induces him to act
with only the utmost caution. A leader in the mayorts office
is seen to be more the exception than the rule.
According to this view, the mayor's job is an unattrac-
tive one. Citizens are always nagging him with complaints
about such mundane matters as garbage collection, snow removal,
street repair, and so on. He is held responsible for munici-
pal performance, and yet is given inadequate authority to
control that performance. Consequently, the resulting tenure
of the average mayor is quite brief2 0 as citizens blame him
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for the inadequacy of policies he has no means to correct.
The mayoralty hence is not likely to provide the ambitious
person with a record which will serve as a springboard to
higher office. And as the mayor's constituency is likely to
be "blacker and poorer" than that of any constituency to which
he would have to appeal to run for higher office, initiatives
of his that benefit city residents would only serve to thwart
his electoral ambitions.21 Thus, according to Wolfinger:
Because the mayoralty typically is a brief, unreward-
ing, dead-end Job, it is unlikely to attract the
ablest men aspiring to political careers or to motivate
incumbents to develop strategies of urban improvement
that will help them on to higher office. Such strate-
gies are unnecessary and unwise for most mayors.22
Yet, as noted, the mayoralty does seem to be able to
attract a fair number of persons possessing firm policy
direction and talent to the office. A reassessment of the
conventional picture as to the desirability of the mayor's job
appears to be in order. The mayor's office, despite all the
travails its occupant faces, still contains all the ego boosts
and trappings of power that politically ambitious people find
rewarding. Only very few elected offices--President,
Governor, Senator, and in smaller cities maybe Congressman--
can be ranked higher in prestige than the mayor's office. And
if a person wants to put his personal imprint on civic
affairs, he will find the mayoralty a more rewarding career
than serving in the House of Representatives where he will
initially be only one of the 435 voices with little influence,
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even on committee.
The mayoralty attracts politically ambitious persons.
Two of the three Madison mayors studied in this thesis, Otto
Festge and Paul Soglin, were rumored to have their eyes set on
Congress; and the third, William Dyke, actually ran as the
Republican candidate for governor in 1974. These mayors, as
well as mayors and prospective mayors in other cities, do not
view the mayoralty as an undesirable job; rather they see the
office both as a large enough goal in itself and a position
from which they can constantly keep their names before the
public and build a record which would help propel them to
higher office. Few other political offices offer them as much
public recognition as the mayoralty. The fact that a mayor's
chances for higher office are likely lessened by his inability
to solve city problems is a risk that persons seeking the
mayor's office either choose to suffer or simply do not recog-
nize.
Finally, Marilyn Gittell too narrowly defines career
patterns when she examines the lack of success for mayors in
terms of seeking higher elected office.23 As James Q. Wilson
points out, mayors may have open to them prestigious oppor-
tunities in private industry and with public-service oriented
foundations. 24 Mayors like John Lindsay and Carl Stokes may
have had no realistic prospects for third terms or higher
office, but they did have attractive opportunities open to
them in the television, cinema, and literary fields upon
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completion of their public career. Less glamorous personali-
ties than a Lindsay or Stokes, though, will likely find their
post-mayoral jobs in positions of importance but much
decreased visibility.
The mayoralty is an office with sufficient perquisites
and career opportunities to attract talented and ambitious
persons. Some persons may view the mayoralty as a stepping
stone to higher office. Others may see it as a big enough
"plum" in itself to merit their attention. The call to the
mayorts office can be powerful and seductive.
The mayoralty despite these afore mentioned observations
will not always be occupied by persons capable of exerting
effective leadership. The relatively low salary of the office
in some cities may deter qualified persons who can find more
profitable jobs in the private sector. Similarly local
recruitment patterns in some cities tend to filter out the
more mobile, cosmopolitan type leader and reward the strict
organizational loyalist.
Still, despite this qualm, there is no doubt that the
dead-end nature of the mayor's job has been greatly exagger-
ated. The mayoralty, as it can potentially attract talented
and ambitious persons, can potentially be a source of policy
program initiatives in a city. The realization of this
leadership potential depends both on the person who occupies
the office and the situational context in which he must govern.
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LESSONS FOR LEADERSHIP
What has been observed in this and other studies of
recent mayors is that despite the shortage of formal power
resources allocated the mayor, mayors still can lead. How a
mayor approaches his job will do much to determine whether or
not he is to be truly influential.
Contained in the analysis of the actions of the three
Madison mayors studied in this thesis are certain "lessons"
for mayors who wish to maximize their impact on the city
domain. It is with the hope of somewhat bridging the worlds
of the academic and the administrator that these lessons will
now be made more clear.
First, though, one qualification must be made concerning
the causation of style adoption. As has been observed
throughout this thesis, much of the roots of style adoption
are to be found in an individualts personality needs. A
person's psychological make-up to a great extent determines
whether or not he will be a proactive or reactive policy
maker, whether he will rely on his ideology or the advice of
others as a cue to action, and whether he will seek to main-
tain community harmony or pursue a course of action that will
invite conflict.
Yet, leadership is of such importance that effective
policy initiatives cannot be allowed to flounder on these
rocks of subconscious forces. Even though much of a person's
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style is determined by his personality needs, it is indeed
possible a person can be made more sensitive to the importance
of style adoption and the dangers of letting this process be
overly determined by psychological factors. The following
bits of advice are put forth with the hope that they will help
leaders more rationally choose their leadership approaches
within whatever constraints are imposed by each individual's
core personality.
These recommendations also contain an implicit bias--
a bias in favor of a strong, active executive who can
"energize" a city's political system and provide the neces-
sary initiation and coordination for comprehensive policy-
making and program implementation.
1. Have a well-defined sense of direction. To have a
maximal impact on the city domain, a mayor must first estab-
lish a clear set of priorities which he wants to see imple-
mented. Without an agenda for action, a mayor risks being
swamped by the various competing pressures that are placed
upon him when he reaches office. It is only a definite sense
of direction that keeps the mayor from succumbing to the
pressures of his job and acting in such a way as to merely
maintain his electoral position. The most important question
that any new mayor should ask himself is: "What do I want to
accomplish or get done now that I am mayor?"
Instead of being a true leader, the mayor lacking a
sense of direction only reacts as a weathervane, or Broker,
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to the forces placed upon him. Only a definite sense of
mission can keep a mayor from being reduced by the diffi-
culties of governing a city to the passive style of Caretaker-
ship.
The importance of a sense of direction to mayors has
been seen throughout this thesis. Otto Festge had it in
regards to the building of an auditorium, and it spurred him
to action despite the continued recalcitrance and obstruction-
ism of the opposition. In most areas other than the audito-
rium, though, Festge lacked such orientation and floundered
with no apparent purpose. Festgets successors, William Dyke
and Paul Soglin, both possessed an extremely well defined
sense of mission which helped keep them action oriented
despite facing a level of community polarization that might
have worn down less committed mayors.
2. Operationalize the enda. This second piece of
advice is a corollary of the first. A mayor's general set of
goals for his city will remain nothing but dreams unless he
knows how to make them materialize. Mayors cannot afford to
be merely pursuers of policies in the ideal; they must be
tacticians and technicians capable of translating their lofty
rhetorical goals into specific programs. The construction
of housing for low and moderate income people, for example,
might be part of a mayor's general sense of direction. But
such housing will not automatically sprout up simply because a
mayor with such a sense of direction has been elected.
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Specific plans for the construction of such housing must be
developed, and then they must be steered through the appropri-
ate authoritative bodies and then implemented by the appro-
priate city bureaucracy or private developer.
Thus, possessing a general goal orientation is not
enough; the mayor must have some idea how to translate his
ideality into a specific program or policy and thereby make
it a reality. Goals must be taken down from the lofty plane
of ideals and translated into concrete programs. It is only
when a mayor starts thinking in terms of concrete action will
he begin to realize just whose cooperation he is going to
require if he is to have any real impact on his city.
A mayor with goals of better housing for his city must
transform that goal into an agenda of specific proposals deal-
ing with housing code inspection and enforcement, housing
rehabilitation, the construction of public housing, and the
development of a turn-key approach to housing construction.
And for each of these proposals he must determine exactly and
in detail what must be done and whose cooperation he must
secure. For example, in the area of housing code inspections
and enforcement, the mayor's general goal orientation becomes
operationalized as he calls for an increase in both the number
of inspections and the number of prosecutions of code viola-
tions. By mentally foreseeing what is needed to implement his
program, he will be prepared to vigilantly oversee the
operation of the city's building inspectors and legal
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departments. And if more inspection or legal staff or a
change in city ordinance are needed to bring about the per-
formance the mayor desires, then he will be prepared to guide
the appropriate budgeting and legislative matters through the
city council.
By "thinking out" in advance the entire process which
must be undertaken to effect desired changes, a mayor will
be able to note whenever a necessary link in the process of
change is missing requiring action on his part to correct it.
A mayor who fails to map out in advance the specific policies
and actions he desires will likely find his lofty goals stuck
on the rocks of committee or bureaucratic inertia. The mayor
who knows in advance exactly what actions on the behalf of
other officials the implementation of his policy desires
require will act to ensure the necessary action of these
officials.
3. Employ the Entrepreneurial Style When Possible.
No one mayoral style can be said to be the "best" leadership
style; the approach a mayor will choose will depend to a great
extent on his goal orientations, the situational context in
which he must operate, and, on a less conscious level, his
own psychological predispositions. Still Entrepreneurship
offers the goal oriented mayor certain advantages which other
high direction leadership styles lack. Entrepreneurship is a
virtually "costless" leadership style. In engaging in coali-
tion building and Entrepreneurial bargaining and pyramiding
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of resources, a mayor, under appropriate circumstances, can
achieve his purposes without running the risks to his own
power position that the non-consensual high-direction
approaches might incur.
The goal-oriented mayor must thus be an effective
booster, promoter, backslapper, cajoler, and bargainer; he
must constantly take advantage of opportunities to build
coalitions behind his programs. This was Madison Mayor
William Dyket s chief failing: his ideologically-dictated
leadership style led him to ignore those instances where his
goals could be achieved through a more traditional, less
purist, leadership approach. Dyke's pure management concep-
tion of the mayor's office and his strict adherence to his
separation of powers doctrine precluded his attempting to
mobilize any such coalitions behind his objective. Opportu-
nities which availed themselves to possible coalition build-
ing, even with aldermen of a conservative philosophy similar
to that of the mayor, were squandered.
4. Know the Limits of Entrepreneurship. But to say that
a goal-oriented mayor may profitably utilize the Entrepre-
neurial approach in certain cases does not mean that the mayor
should limit his activity to that of consensual coalition
building. The mayor who wishes to act must be aware of the
limits to the effective use of Entrepreneurship. As Charles
Levine has cogently observed, and as the study of Otto Festge's
approach to the auditorium has reaffirmed, attempts at
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broad-scale coalition construction are likely to be aborted
in situations involving community polarization. When groups
are at each other's throats, consensus behind the mayor's
program cannot possibly be secured. In such situations only
nonconsensual leadership approaches can have any success.
Similarly, to be an effective Entrepreneur a mayor must
have certain resources which, if not at his immediate dis-
posal, must be at least within his ready reach when necessary.
The mayor cannot bargain effectively if he lacks important
bargaining resources; he cannot pyramid his power resources if
he lacks control over the favors desired by others or if
others simply refuse to bargain with him. The Entrepreneur is
essentially a poker player; to pyramid his chips he must first
have a sufficiently large amount to enter the game; and he can
potentially gain access to the other players' chips only if
they are willing to play with him. Effective Entrepreneurship
requires that a mayor have sufficient powers at his disposal
as well as the opportunity to access the influence of other
key political actors.
But in reformed cities the mayor is often denied these
"chips" of power that he needs for effective Entrepreneurship.
Civil service has not only denied him the patronage to dangle
in front of others, it has also denied him the ability to
dismiss less than fully cooperative city employees. In a
system of nonpartisan elections, the mayor does not run as the
head of a city council ticket; not dependent on the mayor for
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their election, these aldermen are under no special obliga-
tion to the mayor after the election. Lacking access to a
political party in a nonpartisan system, the mayor is denied
both control over aldermanic nominations and access to party
organization for the purpose of building public support behind
his programs. New Haven Mayor Richard Lee, the prototype
Entrepreneur, governed in a partisan setting. Mayors who are
denied the party ties and Council influence Lee was accorded
will not always find Entrepreneurship as fruitful a strategy
as did Lee.
Entrepreneurship, then, proves a profitable leadership
style only in situations where low conflict and the mayor's
access to certain key resources allow the building of over-
arching coalitions to take place. The environmental limita-
tions of the approach does not bode well for the deployment
of strategies by black mayors. Black mayors often find them-
selves governing cities sharply divided along racial lines.
In such situations not only is it impossible to build a
coalition that embraces both camps, but even the more limited
deployment of Entrepreneurial tactics will likely meet with
failure. A white mayor may resort to "booster" appeals,
emphasizing city pride, to gather community wide support
behind a project; such appeals by a black mayor are only
likely to be viewed with great cynicism by the white com-
munity.
Similarly, a white mayor may be able in a less polarized
setting to appoint a "blue ribbon" study group or a committee
of the city's prestigious "big mules" to front those propo-
sals behind which he is trying to garner public acceptance.
The black mayor will find such a tactic of limited value. The
white community, sensitive to issues with any racial conflict
overtones, will not accept the recommendations of any group
that is clearly not adequately representative of their view-
point. And if the black mayor appoints a truly representa-
tive study group, he loses control over their recommendations;
rather than being able to manipulate them to front his pro-
grams, the black mayor will find he has created a Frankenstein
-- a committee truly independent of him. Rather than promoting
community consensus, the study committee will often serve as
an arena for the playing out of the passions of divisiveness.
Black mayors in such a setting will often find themselves
cut off from same of the resources necessary for the effective
utilization of Entrepreneurship. Aldermen from primarily
white constituencies will not look to the mayor as the head
of a party ticket. Their election chances often even depend
on their active opposition to the more redistributive items
of the black mayor's agenda. If the local party organization
is still white-dominated, whatever patronage resources it
controls will likely be denied the black mayor. Similarly, if
controlled by members of the opposing faction the party will
not serve the black mayor as a potential vehicle for mobiliz-
ing community support.
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The black mayor must develop his own alternative
sources of patronage and community organization. But the
advantages to be gained from building overarching coalitions
are quite limited. If the black mayor decides to give what-
ever jobs and favors are at his disposal to help the long-
neglected black community, he will have little left with which
to bargain with white aldermen and other influentials. If the
black mayor successfully builds a community organization as an
alternative to the local party, it likely will be on racial
lines and will not extend into the white community. City-wide
mobilization on any important issue for the black mayor is
nearly an impossibility.
According to the language of "contingency theory" a
leader's style will usually tend toward either the
"expressive"--concern for the maintenance of the social/
emotional feeling of the group--or the "instrumental"-concern
for getting things done even if the means to such task accom-
plishment results in the alienated feelings among co-workers.25
As Charles Levine observes, expressive or consensus oriented
leadership just does not work in situations that can be cate-
gorized as generally unfavorable to mayoral leadership:
In the least favorable situation--when a community is
polarized, tasks are unstructured, and mayoral power is
weak--a mayor with an instrumentally oriented leader-
ship style can be a welcome relief from immobilism.
Under these conditions, an expressively oriented mayor
may spend all his time building a consensus and reacting
to conflict rather than manipulating his environment.
An instrumentally oriented mayor, on the other hand,
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will often push ahead toward a goal regardless of
the impact of his actions on his popularity. He will
do something even if he excludes some interests and
even i he makes enemies. (emphasis in original)26
Under such disadvantageous conditions, attempts at consensus
leadership are little likely to meet with success. Otto
Festge's failed Entrepreneurial initiatives on the question
of the auditorium only serve to underscore this lesson. Black
mayors denied access to key power resources and working in a
polarized setting are only too likely to meet with the same
lack of results when employing Entrepreneurial strategies.
In such situations the black mayor's attempt at
Entrepreneurship will only likely result in failure. Alterna-
tive high-direction leadership styles must be identified which
do not depend on the existence of latent community consensus
or the mayor's control over or ability to access the bits of
influence required by Entrepreneurship.
6, 'ey the Non-Consensual, Combative Leadership
Approaches When Necessary. When either a polarized environ-
ment or the lack of access to potential political resources
precludes the effective employment of Entrepreneurial strate-
gies the goal oriented mayor must find a leadership approach
more suitable to his situation. Two such styles, Partisan-
ship and Ideological leadership, have been discussed in detail
in this thesis.
The Ideologue and the Partisan do not approach problems
from a consensual perspective; rather they seek to advance
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those programs that they or their limited constituency
identify with--even if it means only giving secondary con-
siderations to the desires of elements outside the mayor's
self-defined constituency. The limited resources are not
deployed in an ineffectual attempt to build an overarching
executive-centered coalition. Rather these two types of
mayors use their resources in a manner consistent with a
combative orientation. They may choose a course of action
that even purposely brings community dissensus. They may
even threaten those who will not cooperate; they hold the pet
projects of others hostage; they veto the initiatives of
others--all with the goal of inducing action among political
actors who would not otherwise be amenable to the mayor's
wishes. Their orientation is with program achievement, not
consensus maintenance.
These mayors are not satisfied with limiting their
initiatives solely to those areas where their power resources
can be invested wisely in the long-term. Rather, these mayors
are conscious "spenders" of influence; they are willing to use
their limited resources in an effort to ensure the passage and
implementation of their programs. As more and more of the
mayor's resources are spent, he faces the problem of depletion
of his stock of influence. To this extent he has not
invested wisely; but he at least has made headway in problem
areas which the Entrepreneur would have avoided.
The difference between the Partisan and the Ideologue
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is that the former understands the potential dangers of an
unstopped long-term power drain; the Ideologue, blinded by
his principles, follows his conscience, and ignores both the
power realities of a situation and the impact his own actions
have on his own future influence. Despite his combative
orientation, the Partisan mayor is above all else a pragmatic
politician. The Partisan mayor is flexible; he not only can
adjust his strategy to that course of action most likely to
attain his policy goals, but he can retreat from those actions
which he sees to be too power costly. The Partisan mayor thus
tempers his programmatic goals with some concern as to his
political future. There are still some areas which are too
power costly for him to enter, but his threshhold is at a
higher level than that of the Entrepreneur.
The Ideologue has no such pragmatic program or long-term
power consideration. The virtue and the weakness of this
style is that he will fight on all issues that he considers
important. The Ideologue will thus rush into even the most
potentially explosive situations which "wiser" mayors would
not dare to enter. And sometimes the Ideologue's stock of
influence will be enough to win the short-term conflict. Thus
he can get results when other mayors defer from action.
But the costs of such a leadership approach is that it is
insensitive to the reactions of other political actors.
Actions which produce short-term victories may alienate enough
people in each instance so that the mayor's power position is
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jeopardized in the long-run. Such was the case with
Madison's Ideologue, Mayor William Dyke. Dyke in the short-
term proved successful in transfusing city hall with his
management/separation of powers philosophy; he was also
successful in establishing a law and order approach to the
student demonstrations. But the cumulative impact of these
actions and Dykets inflexibility was to produce an adverse
reaction among the citizenry that denied him a third term in
office and resulted in a reversal of his policy desires by his
successor, Paul Soglin.
6. Choose the Style that Best Fits Each Situation. To
speak of style adoption as if it were solely a matter of
rational choice is obviously an oversimplification. As
already noted personality factors to a great extent dictate
the choice of leadership approach. Yet, to whatever extent
style adoption can be made the product of rational choice, it
must be made to be so. Policies and programs for dealing with
our city's problems are simply too important to have their
enactment and implementation dependent on idiosyncratic per-
sonality factors. To be truly effective mayors and other
political heads must be aware of how their approach to prob-
lems ultimately influence their chances for success.
The successful mayor must be flexible in his leadership
approach; to maximize policy achievement he must adopt a
leadership approach that fits the specific situational
constraints. A consensual strategy, for example, will likely
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produce only immobilism if deployed in a conflict setting.
Yet, a mayor whose personality demands a consistency of
approach will prove unable to vary his style as the situation
demands. Only the mayor who is deeply aware of the need to
adopt a style that fits each situation will be able to trans-
oend to dictates of personality and begin to make the process
of style adoption more rational.
URBAN LEADERSHIP: FROM WHERE WILL IT COME?
According to Raymond Wolfinger, "Because able, innovative
mayors have been not only scarce, nor stirred by ambitions
that are neither commonplace nor generally realistic, it
becomes important to consider possible substitutes for mayoral
leadership."27 Wolfinger sees this substitute for mayoral
leadership to be coming from "cosmopolitan professionals"--
those "(p)rofessional municipal officials, ranging from city
managers to city planners" who have become "an increasingly
independent element in local political systems."28
Yet, as we have already seen earlier in this chapter, the
picture of the dead-end constrained mayoralty has been greatly
overplayed. For this reason Wolfinger is perhaps a bit pre-
mature in his call for alternative sources of leadership.
Yet, Wolfinger has observed a significant trend--the
growth in influence of appointed professional municipal
officials. To the extent that they act as a source of
influence that competes with the influence of a city's elected
officials, the desirability of this shift in power in the
urban arena must be analyzed. The rest of this dissertation
will attempt to explore the relative desirability or undesira-
bility of having a city's policy direction determined by its
professional rather than its elected officials.
The benefits of such professional policy-making are
insightfully detailed by Wolfinger:
Because these officials are oriented toward goals, norms,
and publics beyond their city of current employment,
and because they have skills needed by other actors in
local politics, they can bring to bear resources of
power somewhat independent of the contending local
interests that often stymie progress. It is unlikely
that such officials will be able to build the politi-
cal base and master the autonomous political support
necessary to execute massive, coordinated programs of
the kind typical of New Haven. But they can produce
a number of substantial segmental innovations which add
up to a considerable improvement over the status quo.29
Indeed, professional influence from "outside" the city has
proved to be a progressive force leading to "innovation and
expansion of public programs"30 in such areas as urban
renewal 3 1 and anti-poverty action. 3 2 Though Wolfinger
observes that cosmopolitan professionals will not always be
Inecessarily progressive or sympathetic to the real or the
attributed wishes of the poor,"3 3 he believes that on the
whole
the incentive structure in these professions emphasizes
not jealous defense of routine but a rather venturesome
ambition. As is usually the case, these officials have
a vested interest in maximizing the programs for which
they are responsible and therefore want to expand their
domains, if necessary by appealing to their constituents
in the local community. The likelihood is that such
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expansion will be in the direction of more services to
the poor, improvement of the social and physical environ-
ment, and attempts to impose a greater degree of
rationality and coordination on market processes.3,
Wolfinger's assessment is correct as far as program
expansion is concerned. Yet, the beneficence of direction of
such from-the-top-down innovation is somewhat overstated. The
solutions the professional will pose to problems will reflect
those values emphasized in his professional training as well
as his own self-interest--and will not necessarily be in the
interest of the general public or the city's relatively power-
less citizenry. For example, highway planners have often
ignored mass transit for the sake of fiscal integrity.35
Urban renewal officials have replaced habitable dwelling units
with an expanded business district or college campus.36 Pub-
lic housing officials have regulated the lifestyles of their
clients. 37 Even Community Action Program officials have
"benignly" but deliberately sought to limit the extent of
citizen participation.
Neither the mayor, then, nor the cosmopolitan profes-
sional is necessarily always going to be "progressive" in his
policy orientations. Both are often the victims of narrow
perspectives and self-interest. Yet, if such be the case, in
whose hands is the public's authority "best" vested?
One of the major problems facing cities today is that of
"governance"--whether or not city government is capable of
acting both effectively and in a manner responsible to its
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citizens. According to Theodore Lowi, though, such responsi-
bility is no longer forthcoming, for "The modern city has
become well-run but ungoverned...n3 9 In destroying "the party
foundations of the mayoralty" the reform movement has "also
destroyed the basis for sustained, central popularly-based
action."40 The transferring of power from the mayoralty to
the professionalized agencies has not been entirely func-
tional, for, as Lowi observes: "bureaucratic agencies are
not neutral; they are only independent."'41 As a result of
both civil service protection and extensive municipal union-
ization, officials in city bureaucracies do not have to be
responsive to anyone's but their own definition of desirable
policy; they constitute "relatively irresponsible structures
of power."42
The first advantage of having the mayor rather than the
professional bureaucracy make policy decisions then becomes
clear. The mayor is involved in the political process. His
re-election chances depend on his ability to keep a majority
of the city's voters satisfied or at least quiescent. The
voter's "indirect influence"43 over the mayor's actions is,
in a sense, more "direct" than their influence over the
actions of lesser visible, unelected officials.
The professional bureaucracy, more insulated from politi-
cal currents, has no such need to be similarly responsive to
the public's wishes. Bureaucratic policy-making removes the
determination of value combinations to be achieved from the
political realm. Bureaucratic norms and self-interest become
the primary determinants of policy formation if power is given
to these professionals. The result is interest group self-
regulation with, in this case, the interest group being the
professional bureaucracy.
Similarly, mayoral influence can be seen to be preferable
to professional influence in that career bureaucrats tend to
take only a fragmented view of city problems. As Lowi
delineates:
The decentralization of city government toward its
career bureaucracies has resulted in great efficiency
for the activities around which each bureaucracy was
organized. The city is indeed well-run. But what of
those activities around which bureaucracies are not
organized, or those which fall between or among agen-
cies' jurisdiction? For these...the cities are suffer-
ing either stalemate or elephantitis--an affliction
whereby a particular activity, say, urban renewal or
parkways, gets pushed to its ultimate "success" totally
without regard to its importance compared to the mission
of other agencies. In these as well as other senses, the
cities are ungoverned.4 4
The professional bureaucracies are parochial in ther concerns.
Looking toward bureaucracies as the initiator of policies in
the future will only serve to exaggerate the excesses of
this functional parochialism.
The mayor, in contrast, is not concerned with one parti-
cular policy area; he is a generalist. All city policies and
constituencies are of concern to him. He has a perspective
which counters the tendencies toward stalemate and elephan-
titis. His concern is not the advancement of one particular
area of concern, but the balance of all areas of concern.
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The only professional with a similar overview of the
political situation is the city manager. But even here, as
a result of his training, the city manager will likely value
efficiency in service delivery over increased responsiveness
to the demands of various groups in the population. Yet
efficiency is only one possible definition of the public good.
As today's urban bureaucracies already comprise "islands
of functional power before which the modern mayor stands
impoverished," public acceptance of the professional claims
to having exclusive jurisdiction can only serve to further
aggravate the problem of irresponsive government. The
mayoralty with its powers offers the primary counterbalance to
bureaucratic power. If the problem has been that the modern
mayor lacks sufficient authority to exert his influence over
the municipal bureaucracies, it is desirable that he be given
whatever formal authority he requires. Only a strengthened
mayoralty can produce a coordinated, responsive urban policy-
making process.
This leads us to the final reason for having mayors
rather than cosmopolitan professionals take the primary role
in urban leadership. Leadership can only come about if the
potential leader has the powers with which to lead. The mayor
is relatively advantaged in this area; he has powers which
city managers and professional administrators are unlikely
to accumulate. The only consistent advantage that cosmopolitan
professionals possess relative to the mayor is that they can
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cloak their policy recommendations under the guise of profes-
sional expertise. The claim helps to legitimize their policy
proposals in the eyes of the public and political elite.
But this source of influence pales when compared to the
opportunities for power the mayor possesses which cosmopolitan
professionals lack. Most obvious is the role the mayor plays
as the personalized head of city government. He can command
constant news media attention and public interest where the
low salience professionals can not. The mayor has the oppor-
tunity to amass public support behind his programs which low
visibility officials can only envy.
Similarly, depending on the structure of city government,
the mayor may be able to mobilize support behind his programs
by other means which are not available to cosmopolitan profes-
sionals. In a partisan setting he can use the party organiza-
tion to garner support at the grass roots. He can gain
legislative votes by wisely dispensing patronage and runnings
as the head of a party ticket. And further still, he has a
superior bargaining position in that he can threaten to veto
or exclude from the executive budget the pet projects of
uncooperative aldermen.
As Jeffrey Pressman has noted, even New Haven "Mayor Lee
was helped enormously by his deep roots in the community, his
control of a political party, and his impressive electoral
success--resources which would be less available to a city
manager." 4 6 City managers and professional bureaucrats are
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lacking the tools for leadership which the mayor potentially
has at his disposal.
STRENGTHENING THE MAYOR
The mayoralty, as a result of the responsibility of the
office, the generalist orientation of the person who occu-
pies it, and the potential means of influence already accorded
it, is the proper executive site in which power can be
centralized if our cities are to indeed once more be governed.
Yet, as Lowi has pointed out, the legacy of the reform move-
ment is for the most a mayoralty incapable of effective
governing. The opportunities for power that are afforded a
mayor vary from city to city, depending on the city's formal
governmental structure and the public's acceptance of his
utilization of patronage and his accessing the local party
organization. What is needed is a restructuring of our city
governments to enable the mayor to govern.
The following recommendations perhaps represent only
ideals as they will prove extremely difficult to effect change
in the basic structure of most city governments. Yet if
these suggestions are indeed somehow implemented they can do
much to reassert the governing capacity of the modern mayor:
1. Give the Mayor the Power to Control the Municipal
Bureaucracy. Mayors are held responsible by the electorate
for the functioning of the city, and yet they are not given
the formal powers necessary for the effective governing of the
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city. The mayor must share decision-making in the executive
branch with unelected officials who are not necessarily
amenable to the policy directives of the mayor. The profes-
sional orientations of department heads may conflict with the
policy direction desired by the mayor. The mayor may even
appear to some career administrators to be a mere amateur as
far as the running of their departments go. Mayors come and
go, but the civil-service department head remains a fixture
at city hall to be removed only by retirement or death in
office.
All three Madison mayors in this study encountered
department heads who acted as often to contradict as to
expedite their policy initiatives. Otto Festge was thwarted
by John Bunch, the independent City Traffic Director who
attempted to subvert the mayor's plans for a Law Park audito-
rium. William Dyke could not easily get the action he desired
from Madison Redevelopment Authority Director Sol Levin.
Nor could he get all department heads to fully cooperate with
his Management By Objectives Program. Paul Soglin anxiously
awaited the retirement of City Attorney Edwin Conrad, a man
who saw his job to be the legal representative not of the
mayor but of the city. Soglin also waited two full years to
build a solid case before he fired City Welfare Director
Lowell Messerschmidt, a man whose professional competence the
mayor little respected. Even then, the Messerschmidt firing
wound up being dragged out through civil service appeal.
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The mayor, then, finds himself to be only a bargainer in,
rather than the head of, city administration. He has to con-
stantly cajole, plead, and threaten to get the more obstinate
administrators to follow his course of action. And even then
he is bargaining at a disadvantage; he lacks the ultimate
sanction to fire any but the most utterly incompetent adminis-
trator.
What is needed then is some way for the mayor to get a
handle on his bureaucracy. One viable means of organization
would be to remove the top administrative officials from the
umbrella of civil service protection. If the fallacy of the
"neutral specialist" argument is recognized, the removal of
civil service protection for department heads will be seen as
a step designed to make policy making by municipal executives
more responsive to the people's will, as expressed by their
agent, the mayor.
A cabinet form of government, where the mayor appoints
each of the department heads with city council confirmation,
can replace the present civil service dominated system.
Departmental intransigience would be supplanted by responsive-
ness to the mayor's initiatives. The shift to the cabinet
form of government would once more make our cities governable.
Opponents of the cabinet proposal say such a system gives
too much power to the mayor. Just as "presidential govern-
ment" leads to abuse of executive power at the national level,
some critics fear that unrestrained mayoral government will
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produce similar abuses at the local level. "One-man"
government will not, to their way of thinking, necessarily
produce the wisest course of action. A second criticism con-
cerns the possible introduction of blatantly partisan consid-
erations into personnel decisions in the absence of civil
service protection. A third criticism levied at the cabinet
proposal is that talented persons would no longer be attracted
to the city's administrative hierarchy, as a result of the
unstable tenure of their positions, as each new mayor might
choose to exert his prerogative of naming new department heads.
It was in the light of such criticisms that a variant of
the cabinet approach was instituted in Madison when City
Attorney Edwin Conrad retired.4 7 Rather than serving for
life, the new city attorney, nominated by the mayor and con-
firmed by the City Council, was appointed for only a five-
year term. Such an official would have to be responsive to
the sentiments of the incumbent mayor and Council if he
desired reappointment. Still, the official appointed on such
a basis would be accorded a modicum amount of insulation from
the city's political head as he does not serve exactly at
the pleasure of the mayor. The five-year term for city depart-
ment heads is consequently a compromise proposal which seeks
to promote increased bureaucratic responsiveness to mayoral
policy direction without totally sacrificing the advantages
of bureaucratic independence.
The cabinet and five-year plans, like the abolition of
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civil service, are "radical" proposals not likely to be
readily accepted by those self-professed "good government"
forces who still value "professional"' judgment and distrust
partisan politics. These forces, firm in their sense of the
correctness in their beliefs, will not be easily budged.
Hence a far less comprehensive proposal, merit raises dis-
pensed at the discretion of the mayor (and if "one-man"
government is distrusted, provisions for council confirmation
can be added) also deserves serious attention. Under this
proposal the mayor evaluates the performance of the city's
department heads; the size of the salary increase each
administrator receives is dependent on these evaluations.
To advance their own pecuniary interest, department heads
would have to be more amenable to the wishes of the mayor.
Though viewed with suspicion by department heads, the
merit raise proposal, being far less comprehensive in nature
than the restructuring of city government along the lines of
the cabinet model, is still the more politically feasible
reform. Members of the city council often are just as unhappy
as the mayor with bureaucratic performance; yet they are less
than willing to run the risk of possible mayoral absolutism.
In Madison, the City Council gave Paul Soglin the authority to
implement a merit raise plan but remained intransigient on
the question of cabinet government.
Savas and Ginsburg have effectively catalogued the
dysfunctions of the present civil service system and have
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suggested a number of "reforms" designed to reintroduce merit
and bureaucratic responsiveness.49 The arguments of this
thesis supports their conclusions recommending the selective
weakening of civil service:
The argument for reform is overwhelming. The potential
future imperfections of a revitalized personnel system
are small and distant compared to the actual weaknesses,
large and immediate, of today's illusory merit system.
Undoubtedly, the prescription should be applied selec-
tively. Some states and cities are still suffering under
a corrupt spoils system and can benefit from the kinds
of changes introduced long ago by the first wave of
civil service reform. By far the most common afflic-
tion, however, is the rigor mortis of over developed
and regressive civil service systems.
2. Give the Mayor Adequate Staff. This is a small but
important point. Most mayors are extremely busy officials.
Just their ceremonial duties occupy an enormous part of their
time. If the mayor is to adequately act as a governing offi-
cial, he is going to need capable staff assistance.
The mayor is going to need a staff person to help
research issues and to serve as a liaison with the city
council. Possibly another person will be needed if the mayor
is going to maintain maximum accessibility with community
groups. And finally the mayor is going to need a staff person
to help with his toughest job--riding herd over the bureau-
cracy. The mayor, with his ceremonial, legislative,
constituent service and city emissary duties, simply lacks
the time to be able to pay constant attention to the inner-
workings of city hall; he needs another set of eyes and ears
to ensure that administrators are acting in accord with his
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intentions to the maximum extent possible.
It is in this regard that the office of the City
Administrative Officer (CAO) deserves special attention. The
0AO is supposed to be that official who, operating under the
mayor's direction, supervises the bureaucratic workings of
city hall. The question which must be answered is whether or
not the CAO should be a career official.
Those who advocate having a career official as CAO
emphasize the need of having someone with administrative
experience in the mayorts office. They point out that the
mayor is often new to city politics; even if he previously
held city office, the new mayor is likely to have only
limited experience with the complexities of city bureaucracy.
Accordingly, then, a career CAO helps to provide a measure of
continuity between administrations. The career CAO gives the
new mayor a knowledgeable, experienced person in his office--
someone who can aid the new mayor in running the city while he
is still learning the ropes of his office.
But the career CAO is likely to be of limited use for the
new mayor. As an important official in the previous adminis-
tration, the new CAO will likely be regarded with suspicion by
the city's new political head and his allies. Unsure of the
CAO's policy preferences and loyalties, the new mayor will
likely little entrust this official with handling important
matters. Madison's career city administrator, Robert
Corcoran, was just so mistrusted. William Dyke saw Corcoran
to be a Festge man and only learned to value his assistance
when Corcoran demonstrated his capacity to act according to
the wishes of the present mayor. When Paul Soglin came to
power, Corcoran was similarly distrusted as he was now closely
identified with the Dyke administration. In addition to the
loyalty question, Soglin had doubts as to Corcorant s ability
to adequately perform his job, and for the most part bypassed
his career administrator when important bureaucratic matters
were at hand.
For the CAO to be truly of value to the mayor, the mayor
must have total faith in his loyalty and abilities. This
mandates mayoral appointment of the CAO. To the extent that
continuity in knowledge between administrations is deemed
desirable, perhaps a bifurcation of responsibilities is
required; the ideal solution would be for the mayor to have
one career and one appointed administrative officer. But the
drawbacks of such a proposal are the blurring of lines of
responsibility between two such officials and the double
salary that such an arrangement necessitates.
The problem of mayoral staff is probably more severe in
smaller cities. In large cities, problems are recognized to
be complex, and the mayor is consequently more likely to be
given adequate staff. No one suggests, for example, that the
mayor of New York or Chicago attempt to govern without ade-
quate staff assistance. But in small cities any attempt to
increase the size of the mayor t s office will likely be met
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with charges from the opposition party and the local news-
papers that the mayor is unnecessarily expanding his office.
Why, they will argue, should we hire another official at a
decent salary to do the job that the mayor is already being
paid to do? Such an attitude can only impede the mayor's
governing ability. These objections might also constitute a
"false economy" as adequate staff research and preparation
of grant proposals and freeing the mayor to attend regional
and national conferences might enhance the city's ability to
procure federal project monies.
3. Put the Mayor Back into Politics. In cities where
the reform ideology prevailed, the mayoralty and the city
council were removed from the realm of partisan politics. The
resolution of municipal affairs according to the reformers
required only the application of professional expertise
against increasingly technological problems. Cities were to
be governed with business-like efficiency in the public inter-
est; conflicting partisan perspectives were seen to be irrele-
vant to municipal affairs. Hence, in reformed cities, the
governing of the municipality was placed in either the hands
of a neutral manager or a non-partisan mayor.
The criticisms of the reform ideology are well known.
First, the notion of a common public interest is untenable.
In a pluralist society, different groups have different
perspectives how problems are to be solved. Even decisions
concerning the paving of streets and the collection of garbage
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involves choices which will not necessarily be consensual in
nature. Should money be spent on the facilitation of automo-
bile or mass transit? Through whose neighborhood should
traffic be funnelled? Whose streets should be paved first?
Whose garbage should be picked up in the early morning hours
to the annoyance of late sleepers?
A second set of general criticisms concerns the class
bias of the reformist ideology. If there exists no common
public interest, then reformist institutions benefit some
51
groups to the disadvantage of others. Lineberry and Fowler
demonstrate that the impact of social cleavages on city out-
puts are muted by reformist institutions.52 Nonpartisans and
at-large electoral systems as well as managerial government
all act to reduce the political clout of lower class and
minority groups.53
But it is a third consequence of the reform movement,
the ability of elected officials to govern a city, that is
of most concern to us here. The reform ideology by removing
partisan politics from the realm of city politics, has
stripped the mayor of certain opportunities for influence.
The mayor in a partisan electoral system has certain potential
resources at his command which the nonpartisan mayor can only
desire.
In a partisan setting, the mayor runs as the head of a
party ticket. To the extent that the mayoral election exerts
a coattail effect on city council races, aldermen will find
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themselves more amenable to the mayor's policy desires. If
the aldermanic candidates of the mayor's party are elected as
a result of the mayor's popularity, they owe a debt the city
head can collect later in office. To the extent that their
re-election chances are dependent on the popularity of their
mayor, aldermanic members of the mayor's party will likely do
little to embarrass or frustrate the mayor in office. As
members of the same party, the mayorts record becomes their
record as well. Party ties, then, not only afford the mayor
a common bond with aldermanic members of his party, but it
induces them, from their own electoral self-interest, to fol-
low the mayor's policy leads.
The mayor with access to a party organization also
possesses a number of opportunities for influence that the
nonpartisan mayor is denied. The mayor, if he is indeed
fortunate, can depend on the party organization to help mobi-
lize public opinion behind his programs. A cooperative
relationship with party leaders can also result in tight
mayoral control over the aldermanic nominations process;
renegade party members can be denied slating for city council
seats. Similarly, the mayor who can access the patronage
controlled by a party organization finds that he has appreci-
ably increased the stock of inducements he can offer council
members and other political actors for their support. It is
in this light that we can see the contribution that Richard
Daley's chairmanship of the Cook County Democrats Central
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Committee, with his resulting control over fifteen thousand
Cook County jobs54 and other county patronage, made to his
power. Similarly, New Haven Mayor Richard Lee's power was
advanced by his access to patronage voting registrar and
county courthouse positions.5 5
Reformed institutions, including nonpartisanship, are
based on fallacious, class-biased philosophy. What non-
partisanship has succeeded in doing, though, is to insulate
the modern mayor from possible avenues of influence that he
might find necessary to the governing of the city. If the
modern city is to be truly governable again, the people's
representatives must be given the resources they need to com-
mand the responsiveness of other members of the city's govern-
ment. It thus becomes necessary that politics be put back
into the city, and that the mayor be put back into politics.
4. Restructure the Terms of Other City Polic-Makers
to Make Them More Amenable to Mayoral Influence. In reformed
cities the mayor often finds many policy-making areas to be
the realm of citizen boards and commissions. Often these
boards and commissions are structured in such a way so as not
to be directly subject to mayoral influence. It is common-
place for members of these boards to serve terms longer than
that of the mayor, and the terms are staggered so that the
mayor has no opportunity to re-make the board to his liking in
one felt-swoop. These boards, then, sometimes represent the
philosophy of the previous not the present, mayoral
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administration. Such was the bind in which Madison Mayor Paul
Soglin found himself in trying to deal with a Police and Fire
Commission dominated by his predecessorts appointments.
Similar insulation from mayoral influence is also found
on the City Council in cities where half the membership of
that body is elected on the off-mayoral year. In such a
situation the mayor is deprived of whatever influence comes
from running as the head of a ticket.
Such situations can be corrected to afford maximal
mayoral influence if the terms of board and commission mem-
bers and aldermen are made coterminous with that of the mayor.
In such a system the mayor can assure that policy orientations
of citizen board and commission members are in accord with the
desires of the citizenry as expressed by his election. With
the seats of all council members at stake at the same time as
the mayoral election, issues from the mayoral contest can be
expected to pervade and help determine aldermanic elections.
To the extent that this happens, the voters in the city will
tend to elect a city council with the same policy orienta-
tions as their mayor. And as has already been noted, the
coterminous timing of the elections for mayor and council
enable the mayor to run as the head of a ticket, bringing mem-
bers of his ticket to office and collecting obligations from
them once they reach the council. The only drawback of this
proposal is that it would likely result in a large turnover
in council seats at one time, thus denying the council
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possession of a sufficient number of experienced members nec-
essary for an independent and informed legislative function-
ing.
Making the councilman's job a full-time one with a
full-time salary will also increase his amenability to
mayoral influence. Though part-time aldermen are more likely
than full-time aldermen to be dependent on the mayor's super-
ior information, the former are not as dependent on the mayor
for their pecuniary self-interest. The major source of income
for part-timers lies outside their council position; to a
great extent the time and effort they put in their official
capacities is not nearly adequately compensated by the meager
salary which they are given.
Denial of their public position consequently does not
threaten the part-timer as much as it does the full-timer.
The full-timer has to take more seriously a mayor who can pos-
sibly deny him re-election and the financial rewards his posi-
tion brings. The part-timer, not financially dependent on his
council position unless it serves as a conduit of mayoral or
party patronage, can afford much more the luxury of being a
maverick.
5. Increase the Mayor's Term to Four Years. In many
cities mayors, like Congressmen, serve two year terms. Conse-
quently, they are always running for re-election and their
full energy cannot be devoted to the governing of the city.
But even more important is the fact that most mayors do
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not serve enough time in office to get anything accomplished.
This is just the point that Wolfinger makes when he cites the
advantages that Richard Lee had over most mayors. Lee served
a very long time--sixteen years--in office. Most mayors do
not serve nearly as long due to the incommeasurability of
the responsibilities and the power of the office and the
salience of their positions.
If the mayor is to get things done, he must have time.
If mayors indeed face something on the order of a two-term
crisis--after two terms the public becomes so bored with the
mayor's performance that they will not re-elect him--then
the mayor who serves two-year terms likely has only four years
to put his imprint on city affairs; the mayor who serves four-
year terms, though, has eight years to accomplish what he
wants.
Only one of the three mayors in this study, Paul Soglin,
was able to win a third term in office, and he even suffered
a second-place finish in that year's primary--surely an
indicator of some voter restiveness, Otto Festge and William
Dyke could not win a third term. Festge, faced with the
foregone conclusion decided not to run; Dyke was beat by a
mellowed student radical. To the extent that elections help
to focus public dissatisfaction on the mayor and thus con-
tribute to the public's growing tired of him, the two year
term is a definite handicap to a mayor's ability to deliver
major programs requiring a number of years to enact and
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implement.
THE CHOICE
The proposals listed above suggest a radical restruc-
turing of many of our urban governments away from the institu-
tions dictated by the ideology of the reform movement. But
nothing less will do. Mayors vary in their effectiveness
according to the leadership styles they adopt. But no matter
what style a mayor employs, his impact on city affairs will be
less than what it could potentially be if the city charter
denies him certain opportunities for influence.
Raymond Wolfinger has identified an alternative model
of urban leadership as embodied by the city manager and
professional bureaucrat. Wolfinger observes what the impact
of these officials will likely be:
The trend toward greater influence by cosmopolitan
professionals is not a "solution to the urban crisis,"
but rather a contribution to the development of dis-
crete programs for particular needs. It will be felt
in limited but consequential ways, in programs for job
training or neighborhood parks, for example, rather
than in sweeping root-and-branch attacks on urban
decline. This is not to deny that experts are influ-
ential in the grander forms of policy, a la Lee, but
only that these forms require such unusual accumula-
tions of political power and talent that--impressive
as they may be--they are not a model with very much
direct and total applicability.56
Yet, "the development of discrete programs" by professional
bureaucrats is often as much part of the problem as the cure.
Power in the city is already too decentralized in the hands
of the bureaucracy; no inter-agency coordinative authority
exists. The strengthening of agency professionals will only
reinforce the power of each bureaucratic fiefdom. Only the
mayor has both the power potential and generalist view to
counteract the effects of exaggerated bureaucratic parochi-
alism in policy-making.
In the final analysis, the choice between managerial and
mayoral leadership comes down to a matter of political
philosophy.57 Proponents of an elitist theory of democracy
distrust the popular will and put their faith instead in
the wisdom of trained unelected officials.
Advocates of populist democracy, in contrast, doubt that
any such neutral interest is observable and prefer instead
that policy-makers be as directly responsible to the electo-
rate as possible. Only by such means can the people be pro-
teoted against arbitrary or tyrannical government. As Gerald
Pomper observes, such concerns for responsible government
dominates over any concerns for technically perfect policy:
Elections are highly evaluated because they are effec-
tive means of providing protection for society and
control over government. Decisions might be better or
worse in content, but this consideration is not central.58
The advantages of elections have been seen in their
indirect effects, particularly the protection of the
voters, not in the wisdom of their decisions.5 9
Urban governance by unelected officials, then, risks the
grave danger of irresponsible government. The career bureau-
crat, protected by civil service, municipal unionism and even
his sense of professional obligation, is very much removed
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from popular control.60 Even the city manager is one-step
removed from the people; voters do not exert direct control
over his fate. The manager is even protected further as the
city council may be hesitant to remove a manager from the fear
of being unable to attract a good replacement to a city that
offers little in terms of job security.61
Democratic theory provides that conflicts of values be
resolved by the political system. Managerial government goes
a long way to insulate the decision-making process from
effective citizen input. Managerial government sees such
input as "private-regarding" and denies its legitimacy. Yet,
for all the rhetoric, the biases of the "professional" remain.
According to populist democratic theory, the choice between
managerial and mayoral government is clear; it is the choice
between government by unelected officials who tend to be
responsive to their own self-defined values or government by
elected officials more responsible to the people.
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p. 516, reports that of the 93 cities reporting in
this population range, 33 had the mayor-council,
50 had the council-manager, and 10 had the commission
form of government in 1968.
86. Woflinger, The Politics of Progress, p. 29.
448
CHAPTER TWO:
1. Two quick reviews of the pre-1965 history of the
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18. The Capital Times, May 1, 1966.
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estimate of a $1.5 million difference was also given
by the Wisconsin State Journal, April 5 and 11, 1969,
and by Festge himself, as reported by the Times,
April 11, 1969.
40. The Capital Times, April 4, 1969.
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43. Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale,
1961), p. 204.
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President's power; see Neustadt, Presidential Power
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civil service protected bureaucrats is detailed by
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by Wolfinger, The Politics of Progress, pp. 173-81.
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74. Charles H. Levine and Clifford Kaufman, "Urban Conflict
as a Constraint on Mayoral Leadership: Lessons from
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3. Jeffrey L. Pressman, "Preconditions of Mayoral Leader-
ship," American Political Science Review 66 (June
1972): 521.
4. Interview with conservative alderman, June 11, 1975.
5. The Capital Times (Madison, Wisconsin),
November 25, 1965.
6. Interview with member of Festge's office, June 16, 1975.
7. Mayor Festge, as reported by The Capital Times,
November 25, 1965.
8. The Capital Times, June 1, 1965.
9. Ibid., June 27, 1965.
10. Interview with member of Festge's office, June 3, 1975.
11. Interview with conservative alderman, June 11, 1975.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
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20. Interview with mayoral assistant Peter Dohr.
21. The Capital Times, April 15, 1970.
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28. Wisconsin State Journal, January 6, 1971.
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State Journal, April 4, 1971.
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to have only limited applicability in the public
sector. Furthermore, objectives for such departments
as the City Attorney's Office could only be stated in
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guidelines for action.
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49. Ibid.
50. Interview with mayoral assistant Peter Dohr.
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62. Interview with William Dyke, July 5, 1975.
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Peterson and J. David Greenstone, "The Community
Action Controversy as an Empirical Test of Two
Competing Models of the Policy-Making Process," in
Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Politics, eds.
Willis Hawley and Michael Lipsky (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1976). According to
Peterson and Greenstone, by refusing to confer even the
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Richard Daley and Robert Wagner had acted from an
ideological defense of machine-style pluralist bargain-
ing. I am indebted to these authors for their courtesy
in having extended me a draft copy of their manuscript.
64. Polsby and Wildavsky, Presidential Plections, p. 180.
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66. Interview with William Dyke, July 4, 1975.
67. Ibid.
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September 11 and October 16, 1970.
69. See the Wisconsin State Journal, October15, 1971, and
The Capital Times, October 16, 1971.
70. Alderman Leo Cooper, reported by The Capital Times,
September 11, 1970.
71. Interview with William Dyke, July 5, 1975.
72. The Capital Times, February 21, 1973.
73. Interview with William Dyke, July 5, 1975.
74. Wisconsin State Journal, March 22, 1973.
75. For a discussion of the electoral vulnerability of
mayors--in particular, the lack of prospects for
higher elected office--see Marilyn Gittell, "Metro-
politan Mayor: Dead End," Public Administration
Review 23 (March 1963).
76. Dyke's headquarters speech to his campaign supporters
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is reported by The Capital Times, April 4, 1973.
77. Jeffrey L. Pressman, "Preconditions of Mayoral Lead-
ership," American Political Science Review 66
(June 1972): 517-22.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., p. 518, claims that Reading was a "private man
in public office." The phrase used in this thesis is
a paraphrase of Pressman's.
80. Ibid., p. 518.
81. Ibid., pp. 516-17.
82. See Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George,
Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House (New York: Dover,
1964), for a particularly compelling argument that
Wilson's actions as President were to a great extent
determined by personality factors shaped as far back
as his early youth.
83. Peterson and Greenstone, "The Community Action
Controversy as an Empirical Test of Two Competing
Models of the Policy-Making Process," identify the
"electoral/organizational interest model" and the
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in Chapter Ten of this thesis.
84. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy
(New York: Harper and Row, 1957), for an example
of the application of rational choice theory to the
study of both voting behavior and the issue space
location of political parties.
85. J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, Race and
Authority in Urban Politics (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1973), pp. 128-30, warns of the danger of
tautologically defining an ideology in terms of an
individual's current attitudes. This book is the
larger version of the Peterson and Greenstone
article previously cited.
CHAPTER FIVE:
1. Interview with member of the Board of Education,
June 11, 1975.
2. According to one top city executive, interviewed
July 2, 1975:
He (Festge) inherited a deficit situation--deficit
from anything from the condition of the trucks in
the Parks Department and Streets Department on
through. There had been so much tight-fistedness
with the city budget over several years, he
inherited a situation where things were in a bad
state of repair, operation, maintenance, or what-
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ever. And so, I think, he had to spend more
money to get hings back running smoothely.
One person interviewed, a liberal, even reported
that city trucks during Henry Reynolds' administra-
tion were in such a state of disrepair that drivers
organized a betting pool to see who would break
down first. No effort was made in the interviews to
confirm or disconfirm this story.
3. Interview with William Dyke, July 5, 1975.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Wisconsin State Journal (Madison, Wisconsin),
December 10, 1969.
7. The Capital Times (Madison, Wisconsin), July 23 and
24, 1970. The state attorney general eventually
ruled that city supplemental aid was to be counted as
income for AFDC recipients. State grants were thus
reduced by an amount equivalent to the supplemental
grants. City supplementation thus proved to be of no
advantage and was temporarily suspended in April of
1971. See the 1971 "Report of the Welfare Department"
and the welfare section of the 1971 and 1972 Madison
City Budgets for further details.
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Budgets and the 1969 and 1973 City Fiscal Reports
for Madison.
9. Details of Dyke's views concerning data processing
were taken from the July 5, 1975, interview with Dyke.
10. Interview with William Dyke, July 5, 1975.
11. A tax/election cycle was not evident during Otto
Festge's second term as mayor. Madison cut local
taxes 11 per cent (in terms of full value rates) for
the 1968 budget. Such austerity, though, mandated a
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the next year's budget--a factor which contributed a
few months later to Festge's decision not to seek a
third term in office.
12. Interview with William Dyke, July 5, 1975.
13. Details regarding the likely impending tax rise
are taken from The Capital Times, October 7 and 16,
1969, and the Wisconsin State Journal, October 1, 1969.
14. A detailed account of Dyke's proposed cuts can be
found in The Capital Times, October 21, 27, 29 and
November 5, 1969.
15. Unnamed school board member and board member Robert
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November 22, 1969.
16. The Capital Times, December 16, 1969. The closing of
the two schools was again announced in the April of
the next year; see the Times, April 21, 1970.
17. School board member Robert DeZonia, quoted by The
Capital Times, December 16, 1969.
18. For details of the Council budget restorations, see
The Capital Times, November 12 and 29, 1969.
19. See The Capital Times, May 18, 1970, and the Wisconsin
State Journal, June 10, 1970, for accounts of Dyke's
motives in labeling the budget preparation process
"secret." According to the mayor, these requests
constituted only preliminary "working papers" and
were not formal budgets, and as such were not approp-
riate for Council or press review.
20. Wisconsin State Journal, September 30, 1970.
21. Dyke's budget proposal is summarized by both the
Wisconsin State Journal and The Capital Times,
September 30, 1970.
22. The Capital Times, October 13, 1970.
23. Ibid., November 25, 1970.
24. Interview with Board of Education member, June 11,
1975.
25. The Capital Times, November 27, 1970.
26. Ibid.
27. Dyke's successfuly exhortation to the county to hold
the line on the 1971 budget was noted a year later by
The Capital Times, October 2, 1971. The county mill
rate was 7.54 for the 1971 budget year as contrasted
with 8.83 for the preceding budget year.
28. The Capital Times, December 10, 1970.
29. Wisconsin State Journal, October 29, 1971.
30. See the Wisconsin State Journal, October 24 and 29,
1971; and The Capital Times, October 27, 1971.
31. Wisconsin State Journal, November 19, 1971.
32. This list of likely education service cuts appeared
in The Capital Times, editorial, November 22, 1971.
33. Interview with Board of Education member, June 11, 1975.
34. Ibid.
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35. Interview with Madison school official, July 2, 1975.
36. Ibid.
37. The ital Times, December 3, 1971.
38. Wisconsin State Journal, November 4, 1972.
39. See Chapter Three of this dissertation for further
details concerning Festge's lack of command in these
areas.
40. Interview with Board of Education member, June 24, 1975.
41. Interview with William Dyke, July 4, 1975.
42. Interview with city hall reporter, July 2, 1975.
CHAPTER SIX:
1. See The Capital Times (Madison, Wisconsin) and the
Wisconsin State Journal (Madison, Wisconsin),
May 18-21, 1967, for coverage of the bus-lane disturb-
ances.
2. Ibid., October 18-20, 1967, for coverage of this
emotional confrontation.
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